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ABSTRACT
The research reported in the present thesis constitutes
an attempt to examine empirically the semantic and social-
pragmatic aspects of the meanings of natural language
expressions generated by subjects whilst participating in
spontaneous task-oriented dialogues. Pairs of subjects
were asked to solve a computer game task which involved
them in moving their respective position markers through
a m~. The successful solution of the task required the
subjects to cooperate verbally, and the present research
focusses on the meanings of subjects' descriptions of
locations within the spatial networks of the various
mazes.
The semantic analysis undertaken in the present work
took the form of a classification study, using
hierarchical cluster analysis, of the lexical items
observed in the subjects' location descriptions. This
analysis indicated that there are (at least) four basic
ways of identifying locations within such a spatial
network; it is argued that these four ways of describing
locations could reflect four different underlying types of
mental model of the maze shape.
It was also argued that there is an important social-
pragmatic component in the meanings of such spontaneous
descriptions. Data were discussed which lend support to
the view that (a) each pair of interlocutors constrain one
another's choice of referring expression such that both
xv
use similar types of referring expression, and (b) the
interlocutors tacitly negotiate the meanings of the
descriptions they generate. The final theoretical
analysis of the data, therefore, was in terms of
negotiated mental models of the maze.
xvi
Introductory Overview
The work reported in the present thesis constitutes
an attempt to examine empirically certain aspects of the
meanings of natural language expressions. The problem of
meaning has proven to be a complex and exceedingly
difficult one and is currently being tackled by theorists
in a variety of disciplines, including linguistics,
philosophy, psychology and artificial intelligence.
Like many empirical studies of meaning, the present
research focusses upon one limited subproblem within the
larger domain of enquiry, namely, the meanings of
descriptions of locations within a spatial network
generated by subjects during the course of an ongoing
task-oriented dialogue. In particular, the present set
of studies involved an investigation of the semantic
aspects of such location descriptions (that is, the
relationship between the location descriptions themselves
and the stimuli being described) and their pragmatic
aspects (that is, the relationship between the speakers and
the types of description that they generate).
The advantages of studying such a narrowly-
constrained domain as subjects' descriptions of locations
within spatial networks come from the tight empirical
control which can be exercised over the characteristics of
the referent, and the empirical assessment of critical
contextual variables. This high degree of control over
relevant extralinguistic variables allows a more detailed
xvii
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analysis of the linguistic data than would otherwise be
possible.
The advantage of studying task-oriented dialogues
comes from the fact that subjects participating in such
studies tend to become quite task-involved and
consequently do not reflect upon the language that they
produce, devoting their attention instead to the
experimental task. The result of this is linguistic
data of a truly natural and spontaneously-generated kind.
The experimental task used in the present set of studies
takes the form of a computer-controlled maze game, in
which two subjects, who are located in separate
soundproofed rooms, have to cooperate verbally (via a
headset and microphone link) to assist one another to
move their respective position markers through a maze
(visible to each player on a computer terminal screen)
from starting positions to goal positions. The verbal
cooperation is required because various blockages exist
within each player's maze which impede his progress towards
his goal, and the mechanism by means of which these
blockages are removed involves a given player's (e.g.
player A) partner (player B) reporting his position
within the maze and subsequently moving into one of player
A's ~Hitch nodes visible to player A on his screen. This
mechanism is discussed more fully in chapter 4; suffice
it to say that a given player requires his £artner to
clear blocked pathways for him, and this partly involves
~viii
his partner in describing his location within the maze.
As a result, the rules of the game require that each
player periodically reports his location to his partner,
and these spontaneously-generated descriptions of maze
location constitute the data base for the present set of
studies.
The present thesis consists of two parts. Part I,
comprising chapters 1 to 4, is a review of some of the
extensive literature on the topic of meaning, and Part II,
comprising chapters 5-11, is a report of the empirical
work carried out using the game task described briefly
above.
Morris's (1938) division of semiotics (i.e. the study
of sign systems, of which natural language is an example)
into syntactic, semantic and pragmatic aspects is used as
a suitable structuring with respect to which the variety
of theories and empirical studies of meaning can be
discussed in Part I of this thesis. Thus, chapter 1 is a
review of what could be described as 'syntactic' theories
of meaning (that is, those theories which deal primarily
with meaning relations b~tween different signs in the
language); chapter 2 is a review of those theories of
meaning which could be described as 'semantic' theories of
meaning (that is, those theories which focus upon the
relation between linguistic signs and their referents);
and chapter 3 is a review of theories of meaning which
could be described as 'pragmatic' theories of meaning
~xlx
(that is, those theories which focus primarily upon the
relations betwee~ the particular interlocutors involved and
what is understood by what they say).
Morris's distinction thus provides a tripartite
division with respect to which a variety of genuinely
different approaches to meaning can be classified
(although it is rare that a given theory is related
exclusively to one of these categories).
This (by no means exhaustive) review of previous
theoretical and empirical work on this problem will
underline both the complexity of the issues involved and
the variety of theoretical approaches which have been
adopted.
The final chapter of part I of the present thesis is
a detailed exposition of the experimental maze game task
employed in the present work to elicit spontaneous dialogue.
The maze game task is discussed in the context of previous
experimental studies which also used the methodology of
seeking to constrain the topic of discourse and eliciting
spontaneous dialogue on that topic.
Part II contains details of the various experimental
studies conducted and reports the results obtained.
Chapters 5-10 present descriptions of the data
obtained using the task and the statistical analysis of.
these data.
Whilst the present work constitutes an attempt to deal
with both the semantic and the pragmatic aspects of the
xx
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meanings of the subjects' descriptions of locations within
the mazes, the particular theoretical standpoint from
which the data are interpreted is a social-pragmatic one.
Thus, whilst four basic ways of describing locations
within a maze are described in chapters 6 and 7, further
complexities of a purely pragmatic nature arise:
different dyads of subjects would appear to place very
different interpretations on the ~mg description. Thus,
the importance of what individual pairs of subjects
understand by a particular expression, and how each dyad
selects one sort of interpretation of the expressions they
use rather than another, will be emphasized.
In chapter 9, an experiment is described in which
subjects were set the task of describing locations within
mazes but doing §Q out~ith the context of playing the m~
~m~ In this experiment, a rather different
distribution of the four basic ways of describing
locations within mazes observed in the computer game
studies was obtained, with one of the types of
description observed in the computer game studie~ data
being entirely absent in the 'game-independent' location
description task. The discussion in chapter 9 of the
possible reasons for this difference in the distributions
of the different types of location description in the two
tasks highlights some of the subtle and complex problems
of studying dialogue.
The thesis concludes, in chapter 11, with a
.:xxi
discussion of the experimental results in relation to some
of the theories of meaning which were discussed in part I.
In chapter 11, both the potential wider significance of the
present set of results, and the further issues raised by the
results of the studies reported in this thesis, are
considered.
xxiL
Theoretical Approaches to the Problem of Meaning
,
CHAPTER 1
'SYNTACTIC' APPROACHES TO MEANING
a) Introduction
The study of the broad field of sign systems
(including natural language, letters and numerals,
diagrams, pictures, sketches, gestures and facial
expressions, and tokens) is called semiotic. Morris
(1938), following the philosophy of Charles Pierce,
distinguished between three different levels of semiotic,
representing different degrees of abstraction, as follows:
i) SYNTACTICS constitutes the study of signs and
the relations between signs;
ii) SEMANTICS is the study of the relation between
signs and what they designate (i.e. the
designata); and
iii) PRAGMATICS, which is the study of the signs in
relation to the users of those signs.
This distinction between three sub-areas of study of
the sign systems in language has been used down to the
present day - see, for instance Cherry (1957), and Lyons
(1977). According to Morris, these three levels are not
separate from one another, but are inclusive: they
overlap one another such that the study of syntactic
relations between signs is the highest level of
abstraction from actual usage and is directed to the signs
2
themselves and their orderings, studying purely formal
aspects, and is wholly subsumed within the area of
semantics.
Correspondingly, both syntax and semantics are
necessary parts of the study of pragmatics (see diagram
below).
Pragmatics
Figure ~ The three levels of semiotic (shown
schematically as successive abstractions) (From
Cherry, 1957, p. 222).
The 'rules' studied at the three levels are inherent
in the analysis of language rather than being inherent in
the language itself (Cherry, 1957) and are expressed in
meta-language (the distinction between object language and
meta-language corresponds to the distinction between what
is described - the object language - and the meta-language
in which the description is couched: see chapter 2).
Pragmatics, notes Cherry (1957) is the "real-life" level.
Semantics abstracts from all specific communication events
3
and concerns only signs and their designata (qualities,
objects, actions etc.). Syntactics abstracts still
further and concerns signs only: it treats language as a
calculus.
The term 'semantics' has since become used to refer
to theories of meaning, an area of great interest to
philosophers~ _psychologists and linguists and an area of
central concern to this thesis. Not all theories of
semantics are 'semantic' according to the above definition;
there have been theories of meaning which have considered
'semantic' phenomena in terms of relations between the
signs (or rather, between the hypothesized mental
representations of the signs). Such theories are,
therefore, more properly termed 'syntactic' theories of
meaning. There have, likewise, been 'semantic' theories
of meaning which attempt to relate the signs to their
designata or mental models of their designata. In recent
years, pragmatic approaches to the study of meaning have
also been mooted (see, for example, Rommetveit, 1974).
These three levels of tackling the problem of meaning will
be considered in turn. In chapter 1, theories of an
essentially 'syntactic' nature will be considered: in
chapter 2, theories of a 'semantic' nature will be
considered. Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) contrast the
two positions of 'intensional ism' (which considers the
relation between signs) and 'extensional ism' (which
conside~ relations between the signs and their designata)
4
and contend that both approaches pursued independently
must fail, and that the failures are related since each
approach contains too much of what the other lacks. They
advocate an integration of the two approaches, and an
exposition of their theoretical framework will be given in
chapter 2. In chapter 3, theoretical approaches which
explicitly challenge traditional linguistics-based
approaches to communication will be considered. These
theories emphasize the importance of pragmatic factors in
the understanding of language, and contend that an
emphasis on linguistic-type analyses effectively ignore
phenomena of central importance.
b) Historical Introduction
The meaning of words and larger expressions has
fascinated inquirers for many hundreds of years, from the
time of the ancient Greeks until the present day, and has
been the source of many theoretical disputes. The
fundamental question of·nwhat is meaning?" has engendered a
great deal of speculation. As Katz (1973) puts it,
"We find, historically, a variety of direct
answers, including Plato's answer that
meanings are eternal archetypes, John Locke's
answer that meanings are the mental ideas for
which words stand as external signs, the
answer that meanings are the things in the
5
world to which the words refer, Wittgenstein's
answer that meaning is use, the behaviourist's
answer that meanings are mental images
associated with verbal behaviour, and so on.
But every attempt to give a direct answer has
failed. Some, such as the Platonic answer
proved too vague and speculative. Others gave
the wrong answer".
(Katz, 1973, pp 36-37)
That such a variety of answers has been given to the
fundamental question serves to underline the fact that it
is a question of interest not only to linguists, but also
to philosophers and psychologists. Philosophers, in
particular, have always been interested in meaning,
since it is necessarily involved in vital and notoriously
controversial philosophical issues, including the nature
of truth (Lyons, 1968).
When considering what the meaning of a word might be,
we soon end up embroiled in philosophical controversy.
Lyons (1968) gives the example of the word £QH. What is
the meaning of the word cow? It cannot be a particular
individual animal. Is there a set of properties which
distinguishes cows from other objects (for which we have
different words)? Immediately we are caught up in the
philosophical controversy between nQminalism and realism.
Nominalism is the position that the set of referents to
which we apply the same name have nothing in common other
6
than the name which we have learned to apply to them. In
contrast, realism is the position that the things to which
we apply the same name have some common 'essential'
properties by which we identify them. Thus, as soon as
we begin to consider meaning, we become involved with
philosophical issues.
The term 'meaning' has itself a number of
distinguishable meanings. Lyons (1977) gives some
examples: some of the senses of 'mean' can be enumerated
as follows:
i) as synonymous with 'intend' (as in 'I did
not mean to hurt you').
ii) as equivalent to 'significance' or 'value'
(as in 'Life without Faith has no
meaning').
iii) a relation of reference (as in 'It was John
I meant, not Harry').
Lyons concentrates upon the sense as exemplified by iii)
above.
Katz (1972) considers the question "What is meaning?"
to be at the same level as the question "What is matter?"
and accordingly advocates the theoretical tackling of more
manageable subproblems which themselves are related to
the larger problem. The breakdown of the general
question into more specific questions which he lists
results in a listing of phenomena which a theory of
7
meaning would have to be able to explain, namely:
1) What is synonymy (sameness of meaning) and paraphrase?
2) What is semantic similarity (e.g. "aunt", "nun", "cow",
"filly" and "actress" all share a common component) and
semantic difference?
3) What is antonymy? (i.e. incompatibility of meaning -
for example, "whisper" and "shout" are incompatible in
meaning).
4) What is superordination? (For example, "human" and
"boy").
5) What are meaningfulness and semantic anomaly? (For
example, compare "a smelly soap" and "a smelly itch").
6) What is semantic ambiguity? (That is, multiplicity of
sense - e.g. "button", "foot.).
1) What is semantic redundancy? (An example of this would
be where a phrase contained superfluous semantic
information, such as the phrase "naked nude").
8) What is semantic truth? (That is, truth by virtue of
meaning, or analyticity - such as "Uncles are males").
9) What is semantic falsehood? (That is, contradiction,
as in "Kings are females").
10) What is semantically undetermined truth or falsehood?
(For example, syntheticity - that is, where the truth
or falsity of a sentence is not settled on the basis of
its meaning alone but depends upon what is the case in
actuality).
8
11) What is inconsistency? (For example, where "John is
alive" and "John is dead" refer to the same individual,
one sentence is necessarily true and one is necessarily
false; they cannot both be true nor both be false).
12) What is entailment? ('Entailment· is where two
sentences are related by virtue of their meaning such
that one follows necessarily from the other - for
example, "The car is red" entails "The car is
coloured").
13) What is presupposition? ('Presupposition' is where
one sentence presupposes the truth of another - for
example, the sentence "When did you stop beating your
wife?" presupposes the truth of a declarative to the
effect that the listener had previously indulged in
wife-beating) •
14) What is a possible answer to a question? (For
example, given a question like "When did John arrive?",
possible answers include "John arrived at noon" and
"John arrived a minute ago" but not "John loves to eat
fruit") •
.~
15) What is a self-answered question? (For example "What
colour is my red wagon?" expresses a question that is
answered in the asking).
The above phenomena are all due to the meaning of the
expressions in the examples. A semantic theory, Katz
argues, must explain why the meaning of a linguistic
construction makes it a case of a certain property or
9
relation, or makes it exhibit the phenomena of synonymy or
ambiguity, etc.
Katz (1912, P. 10) concludes from the foregoing that
" ••• once we construct a theory that can successfully
explain a reasonably large portion of • ,~ semantic
phenomena, we can base our answer to "what is meaning?" on
what the theory had to assume meaning was in order to
provide its explanations".
Clearly, the question of what meaning is requires a
,comp Licat.ed answer and a variety of phenomena and meaning
relations require to be explained. As noted above, many
issues and distinctions are raised by a consideration of
meaning. One such distinction is that between the
intension of a word or phrase, and its extension
(sometimes expressed as a distinction betwen sense and
reference). The intension or sense of, for example, a
word, is the set of properties which determine the
applicability of the word: the extension or reference of
the word is the class of things to which the word may be
applied. Thus, the intension is the 'intrinsic' meaning
of a word and its relation to other words - for example,
the word 'chair' has a meaning which is related in some
ways to other words like 'table', 'bench', 'wardrobe' etc,
The extension of the word is t.be entire class of entities to
which it can refer, in any real or imagined world. So,
in the above example, the extension of 'chair' is any real
or imaginary chair.
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Many theories of meaning (especially those based on
linguistic considerations and which will be described in
this chapter) have concerned themselves exclusively with
the intensional aspect of meaning. Extensional
considerations, however, become important when words are
considered in ~ because then the relation of language to
the world becomes important. Extensional theories of
meaning have been formulated particularly in recent years
with the advent of procedural semantics and the postulation
of theories of comprehension in terms of mental models of
the reference situation (see chapter 2).
An early psychological theory of meaning which retains
theoretical appeal today was that advanced by C. K. Ogden
and I. A. Richards (1972, originally published 1923).
Their fundamental argument was that the relation between
w 0 rdsan d ref ere ntsis .!n!!.!!.~£..t.:· ". • • wen eed a the 0 ry
which connects words with things through the ideas, if any,
which they symbolize. We require, that is to say, separate
analyses of the relations of words to ideas and of ideas
to things ••• " (Ogden and Richards, 1972, P. 7).
They attribute a great deal of the confusions and
arguments among theorists to their overlooking the
indirectness of this relationship. This point is
summarized in a diagram taking the form of a triangle,
which has become known as the "semiotic triangle" (Lyons,
1968, P. 404).
11
thought
Symbol Referent
Figure ~ The 'semiotic triangle'
(Adapted from Ogden and Richards, 1972, P. 11.
Key: direct links - - - - - indirect link)
I
Ogden and Richards argue that words mean nothing by
themselves: it is only when a thinker makes use of them
that they stand for anything or have 'meaning'. Words are
instruments. The indirect relation between the word (or
symbol, to use the more general term) is illustrated by
the above triangular diagram. Between the thought and
the symbol is the 'symbolizes' relationship, a causal
relationship; between the thought and the referent there
is also a direct relation. Between the symbol and the
referent, however, there is only an indirect relation
which consists in the symbol being used by someone to
stand for the referent. The base of the triangle (shown
dotted in the above diagram) is an inferred relationship.
The symbol and the referent are not connected directly
but instead are connected via the other two sides of the
triangle. The direct connection represented by the
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·'dotted line is an inferred relation, and to treat this
inferred relation as being of the same nature as the other
two direct relations is the " ••• fundamental and most
prolific fallacy • • ." (Ogden and Richards, 1972, P. 15).
They pOint out in a footnote that philosophers,
psychologists and logicians are wont to confuse the
imputed relation between a sign and that to which it
refers either with the referent or with the processes in
the mind of the interpreter, when speaking of the meaning
of a sign. They comment that it is this sort of confusion
which had made so much previous work on the subject of
signs and their meanings unfruitful.
Ogden and Richards' characterization of the word-
referent relation as an indirect relation via the thoughts
of the understander has its modern counterpart in current
psychological approaches to meaning; Sanford and Garrod
(1981) in their preface to a book on understanding written
language, for example, comment that" ••• the squiggles
on the page can live only through the agency of the minds
of readers" (p. xiv). Likewise, if for "thought" or
"reference" at the apex of Ogden and Richards' triangle we
substitute instead "conceptual system" or "mental models"
we have the basis of many current approaches to meaning.
That a characterization of the operations of the mind
of a reader/listener would be fundamental to a plausible
theory of meaning may today seem uncontroversial;. it was,
however, challenged by theorists in the past. In
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particular, the doctrine of Behaviourism in psychology
attempted to rid psychology of such unobservable entities
as 'mind'; the Behaviourists, led most notably by B. F.
Skinner, argued against the reification of meaning in
the mind of the language user and contended intead that
words were mere verbal responses which were under the
stimulus control of the environment of the speaker. This
antimentalistic outlook was shared by a school of
linguists led by Bloomfield. For the Bloomfieldian
linguists, the.meaning of a word was a full 'scientific'
description of its referent. Lyons (1968) points out
that this approach is more detrimental to progress in
semantics than the definition of meaning in terms of
'concepts' which it attempted to supplant, since the
Bloomfieldian approach gives preferential treatment to the
relatively small set of words which refer to 'things'
describable, in principle, by the physical sciences.
Furthermore, it rests upon two tacit and unjustified
assumptions, namely - (i) that a 'scientific' description
of the referents of these words is relevant to the way in
which the words are used by speakers on the language; and
(i1) that the meaning of all words is ultimately
describable in the same terms (Lyons, 1968, p. 408).
Skinner's extreme form of behaviourism was accompanied
by a less extreme manifestation of the same doctrine, in
the form of Osgood's (Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum, 1957)
mediation theory of meaning, which characterized meanings
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as symbolic mediation processes. These are unobservable
meaning responses to words. They represent only a part of
the overt response that would have been made to the word's
referent, and in turn stimulate appropriate responses to
the word. This type of learning theory approach was
popular as a psyc~~logical theory of meaning during the
1950's. Osgood et aI's approach to meaning also had an
impact on the development of social psychology through
Osgood and Tannenbaum's congruity theory. Congruity
theory linked the mediation theory of meaning, and in
particular the use of its associated measuring instrument,
the semantic differential, to the study of persuasive
communication and attitude change.
A revolution in thinking about language took place
following the publication of Chomsky's book 'Syntactic
structures' in 1951. In this book, Chomsky argued that
the best way of explaining a speaker/listener's ability to
understand language was in terms of a system of
internalized rules. Chomsky demonstrated mathe-
matically that for natural languages, the number of
permissible word strings (that is, grammatical sentences)
is inf1ni teo It therefore follows that a descriptive
grammar has to be pro1ective, that is, it must be couched
in terms of rules which will generate all of the infinite
number of grammatical sentences, and no non-sentences.
The notion of there being an unlimited number of
grammatical sentences undermined the behaviourists'
15
approach to language. As Greene (1972) puts it, "The
arguments used by Chomsky and his supporters were designed
to show, first, that learning theory is in principle
unable to account for the speaker's ability to use
language, and second, that in any case, acquisition of
stimulus-response probabilities would be a wildly.
. .
. "uneconomical explanation of language learning (Greene,
1972, p, 15). Chomsky's emphasis on the need to
characterize a speaker's ability to use language as a
system of internalized rules caused something of a
revolution in psychological theorizing: the notion that
cognitive functions could best be treated as centrally
planned, rule-governed mental operations swept away
behaviourist antimentalistic theorizing and brought mental
operations into the limelight once more.
Chomsky's two-tier theory for the description of
language, involving surface syntactic structures, deep
syntactic structures and transformational rules for
deriving these from one another, was taken up by some
psychologists as a possible psychological model of
language use. Thus, the psychological reality of
transformational grammar was tested, experiments being
conducted which attempted to ascertain whether
transformationally complex sentences were also
psychologically more complex and consequently required
more processing time, or occupied more space in memory,
etc. (For example, Savin and Perchonok, 1965: Miller and
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McKean, 1964). Chomsky also distinguished between
£Qmpetence (the abstract, underlying form of linguistic
knowledge possessed by a speaker) and perform~ (the
actual use of the language in concrete situations).
Performance reflects competence in only indirect ways:
memory span limitations, fatigue, distractability,
switching of attention etc. affect linguistic performance
in ways which deviate from a competence-based prediction.
Slobin (1911) identifies the task for the linguist as that
of characterizing competence. The psychologist, on the
other hand, has to cut through the maze of performance
factors in order to convince himself that competence has
"psychological reality", and also examine the
psychological factors which cause performance to deviate
from competence. Kintsch (1914) rejects this neat
division of labour, maintaining that as long as a
linguistic theory is strictly a competence theory it is of
no interest to the psychologist.
Chomsky's theory emphasized syntactics heavily. It
also heavily emphasized the study of isolated sentences in
vacuo. So, for example, a typical task set to a subject
would be to give an intuitive judgement as to the
grammaticality or otherwise of a set of word strings, one
string at a time. This emphasis on having subjects
judge the grammaticality of isolated sentences abstracted
from communication settings and having no significance for
the subject was subsequently attacked, particularly by
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Rommetve it (1974; see chapter 3).
Broadbent (1973) also attacked Chomsky's theory from
the standpoint of empiricism (learning theory) and
simultaneously defended learning theory accounts of
language acquisition. Specifically, Broadbent denied the
belief that Chomsky's description of language has any
psychological reality, and he also denied the
transformationalists' claim that language is innate. He
stated his admiration for the elegance of Chomsky's
mathematical description of language but, as he put it (p.
193), "Elegance of mathematical description of the effect
of an operation does not bear any necessary relation to
the empirical facts about the operation itself". Thus,
his argument against Chomsky's theory is that, while it
describes language by being able to generate all of the
grammatical sentences in the language, it is quite
possible that the actual mechanism with which people
produce language could be very different.
He also attacked the transformationalists' claim
that, because of the potentially infinite number of
grammatical sentences in a natural language, it could not
be acquired using the mechanism of learning but instead
had to be considered as an innate capacity. Broadbent
countered this claim by pointing out that most learning
theorists, including those interested in animal learning,
believe that what is learned is not an association between
particular concrete events but instead an association
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between conceptual classes, each of which may have many
members. A word or a short sequence of words is treated
as a member of a class, and sequences of classes would
also be learned. Broadbent's emphasis on language
expressions being learned as conceptual classes rather
than as concrete entities undermines Chomsky's criticism
of learning theories being unable to account for language
acquisition.
Chomsky's theory did constitute a revolution at the
time it was advanced and the 'psycholinguistic' approach
which attempted to test the psychological reality of the
theory constituted a "far cry from (the) simp11ste pre-
Chomskyan attempts to look at verbal associations and so
on" (Greene, 1912, p, 196). That the search for an exact
one-to-one relationship between grammatical rules and
subjects' performance failed does not diminish the
revolutionary impact of the theory: it directed to the
attention of psychologists the influence of many
unexpected factors, and underlined the complexity of
language.
-.. c; co,
At least one influential theory of meaning, that of
Katz and Fodor (1963), was developed specifically to
dovetail into the transformational grammar framework as
the 'semantic component' required by, but not specified
in, the theory. Katz and Fodor's approach focussed upon
intensional relations between lexical items and so could
fairly be described as a 'syntactic' theory of meaning.
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Katz and Fodor's theory was in fact subsequently accepted
by Chomsky as a suitable theory of the semantic component
for incorporation within his general theory. Another two
'intensional' approaches to meaning were also formulated
during the 1960's/early 1970's. One approach, based on
'meaning postulates' has its origin in extensional
theories of meaning of a type known as model-theoretic
semantics (which will be described in detail in chapter
2). The third 'syntactic' approach to meaning to be
considered in this chapter is Collins and Quillian's
semantic network theory, which owes its origins to
attempts at computer modelling of semantic memory
(Quillian, 1968; Collins and Quillian, 1972). These
three theories will each be reviewed in turn.
c) Ihree 'intensional' theories of meaning
11 Katz and Fodor's (1963) theory of meaning
The approach outlined by Katz and Fodor has as its
origins the componential analyses which were first evolved
in anthropological linguistics as a means of studying
relations between words within a semantic field (i.e. a
collection of semantically related lexical items such as
kinship terms). The aim in componential analysis is the
reduction of a word's meaning to its ultimate contrastive
elements; for example, 'Man' has as its definition the
collection of semantic elements + MALE, + ADULT, + HUMAN,
whilst 'woman' has as its definitiom the set of semantic
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elements - MALE, + ADULT, + HUMAN, and so on, each word in
the semantic field having a definition chracterized in
terms of these elements.
Thus, the central tenet of decompositional theories
of meaning is simply that the meaning of an individual
word is a composite of 'atoms' of meaning in the form of
semantic markers or semantic primitives. The semantic
interpretation of a sentence can be obtained by replacing
its words with their dictionary definitions and combining
them according to the syntactic relations'of the sentence.
The process of combining word meanings is sensitive to the
constraints, or selection restrictions, that a word may
place upon the meaning of the other words with which it
can be combined. The theory thus attempts to account
both for the meanings of words and the meanings of larger
linguistic structures.
This basic notion that in the course of
understanding, we decompose the linguistic input into the
appropriate set of semantic elements or markers has been
used in several theories. One of the most famous
explications of the idea was that of Katz and Fodor
(1963). In their article. "The structure of a semantic
theory", they outlined the general characteristics of a
theory of meaning rather than advancing one specific
theory. Their approach was in terms of semantic markers,
and they indicated some of the phenomena which a semantic
theory would be required to explain, such as synonymy,
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synthetlcity, etc., outlined earlier.
Such relationships do require explanation by a theory
of meaning, and Katz and Fodor explain these relationships
by suggesting that, for example, synonymy can be explained
in terms of the relevant lexical items sharing one sense.
Accordingly, their outline of the form of a semantic
theory concentrates on explicating the notion of how a
sense could be represented theoretically and they explain
the various meaning relationships between words in terms
of sense relations of one kind or another.
As noted above, Katz and Fodor's theory is explicitly
designed to dovetail into the 'semantic component'
theoretical space left by Chomsky's syntactic analysis, or
as Katz and Fodor put it, "Synchronic linguistic,
description minus grammar equals semantics" (p. 172).
They take as their starting point the observation that
much of the understanding of sentences is left unexplained
by grammar, and this is where their theory of semantics
fits in. Some examples of ambiguity, such as "The bill
is large" cannot be characterized grammatically, but
instead are best characterized in terms of meaning. The
ambiguity in this sort of example takes the form of there
being two different senses (that is, two different
interpretations) of the word 'bill'; it can be taken to
mean either an invoice for money or as the beak of a bird.
Katz and Fodor give as an example the decomposition
of the word "bachelor" into its four senses (a man who has
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never married, a young knight serving under the standard
of another knight, a person possessing the first or lowest
academic degree, and a young male fur seal when without a
mate during the breeding time). They represent these
four senses in the form of a tree diagram. The first
entry for 'bachelor' is the syntactic marker 'noun', to
indicate that only those senses of a word classified as
nouns are being considered (this can be an important
distinction for many words, such as run, dog and chase,
which can either be nouns or verbs). Proceeding down the
tree, the next entries are the semantic markers which
represent the meaning of the word in terms which are used
to systematically define many words in the dictionary:
(human), (male), (animal), etc. Also in the dictionary
entry are semantic distinguishers, which distinguish only
between senses of the one word, in this case 'bachelor'.
These appear in square brackets at the lowest part of the
diagram:
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bachelor
noun
(hL~l)
..'>. ~(male) [who has the (male)
/ "'!~~~~or lowest. . ~miC degree][who has never [young knight serving
married] under the standard of
another knight].
[young fur seal
when without a
mate during the
breeding time]
figure 1:1 Katz and Fodor's tree diagram representing
the four senses of 'bachelor'.
(From Katz and Fodor, 1963, P. 186).
As Katz and Fodor (1963) P. 185-6) put it "The semantic
markers and distinguishers are the means by which we can
decompose the meaning of one sense of a lexical item into
its atomic concepts, and thus exhibit the semantic
structure in a dictionary entry and the semantic relations
betH~ dictionary entries. That is, the semantic
relations among the various senses of a lexical item and
among the various senses of different lexical items are
represented by formal relations between markers and
"distinguishers (emphasis in original).
Thus, the semantic markers are the atoms of meaning
. I"
with which to characterize sense relations between
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different lexical items, whilst the distinguishers serve
to relate the different senses of a single lexical item.
The semantic markers are the constructs which characterize
that part of the meaning of a lexical item which is
systematic for the language. The distinguishers, on the
other hand, deal wi th that part of the meaning of a
lexical item which do not enter into theoretical relations
within a semantic theory - that is, they characterize that
part of meaning of which a semantic theory offers no
general account.
Where meanings in the distinguishers make more general
distinctions than merely between alternative senses of one
word, Katz and Fodor suggest (p. 195-196) that the
distinguishers can be reanalyzed to yield semantic markers
- for example, 'young' could appear as a semantic marker
for the second and fourth sense of the word (see diagram,
above).
Dictionary entries also contain, in addition to
syntactic markers, semantic markers and semantic
d1st1nguishers,' selection restrictions which limit the
possible senses of the other words with which the given
lexical items can be combined. Thus, to borrow Katz'
(1973) example, a selection restriction would be
exemplified by the case where the noun which "waterproof"
modifies must contain the semantic marker (Physical
Object), otherwise semantic anomalies of the type
illustrated by the phrase "waterproof shadows" would
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result.
As noted earlier, the decompositiona1 theory also
attempts to account for the meanings of larger lingustic
constructions such as phrases and sentences.
this by means of using Frege's "principle of
compositiona1ity" which holds that the meaning of a
It achieves
syntactically complex constituent such as a sentence, is a
compositional function of the meanings of its parts.
This is realised by using projedion rules in addition to
the decompositional dictionary. "The projection rule
specifies how lexical readings for the syntactic atoms can
be combined,to form derived readings for a whole
expression or sentence". (Katz, 1913, p. 43). Thus, the
meaning of a phrase or sentence is a compositional
function of the meaning of its parts. Furthermore, the
meaning of the parts can in turn be specified by
dictionary entries.
This type of dictionary theory employing
decomposition into semantic elements can be quite a useful
way of characterizing meaning relations between words.
Intuitively, such decompositiona1 analyses do seem to
capture something of word meanings. However, certain
subtleties are ignored by such an analysis. To use
Sanford and Garrod's (1981) example, the word 'spinster'
might be broken down by componential analysis into
(adult), (woman), [who has never married]. However, in
common usage, 'spinster'generally is taken to convey the
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feature 'middle aged', or 'elderly' also. There seems to
be no such constraint on 'bachelor', intuitively speaking,
so characterizing the difference in meaning between
'bachelor' and 'spinster' in terms of the ~MALE marker
fails to capture certain subtleties. Similarly, as
Clark and Clark (1977) have pointed out, the word 'girls'
can be used sometimes to refer to adult women, as in 'the
girIs in the typing pool'. Such subtleties fail to be
captured by a conventional decompositional theory.
Other criticisms have been levelled at this type of
theory, and the criticisms are summarized by Johnson-Laird
(1981a) as follows:
1. Kintsch (1974, P. 12) argues that "if one starts
to decompose, it is hard to see where to stop".
To quote Johnson-La ird (1981 a, P. 107) •••
"(Kintsch's) point seems no more cogent here than
it would be in oppos ing the atom ic theory of
matter".
2. Fodor, Fodor and Garrett (1975) argue that the
rapidity with which comprehension occurs is not
easily explicable if comprehension involves
replacing'words with 'their dictionary entries,
combining the dictionary entries in accordance
with the selection retrictions, etc. However,
this argument carries little weight, since many
complicated mental processes occur with great
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rapidity.
3. Fodor, Fodor and Garrett claim that the
decompositional theory makes erroneous predictions
about the comprehension of sentences - for
example, predicting that sentences involving
'bachelor' should be harder to understand and
occupy more space in memory than sentences using
the synonymous phrase 'is married'. Fodor, Fodor
and Garrett investigated the times taken to
evaluate deductive arguments, some involving
explicit negation ('is unmarried') others
involving lexical items like 'bachelor' with a
putative semantic representation containing a
negation. Such items (that is, those like
'bachelor' with a putative semantic representation
containing a negation) made an inference reliably
easier to evaluate than one containing an explicit
negation, from which Fodor, Fodor and Garrett
conclude that a word such as 'bachelor' does not
seem to contain a negative in its semantic
representation although it ought to according to
the decompositional theory. Such evidence is
not, however, conclusive. Fodor, Fodor and
Garrett's conclusion that the representation of
'bachelor' does not include a negative cannot be
justified by a difference in latency of response;
it is possible that a negation in a dictionary
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entry may be responded to faster than a
morphological or explicit negation.
4. Fodor, Fodor and Garrett argue that decom-
positional dictionary entries are unable to
capture certain inferences that depend upon the
meanings of words. For example, in the case of
KILL, if 'kill' is replaced by a decompositional
entry of 'cause to die', then the inference from
'x causes y to die' to 'y dies' requires other
machinery. Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976, p.
506) present a decomposition of 'cause' from which
this inference does follow, however.
5. Kintsch (1974) claims that, if decomposition was
invariably required in extracting meaning from
linguistic input, it is difficult to see why
complex words would have evolved, only to be
decomposed again in the process of comprehension.
Johnson-Laird (1981a) comments that this is a
sensible pOint, but contends that there may be
economies to be obtained by processing one
semantically complex word rather than a synonymous
string of simple words. Johnson-Laird concludes
overall that the case against decompositiona1
theories of meaning is "hardly overwhelming" (P.
109). Decomposition has also been advocated by
Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) and Schank (1975).
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111 The Meaning Postulate Theory of Semantics (Kintsch,
(1974l, Fodor, Fodor and Garrett (1975»
The central notion underlying this theory is that
meaning relations between lexical items is best captured
by means of a meaning postulate. The meaning postulate
was a device introduced by Carnap (1956) into the
(extensional) theory of semantics known as model-theoretic
semantics. A meaning postulate is essentially a rule
which relates the meanings of two lexical items or
expressions. Thus, in 'possible-worlds' semantics (a
variant of model-theoretic semantics), a meaning postulate
is introduced in order to eliminate some, otherwise
possible, worlds. So, for example, a meaning postulate
which expresses the synonymity of 'seek' and 'try to find'
eliminates those possible worlds 1n which one may seek
something without trying to find it.
An example of a meaning postulate would be that which
relates the meanings of 'buy' and 'sell', as follows:
for any x, y, and z, x sells z to y = Y buys z from x
Bar-Hillel (1967) argued that deco~positional theories
cannot explain the semantic relation between 'buy' and
'sell' and that the best way of explicating this meaning
relation is in terms of a meaning postulate. This
replacing of dictionary entries by meaning postulates has
formed the core of a psychologically oriented theory of
meaning advocated by Kintsch (1974). .The meaning"
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postulate in Kintsch's system characterizes the semantic
relations between items in semantic memory. Kintsch
argues against lexical decomposition and provides
experimental evidence against the decomposition of lexical
items. He suggests that lexical concepts exist as
unanalyzed wholes, and their logical entailments can be
pursued by means of meaning postulates. Thus, Kintsch
postulates a semantic memory consisting of lexical
concepts, which he represents in a capitalized form, e.g.
KILL. These lexical concepts contain sensory information
and motor programs, these latter allowing the theory to
escape the circularity of exclusively defining lexical
items in terms of other lexical items by means of meaning
postulates. The sensory and motor parts of the lexical
descriptions provide the interface between the real world
and the semantic structure.
Fodor, Fodor and Garrett (1975) also advocate a
theory couched in terms of meaning postulates. They
argue against lexical decomposition and indeed argue that
semantic representations, as linguists have conceived of
them, do not exist. They cite the failure of correlation
between definitional complexity (as defined by
decompositional theory) and psychological complexity as
being of a considerable enough magnitude to justify the
rejection of decompositional theory and the hypothesizing
of a rather different theory based on meaning postulates.
Their proposed theory involves the following:
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i) To each morpheme of the surface vocabulary (of a
natural language) there corresponds a primitive
expression in the vocabulary of the representa-
tional system. This does not imply, they
stress, that the vocabulary of the natural
language is identical with the vocabulary of
semantic representations; they do not suppose,
for example, that the formatives of the semantic
level are phonologically interpreted, merely that
there is a one-to-one correspondence between the
formatives of the natural language and the
formatives of the representational system -
whatever these latter may turn out to be.
ii) They consider that it is "practically mandatory
to assume that meaning postulates mediate
whatever entailment relations between sentences
turn upon their lexical content" (P. 525-526).
Thus, meaning postulate theories have been advanced in
explicit opposition to decompositional, dictionary
theories.
i1il ~mantic netHork theories Qf meaning (e.g. Collins and
Ouillians, 1972)
As already noted above, semantic network theories owe
their origins to attempts at modelling semantic memory in
computers, with the wider aim of making a language user
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(Collins and Quillian, 1912). The essence of this theory
of semantic memory is its characterization of semantic
memory as a network of interrelationships between
concepts, using a variety of inferential links.
In this type of network, rather than having a list of
words as the properties of a concept, the list
corresponding to the properties of a concept is a list of
pointers to other concepts - thus, a concept would be a
set of interrelationships among other concepts. From the
outside, such a network appears as a whole set of
interrelated lists, with pointers to words found on many
of the lists. In such a network there are.no primitive
or undefined terms: everything is defined in terms.of
everything else. In this respect, it is like a
dictionary, where words are defined in terms of other
words. However, they explicitly reject the dictionary as
an adequate model of human semantic memory, considering
concepts in humans to be much more encyclopaedic: "As a
first approximation, it makes sense to assume that the
content of a concept is everything that has been heard or
read or seen about that concept" (Collins and Quillian,
1912, p. 318). ThUS, concepts are not mere word
concepts.
There are a variety of possible relationships between
concepts in semantic memory - for example, the superset
(IS A) relation, similarity, part, proximity, consequence,
precedence, parent etc. relationships. They also stress
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their notion of semantic distance between concepts;
concepts can be related more or less distantly, and the
semantic distance between adjacent, direcly linked
concepts can in fact be greater than the semantic distance
between concepts linked via one or more other concepts.
This happens when the sum of the accessibilities in the
latter case is less than the accessibility of the former
case. The semantic distance between concepts is not
simply proportional to the number of nodes in the path
between the concepts.
According to this theory, comprehension of a sentence
or string of words involves an attempt to construct an
interpretation based on a configuration of paths in memory
between the various concepts referred to by the words in
the string. This involves an extensive search to
determine how the words can be interrelated within the
constraints of syntax and context. Thus, a network type
representation of the sentence is set up (for an example,
see Johnson-Laird, 1981a, p.110) with pointers into the
appropriate nodes of semantic memory, and an extensive
search for associated concepts (whilst a parallel
syntactic analysis proceeds simultaneously) results in an
interpretation of the sentence being arrived at. The
entailments of the sentence can be captured by pursuing
the links in semantic memory that initiate from the nodes
which are initially activated.
Collins and Quillian's account thus stresses the
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importance of the various types of relationship between
concepts in semantic memory, resembling the meaning
postulate theory in this regard. However, the nature of
the relations between concepts differ in the two theories.
Ql Overview of the three intensional theories of meaning
The three theories of meaning outlined above share
some common features, most notably an emphasis on
intensional semantics. Indeed, some of the authors of
the above three theories explicitly acknowledge their
commitment to intensional aspects of semantics. This
theorizing at the level of intensional semantics is, they
argue, a necessary simplification for the purpose of
devising theories of manageable complexity: to attempt to
devise theories which take into account extensional and
pragmatic phenomena would, they suggest, be premature. To
quote two of the authors of the above theories, Kintsch
(1974, p. 14/15), says:
"It is quite true that the pragmatic factors are
of great significance in psychological research
in language behaviour ••• The study of the
logical-semantic structure of language and
memory appears to be sufficiently rich and
promising in itself. It is surely complex
enough, and if any simplification can be gained
by disregarding further complexities this
appears to be a sound research strategy.
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Certainly, an understanding of both semantic and
pragmatic factors will eventually be necessary,
but for the moment, concentration upon one or
the tither seems quite appropriate".
Later, Kintsch does concede (p, 15) that" ••• pragmatic
considerations can never be neglected for long • • ."
Similarly, Katz (1913, p. 38) emphasizes the importance of
tackling manageable subproblems, and Katz and Fodor (1963)
argue against the possibility of a theory of semantics
taking the sociophysical setting of speaker and listener
(i.e. pragmatics) into account, because such a theory
could not ••• "be completed without systematizing all
the knowledge about the world that the speakers share and
keeping the systematization up to date as speakers corne to
share new knowledge". (Katz and Fodor, 1963, p. 181).
They further argue that even a limited theory of how
sociophysical setting determines the understanding of an
utterance blurs the distinction between the speaker's
knowledge of his language and his knowledge of the world.
They conclude that" ••• since it is unlikely that
anything stronger than a theory of semantic interpretation
is possible and since such a theory is clearly an
essential part of a linguistic description, it is
reasonable to fix the upper bound of a semantic theory of
a natural language at the point where the requirements
upon a theory of semantic interpretation are satisfied"
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(Katz and Fodor, 1963, p. 181).
Thus, these theorists are all in agreement upon the
necessity to tackle the intensional semantics problem
since it is of manageable proportions. This means that
their theories are of an essentially 'syntactic' nature,
to use Morris' (1938) definition of 'syntactic', that is,
they theorize about the relationships between signs in the
language system, attempting to account for intensional
phenomena and neglectlng semantic (the relation of signs
to their designata) and pragmatic aspects.
A further similarity shared by the three theories is
that, ln attempting to theorize about semantics, they
(explicitly or implicitly) focus upon the understanding
aspect of semantics, rather than the production aspect.
These theories give an account of the understanding
process which is, to a greater or lesser extent,
intuitively plausible; however, the theories then assume
that speech production ls, as it were, merely the converse
of the understanding process. When considering the
theories from the polnt of view of speech production, they
lose some of their plausibility. For example, whilst a
meaning postulate theory will attempt to give an account
of what occcurs when a listener is presented with
discourse, intuitively speaking it is difficult to see how
meaning postulates could be employed in the selection of
lexical items for the speech production process.
Katz and Nagel (1974) compare and contrast meaning
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postulate theory with Katz and Fodor's (1963)
decompositional semantic theory. Katz and Nagel argue
that decomposition theory is the logical theoretical
successor to a meaning postulate theory, and that
decomposition theory provides a fuller account of
semantics, since it is capable of accounting for semantic
relations between entire sentences by use of the principle
of compositionality, whereas meaning postulate theory can
only explain semantic relations between individual lexical
items. In addition to the above difference between the
two types of the~, Katz and Nagel specify three others:
1) Dictionary entries in decompositional theory
contain selection restrictions but dictionary
entries in meaning postulate theory do not.
2) Semantic analysis in decompositional theory (that
is, readings) are sets of semantic markers, but
semantic analyses in meaning postulate theory are
sets of predicate letters (representing either
language - independent abstract concepts, or
abbreviations of words in a particular language;
Katz and Nagel argue for the former
interpretation). Furthermore, the semantic
marker of decompositional theory not only names a
concept, but also represents the logical structure
of the concept in terms of its own formal
structure in the same way in which a phrase marker
not only designates a sentence but also represents
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its constituent structure in terms of its own
formal structure. Semantic analyses in meaning
postulate theory, on the other hand, yield sets of
predicate letters which are not phrase markers.
3) Decomposition theory contains a set of definitions
of semantic properties and relations which
explicate questions concerning synonymy,
redundancy, ambiguity, and so on, while systems of
. .
postulates lack such explications.
Katz and Nagel further argue that, in order to
convert meaning postulate theory into a satisfactorily
complete theory of intensional phenomena, additional
machinery is required (in particular, selectional
restrictions and some principles for combining the
meanings of words in syntactically complicated sentences).
They argue that when those supplements are effected, the
theory becomes a notational variant of decompositional
theory.
Fodor, Fodor and Garrett (1975), however, reject the
view that meaning postulate theory is a notational variant
of decompositional theory. Among the differences between
the two theories pointed out by Fodor et al. are that
meaning postulate theory hypothesizes an internal mental
language (into which natural language input is translated)
that stands in a one-to-one relation to the vocabulary of
natural language, whereas decompositional theory is
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committed to a language of semantic primitives that need
have no such correspondence to natural language.
Secondly, meaning postulate theory hypothesizes a less
abstract type of semantic representation than does
decomposition theory. The third major difference
existing between the two types of theory is that, whereas
decompos1tional theories hypothesize that inferences such
as entailment take place during the course of ordinary
comprehension, meaning postulate theory holds that initial
comprehension is superficial, with the entailments of a
sentence determined at some later time.
In contrasting decompositional theory with meaning
Ipostulate theory, Kintsch (197~)points out that, whereas
decompositional theories require complex encoding of
sentences, a theory based on meaning postulates requires a
large number of such rules in semantic memory and there
is, therefore, no real advantage of parsimony for meaning
,ostulate theory.
rcally simpler.
Neither way, as Kintsch puts it, is
Kintsch even goes so far as to concede
that decomposition may provide substantial gains in
economy for artificial intelligence devices. He
maintains, however, that since no-one has written a
computer simulation employing meaning postulates, it is
impossible to say how such an approach compares in terms
of efficiency with the decomposition technique.
Kintsch's main point is, however, that whether
decomposition or meaning postulates are used in human
~o
comprehension and memory is an empirical psychological
question, and his advocacy of a theory based on meaning
postulates is based on his own evidence against lexical
decomposition as an obligatory process in comprehension.
Kintsch's experiments tested the notion that lexically
complex words are harder to process than lexically simple
words, in various ways. For example, in one experiment,
processing difficulty was measured in terms of sentence
initiation time,'where subjects were instructed to
generate a sentence using a given (lexically simple or
complex) word. If decomposition takes place, the
lexically complex word should take more time to comprehend
than the lexically simple word. Kintsch did not,
however, find any effect of semantic complexity on the
time taken to begin to speak a .sentence in the above
experiment. Johnson-Laird (1981a) pOints out that the
latency of speaking does not correlate with the difficulty
of defining a word, however (Johnson-Laird and Quinn,
1976)• Johnson-Laird further notes that Kintsch's other
experimental tasks probably do not require subjects to
decompose the meanings of lexical items in order to
perform satisfactorily in the experiments. Under these
conditions, accepting Kin~(h's results as hard evidence
against lexical decomposition during comprehension would
be unwise.
Johnson-Laird concludes that it is best to consider
lexical decomposition to be an optional process which can
be used if required but which was probably not required by
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Kintsch's subjects. He gives the example of someone
asking one's name; under such circumstances, one is
hardly likely to decompose the word 'name' in order to
reply. It is likely that a fact such as one's name will
be directly represented in memory. However, if someone
asks what is meant by the word 'name', then a process of
decomposition is necessary in order to answer. Johnson-
Laird concludes that, in the course of ordinary
comprehension, the listener may retrieve no direct
information from the relevant lexical entry, but instead
may merely access it and check that it contains some
semantic information. This information may be required
subsequently when, for example, attempting to verify the
sentence, but mere access is sufficient for normal
comprehension.
Semantic network theory has been criticized in some of
its aspects. Woods (1975) pointed out a number of
problems for semantic network theory. Most notably, three
criticisms of importance advanced by Woods are:
1) There is a need to adopt a consistent notation,
and also there is a need to ensure that the links
between concepts are not treated in an entirely ad
hoc manner.
2) There is no means of distinguishing between the
intension and eaxtension of expressions in
semantic network theory. It is not clear how
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this distinction could be captured within a
semantic network.
3) The treatment of quantifiers (such as 'some',
'all' etc.) require special care within semantic
networks. Quantifiers have been treated as
though they were adjectives that modify a noun
phrase in semantic networks. Quantifiers and
their scope do present problems for psychologists
and proponents of semantic networks are not the
only theorists who have failed to do full justice
to the complexities of quantification (Johnson-
Laird, 1981a, p.112).
In summary, all three theories share an emphasis on
intensional semantics, and have been directly compared
with one another by some theorists. Katz and Nagel argue
that meaning postulate theories are a notational variant
of decompos1tional theories, and Hollan (1975) tak~the
view that semantic network theories are notational
variants of decompositional theories. These similarities
aside, all three theories share a fundamental weakness,
that of being inadequate as psychological models of the
comprehension process. Johnson-Laird (1981a) advances,
several arguments to support this claim, and we shall now
consider the pOints raised by him.
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~ Johnson-Laird's (1981a) ~ against the three
'syntactic' theories of meaning
The first major criticism advanced by Johnson-Laird of
the three intensional theories of meaning is that all
three theories are based on what he terms the "autonomy of
semantics" - that is, the theories assume that the meaning
of any sentence can be established independently from what
the sentence may refer to. Indeed, all three theories
have nothing of note to say about referential matters.
Johnson-Laird points out that it is taken to be natural to
assume that deriving the intensional meaning of an
expression is a precursor to determining its extension.
Natural language does not, however, always work in this
orderly fashion. Johnson-Laird argues that intensional
meaning and reference in fact interact with one another.
This interaction between intensional meaning and reference
is evident in the case of selection restrictions. He
gives the example of the expression "it is pregnant"",
where the selection restriction for 'pregnant' constrains
the referent of 'it', not its intensional meaning; 'it'
must refer to either an idea or a female animal.
Johnson-Laird further argues that sentence
interpretation is based upon factual knowledge of the
Hor1d rather than selection restrictions. So, for
example, a selection restriction for the verb 'lift' is a
constraint upon the verb's subject; the subject must be
human, animal, or machine. This specification, however,
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fails to allow certain acceptable sentences, such as:-
"The wind lifted the leaves over the fence".
"Hot air lifted the balloon".
and "The rope lifted the weight".
In such cases, Johnson-Laird argues, the listener
ut1lizes factual knowledge (that hot air rises, that ropes
can support weights, etc.) rather than selection
restrictions.
A further example of the interaction between
intensional meaning and reference (and the use of factual
knowledge to constrain reference) is given by the
sentence:
"He found it difficult to grasp".
The point is nicely illustrated by considering what
'grasp' will be taken to mean if the referent of 'it' is a
mathematical theorem, as opposed to what 'grasp' will be
taken to mean if the referent of 'it' is a boa
constrictor.
Johnson-Laird (1981a) also argues that reference is
also a critical importance for certain logical
implications that hold between expressions. This is
illustrated by considering the transitivity of spatial
prepos itions. ; So, for example, the relation in can be .
specified as being fully transitive. c For example, the
conclusion of the following inference is valid:
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Fred is in his office.
Fred's office is in the University.
Fred is in the University.
The transitivity of in can be specified using a meaning
postulate:
If x is in y and y is in z, then x is in z.
However, other spatial prepositions exhibit varying
degrees of transitivity, depending upon the nature of the
reference situation. The classic example from Johnson-
Laird is the relation 'on the right of'. The
transitivity of this particular preposition depends upon
the reference situation, and it therefore has a deictic
component. For example, if all individuals being
considered are seated along one side of a straight table,
then the transitive inference:
Matthew is on the right of Mark.
Mark is on the right of Luke.
Matthew is on the right of Luke.
is valid, granted the truth of the premises, and 'on the
right of' is transitive. "However, if the three
individuals were equally spaced around a circular table,
the above transitive inference would not be valid. If we
consider a third case where the three individuals are
seated adjacently at a large-radius circular table around
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which many individuals are seated, then the transitive
inference is again valid.
Thus, the transitivity of "on the right of" varies
depending upon the nature of the reference situation; how
large the table is, how the individuals are spaced around
it, and how many individuals are being considered when
attempting to make the transitive inference all,affect the
validity of the resulting inference. This example
forcefully emphasizes Johnson-Laird's point that the
logical entailments of expressions depend critically upon
the reference situation.
_)
Since none of the theories are capable of accounting
for the problem of reference, such inferences would have
to be embodied in the form of a set of meaning postulates
for each spatial preposition. However, the above example
illustrates a fundamental difficulty for this way of
tackling the problem: .the number of meaning postulates
required tO,capture the varying degrees of transitivity in
different reference situations would be very large indeed
and is in fact potentially infinite. Meaning postulates
would not, therefore, constitute a parsimonious solution to
this problem.
Johnson-Laird postulates his own theory of
comprehension, which overcomes the problems which he
raises. His theory will be considered in more detail in
the next chapter. Johnson-Laird concludes his criticism
of the three theories by noting that the problems of
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logical inference "destroy any theory based on the
assumption that meaning is autonomous and independent of
the reference of expressions ( Johnson-Laird, 1981a, P.
117)". This comment serves as a prelude to his own
theory of comprehension, since it does tackle the
reference problem.
fl Conclusions •
Three theories of meaning which attempt to account for
intensional relations between expressions, but which do
not account for reference or extensional phenomena, were
considered. Similarities were noted between the
theories, and also differences between them - for example,
decompos1t10na1 theory has it that the logical entailments
of an expression are recovered in the course of
comprehension, whereas meaning postulate theory held that
such entailments are determined at a later time, initial
comprehension being of a superficial nature. The
arguments concerning the relative merits of the three
theories of semantic representation are, however,
overshadowed by the problems facing all three theories.
Arguments were considered which suggest that a
psychologically plausible theory of meaning has to account
for the reference situation as well as intensional
phenomena. It was also argued that the machinery of
'selection restrictions' would best be replaced by
thinking instead of subjects using their factual knowledge
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in order to constrain reference of expressions
appropriately. It was further argued that logical
properties such as transitivity also depend critically
upon the nature of the reference situation, and that,
since these three theories are unable to account for
reference, they are also in principle unable to provide a
parsimonious explanation of such logical properties.
A further criticism noted in passing was that all
three theories provide accounts of intensional meaning
which are biased toward explaining the listener's task in
comprehension: they do not offer particularly plausible
models of speech production.
We now turn to consider 'semantic' (according to
Morris's definition) theories of meaning, that is, those
theories which attempt to take account of the reference of
expressions.
49
CHAPTER Z.
'SEMANTIC' APPROACHES TO MEANING
1) Introduction
In the last chapter, a historically-organized
introduction was given which indicated the variety of
theories of meaning postulated in recent years. Also
reviewed in the last chapter were three 'syntactic'
theories of meaning, that is, theories which focussed on
sense relations between expressions. After noting certain'
similarities and differences between the three theories,
it was concluded that all three theories suffered from the
fundamental problem of being unable to account for the
relation between the signs and their referents. The
reference situation, it was noted, is of critical
importance for certain logical inferences (particularly,
transitive inferences), and Johnson-Laird (1981a) argues
that it is knowledge of referents rather than the use of
selection restrictions that constrains the interpretation
of the sense of an expression.
Given that the relation between signs and reference
situations is of great importance to the interpretation of
the meaning of those expressions, we now turn to examine
theories which do attempt to account for, or ascribe
importance to, the reference of expressions. Such
theories can, therefore, be termed 'semantic' theories of
meaning, since Morris (1938) defined 'semantics' as the
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relations between signs and their designata. The
theories to be reviewed in this chapter examine (or give
precedence to) the relation between signs and their
designata.
The first theory to be reviewed, the theory of model-
theoretic semantics, has as its origins a background of
linguistic and philosophical interest in the logical
structure of language. The second theory (or rather,
family of theories) to be reviewed is that of procedural
semantics, which owes its origins to the relatively new
discipline of Artificial Intelligence. The final theory,
which will be reviewed in some detail, derives largely from
psychological considerations and uses procedural semantics
as a proper part; this is the theory of mental models.
The theory of mental models is a recent and powerful
theory, being considered by its exponents to be capable
not only of explaining the problem of meaning, but also of
being capable of explaining errors in reasoning (for
example, in syllogistic inferences) and also as a possible
way of resolving the longstanding controversy regarding
imagery (Johnson-Laird, 1980).
The widely differing backgrounds to these three
theories (model-theoretic semantics, procedural
semantics, and the theory of mental models) serves to
emphasize the interdisciplinary nature of the whole
question of meaning.
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Ql 'Extensional' linguistic theories of meaning
An extensional approach to meaning which originates
in the areas of linguistics and philosophy is due to
Tarski (1956) and is known as "model-theoretic
semant ics". This theory stems from Tarski's definition
of truth, which held that truth is relative to actual or
possible states of the Universe. Model-theoretic
semantics also embodies Frege's principle Qf
compositionality, that is, the intension of a complex
expression (such as a sentence) can be built up
compositionally from the intensions of its constituents in
a way that depends only upon their grammatical mode of
combination.
Logicians had shown how to formulate a rigorously
compositional semantics for a formal language by providing
it with a semantic interpretation with respect to a model
or state description. This model is an abstract
construct and consists in elements (corresponding to
elements in the real world - the model corresponds to a
view of the world) and atomic propositions which combine
particular elements with particular predicates. The
model has a list of atomic propositions which are taken as
a list of true descriptions of the world, and elements in
the language are mapped onto elements in the world.
The language which is under interpretation is termed
the 'object language', whilst the semantic interpretation
with respect to the model is achieved using an extensional
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metalanguage, in the form of a logical calculus. Thus,
the structural rules of the model are couched in a
metamathematical calculus.
For example, a state description or model can be
constructed for a "love triangle" situation in which both
John and James love Mary (and Mary loves neither John nor
James) and, as a result, John hits James and vice versa,
as follows (This example is adapted from the example in
Johnson-La Lrd , 1982, p, 3):
LEXICAL ITEMS
Nouns - "John" "James" "Mary"
Verbs - "Loves" "Hits"
SYNTACTIC RULES
N~V-N is a well-formed sentence
S-"and"-S is a well-formed sentence
(N.B. In more complicated models, other logical operators
are permissible).
MODEL STRUCTUR~ LEXICAL RULES
1) "John" has extension JOHN
2) "James" has extension JAMES
3) "Mary" has extension MARY
4) "Loves" has extension {(JOHN, MA~Y) (JAM~.s,M¥\It)')}
5) "Hits" has extension {(JOI-iN,JI\Mt::.S~)(JAME.S, JOI-IN)}
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Predicates are extensionally defined in terms of
what can be true in the model - for example "John loves
Mary" is true but "John hits Mary" is not. The model
structure specifies the extensions, as above, and the
extensional relationship is one where, for example,
element A in the language maps onto element a in the
model, and so on.
STRUCTURAL RULES
1) A sentence of the formc(~J3 is true only if the
extension of <CC, J3 > is a member of the set
comprising the extension of ~.
2) 8" "and"-'/' is true if e is true and 'f is
true in the model. (where If and e are well-
f d t N""'V-Norme sen ences, e.g. ,
and 0<. , P are nouns.
is a verb,
The structural rules are normally much more
complicated than in the above (purely illustrative )
example. More complicated structural rules allow this
method of semantics to be very powerful. A variety of
such structural rules would enable semantic inter-
pretations (truth values with respect to the model) to be
returned for a wide variety of complex expressions.
That the predicates are extensionally defined 1s
evidenced by the very definition of 'extensional
definition' - an extensional definition is a listing of
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the members of the relevant class, and this is precisely
what is done in the model structure lexical rules.
The essence of model-theoretic semantics is that,
given the extensions of a list of simple expressions and
an appropriate set of structural rules, truth values can
be assigned to complex sentences and phrases. The final
product is therefore a truth value with respect to the
model structure for a given complex expression.
This type of theory has been applied not only to
formal languages but also to natural languages (Montague,
1974). This is achieved by introducing sets of model
structures, each representing a possible state of affairs
- a 'possible world' - at a particular moment. The
introduction of 'possible worlds' into model-theoretic
semantics allowed the theory to encapsulate Frege's
(1952, originally published 1892) distinction between
sense (intension) and reference (extension) (see chapter
1, P. 10). This is possible since the theory is then
capable of dealing with denotations of expressions not
on 1yin the act ua1 w 0 rLd but wit h .!:Yl~.§.that g0 vern the ir
denotations in all possible worlds: such rules can be
identified with the intensions of expressions. As
Johnson-Laird (1981b) puts it, the intension of a
sentence, i.e. the proposition it expresses, can be
treated as a function from the set of possible worlds
onto the set of truth values (true and false); the
extension of the sentence is its truth value in the
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particular possible world under consideration.
Thus, we can distinguish the intension of the
following two sentences:
1) The Morning Star is identical to the Morning
Star.
and 2) The Morning Star is identical to the Evening
Star.
by noting that sentence 1) is true in all possible
worlds, whilst 2) Is true in only some possible worlds,
including the real one. Accordingly, their intensions
are different. Thus, a logically necessary proposition
is one which is true in all possible worlds, whilst a
logically possible proposition is one which is true in at
least one possible world.
Montague also used the method of model-theoretic
semantics as a basis for developing a treatment of
pragmatics; although Montague limits pragmatics to the
study of indexical expressions, that is, expressions such
as '1', 'here', etc., whose semantic values depend on
contexts of use. He considered that pragmatics should at
least initially follow the lead of semantics, that is,
pragmatics should, like semantics, concern itself with
trut h - but wit h res pect no t 0n1y to a given
interpretation but also with respect to a context of use.
Model-theoretic semantics provides a formal and
rigorous extensional treatment of the object language
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using an (extensional) metalanguage for the
interpretation of the object language. Montague's chief
generalization of model theory was to make semantic
assignments relative to various factors.
The notion of truth-under-a-given-interpretation and
truth relative to a context of use, and the utilization of
a model (state-description or view of the world) to
represent the 'given interpretation' in semantic analysis
is of interest to psychologists. Even although the
model is an abstract formal entity, the general approach
of the theory is of interest. Important points of note
are: a) that the combinations of particular signs which
are admissible is given by the model, and therefore what
gets accepted as true or rejected as false is determined
by the model structure; b) the model in turn represents a
'possible world', that is, it corresponds to a view of a
particular state of affairs at a particular time - i.e. a
particular view of the world; and c) extensional
considerations are given prominence, in contrast to the
theories outlined in the previous chapter.
However, despite its admirable formal rigour, there
are problems for model-theoretic semantics; in
particular, the treatment of sentences about beliefs,
desires and psychological states has not yet been
satisfactorily dealt with using this framework (Johnson-
Laird, 1981b). Lyons (1977) points out that many
sentences of ordinary language express what appear to be
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complex intensional propositions. For example, "Romeo
thinks that Juliet is dead" is not a truth-function of
the simple proposition "Juliet is dead", since the truth
or falsity of the complex sentence is independent of the
truth or falsity of "Juliet is dead". The complex
sentence would therefore normally be described as an
intensional proposition. This is true also of many
compound sentences of ordinary language containing 'and'
or 'if' since they are taken to imply that some kind of
causal, temporal or other connexion holds between the
.propositions expressed by the constituent clauses, as 1n
"If he did that he is very brave".
A further problem noted by Lyons (1977) is that these
formal systems consider the descriptive function of
language. It is important to bear in mind, following
Austin (1962) that there is no simple one-to-one
correspondence in the everyday use of language between the
grammatical structure of a sentence and the kind of
communicative act that 1s performed in particular
situations by the utterance of that sentence. Thus,
declaratives do not always make statements, and
conversely, interrogatives, for example, can be used to
make statements (e.g. "Do you know that I am 92 years
old?"). Such considerations are part of the domain of
pragmatics and will be considered in the next chapter.
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c) Procedural Semantics
The term "procedural semantics" refers not to a
specific theory of semantics, but instead a general
approach to the problem, a general way of couching
semantic theories. Woods (1981) argues that it is
possible to formulate incorrect theories in this vein, as
well as (he contends) correct theories.
Winograd (1975) contrasts declarative and procedural
knowledge, and pOints out that this contrast corresponds
to the philosophical distinction between 'knowing that'
and 'knowing how'. A declarative representation of
knowledge would be one where knowledge takes the form of
a set of specific facts describing particular knowledge
domains, and there exists in addition to the facts a
general set of procedures for manipulating these facts.
In thinking, the general procedures are used to manipulate
the domain-specific data base in order to make
deductions., This is similar. in principle to axiomatic
mathematics, with the facts corresponding to axioms and
the thought processes corresponding to proof procedures for
drawing conclusions from the axioms.
The proceduralists, on the other hand, assert that
our knowledge is primarily a "knowing how": the human
information processor is a stored program device, with
its knowledge of the world embedded in its programs.
Thus, by this account, what we know about language is
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coextensive with our set of programs for operating with
it.
The notion that the meaning of language expressions
could be identified with a procedure or set of procedures
stems from the area of Artificial Intelligence and has
caught the interest of psychologists interested in language
(e.g. Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976; Johnson-Laird,
1911a).
The approach originated from a consideration of the
semantics of high level computer programming languages
like Fortran and Algol. These high level languages,
which are used to commmunicate programs of instructions
to the machines, have both a syntax and a semantics.
The syntax consists of rules for writing well-formed
programs; the semantics consists of the procedures that
the computer is instructed to execute. In the computer
programming sense, therefore, procedural semantics deals
with the meaning of the procedures that the computer is
instructed to execute, whether the result returned by the
program* is what the programmer would have expected, and
so on (Johnson-Laird, 1971a).
There are therefore two stages involved in running a
computer program. The first step is to compile the
program, that is, translate it into the operational code of
the particular machine to be used. The second step is
* The American spelling of 'program' will be used to refer
to computer programmes in this thesis, and other senses of
'programme' will use the British spelling.
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to execute the compiled program, using data which mayor
may not be supplied with the program. This "compile and
execute" strategy has been metaphorically applied to
natural language processing as a theory of meaning. As
such, it is an interesting and flexible approach to the
problem of meaning, since it is possible to explicate both
intensional and extensional meaning in procedural terms
(Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1916).
The application of the "compile and execute"
strategy to human language processing was first clearly
formulated by Davies and Isard (1912), and goes as follows:
on hearing an utterance, the person must firstly compile
it, that is, translate it into his or her internal mental
language. The second step is the decision on the part
of the person of whether or not to run the compiled
program - the choice is usually under the voluntary
control of the listener. The two steps differ with
regard to the hearer exerting voluntary control; while a
person can, for example, choose not to answer a question
(that is, choosing not to execute a compiled program), he
has no voluntary control over the compiling of the
program - this is automatic and involuntary. As Davies
and Isard put it, it is difficult to refuse to understand
a sentence in a language you know well, but it is often
easy to refuse to verify it. A further interesting
comment by Davis and Isard is that loss of conscious
control over one's compiler may correspond to knowing a
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language fluently.
In general terms, the main thrust of procedural
semantics as applied to human understanding of natural
language is to c~aracterize understanding as a process of
translation of input utterances into procedures or
programs, that is, sets of operations that mayor may not
be subsequently carried out. That a variety of such
operations are admissible (see below) in terms of the
theory gives the theory sophistication and plausibility
from a psychological point of view.
There are in fact a variety of possible programs which
expressions could be translated into. For example,
procedures to verify the proposition expressed by a
sentence, procedures to take action satisfying the request
made by a sentence, and procedures to find information (for
example, by instituting a memory search) answering the
question posed by a sentence. Some authors have
misunderstood procedural semantics as particularly
emphasizing the processes of verification (Fodor, 1978);
it has been assumed that the meaning of a sentence is the
procedure to verify whether it is the case or not.
However, as Johnson-Laird (1978) points out in a reply to
Fodor, procedural semantics admits many different types of
operation, and furthermore points out that understanding is
antecedent to verification, not a consequence of it
(Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976, p. 126). The point to
be stressed is that verification is but one of many types
62
of procedure which can be compiled and executed on hearing
a sentence.
Woods (1981) points out that primitive perceptual
procedures could be used to define truth conditions for
elementary propositions. This relates to Tarski's model
theory. Ta~ki's definition of truth was as follows, to
quote his own famous example -
"Snow is white" if and only if snow is white.
The object language statement whose truth is to be
verified appears on the left hand side of the expression
and is enclosed by quotation marks. The metalanguage
definition of the truth conditions for the object language
expression, which is on the right hand side of the above
expression and is not enclosed by quotation marks, could
be characterized in procedural terms, that is, in terms of
the primitive operations of sensory perception. This
pOint is taken up and amplified by Miller and Johnson-
Laird (1916). Miller and Johnson-Laird came up with the
general formulation that a person learns many rules of the
form
P is true if and only if F(x) = 1
where F(x) describes a mental computation to be
performed. If the result of the computation is F ex) =
1, then P is true; otherwise it is not true (false or
indeterminate). They argue that the psychological problem
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is to characterize the mental computations that a person
performs when he learns and applies such rules, and that
the best metaphor currently available with which to
formulate such a theory is the theory of computation
developed to describe the operation of computers.
Therefore, F (x) is characterized as a program of
instructions to be executed, containing instructions such
as find (in a given search domain, x) and test (at time t,
x satisfies the description D (x». The description D
could be a perceptual paradigm composed of perceptual
predicates (in Miller and Johnson-Laird's formulation of
the idea). Thus, some high-order executor would request
the perceptual system to search for, attend to, and make
judgements of various combinations of perceptual
predicates. The combination of perceptual predicates
identify objects or events taking a label, and each label
is associated with a particular perceptual paradigm D(x).
Thus, in this case, the relevant label would be "white" and
the verification of the natural language expression using
the truth-rule involves attention to snow and making
judgements concerning the presence or absence of
particular perceptual predicate(s) given by D (x)
corresponding to "white".
Woods (1981) provides an interesting discussion of
language understanding from the point of view of
procedural semantics. He argues for the existence of an
internal language capable of vastly greater discriminative
64
subtlety than the external natural language, and it is in
terms of the internal language that the meanings of
natural (external) language expressions are defined.
Woods argues that human communication requires a receiver
to deduce a much more precise understanding of the intended
meaning of an utterance than the external language words
and syntactic structure manage to convey. This, he
argues, is an economic solution, for if the natural
language were to be capable of the same level of
discriminative subtlety of which the internal language is
capable, it would require a much greater vocabulary than
it actually has. He argues that most words in English are
highly ambiguous, and the speaker's intended sense is
selected by context. (This is in fact a problem of
pragmatics - that is, the selection of a particular
intended sense of an expression from the many possible
senses which it has, and will be returned to in chapter
3). The point that is emphasised by Woods is that both
the process of translation (corresponding to selection of
a particular sense) and the process of execution (the
carrying out of the set of operations selected during
translation) can best be modelled by means of procedures.
The advantages of a procedural semantics approach to
natural language meaning are many and varied. Firstly,
the distinction between compiling and executing a program
provides a way of disconnecting the understanding of a
sentence from any actions it might entail. Secondly, it
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forces the theorist to consider processes as well as
structure. Thirdly, it admits a wider range of
extensions of sentences than does model-theoretic
semantics: in procedural semantics, the extension of a
program is the result the program returns when the
procedure has been executed, and the intension of the
program is the particular procedure that is executed when
the program is run. Accordingly, whilst model-
theoretic semantics admits only "true" or "false" as
extensions of sentences, procedural semantics admits
a variety of possible extensions, including truth values,
answers to questions, compliance with requests, additions
to knowledge, modification of plans, etc. Fourthly, the
distinction between pragmatics and semantics can be
explicated in terms of procedural semantics: pragmatic
considerations come into effect at the 'compilation'
stage, that is, the particular program which gets compiled
depends upon the pragmatics of the situation, whereas the
semantics corresponds to the particular procedure selected
and the execution of it. Lastly, the procedural approach
places a diverse range of speech acts (statements,
questions, requests etc.) on an equal footing and
provides a theoretical language in which to formulate
hypotheses about the mental processes involved •
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Miller and Johnson-Laird (1976) developed a
complicated procedural theory which attempted to
characterize linguistic and perceptual functions in
computational (procedural) terms. They point out
initially that language and perception are related - in
their terms, what is seen and what is said are somehow
related. Philosophers have been interested in the nature
of that relation for centuries. Miller and Johnson-Laird
focus primarily upon how perception of the world affects
communication about it, and they concentrate their
attention on word meanings. To use their example,
consider the word "lamp". Such a word must not only
relate to other words through grammatical, conceptual or
memorial systems, it must also relate to concrete,
objective in~tances of lamps: otherwise the word would
be unable to serve the purposes it does serve.
Miller and Johnson-Laird argue (P.7) " ••• the
active ~ of words like "lamp" depends critically on
one's ability to identify instances. The word must be
associated somehow with a perceptual procedure capable of
deciding which objects are and which objects are not
~instances of an appropriate kind. Thus, although
verification is only one of the many procedures which a
hearer may try to execute on hearing a sentence, it
illustrates the need to be able to link words and
percepts. This is the starting point of Miller and
Johnson-Laird's programme of "theoretical revisionism";
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they set out to attempt to achieve a theoretical synthesis
of external (referential) relations and internal
(intensional) relations of the system.
They conclude, after lengthy and detailed
examinations of perception and cognition,ihotworclsandpu'cqrfs::ate n.ot:
linked directly but instead they are linked via a conceptual
system of inscrutable complexity, this conceptual realm
itself being the central concern of cognitive psychology.
The final analysis was therefore in terms of concepts and
proceaures for using them. In their theory, every word is
associated with a lexical concept. A lexical concept is
anything capable of being the meaning of a word, and, for
most words, consists of two parts: 1) a definitional part
depending on a functional-perceptual schema for
recognizing instances (perceptual predicates alone in the
definition are insufficient because of problems caused by
vagueness, the contribution of noncriterial features, and
other problems for a purely perceptual definition, such as
the importance of characteristic orientation). The
second part of the lexical concept is 2) a connotative part
consisting of knowledge associated with the word,
including the relation of the word to other words. This
particular definition of a lexical concept is thus capable
of capturing both sense relations and referential aspects
and is tied to procedural rather than propositional
interpretations of sentences.
Miller and Johnson-Laird's consideration of the
68
possible intensional relations bewteen lexical concepts is
based upon the notion of the concepts being organized into
semantic fields. To quote Miller and Johnson-Laird:
"We assume that a semantic field consists of a
lexical field and a conceptual core. A
lexical field is organized both by shared
conditions determining the denotations of its
words and by a conceptual core, by the meanings
of what the words denote. A conceptual core
is an organized representation of general
knowledge and beliefs about whatever objects
or events the words denote - about what they
are and do, what can be done with them, how
they are related, what they relate to. This
lexical-conceptual relation is complex. To
say that a lexical field covers a conceptual
core like a mosaic is suggestive, but it
greatly oversimplifies ••• " (Miller and
Johnson-Laird, 1916, P. 291).
For example, for furniture in general there is a core
of indoor human activities associated with furniture, such
as eating, sleeping, working, playing etc., and furniture
exists to accommodate peoples' bodies and the objects and
instruments they use as they engage in those activities.
These core concepts are essentially commonsense theories
about the way the world works. The lexical field
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associated with the conceptual core consists of lexical
concepts organized in interlinked decision tables. The
schemata of individual lexical concepts specifies a set of
conditions that must be satisfied for an appropriate use
of the term associated with the lexical concept, and
many of these conditions are shared by several schemata.
Thus, a decision table based on shared conditions is a
parsimonious way of characterizing interrelationships
between individual lexical concepts within a semantic field
(see example below). If, for example, we consider a
'furniture world' where there are only three kinds of
item of furniture, that is, chairs, tables, and beds, we
could represent these three concepts in a decision table
as follows:
Decision Table
1 2 3
Conditions
(i) It has a seat? Y N N
(ii) It has a work top? y N
Actions (call the object a-)
"chair" x
"table" x
"bed" x
(Adapted from Miller and Johnson-Laird, 1976, P. 284).
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Rach schema (a column in the table) is represented by
a pattern of outcomes for these conditions, plus an
indication of which words are assertible given that
pattern. The table can be entered with a pattern of
conditions and the appropriate word found, or it can be
entered with a word and the pattern of conditions found.
Thus, extremely flexible access is possible both from the
speech production and the speech understanding points of
view.
It is possible to interlink the above decision table
with other decision tables by means of having a fourth
column, where in the case of a larger decision table none
of the actions has been satisfied by the conditions
provided, a 'call decision table # Xl option is available
if none of the other actions specified by the table were
I
!
able to be carried out. Recursion is also possible, with
a given. table calling itself. The decision table is a
specific realization of how schemata might be integrated,
and is one way of characterizing 'the organization of
conceptual information, and could prove a useful basis of
organi~ation from the point of view of both production and
reception of speech.
Miller and Johnson-Laird's theory has been described
at some. length, because it illustrates several pOints,
both about procedural semantics in particular and
'semantic' theories (in Morris's sense) in general.
Firstly, it illustrates the power of the computational
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metaphor; both sense and reference are characterizable in
procedural terms. Referential matters and verification
are processes according to such a theory, and it thus
provides a natural and plausible psychological account of
the reference problem, which tends to be finessed in some
other 'semantic' theories. Model-theoretic semantics is
a 'semantic' theory which emphasi~es structure rather
than process, in contrast to the procedural theory.
Sense relations can also be characterized in procedural
terms using semantic fields and interlinked decision
tables. The fact that it can deal with both sense and
reference is necessary according to Morris's definition of
'semantic'; semantic theories include syntactics as a
proper part of their study.
Miller and Johnson-Laird's approach concerns itself
primarily with the problem of characterizing lexical
knowledge; ideally, however, we would like to
characterize how whole utterances and even larger units of
discourse are understood and how their meaning could best
be characterized. The virtue of Miller and Johnson-
Laird's theoretical ideas is that they both illustrate the
viability of a procedural approach to these problems, and
they also raise theoretically interesting questions.
Procedural Semantics in general is a useful and
powerful theoretical tool for developing theories of
meaning. Perhaps the most important point about this
type of theory is that it emphasizes process rather than
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,structure (Johnson-Laird, 1911a). Procedural semantics is
not only a theory of semantics in itself, however. It has
been incorporated into other theories which attempt to
explain meaning and some of the phenomena of human
language understanding. The next theory to be considered
uses procedural semantics fairly extensively, and
attempts to characterize not only the problems of how
humans represent meanings, but it also attempts to explain
some of the phenomena of syllogistic reasoning and to
serve as a general theory of comprehension. We will
consider in detail only its treatment of the problem of
meaning.
Ql The theorY of mental models
Earlier in this chapter, an exposition of model-
theoretic semantics was given and it was noted that in
model-theoretic semantics the "model" is an abstract
construct, a set of rules couched in a meta mathematical
logical calculus. This "model", it was noted, corresponds
to a view of a possible world and specifies the admissible
combinations of extensionally defined elements to yield
interpretations of complex expressions with respect to the
model structure. A rather different notion of a 'model'
has been suggested in psychology by several different
theorists during the past forty years. The psychological
notion of a model is that of an internal mental
representation which takes the form of a structural
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analogue of the state of affairs which is being described
or thought about.
One of the earliest exponents of such a notion was
Kenneth Craik (1943). Craik pointed out the advantages for
an organism of having an internal model of the world with
which to mentally 'tryout' hypothetical courses of action
without physically suffering the potentially adverse
consequences of those courses of action - specifically, as
Woods (1981) puts it, such a modelling system would allow
one's theories to die instead of oneself.
The general notion of mental models has been
hypothesized by other theorists since Craik, and is now
the core of a psychological theory of comprehension by
Johnson-Laird (1980, 1981a, 1981b). The motivation for
the interest in such internal structural analogues of the
referents of a piece of discourse has been the observation
that what is remembered of a sentence corresponds to none
of its linguistically motivated representations, a point
made by Fodor, Fodor and Garrett (1975). Sanford and
Garrod (1981, p. 63) comment that "if memory is the
product of the comprehension process, then memory
experiments may provide clues about the nature of
comprehension itself". It therefore follows that none of
the linguistically-motivated representations of discourse
will suffice as a psychological model of comprehenSion,
and a different type of theory 'is called for. This
theory is based not on linguistic considerations but on
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the general notion of a mental model.
The basic point which experiments on memory for text
demonstrate is that the surface structure (that is, the
actual wording of the text) is rapidly forgotten and the
enduring memory is for the 'gist' of the text, that is,
the 'logical points', main substance or pith of the text.
One of the earliest and most striking demonstrations of
this phenomenon was the oft-quoted experiment by Frederick
Bartlett (1932). Bartlett read his subjects a North
American Indian folk story called 'The war of the
ghosts', and then had them recall it at later pOints in
time (with varying length of delay between presentation
and recall). Firstly, Bartlett noted that recall was
very inaccurate, often being only the outline of the
story. Secondly, he noted the presence of various
systematic distortions in the recall of the story: things
which fitted the story but were not actually present in
it appeared in the recall protocols. Finally, when the
subjects' memory of the story was so poor that only
isolated fragments could be remembered, subjects sometimes
invented plausible, stereotyped stories around those
details which could be recalled. Such reconstruction
processes tend to be used less when less curious
experimental stimuli are used; furthermore, when
reconstruction errors do appear, they generally do so in
the case of long delays between presentation and recall.
Recall in the case of less exotic material appears to be
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fairly accurate in the sense of capturing gist. Sanford
and Garrod conclude (p. 65) "In part at least, what is
remembered is allegedly a product of the comprehension
process".
One experiment whose results point to an explanation
in terms of models is that of Bransford, Barclay and
Franks (1972) who showed that subjects who had been
presented with the sentence
1) Three turtles rested on a floating log and
a fish swam beneath them.
later erroneously recognized the sentence
2) Three turtles rested on a floating log and a
fish swam beneath it,
but they did not erroneously recognize the sentence
3) Three turtles rested beside a floating log
and a fish swam beneath it
This result is consistent with the subjects having
somehow represented the sentences in a way which captures
the spatial relations of log, turtles and fish.
Accordingly, Bransford, Barclay and Franks distinguish
between a 'constructive' and an 'interpretive' approach to
semantics. The result noted above would constitute
strong support for a theory based on mental models.
Another line of support comes from an experiment by
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R. C. Anderson et al., (1976) in which subjects were
presented sentences such as:
The fish attacked the swimmer
Later, subjects were presented with a recall cue. It
turn ed 0 ut that a m 0 res pecif ic term suc has .§.h~.rk was a
better recall cue than 'fish', the more general term
actually used in the original sentence. Such a result is
problematic for conventional theories of meaning using
semantic features or semantic networks. Anderson et al.
explain their results in terms of an 'instantiation'
hypothesis, that is, the word "fish" has in fact a whole
familY of potential meanings, and a particular sense is
instantiated as a function of the context of the sentence.
Johnson-Laird (19S1a) argues that a more plausible'
interpretation of the findings would be one in terms of-a ..
mental model of the referents and relations described in
the sentence.
Similar results were produced by Garnham (1979), but
in this case with verbs. Garnham also used a cued recall
technique, and subjects read sentences like:
The housewife cooked the chips
Garnham showed that the recall cue fried was more
effective in helping the subjects to remember the original
sentence than was the cue 'cooked', the original verb which
has been present in the sentence. Garnham interpreted his
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results in terms of the sentence being represented in the
form of a knowledge-based model of the situation, and this
model is essentially non-linguistic in nature. The word
'fried\maps into this model better than does 'cooked' in
this case (since the subject knows that the particular
method of preparing chips is by frying), hence the result.
The work of Garnham and of Anderson et al. demonstrate
that, in the case of both nouns and verbs, the particular
sense of the word which is selected by the subject in the
context of a particular piece of discourse is not easily
explained in terms of a breakdown of the relevant lexical
item into particular sets of semantic primitives, but
rather a better explanation would be in terms of the
discourse addressing a model-based package of knowledge,
and this model constrains the selection of the sense of
the lexical item (rather than using selection restrictions
or some such machinery).
Several model-based theories of reading comprehension
have been proposed. These theories hold that the problem
for the mderstander is not one of breaking words down
and relating their various senses together in order to
build up a coherent interpretation, but instead the
problem is one of addressing appropriate pre-packaged
knowledge structures. These pre-packaged knowledge
structures (i.e. models), basically contain information
about what to expect in a particular situation around which
the discourse is based. The characterization of such
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knowledge structures is usually that of variations on
Minsky's (1975) 'frame' hypothesis, that is, as
hierarchically-organized data structures.
Minsky put forward the frame as the basic building-
block of knowledge and conceived of memory as comprising
millions of frames. Data in frames is hierarachical in
that the higher levels of the frame 'package' of data
contains necessary, fixed elements in the situation;
lower down, the data in the frame becomes increasingly
arbitrary, that is, it could be violated without
necessarily making the use of that frame implausible. So,
for example, in a child's 'birthday party' frame, at the
top levels a host and guests constitute fixed, necessary
features of the situation. Lower down in the data
structure, the definition of the lists of features become
less well defined, and/or optional. For example, there
are presents, KSm~, decor, a birthday cake, ~ ~m,
etc. - these are normal features of the child's birthday
party. However, if one of these expectations were
violated; the situation would still be describable as a
child's birthday party, whereas violation of the
expectation of there being a host or guests would
invali date the use 0f the par ty frame: wit h0uta hQ.§.l 0 r
guests there would be no~party as most people would
understand it.
Thus, the emphasis in these accounts is on how
discourse relates to models taking the form of pre-
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packaged, available data structures. Frames are usable
in many ways; for example, there are frames for objects
(such as the use of a frame to contain default information
to assist the recognition of a cube), temporal or
programmatic frames (these contain information about what to
do and expect in a restaurant, at a lecture, etc.), mixed
frames for situations (such as the child's birthday party.
example above, etc.), grammar frames (verbs are viewed as
frames or information structures which allocate the other
parts of speech in a sentence into a relationship with the
verb), narrative or text frames (such as what to expect
in a folk story), and even scientific paradigms have been
considered from the 'frames' point of view.
Particular versions of the frames hypothesis have been
mooted in the form of model based theories of
understanding; for example Schank and Abelson's (1911)
'script' account is a model based theory using temporal or
programmatic frames to provide models of particular
situations on which to base understanding. Sanford and
Garrod's (1981) 'scenario' account also is a model based
theory of comprehension. In both of these theories, the
emphasis is more on how discourse addresses knowledge than
on how the discourse elements themselves are broken down
semantica lly. That is, these theories are 'top-down'
(L,e , concept-driven) rather than 'bottom-up' (t ,e, data
driven) theories of comprehension. There may be no
necessity to break down input language into components on
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every occasion; what is important according to these
accounts is that utterances act as cues or clues for
addressing pre-packaged mental models, or as clues to
build new models (see below). Lexical decomposition may
therefore be an optional process.
There is, therefore, a good case for supplementing
the theories of sentence comprehension with a richer form
of representation in the form of a model or internal
structural analogue of the state of affairs described by
the discourse (Johnson-Laird, 1980, 1981a, 1981b). In
particular, it was noted in chapter 1 that theories of
comprehension which fail to take referential matters into
account run into trouble with logical inferences. Mental
model theory attempts to circumvent this difficulty by
postulating the existence of an internal model of the
referent, modelling its major structural features, etc.
Mental models also make logical deductions such as
transitive inferences possible without having to rely on
rules of inference. Features such as transitivity emerge
naturally from a model-based account without having to be
explicitly specified in advance.
The essence of Johnson-Laird's (1980, 1981a, 1981b)
theory is that utterances provide clues for building
mental models. Johnson-Laird's emphasis is on how models
are constructed to represent novel situations. Other
model-based accounts (such as Sanford and Garrod's
'scenario' theory) consider how discourse is related to
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pre-packed, 'ready-built' models. Models are not always
available for every reference situation and in some
discourse situations may have to be constructed at the time
of encountering the utterance and it is with these
processes which Johnson-Laird concerns himself.
Thus, utterances provide clues for building mental
models. The phenomenal content of a model is immaterial -
it mayor may not be accompanied by visual imagery, for
example. What does matter is the structure of the mental
models and the fact that we possess procedures for
constructing, manipulating and interrogating them. Many
of these procedures can take for granted a common
background of knowledge, including world knowledge and
knowledge relating to the language and the conventions
governing conversation. Mental models in fact
constitute one option in the encoding process: a hearer
can choose to either construct a mental model on the
basis of what he or she hears, actively drawing as many
implications as possible from what is said, or the hearer
can choose to merely register the speaker's discourse in
a passive way.
Johnson-Laird contends that there are in fact two
stag~in language understanding. Firstly, the utterances
are translated into the internal mental language of the
hearer. The formatives of this internal language are in
close correspondence with those of the natural language
input (as in the theories of Kintsch (1974) and Fodor,
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Fodor and Garrett (1975) mentioned in chapter 1). Thus,
a given natural language expression is translated into a
representation of essentially similar form - in fact,
Johnson-Laird theorizes that the mental representation
language may take the form of a propositional
representation similar to that advocated by Kintsch (1974).
The original surface structure of the linguistic input is
readily recoverable from this representation. Following
this, the listener may choose to construct a mental model
from the initial propositions representation. This
mental model would utilize a procedural semantics which
would build, for example, a spatial array which would
mirror the structural layout of what was being described.
Thus, for example, in the case where one reads a
description of the spatial layout of a room when reading a
novel, one may build a model of the room, and the
positions of objects in the model would correspond to the
positions of the objects stated in the description. We
should note that such descriptions are radically
indeterminate, that is, they are usually consistent with a
variety (a large number) of different rooms, not merely in
terms of the dimensions of the room but also in terms of
the actual spatial layout of the furniture and other
objects within it. The mental model builder may notice
this indeterminacy - indeed, Johnson-Laird argues that
it can only be detected upon attempting to build a model _
but he may choose one particular interpretation and build
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the model to correspond to that interpretation.
Thereafter, if the listener has decided to plump for one
particular instantiation, then all will go well provided
that interpretation is not violated in the subsequent
discourse - if such a violation occurs, the listener may
attempt to rebuild his model appropriately, or else he
may abandon the whole enterprise in some confusion.
The poInt s of note are that model construction is an
optional mode of encoding, involving more cognitive work
than mere translation of the discourse into mental
currency, and that, for indeterminate descriptions, the
construction of one model which satisfies the discourse is
effected rather than there being attempts to construct
multiple models. The fact that two:stages are involved
is necessary to explain the results of some experiments
which demonstrate retention of surface structure without
detailed understanding having taken place - in such cases,
encoding has gone no further than translation of the
discourse into a propositional representation (examples of
this will be given below in the discussion of experiments
by Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird, 1982).
Johnson-Laird (1980, 1981a, 1981b) reports on a
program written by him in a high-level list-processing
language which simulates his theory of mental models.
The program works by interpreting simple spatial assertions
by means of building up a spatial model of the relations
between entities, and it can combine information from
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separate assertions in order to achieve a unified
composite representation. The procedures used by the
program are mainly general procedures which set up an
internal representation of two-dimensional space, add items
to the array, test for specified relations between items,
etc. So, for example, if verification of a statement that
one item is behind another is required, the verification
procedure would operate by scanning along a line
originating from the second of the two items to determine
whether the first item is located somewhere along that line.
The direction of this scanning search is controlled by two
variables, which are the values by which the X and Y
coordinates are incremented to successively spell out the
locations to be scanned. The actual values of X and Y
are determined by the particular relation being tested
for. For example, for the relation 'on the right of' ('A
is on the right of B'), the instruction to the scanner is
as follows:
FUNCTION (%1, 0%)
This instruction takes a general procedure for
verifying the relation between two items, assigns it to the
variable FUNCTION, ..and "freezes in" the value of two of
its parameters (the "freezing in " being denoted by the
decorated parentheses). In this case, the parameters +1
and 0 specify the direction in which to scan - that is, by
incrementing the X-coordinate and holding the Y coordinate
constant. Thus, the scanner begins at object B and scans
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successive locations to the right of B to verify whether A
is indeed located to the right of B. The array is thus
represented as if it were a graph laid upon a table being
viewed from above.
This simulation illustrates several interesting pOints
- firstly, the meaning of 'behind", 'to the right of' and
other relational terms is represented in an internal meta
language which bears no simple, let alone one-to-one,
relation to the natural language. (This is a further
advantage of the procedural semantics approaoh;
relational terms, conjunctions and other terms of this
nature are handled in a very natural way, as opposed to the
treatment which they receive in some other theories).
The program described illustrates the point that it is
possible to define the meanings of relational terms as
procedures that work in a way that is utterly remote from
meaning postulates and conventional decompositional
theories. "The definitions decompose meanings into the
primitive components of specific coordinate values that are
only interpretable with respect to the spatial models.
The meaning of a word is accordingly not a procedure that
can do anything by itself, it is a procedure that applies
to other procedures" (Johnson-Laird, 1980, p.166). That
is, the meanings of words like 'behind' take the form of
decompositional procedures which relate to (constrain the
operation of) other general procedures which operate on
models. The models in turn represent the subject of
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discourse; this is the basis of the semantics proposed
for mental model theory. The simulation demonstrates the
use of lexical procedures that interact with the general
procedures for constructing, manipulating and
interrogating mental models and constraining the general
procedures to operate in particular ways.
A further point to note is that such modelling and
scanning operations can effect transitive inferences, etc.,
without such inferences being prespecified in the system
in terms of inference schemata; for example, if the
program is told that:
A is behind B
B is behind C
this would be represented in the program as: A
B
C
If the~program were asked to verify whether A was
behind C, the program would use an identical scanning
operation as in the above example. Thus, on finding
that both A and C were pres ent in the a rra y, the program
would run its verification procedure, testing whether A is
indeed behindC; since it would be in this instance, the
program would return. the value 'true'. The point of note
is that the inference schemata associated with relational
terms do not have to be specified with those terms, and
the vagaries of transitive inference in different spatial
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arrays (see chapter 1) can therefore be coped with without
requiring an extremely large number of postulates.
Transitivity is an emergent property of the mental model
rather than being specifically 'written in' in advance.
In real life, of course, the procedures involved in
scanning would be more complicated, since the locus of
points scanned need not be in a straight line and since
the actual sizes and shapes of the objects would need to
be taken into account. Nevertheless, the simulation
demonstrates the essence of how this sort of modelling
can work and indeed it is argued by Johnson-Laird that
the only way that the factors alluded to in the above caveat
could be taken into account would be by constructing an
internal model of the sort described in the theory.
There is therefore a twofold advantage of the mental
model based theory over conventional theories based on
stative decompositions or meaning postulates. Firstly, the
theory based on procedures is well capable of accounting for
the extensions of expressions, which meaning postulate
theory and other 'syntactic' theories of meaning are unable
to do, and secondly, the model-based theory is capable of
accounting for transitive inferences in a natural and
parsimonious way, without multiplying rules and postulates
to implausible extents, indeed without necessitating the
existence of rules or postuhUS at all. The operation of
procedures on mental models provides a natural and intuit-
ively satisfying way of accounting for such logical inferences.
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Having demonstrated the feasibility of a procedural
theory utilizing mental models by means of a computer
simulation, the question of whether human beings actually
do use such models in the course of comprehension is an
empirical issue. Johnson-Laird and his colleagues have
conducted experiments which test for the existence of
mental models and their use in comprehension and deductive
inference. For example, Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982)
investigated the notion that a listener or reader can
construct a mental model of a spatial layout. The
subjects heard a series of spatial descriptions involving
everyday objects (for example, spoon, cup, knife, etc.)
and then judged whether a diagram was consistent with the
description they had just heard. For example, subjects
WOuld hear a description such as:
The spoon is to the left of the knife.
The plate is to the right of the knife.
The fork is in front of the spoon.
The cup is in front of the knife.
Subjects would then have to judge whether a diagram such
as
spoon knife plate
fork cup
was consistent or inconsistent with the description. If
the diagram is considered to depict the arrangement of
these objects on a table top (i.e. in plan view) then
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the diagram is in fact consistent with the description.
The above description was determinate, that is, only
one spatial layout is consistent with it, but half of the
descriptions which subjects heard were indeterminate, such
as:
The spoon is to the left of the knife.
The plate is to the right of the spoon.
The fork is in front of the spoon.
The cup is in front of the knife.
This description is consistent with at least two
radically different spatial arrangements:
spoon
fork
knife
cup
plate spoon
fork
plate knife
cup
After subjects had evaluated a whole series of pairs
of descriptions and diagrams, the subjects were given an
unexpected test of their memory for the descriptions.
This test took the form of their ranking four alternative
descriptions in terms of their resemblance to the
description that had actually been presented. The four
alternatives consisted of the original description, a
description that was inferable from a model of the
original description, and two descriptions which
corresponded to arrangements different from those in the
original description - that is, two confusion items. An
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example of an inferable description for the above would
be:
The fork is to the left of the cup
The results of the study showed that a) sUbjects
ranked the original and inferable descriptions as closer
to the original significantly more often in the case of
the determinate descriptions. This result indicates that
subjects were retaining the meaning of the determinate
descriptions (more so than with the indeterminate
descriptions) since they were not accepting the confusion
items so often in the case of determinate descriptions.
The second finding was that b) the percentage of trials on
which the original description was ranked higher than the
inferable description was significantly greater for the
indeterminate descriptions. This suggests that subjects
confuse original and inferable items more often in the
case of determinate descriptions, which fits in with
mental model theory, and it also suggests that in the case
of indeterminate descriptions, subjects are retaining
verbatim detail of the original description to a greater
extent than is the case with determinate descriptions.
Johnson-Laird (1981b) interprets these results in
terms of the subjects constructing mental models for the
determinate descriptions but using a superficial
linguistic representation when they encounter an
indeterminacy; reconstructing an existing model in the
light of subsequent information places a heavy load on the
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cognitive system, so subjects use superficial linguistic
representations in the case of indeterminate descriptions.
In the case of determinate descriptions, the construction of
a mental model encodes Ii ttle or nothing of the form of the
original description on which the model is based, and
subjects consequently confuse inferable descriptions with
those actually given. In summary, these results are
consistent with mental model theory; determinate
descriptions permit the easy construction of a mental
model. Once constructed, however, the verbatim details of
the original sentences on which the model is based are
discarded, and hence the greater confusion of original
with inferable descriptions in the case of determinate
descriptions. Indeterminate descriptions, on the other
hand, tend not to have models built from them and greater
verbatim retention is the result.
Ehrlich and Johnson-Laird (1982) looked at the"
problem of referential continuity and its effect on the
construction of mental models. In their experiments,
subjects listened to three sentences about the spatial
relations between four common objects, for example:-
The knife is in front of the spoon.
The spoon is on the left of the glass.
The glass is behind the dish.
subjects then had to draw a diagram of the
corresponding layout using the names of the objects. If
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subjects were continuously building up a mental model as
they heard the sentences, the task would be
straightforward. If the references were continuOUS (as
in the case of the·above example), the.model could be built
up continuously. Howver, in cases where the premises are
in a discontinouous order, for example, where the first two
assertions refer to no item in common, it is more
difficult to build a mental model. For example:-
The glass is behind the dish.
The knife is in front of the spoon.
The spoon is on the left of the glass.
In such cases as this, the listener must either represent
the premises in a superficial linguistic form until the
time comes to make the drawing, or else the SUbject can
attempt to firstly build two separate mental models
corresponding to each of the first two assertions, and
subsequently combine them. The prediction that
discontinuous references in the assertions would prove
more difficult for the subjects was borne out by the
results; the percentage of correct diagrams was 69% for
those based on descriptions with referentially continuous
assertions, and only 42% in the case of diagrams based on
descriptions with referentially discontinuous assertions.
A third type of ordering of the assertions yielded an
interesting result; reference can be continuous for the
first two assertions but discontinuous for the third
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assertion. In this case, mental model theory would
predict that a single mental model could be continuously
built up on the basis of the first two assertions, and the
third assertion could be integrated into this model more
easily than in the case where the discontinuity occurs
early on, in the first two assertions. For example:
The spoon is on the left of the glass.
The glass is behind the dish.
The knife is in front of the spoon.
The third assertion has nothing in common with the
second, but it has one referent in common with the first
assertion; accordingly, a hypothesis in terms of mental
models would be that this sort of discontinuity should be
less difficult than in the case of discontinuity in the
first two assertions, since referential continuity in the
first two assertions allows a consistent single model to
be built. The discontinuity at the later point in the
discourse is not, therefore, so disruptive to building and
retaining one consistent model. In fact, this ordering
of the premises yielded 60% correct diagrams, and this
result was not reliably different from performance with
continuous diagrams.
Johnson-Laird (1981b) argues that a number of discourse
phenomena are interpretable by means of postulating the
existence of mental models of the discourse; an example
would be the problem of reference. This has
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been something of a problem for philosphers in the past,
resulting in such philosophical distinctions as referential
vs. attributive usages of definite description. A
referential description is one which picks out a particular
unique individual, whilst an attributive description is
one which merely picks out whoever satisfies the
description.
1966).
Johnson-Laird (1981b) argues that the question of
This distinction was made by Donellan
existence is independent of the referential-attributive
distinction; both referential and attributive
designations can be used to pick out an individual who
does not exist. As Johnson-Laird argues, reference and
the mechanisms that underlie it do not depend on whether
there is something in the world that an expression picks
out. What ~ crucial is that there is something in a
mental model to which the expression refers; it does not
matter as far as psychological processes go whether the
mental model bears a veridical relation to reality. This
consideration has interesting consequences.
Johnso~Laird and Garnham (1980) make points of great
interest when they write,
"Uniqueness in a model rather than in reality
is what controls the use and interpretation of
definite descriptions. If a speaker is to
communicate felicitously, then he must
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consider whether an entity will be unique in
his listener's model. Utterances need seldom
be more than clues about how to change a
discourse model; they depend for their
interpretation on what a listener knows, but
that interpretation in turn modifies or extends
the discourse model. A discourse model is in
part a surrogate for reality. Indeed, it is
sometimes convenient to speak as if language
were used to talk abut discourse models rather
than the world." (Johnson-Laird and Garnham,
1980, p , 377).
Thus, mental model theory can be used to provide an
explanation of the problem of definiteness; the referential
problem centres on the problem of picking out entities
within models, not necessarily within the world. The
above quote also has a direct bearing on pragmatic
phenomena (in Morris's definition, pragmatics is the study
of the relation between signs and the users of those
signs). The choice of a particular type of referent
depends upon the speaker's model of what the listener
knows. The speaker, as it were, anticipates the nature of
the mental model built by the listener on the basis of the
discourse and plans his subsequent discourse accordingly.
Thus, there is a possibility of attempting to address
pragmatic questions using this general approach; the
particular listener's knowledge state (or at least, the
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speaker's notion of the listener's knowledge state) has an
influence upon the speaker's choice of referring
expression.
To summarize, mental model theory postulates two levels
of representation of linguistic input, an initial
propositional representation of a form akin to the
linguistic input and from which verbatim details of the
input are readily recoverable, and a much deeper level of
representation in the form of mental models, that is,
structural analogues of the state of affairs being
described. Mental models constitute an option at the
encoding stage; the subject may choose not to construct
such an extended representation. Once a mental model
has been constructed, the propositional representation on
which it was based is discarded, and as a result, verbatim
retention of the original discourse is poor but the
richness of meaning derived from the discourse is great, and
errors in recall stemming from assumptions made at the
model-building stage can occur (as in the results of
Bransford, Barclay and Franks (,972) and Garnham (1979».
That is, mental models incorporate more than is actually
given and this leads to error.
The advantages of a mental model based theory are
that mental models provide the 'interface' between natural
language and the world. Furthermore, the semantic
procedures employed in the construction, manipulation and
interrogation of mental models make possible a variety of
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inferential techniques to enable, for example, transitive
inferences to be made without having to explicitly
represent rules to make such inference possible.
The parsimony of such an account is appealing.
By mirroring the structure of what is being described,
the problems of extension and the vagaries of logical
inference are overcome, and a variety of subtle
referential phenomena, such as the problem of
definiteness, can be addressed using this theory. That
the problem of extension is dealt with in a natural
way justifies the description of this theory as a
'semantic' theory; there is also the possibility of
accounting for pragmatic phenomena in these terms.
Although Johnson-Laird emphasizes that function of
language which enables us to gain another person's
experience of the world by proxy in his exposition of the
theory, that is, although once again the theory is
couched in terms of what goes on in the mind of the
listener or reader when listening to or reading discourse,
the theory places plausible constraints upon speech
production. In particular, the particular mental model in
the mind of the speaker will constrain what he can say,
and as Johnson-Laird and Garnham argue, the knowledge
state of the listener will also constrain the speaker's
choice of phrase. Thus, there is both a plausible set of
constraints upon the speaker acccording to this theory (as
compared to the theories outlined in chapter 1) but
98
there is also a possiblity of beginning to take stock of
the influence of pragmatic phenomena on speech production
and understanding.
Although it is rather removed from'the mainstream of
interest to the work reported in this thesis, it is perhaps
worth noting in passing that Johnson-Laird (1980) also
argues that mental-model type representations can be used
by subjects to represent the premises in syllogistic
reasoning tasks. Johnson-Laird and Steedman (1978)
produced results which were consistent with an
interpretation of the syllogistic reasoning process as one
of manipulating and testing mental models. Thus, an
advantage of a theory based on mental models is that it can
parsimoniously account for a number of cognitive
phenomena.
The next chapter will focus upon pragmatics; it
will be argued that, although there are no comprehensive
formal theories of how pragmatic phenomena constrain
speakers' discourse and listeners' understanding of
discourse, the phenomena in the domain of pragmatics are
of concern to the psychologist, since issues which
directly involve social psychology are implicated. It
will be argued that the supplementing of a mental model-
type theory with considerations stemming from the area of
pragmatics (i.e. pragmatic constraints) results in a more
complete and intuitively plausible overall picture of
language use which does more justice to the complications
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of the subject than has been possible with earlier
theories. Most theorists would agree with the
contention that ultimately pragmatics (that is, including
syntactics and semantics) will provide a more complete
model of communication than has been hitherto formulated.
In the next chapter, we will examine some of the possible
pragmatic constraints on discourse production and
understanding.
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CHAPTER 3.
'PRAGMATIC' APPROACHES TO MEANING
tl Introduction
In the last chapter, we considered approaches to
meaning which were essentially of a 'semantic' nature, that
is, they related the signs of the language both to other
signs and also to the referents (or models of the
referents) • We now turn to examine 'pragmatic' approaches
to the explication of meaning. Morris's definition of
'pragmatic' was the domain of phemonena pertaining to the
relation between the signs of the language system and the
users of those signs. As Cherry (1957) put it,
"Pragmatics is the most general, inclusive level of study
and includes all personal, psychological factors which
distinguish one communication event from another, all
questions of purpose, practical results, and value to sign
users. It is the "real-life" level" (Cherry, 1957, p.
223). As such, the domain of pragmatics is a rather wide-
ranging one, encompassing areas of language use which have
received attention from linguists and philosphers (such as
the problem of 'deictic' or 'indexical' expressions, for
example, 'here', 'there', 'left', 'right', 'I', 'you', and
so on, whose meaning depends upon the circumstances of
usage) and also areas of language use which have received
attention from psychologists and sociologists. An example
of the latter would be what Clark and Murphy (1982) refer
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to as "audience design", that is, the way in which
particular audiences constrain a speaker or writer's choice
of phrase.
A consideration of pragmatics leads naturally into
some of the subtle social aspects of communication. For
example, Rommetveit's (1974, 1979, 1984) emphasis is
upon what particular listeners understand particular
speakers to mean when they make an utterance. He
therefore discusses what is made known by particular
utterances in particular contexts of use. Similarly,
Johnson-Laird (1977b) distinguishes between the meaning of a
sentence and its significance. Johnson-Laird and Wason
(1977) give an example of a sentence whose meaning is
perfectly clear to the reader but which has no sien1ficance
for him:
The men object to their new rates of pay.
(Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1971, P. 346). This sentence
has little or no significance for the reader, except
insofar as it is made to illustrate a point about language.
If, however, the reader or hearer of such a sentence was a
manager or director of a company who had recently changed
its employees' pay rates, the utterance would have a great
deal of significance. In this example, the social and
physical circumstances of the utterance make a great deal
of difference to the significance of the message, or 1n
Rommetveit's terms, what is 'made known' by it. (Such
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terminological differences will not be explored in any
detail; the expositions of various theorists' work given
in this chapter will be couched in the theorist's own
terms, and theoretical similarities will be of greater
importance than terminological differences). One of the
general points which will emerge clearly from such
considerations is that what is understood by an utterance
(what significance it has for the listener or reader) is
influenced very much by pragmatic factors.
Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977) state that the
significance of an utterance is inferred on the basis of
five main components:
1. Its meaning.
2. Its linguistic context.
3. Its social and physical circumstances, including
a knowledge of the speaker.
4. A knowledge of the conventions governing
discourse.
5. General knowledge.
Johnson-Laird and Wason point out that the structure of
discourse is presumably determined by an interplay of
these five factors; no purely linguistic analysis is going
to succeed in elucidating the way in which discourse is
structured, a point made by the ethnomethodologists. A
further point to emerge from the above listing of factors
is that both Rommetveit and Johnson-Laird and Wason are in
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agreement about the fact that the significance of an
utterance (or what is made known by it on a particular
occasion) is not adequately characterized by its meaning (in
the narrow linguistic sense of 'literal meaning').
The general point that the significance of an
utterance can not be characterized solely in linguistic
terms has already been touched upon in the earlier
discussion of model-theoretic semantics (see Chapter 2),
where it was noted that there is no one-to-one
correspondence between the grammatical structure of a
sentence and the kind of communicative act that is
performed what that sentence is uttered on a particular
occasion. These subtleties of language use in everyday
situations were explored by the philosopher J. L. Austin.
Austin (1962) noted that people often perform actions by
uttering a sentence, and that these sentences cannot be
classified as true or false (as logicians had previously
done; the meaning of a sentence for a logician was its
truth value). An example would be in making a promise.
The sentence may succeed or fail ~ 2n action (the speaker
mayor may not fulfil his promise) but regardless of this
the sentence cannot be described as true or false. Such
sentences are termed performatives.
These ideas led to the view that all utterances could
be described as actions called speech acts. Austin
classified speech acts into three classes:
(0"
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i) locutionary acts - L,e, the act of saying something.
This involves speaking in a way which conforms to
vocabulary and grammar.
ii) illocutionary acts - i.e. the actions performed in
making an utterance, such as "promise", "request",
"warn" and "inform" - these are examples of
illocutionary acts.
The illocutlonary force of an utterance is the
effect that the speaker intends the utterance to
have. The intended effect is usually that the
hearer knows what illocutionary act was performed.
The hearer must correctly identify the
illocutionary force of the utterance in order for
the intended effect to be successful.
iii) perlocutionary acts -i.e. the acts performed Qy
makIng the utterance. This is, in effect, the
~tual effect upon the hearer - whether he has
been scared, convinced, or whatever. A
perlocutionary act mayor may not be intended by
the speaker.
When considering language from this point of view, the
notion of indirect speech ~cts came to the attention of
theorists. For example,
"Can you pass the salt?"
is not a question about salt-passing prowess; it is a
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request for the hearer to pass the salt. In such cases,
the hearer has to correctly identify the illocutionary force
of the utterance - treating the above utterance as a
straightforward interrogative and giving the reply "Yes"
would not be the effect intended by the speaker. A reply
of "Yes" would thus be a failure to grasp the illocutionary
force of the utterance. Determining the illocutionary
force of a sentence is al~~ a matter of inference beyond
what is actually said. No matter what elaborate
linguistic construction is employed by the speaker (of the
form "I swear to you that I am really asserting that
." (and so on», he could always be playing the fool
(Johnson-Laird and Wason, 1979). ThUS, correctly
identifying the illocutionary force of an utterance is a
• •
pragmatic problem of some importance.
Earlier in this section, we noted that one of the
factors which plays a part in determining the significance
of an utterance is that of the listener (and speaker)
possessing a knowledge of the conventions governing
discourse. The philosopher Paul Grice has formulated some
of the conventions governing discourse in our culture, and
formulates them as a set of precepts or conversational
maXims, as follows:
The cooperative principle: Make your conversational
contribution such as is required by the accepted purpose
or direction of the exchange in which you are engaged.
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Specific conversational maxims:-
Quantity:
Quality:
Relation:
Manner:
Make your contribution as informative as is
required - neither too much nor too little
information.
Don't say what you believe to be false.
Don't say what you lack evidence for.
Be relevant.
Avoid obscurity and ambiguity.
and brief.
Be orderly
Such maxims are normally followed implicitly.
Johnson-Laird and Wason illustrate this point by
demonstrating what happens when the maxims are violated.
In such cases a listener may draw inferences from such
violations: e.g.
Answer
Question - How old are you?
- Nice weather we're having.
From the reply, an inference, such as the inference
that a relevant answer is unspeakable, may be drawn.
That adherence to such maxims is a social-pragmatic
problem is exemplified by the conversational maxim of
quantity. Clearly, in order to make one's conversational
contribution as informative as is required, giving neither
too much nor too little information, one needs to
anticipate the listener's knowledge state, beliefs and
presuppositions. This anticipation is central to what
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Clark and Murphy term "audience design", and an exposition
of their views will be given later in this chapter.
The foregoing serves to illustrate Cherry's point that
pragmatics is the "real-life" level of study;
illocutionary force, indirect speech acts, and
conversational maxims are used by us every day in ordinary
conversation. Pragmatic phenomena are of importance,
therefore, and in this chapter several different aspects
of pragmatic phenomena will be examined, and the work of
several different theorists will be reviewed.
The first aspect of pragmatics to be considered is one
of the most basic pragmatic problems, that of deixis.
Deictic or indexical expressions are expressions whose
reference depends upon contextual factors like the
position in space of the speaker, his direction of gaze,
and other contextual factors. A speaker and listener have
the problem of jOintly agreeing upon the denotata of
deictic terms like 'here', 'there', and the like; speaker
and listener must set up a common deictic space and
coordinate their perspectives to ensure a common
interpretation of deictic terms. We will consider Karl
Buhler's (1982, originally published 1934) theoretical
treatment of deixis since it remains an influential
treatment of the subject. We will also consider briefly
the work of Klein (1982) and Wunderlich and Reinelt (1982)
which examine how some deictic terms are used when an
individual gives route directions to a destination.
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Kaplan's (1977) theory of deixis and Miller's (1982)
discussion of Kaplan's theory also raise interesting
pragmatic questions. For example, when pointing to an
object in order to refer to one of its properties (pointing
to grass to refer to the colour green, for instance) the
speaker has to utilize his general knowledge about the
relation between the referent and the demonstratum, and
also his beliefs about the hearer's knowledge of such
relations.
Given that a speaker and li~tener have successfully
set up a common deictic space with agreJ-upon
delimitations of that space, one of their next important
pragmatic problems is the question_of how they refer to
the entities under discussion, whether those entities are
physically present or not. This raises the problem of
mutual knowledge, that is, knowledge that is common to both
parties and, furthermore, knowledge which both parties
know that they share. That.shared knowledge influences
the choice by a speaker of particular referring
expressions is illustrated by work which shall be
reviewed, for example, the work of Clark and Murphy and
the work of Marslen-Wilson et: al. The work of a variety
of theorists pOints, it will be argued, to the importance
of pragmatic factors in influencing the speaker's choice
of referring expression.
This area of pragmatics leads on rather naturally to a
further layer of pragmatic complexity, so to speak: that
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is, the particular social identities of speaker and
listener and how this factor enters into a speaker's choice
of phrase and a listener's understanding of what has been
said. Particular listeners may understand different
things from the same utterance depending upon the identity
of the speaker. The work of Rommetveit stands out in its
advocacy of a social-pragmatic approach to both the above
phenomenon and also the more "elementary" ones of deixis.
For this reason, the work of Rommetveit, being of a
comprehensive and generally thought-provoking nature, will
be reviewed in a separate section of its own.
The last problem of pragmatics to be considered will
only be raised briefly. This brief treatment is necessary
because very little theoretical work has been done in the
area. The problem is the social-psychological question of
whether one party to a dialogue might exert overall
control of it. That is to say, the possibility is raised
that one interlocutor may dominate the dialogue in some
sense and that this domination may be reflected in terms of
linguistic aspects of the dialogue. This intriguing
notion, if it were to be supported empirically, would add a
further layer of complexity to the area of pragmatics, and
should prove to be of great interest to the social
psychologist.
Throughout this chapter, the emphasis on the meanings
of natural language expressions in natural dialogue will be
retained, since it is the question of meaning which
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constitutes the primary focus of interest in the work
reported in part II of this thesis. The importance of
pragmatic factors for meaning, in addition to 'syntactic'
and 'semantic' aspects, will be emphasized.
b) The pragmatics of deictic expressions
As noted above, perhaps the most basic problem for two
persons engaged in a dialogue is the problem of
the referents of deictic expressions. Deictic or
indexical expressions are those expressions such as 'here',
'there', 'I', 'you', 'this' and 'that', whose reference
depends upon the context is which they are used. In other
words, these terms have no'fixed denotata, the denotata
involved varying depending upon who is speaking to whom,
where and when. The first problem for a speaker and
11stener, therefore, 1s that they have to set up a system of
reference relative to which the denotata'of deictic terms
are agreed~
In examining the problem of deixis we shall firstly
consid er the theories of Karl Buhler (1982, orig inally
published 1934), whose views on the subject are today still
influential. Other interesting notions are raised by
Kaplan's (1977) theory and Miller's (1982) discussion of
Kaplan's theory.
Buhler (1982) proposes a two-fields theory of
language, partitioning language into the ~mbolic field
(which contains the vast majority of lexical items, such as
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names, whose referential function is less context dependent
and which more abstractly reflect symbolic representation of
objects, properties and events) and the deictic field
(which contains the deictic or indexical expressions whose
reference depends upon the particularities of context).
Buhler identifies three areas of use of deictic terms:
(a) demonstratio ad oculos or 'verbal pointing' in which a
deictic term such as 'there' replaces the pointing finger
gesture; (b) anaphorical deixis, where adeictic term such
as 'here' is used anaphorically to refer forward or
backward to an abstract 'place' in discourse; and (c)
deixis at phantasma (that is, deixis in the imagination,
for example, where a novelist leads a reader into the realm
of constructive imagination and there uses deictic terms).
Buhler treats the 'pointing' function of deictic
expressions as primary and treats the other two functions
(anaphora and phantasma) as derivative from the primary
pointing function. We shall examine each of the three in
turn.
(1) Demonstratio ad oculos, or ,'verbal pointing'.
In their 'pointing' function, Buhler argues, deictic
words function in the same way that a physical signpost
does, that is, they act as way-indicators or signals (for
example, 'here' and 'there'). The deictic terms replace
or accompany the pointing forefinger gesture in the case of
demonstratio ad oculos, and 'point' verbally, hence the
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analogy with a roadside signpost. The speech event,
however, differs from the physical signpost in that it is
an event - a complex human action- in which the speaker has
both a position in the terrain (as does the signpost) and a
role in the action. The speaker's role is that of sender
as opposed to receiver. Deictic words therefore include
not only positional terms but also personal pronouns such
as 'I' and 'you' which .!:.§.f.§..!: lQ the roles of the
interlocutors (rather than denoting them in the manner in
which names, for example, do).
Buhler therefore argues that the naming words function
as ~mbols, while deictic terms function as signals.
Deictic terms receive their full precision of meaning
within the deictic field of language, and can do so there
alone. For example, the denotata of 'here' and 'there'
vary with the speaker's position precisely as the referents
of 'I' and 'you' change with each change of speaker.
Deictic words therefore can refer to a vast variety of
persons, locations and objects depending upon who is
speaking to whom, where and when they are in conversation,
and what the conversation is about. This contrasts with
the naming words, each of which is used by all speakers of
the language to refer to the ~ object.
Buhler further argues that there are conceptual
similarities between first person pronouns and close-to-the
speaker local deictic terms, and that there are conceptual
similarities between third person pronouns and
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demonstratives. He backs up this argument with evidence
from linguistic studies which suggested that pronouns and
certain deictic words originated from common word stems,
and argues that the postulated similarities are
phenomenologically plausible (Buhler, 1982, PP. 16-17).
There are therefore good arguments to sustain the point of
view that pronouns should not be separated theoretically
from positional deictic terms: both personal pronouns and
positional words are nothing but deictic words.
Buhler describes a coordinate system of subjective
orientation with respect to which the reference of deictic
terms is fixed by the interlocutors. All parties to
the verbal exchange are and remain attached to this system
of coordinates. The point of origin for the coordinate
system is ref err edt 0 as the Qr.l&Q and is rep res ented by
two perpendicular strokes on the page:
+
Three deictic words must be put at the place of 0,.
namely HERE (the verbal place marker), NOW (the verbal
moment marker) and I (the verbal sender marker). These
words, Buhler argues, draw. our attention to the speech
sound out of which they are constructed, and in so doing
they achieve their functions as place, time, and sender
markers.
It is from the origo that all other spatial positions
are identified ('there' as opposed to 'here', which is
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located at the origo) and it is from the origo that all
other time points are identified ('then' as opposed to
'now', which is located at the origo). Thus, all deictic
terms' references are fixed relative to the origo.
Clearly, in fixing such references, differences in
visual perspective between the speaker and listener may
become important. If the speaker and listener are
directly facing one another,. the speaker's right will be .
the listener's left, and vice versa. In some cases, this
difference in perspective will be negligible, as when the
denotatum of 'here' encloses both speaker and listener.
However, the difference does become important in many
cases, and in these cases, the listener has to 'take over'
the orientation or perspective of the speaker, projecting it
onto his own (Klein, 1982; Rommetveit, 1974, 1979). In
some cases, the speaker may adopt the listener's visual
perspective. Buhler gives the following example: "If I
stand as a leader facing an aligned formation of gymnasts,
I would conventionally choose commands, such as 'forward,
backward, to the left, to the right' not in my own system
of orientation, but in theirs, and the translation is
psychologically so straightforward that every group leader
learns to master it ••• n (Buhler, 1982, p, 14). He
further points out that this taking of the perspective of
another can be achieved" ; •• without mental gymnastics
." (P.14). This notion of taking the perspective of a
fellow conversant is further elaborated by Rommetveit
• •
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(1974; see section d) of this chapter).
Klein (1982) summarizes what is involved for a speaker
and listener when they use deictic terms, as follows:
(a) Firstly, the two persons must set up a common deictic
space - for example, the deictic space relevant to their
conversation might be the space of visual perception, or
some geographical space such as, for example, the building
in which the speaker and listener are located. (b) The two
conversants must then fix the position of the origo. (c)
The conversants' next problem is to coordinate their
perspectives (see above discussion), and (d) what 'here'
and 'there' refer to must be delimited. 'Here' is som,g
space enclosing the origo, not the origo itself, and the
boundaries of 'here' are fixed by context and often by our
knowledge of the world. Exactly how this delimitation of
local deictic space is achieved (whether by verbal context,
components of factual knowledge, or gestures) is an
important question for research. (e) The system of
oppositions of the language must be used. For example, in
English there is a two-term system of opposition which is
summarized as 'proximal-distal' (for example, 'here-
there'). Again, this is complicated by the fact that
" 11·'
what is proximal and what is distal or non-proximal depends
on the context. (f) A final potential complication listed
by Klein is that of analogical deixis, for example, when
reference is made to a spot on a map. Two deictic spaces
are involved, the map and the geographical space of which
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the map is an analogue (hence 'analogical deixis'), and the
problem here is how the two deictic spaces are related.
Klein's summary underlines the fact that the use of
local deictic terms (that is, those terms like 'here' and
'there' which refer to locations) is a complicated
business.
(2) Anaphorical deixis
The first of two derivatives of 'pointing' deixis
which Buhler lists is anaphorical deixis. This is where
deictic terms, particularly 'this' and 'that', are used to
refer to 'locations' in an ongoing piece of discourse.
This referring forward or backward to different segments of
a text presupposes that the speaker and listener (or
isolated thinker) have access to the flow of discourse as a
whole, where parts may be retaken up and anticipated.
Many terms are used in anaphorical deixis, including
'here', 'there', 'this' and 'that', and 'therefore' and
'thereafter' are used anaphorically (these latter two terms
stem from 'there' which is itself a positional deictic).
The anaphoric reference to places in the organization of
discourse involves largely the same deictic words as does
demonstratio ad oculos.
(3) Deixis at phantasma
The other derivative of 'pointing' deixis described by
Buhler is termed deixis at phantasma: this is where, for
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example, a narrator takes the listener into the realm of
constructive imagination and uses the same deictic terms to
refer to imaginary entities as he would to refer to
physically present objects. Buhler asks what happens to a
reader or listener in such a case who becomes 'lost' in
imaginary travels, for example. What about the verbal
pointing used by the author (or by the thinker himself in
some cases) which the reader (or thinker) follows in his
'phantasma'? The person is not removed in a literal sense
from his perceptual situation. Buhler divides deixis at
phantasma into three major cases:
(a) The first major case is where, to use Buhler's
metaphor, 'the mountain moves to Mohammed' (Buhler, 1982"
p. 28), that is, the person mentally 'shifts' what is being
imagined into the physically present current environment
where it is 'localized'. In this case, the current body
feeling representation together with the visual perceptual
orientation are maintained and integrated into what is
imagined.
(b) The second major case is where 'Hohammed moves to the
mountain'. In this case, the person is transported in the
imagination to the geographical place which is being
imagined, the person seeing what has been seen before in
real wandering. In this case, the current body feeling
representation is 'taken along' into the imagination.
(c) The third major case is where both Mohammed and
the mountain remain where they are, but Mohammed perceives
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the mountain from his current location. An example would
be where a person when wandering in a strange town is
asked the location of the railway station from whence he
came. Often, he is able to point in its approximate
direction. This third major case is usually a labile and
transitory experience, and, Buhler argues, is an additive
whole or superposition of two localizations, one of them
corresponding to the first and the other to the second
major case.
Buhler argues that all cases of deixis at phantasma
are reducible to one or other of the above three major
cases.
One particular case of deixis at phantasma which
occurs commonly is involved when we give route directions
to another person who has requested them from us. Klein
(1982) and Wunderlich and Reinelt (1982) comment on this
phenomenon. It involves the speaker and listener firstly
setting up a deictic space and coordinating their
perspectives with respect to their joint perceptual field.
The speaker (i.e. the route-direction generator) activates
his cognitive map, localizes his current location and the
destination, and then 'takes' the listener on an 'imaginary
walk'. The 'imaginary walk' is used to generate a route-
description. The speaker initially adopts the
listener's perspective, and in the imaginary walk the origo
is thought of as shifting. The skeleton of the route is
marked by the selection of fixed reference points or pOints
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of orientation (landmarks), and the speaker explicitly or
implicitly sets up a new perspective at each landmark in the
route description. This route description - giving
involving an 'imaginary walk' is an example of Buhler's
second major case (see above).
Kaplan (1977) also developed an interesting theory of
deixis. Kaplan distinguishes demonstrative indexicals
which preserve a gestural component in spoken language, from
Ql!r:g, inf!.g,.!iQgl.§. (suchas 'I', 'here', 'n0 w '), w hich are
used to define a point of origin for a spatio-temporal
coordinate system relative to which demostrative indexicals
can be produced and interpreted. Kaplan argues that all
deictic terms are directly referential - that is, in order
to evaluate the truth of a sentence which uses a deictic
w 0rd , itis a1way s the r:g,fg,r:g,ni 0 f the w 0rdin con text
which is relevant to the evaluation of the truth of the
sentence. For example, if we speak the sentence 'He
(accompanied by the demonstration of a particular person)
is a thief', it is only the person demonstrated (the
referent) who is relevant to the truth or falsity of the
sentence. This contrasts with a situation where a non-
deictic phrase is used, such as 'The butler is a thief'.
This latter sentence depends for its truth on who the
butler is: 'The butler' is not directly referential in the
way that 'He' is. It does not directly refer to a particular
individu..al(Furthermore, to define 'He' as 'the male person
that the speaker is demonstrating' does not result in an
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equivalently directly~referring expression. 'He' is
directly referential and the longer phrase is not.
Hence, indexical terms do not have synonyms).
Kaplan furth~r distinguishes between the content if a
sentence and its character. This is a distinction which
makes good intuitive sense with respect to deictic
expressions. There is one sense in which a deictic word
has a variable meaning, since it can be used to refer to a
variety of individuals and objects depending upon its
context of use. This variability in meaning is the
content. The content of a sentence is the proposition it
expresses (which is equivalent to an intension - see
chapter 1): content is obtained by replacing all deictic
terms by the demonstrata they determine. Content is thus
sensitive to context; thus, for example, the term 'this'
may be used to demonstrate a variety of objects in
different contexts and accordingly the content (intension)
of what is said varies.
On the other hand, there is a sense in which a deictic
term has a constant meaning: it has a constant meaning in
that all speakers of the language use the term in the same
way (for example, the term 'there' always refers to a more
distal location whereas 'here' always refers to a more
proximal location). The term character is used to refer
to the constancy of meaning of a deictic term. A character
is (partly, at least) a semantic rule that we can use to
determine the content in different contexts.
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Character is not sensitive to context (for example,
'there' always refers directly to a demonstrated location
whenever it 1s used in a demonstrative sense).
Thus, Kaplan's notion oflconten~ captures the idea
that deictic words can have a variety of meanings, and his
notion of 'character' captures the constancy of usage of a
deictic word. However, the semantic rule is only one
component of character in Kaplan's theory; a demonstrative
can be thought of as assuming a character only when
completed by a particular demonstration. A character may,
therefore, be likened to a manner of presentation of a
content, and the appearance of the demonstratum is part of
the completed character.
In broad terms, the distinction between content and
character makes good intuitive sense when applied to
deictic expressions. The difference between content and
character has been generally'overlooked bec~use character is
fixed in non-deictic language; the same content is evoked
in all contexts by a non-deictic word.
In discussing Kaplan's theory of demonstrative
reference, Miller (1982) raises some theoretically
interesting complications for Kaplan's theory. One such
complication is the case where the referent of a deictic
expression is not the demonstratum of the demonstration
used - this is referred to as deferred ostension. Quine
(1971) gives the example of someone pOinting to a gas
(petrol) guage in order to show that there is petrol in
122
the tank. Such deferred ostension as occurs in this
example may intuitively seem unproblematic given the
conventional relationship between the state of emptiness of
the tank and the reading of the gauge. However,
referential convention is not always necessary to support
deferred ostension. Deferred ostension can occur in novel
situations, as, for example, in the case when a waitress
says 'He's sitting at table 20' whilst pointing to a ham
sandwich. Nunberg (1977) gives this latter example and
others, and argues that a complete account of demonstrative
reference will require (at least) two theories. One, like
Kaplan's, will explain how a deictic term enables a hearer
to identify a physically present demonstratum. The other
theory will explain how the hearer's knowledge of the
demonstratum enables him to identify the referent of the
deictic term. This latter theory will be required to
explain how an ostensive gesture to a ham sandwich does in
fact refer to the person who ordered the ham sandwich and
not the sandwich itself. Nunberg conceptualizes this
inference (from demonstratum to referent) in terms of a
r.,gf,gr..r:1ngfyn£i1Qn 0 fag ivenus e 0 fat erm w hich , g iven a
demonstratum, delivers a referent.
Nunberg argues that deferred ostension will work when
the property relating the demonstratum to the referent
(that is, the property being used as the referring
function) has high ~ validity. A property has high cue
validity if it distinguishes one object from a range of
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alternatives -'thus, for example, if there is only one red
book on a shelf, then 'red' has a high cue validity for
that book. In using deferred ostension, the speaker has
to choose a referring function which has the highest cue
validity for relating the demonstratum to the intended
referent. In other words, the link between the
demonstrat~d object and the referent has to have high
validity as a cue which enables the listener to infer the
referent from the demonstratum.
Examples of referring functions include the hypostatic
function (i.e. 'is a type of'), in which a particular
individual object is demonstrated in order to refer to all
individuals of that type. For example, 'That (pointing to
a chair) is commonly seen in eighteenth century interiors'.
The particular chair being pointed to is not the intended
referent; instead, the speaker is referring to all chairs
of.that type. The listener knows this from his general
knowledge of eighteenth century interiors and the
conventions of chair ownership. The hypostatic
interpretation of the deictic reference goes so smoothly
that we scarcely notice that the demonstratum of the
subject phrase is not the referent. Another referring
function is exemplified by the case where we demonstrate an
object (such as grass) in order to refer to one of its
properties (e.g., the colour green).
ThUS, the choice of referring function should be based
on the ready inferability of the referent when given the
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demonstratum, i.e. the property relating the demonstratum
to the referent (the referring function) should constitute
a readily inferable relationship. This inferability
depends very much on the characteristics of the listener -
the choice of a referring function therefore has to be made
in the light of what the speaker believes that his listener
is likely to believe or know. This underlines the fact
that the problem of deferred ostension involves a
considerable pragmatic component.
Miller concludes that demonstratives are directly
referential even though a referring function may be
inserted between a demonstratum and the referent of a
demonstrative term; this results in an extended form of
direct reference.
Deixis thus stands squarely within the domain of
pragmatics, both in the space-delimiting referential
function and in the more subtle phenomena such as deferred
ostension. The relation between deictic dissection of
space and proxemics, (our perception of social and
personal space (Hall, 1966» would be an interesting, if
complex, problem.
The more subtle phenomena of deferred ostension
illustrate the fact that the presumed knowledge state and
beliefs of the listener influence the speaker's choice of
phrase (specifically, affecting his choice of referring
function in the case of deferred ostenslon). This in
turn raises the more general question of the extent to
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which the sharing of knowledge and the identities of the
interlocutors influence their speech. We shall now
examine these issues, reviewing in particular the notions of
mutual knowledge (Clark and Marshall, 1981) and audience
design (Clark and Murphy, 1982). These topics in tUrn
lead naturally to more general questions of how the
meanings of non-deictic, symbolic words are affected by
such pragmatic and social factors as the identities of the
dialogue participants.
c) Mutual knowledge and audience design: pragmatic factors
which influence ~ speaker's choice of referrinR expression
In the previous section of this chapter, the
pragmatics of how deictic expressions are used was
examined. It was concluded that particularly in the
case of deferred ostension (where a speaker points to one
object in order to refer to another object), the assessment
by the speaker of the listener's beliefs and knowledge
states is necessary. This section of the chapter will
examine how a speaker's choice of referring expression in
general is influenced by pragmatic factors (that is,
evidence will be reviewed which suggests that not only
deictic, but also other forms of referential devices'
usage are influenced by pragmatic factors). It will b~
argued that the work of a variety of different theorists
supports the view that, when choosing a particular
expression with which to refer to something, the speaker is
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forced to take account of who his listener is and which
particular domains of knowledge they can be expected to
share.
The first theory of relevance in this sphere is the
cognitive theory of semantics (in the sense of "meaning")
advanced by David Olson (1970). Olson argued that
semantic decisions (about which particular referring
expressions to use) by a speaker are based, not on
syntactic or semantic selection restrictions, but on the
speaker's knowledge of the intended referent. In arguing
that semantic decisions are based on knowledge of referents
rather than linguistic selection restrictions, Olson was
advancing a similar argument to that of Johnson-Laird
(1981a; see chapter 2).
Olson's fundamental argument is that semantic
decisions about which type of referring expression to use
are based on the speakers having to distinguish the
intended referent from a (perceived or imagined) set of
possible alternative referents: "We shall adopt the point
that words do not 'mean' referents or stand for referents,
they have a use - they specify perceived events relative to
a set of alternatives; they provide information" (Olson,
,970, P. 263).
This thesis is illustrated by his 'paradigm case', in
which a gold star is placed under a small, round, white,
wooden block. The speaker, who saw the star being placed
under the block, is then asked to tell a listener (who did
I
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not see the star being placed under the block) where the
gold star is. When the description is being given, the
target block is placed in an array of alternative blocks.
In one case, the alternative block is a square, white,
wooden block. In another case, there are three alternative
blocks present, a round, black one, a square black one, and
a square, white one. In the first case (with one square,
white alternative block also present), the speaker would
des cri bet het arget b10 ck as" • • • the 1:.Q1!ns! 0 ne" ,
whereas in the second case (with three alternative blocks
also present), the speaker would describe the target block
as " ••• the round, white one". Thus, the particular
set of possible alternatives from which the referent must
be distinguished affects the speaker's choice of
description. The paradigm case therefore illustrates the
general thesis that semantic decisions regarding the type
of description to be generated are based upon the set of
alternatives from which the referent must be
distinguished.
This general thesis has some interesting corollaries.
Firstly, this point of view implies that words do not name
things: " ••• words designate, signal or specify an
intended referent relative to the set of alternatives from
which it must be differentiated" (Olson, 1970, p, 264).
Another consequence of this point of view is that the
conception of meaning is altered: the meaning of an
utterance is the information provided by the utterance to a
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listener, where "information" refers to any perceptual or
linguistic cue that reduces the number of alternatives to
the intended referent. Thus, traditional views to the
effect that words symbolize the objects they designate is
challenged: " ••• words (or utterances) nei ther
symbolize, stand for, nor represent referents, objects, or
events. They serve rather to differentiate some perceived
event from some set of alterna tives" (p. 265). The
meaning of a word is therefore its parti tioning of a set of
alternatives; meaning is reconceptualized in informational
rather than symbolic terms.
Another interesting corollary of this view follows
from the fact that all of the information required by the
speaker is perceptual and is available to him before he
generates the utterance (as is exemplified by the paradigm
case). It follows from this that utterances are redundant
for the speaker but provide information for the listener.
Furthermore, since a word or utterance specifies the
perceived referent and also (implicitly) the set of
excluded alternatives, it contains m~ information than
the simple perception of the referent itself. A
description of an object implicitly specifies the set of
alternatives from which it has been distinguished, and
explicitly specifies the critical feature which
distinguished the object from the alternatives.
Perception of the object alone (for example, the target
round, white block) does not specify the critical feature
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which distinguishes it; the critical feature could be its
colour, the grain of the wood from which it is made, the
way in which it is handled by the experimenter, and so on.
Thus, there is more information in the utterance than in
the perception of the object alone.
Much of our conversation about objects involves sets
of alternatives which are not physically present. Olson
accordingly hypothesizes that the speaker makes his
semantic decision on the basis.of inferred alternatives -
he infers what the alternatives being entertained by the
listener are. Such an inferential process is a purely
pragmatic one; who the listener is, how well the speaker
knows him, what they mutually know, and other such
pragmatic factors are going to be of great importance in
making this inference.
Olson's theory, whilst emphasizing cognition
(knowledge of referents) and perception, clearly involves a
pragmatic component which centres on what 'common ground'
the speaker and listener share, and this in turn relates to
Clark and Marshall's notion of 'mutual knowledge' which
will be discussed later.
The principal objection to Olson's theory is that
people often use a more specific description than Olson's
model predicts. For an array with a rock and a dog in it,
people say "Look at the dog" rather than "Look at the
living thing" as Olson's model would predict. This level
of preferred naming, at a middle level of abstraction, has
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been called the basic level of abstraction (Rosch, 1976).
The basic level of abstraction maximizes two factors
simultaneously, namely (1) basic level terms are specific
and (2) they are dissimlar to other categories. It would
appear that speakers design their descriptions to convey as
much information as possible yet not to make unnecessary or
inappropriate distinctions in the particular situation of
speaking (Clark and Murphy, 1982).
Another study which directly tackles the problem of a
speaker's choice of referring expressions is that by
Marslen-Wilson, Levy and Tyler (1982). The approach of
these theorists was methodologically unusual in that they
had a single speaker read a single story then retell it
from memory to a listener. The story was a comic-book
story concerning a battle between two superhuman monsters,
'The Hulk vs The Thing' or the 'battle of the behemoths'.
Whilst the speaker had to retell the narrative from
memory, the comic book cover was available to him on his
lap, and he used this for the purpose of pointing to the
(depicted) protagonists on some occasions. The speaker
was video- and audio-taped, and the study examined the
manner in which the speaker introduced and subsequently
referred to the protagonists with respect to the
informational context of the descriptions.
The main motivation behind the study was to assess
whether the speaker adjusts the nature of the referential
devices he is using to the informational conditions under
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which they occur, and therefore allows the listener to
unambiguously resolve the references at the point at which
they occur in the speech stream. This makes the basic
assumption that "the ways humans produce speech are
necessarily closely adapted to the ways that humans can
comprehend speech" (Marslen-Wilson et al., 1982, p. 339).
Speech production is approached from the perspective of a
theory of the listener, and assumes a complementarity
between speaking and listening •
.The study thus examined whether there was any
systematic pattern in the d1str1bution of different
referential devices across different informational
contexts. The different types of referential device
varied on a dimension of lexical specificitX.
Referential devices which are less lexically specific
(such as pronouns) presuppose for their interpretation
information that has to be supplied by the listener,
whereas referential devices which are more lexically
specific (such as names) require less information to be
supplied by the listener. The various types of
referential devices examined, with the most lexically
specific first and the remainder in order of decreasing
lexical specificity, were: names plus definite
descriptions (e.g, "The Hulk, the green guy"), names alone,
non-specific noun-phrases or pro-forms (e.g. "one of these
guys"), personal pronouns, and zero anaphors (zero
anaphors are cases in which the specification of the
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referential device becomes lexically empty, such as "he
takes the merry-go-round and 0 whips it around at supersonic
speed". The 0 marks the location of the lexically empty
referential device).
The informational context in which these different
devices occurred was assessed in terms of a dimension of
"degree of embedding". The 'degree of embedding'
reflected the levels of organization of the narrative,
with the 'story' level being the least embedded level, and
the 'episode' and the 'event' levels representing
increasingly more embedded levels. The 'story' level of
embedding is necessary to capture the fact that the
protagonists in the story cannot be talked about until
they have been introduced into the story in the first
place. The,episode level of-embedding reflects the fact
that the comic-book itself is segmented into a series of
distinct scenes. The 'event' level corresponds to the
fact that each episode typically contained a number of
distinct sequences of actions, with each sequence marked
by a change of actor(s) and/or a change of location
within the location of the episode.
Thus, Marslen-Wilson et al. essentially sought to
examine whether the use of the different types of
referential device was correlated with the level of
informational context such that the most referentially
specific devices (names plus descriptions) were used
initially where there is little or no informational
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context, and the least lexically specific devices
(pronouns and zero anaphors) were used when there was a
great deal of informational context (that is, at the most
deeply embedded layers of the story). They did in fact
find such a regular correspondence between informational
contexts and types of referential device: " ••• the
actual deployment of referential devices turns out to be
precisely constrained by the local environment in which
the devices will have to function, and by the extent to
which the available intra- and extra-linguistic context
can support the requirements of different types of
device" (Marslen-Wilson et al. 1982, p. 355).
A closer examination of the on-line resolvability of
referential devices revealed some interesting facets of
the data which suggest that pragmatic factors are of
importance in the resolution of pronominal reference.
Several factors assist in the resolution of
pronominal reference. The lexical properties of the
pronoun itself constrain the number and gender of the
antecedent (for example, the pronoun "He" req~ires that
the antecedent be singular and male). Syntax and
prosody also assist the assignment of reference.
approaches in the psychological and artificial
intelligence literature emphasize the importance of these
Many
three types of constraint, suggesting that on encountering a
pronoun, a search is instituted for possible antecedents
which match these lexical properties of the pronoun.
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Such a search might, for example, be based on recency;
thus, memory is searched for the most recently encountered
possible antecedent which matches the pronoun on all three
counts, and this is accepted as the pronoun's antecedent.
Marslen-Wilson et al. argue, however, that such search
strategies misconstrue the role of inference in pronoun
resolution. Such inferences, or 'pragmatic checking' as
Marslen-Wilson et. al. put it, assist in resolving the
reference by assessing whether the properties predicated
of the pronoun in the utterance are plausibly consistent
with the properties assigned to the possible antecedents
in the previous discourse.
Marslen-Wilson et al.'point to cases in their data
where such 'pragmatic inferences' alone could resolve the
pronominal reference whilst a search strategy based on
recency would deliver the ~rong antecedent. An example
of this is a case where the two protagonists, The Hulk
and The Thing, had been fighting on top of a skyscraper
building, and The Hulk had just fallen to the ground sixty
storeys below. The speaker continues (N.B.: ' ••• '
indicates unfilled pauses):
" ••• so The Thing has to get down to •••
the ground level ••• before The Hulk recovers
enough ••• while he1 's still stunned ••• so
he2 rips open the elevator door and just sort
of slides down the cable ••• "
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A recency strategy would assign the correct antecedent for
he,: The Hulk is indeed still stunned, having fallen
sixty storeys to the ground, and is currently in progress
of recovery from this fall. He2 would be wrongly
assigned to The Hulk by a recency search strategy; he2
must refer to The Thing, because the action of ripping
open elevator doors in order to slide down the elevator
cable to ground floor level is inconsistent both with
being stunned, and in particular, with being stunned at
the bottom of a building, having just fallen from the top.
The two pronominal references can only be resolved by
recourse to world knowledge. The 'pragmatic checking' is
thus necessary for pronoun resolution in this instance
(Marslen-Wilson et al., 1982, p. 363).
The checking is 'pragmatic'! in two senses; the
sense used by Marslen-Wilson et al. is that what is
predicated of the pronoun is plausibly consistent with the
antecedent. The 'pragmatic checking' is also pragmatic
in the technical sense employed in this volume. It is
pragmatic in the more technical sense in that the speaker
is relying upon the listener sharing certain world
knowledge and using this to resolve the pronominal
references. In this case, the speaker relies upon the
listener's knowledge of which states (such as being
stunned at the bottom of a building) are consistent or
* N.B. 'Pragmatic' will be enclosed in quotes when used in
its non-technical sense.
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inconsistent with particular actions (such as ripping open
elevator doors in order to slide down to the ground
level). It is worth remembering that the speaker was
previously shown to display great sensitivity in his
choice of different referential devices relative to the
informational context in which they occurred. It is
therefore unlikely that his reliance on mutual knowledge
and 'pragmatic checking' on the basis of that mutual
knowledge is a lapse into laziness on his part; rather,
it suggests that mutual knowledge is an important entity
which speakers and listeners exploit with some frequency.
Marslen-Wilson et al. note (p.361) that all 35 pronouns
in the sample are disambiguated by the 'pragmatic'
properties of the utterances in which they occur, when
interpreted relative to the discourse properties of the
potential antecedents.
Once again, this example points to the speaker and
listener using mutual knowledge to guide the description
generation and reference resolution problem. An issue
which naturally arises from this takes the form of a
simple question: how does the speaker know that a
particular piece of knowledge is shared by himself and his
listener? The problem of mutual knowledge and its
influence upon reference generation has been examined by
Clark and Marshall (1981), who examined the relation
between mutual knowledge and definite reference.
Definite reference (when we refer to an object name
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preceded by the definite article "The. ". , for example)
has inspired a vast literature in the disciplines of
linguistics, philosophy, artificial intelligence, and
psychology, concerning conditions for the felicitous use
of definite reference. Clark and Marshall argue that
with definite reference (used in the non-generic,
referential fashion), speakers refer to individuals -
things in particular knowledge (particular knowledge is a
partition of mutual knowledge, a partition containing
knowledge about particular individual objects, states,
events, and processes). The essence of·Clark and
Marshall's position regarding definite reference is this:
for a speaker to use a definite reference to a thing, he
must be confident that because of his speech act the
identity of that thing will become mutually known to him
and his listener. Thus, a definite reference to an
object results in the listener inferring mutual knowledge
of the identity of that object. The question then
arises as to what mutual knowledge ~.
Mutual knowledge is knowledge that is shared by
spea kera nd Ii sten er, EIl.Q .Hh1Qh 1~ KIl.2.HIl.12 Qg ~hE.!:gQ QY
The questions of importance concerning
such mutually shared knowledge are the following: (1)
What type of shared knowledge is needed for language use?
and (2) How is that shared knowledge in practice assessed
and secured?
Mutual knowledge is potentially something of a paradox
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from the point of view of information processing. The
reason is simply that in order for persons A and B to
mutually know some proposition p, it is necessary that:
(1) A knows that p.
( 1 ' ) B knows that p.
( 2) A knows that B knows that p.
(2' ) B knows that A knows that p.
(3) A knows that B knows that A knows that p.
( 3 ' ) B knows that A knows that B knows that p.
et cetera, ad infinitum.
There is thus a potentially infinite regress; in
order for A to know that A and B possess mutual knowledge of
some proposition p'(such as the fact that a Scotland vs.
England International soccer match will soon take place),
A must know that Scotland will play against England, A
must know that B knows that Scotland will play against
England, A must know that B knows that A knows that
Scotland will play against England, and so on, ad
infinitum. Thus, in order for A to ~ this mutual
knowledge in order to felicitously generate a definite
reference (for example, to inquire whether B intends to go
to "The big match"), A has to check through a potentially
infinite number of knowledge (or belief) statements.
This checking would require a very large amount of time in
order to generate one definite reference. However,
interlocutors can generate such references in a matter of
seconds •.
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Clark and Marshall argue that instead of performing
such an infinite regress of belief checking, interlocutors
use certain heuristics to assess whether they have an
evidential basis for assuming mutual knowledge. If there
are such grounds for assuming mutual knowledge, they use a
mutual knowledge induction schema to infer its existence.
The heuristics used by individuals as a means of
collecting evidence from which to infer mutual knowledge
are termed copresence heuristics. For example, suppose
that two people, A and B, are sitting across a table and
that there is a single candle on the table between them.
from person A's point of view, there is direct evidence
for the truth of (1):
(1) A knows that there is a candle on the table.
A also knows that A and B are looking at each other and
the candle simultaneously (this is the simultaneity
assumption). A also assumes that B is attending to the
candle (the attention assumption). Finally, A assumes
that B is rational and will draw the same conclusions as A
does (this is the rationality assumption). If B is
rational and is attending to the candle, he has evidence
for (1'):
(1') B knows that there is a candle on the table.
From the above three assumptions, that B is attending to A
and the candle simultaneously, and that B is rational, A
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can conclude (2):
(2) A knows that B knows that there is a candle on the
table.
If B is rational, he will be drawing a parallel inference
about A, namely (2'):
(2') B knows that A knows that there is a candle on
the table.
Once again, A can conclude (2') from the three
assumptions, and can have evidence for (3):
(3) A knows that B knows that A knows that there is a
candle on the table.
Likewise, the corresponding statement can be inferred
by B, and so on to infinity. ,The above illustrates the
operation of the mutual knowledge induction schema, which
Clark and Marshall summarize as folows (Clark and
Marshall, 1981, P. 33):
A and B mutually know that p if and only if some
state of affairs G ('grounds') holds such that:
1. A and B have reason to believe that G holds.
2. G indicates to A and B that each has reason to
believe that G holds.
3. G indicates to A and B that p.
In the candle example above, the grounds G is A and
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B's evidence of the triple copresence of the candle, A and
B, and their auxiliary assumptions. A and B each have
reason to believe that G holds. "These grounds G
indicate to each of them that the other has reason to
believe that they hold. And the grounds G indicate to both
of them that there is a candle on the table. By the
induction schema • "(A and B) "mutually know that there is
a candle on the table" (Clark and Marshall, 1981, p. 33).
Thus, once two people have proper grounds which
satisfy the three requirements of the induction schema,
they can assume mutual knowledge, rather than computing the
infinity of belief statements. This is an economical
solution in terms of memory load: A does not represent
statements (1), (2), (3), ••• and so on, but instead
merely represents directly: A and B mutually know that p.
Mutual knowledge is thus inferred from the induction
schema given evidence and assumptions, thereby obviating
the processing paradox. If mutual knowledge is to be
assumed when the evidence on copresence is weak, the
assumptions made in inferring the mutual knowledge must be
stronger (for example, B may temporarily not be attending
to the candle in the example above; if A then mentions
'this candle', this causes B to look at the candle. This
is termed potential physical copresence). Mutual
knowledge can be of different types, depending upon the
type of copresence evidence upon which it is based.
There are in fact three types of copresence evidence:
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physical copresence, linguistic copresence and community
membership.
(i) Community membership
If both A and B are members of a particular community
and both mutually recognize that they are members of that
communi ty, then both A and B can take for granted the
body of knowledge in the community. If both A and B
recognize that they are members of the community of
educated Americans, for example, then both can take it for
granted that they both know the things that the community
of educated Americans know, such as the fact that American
Independence was declared on July 4th 1776, George
Washington was the first president of the U.S.A., and so
on. This type of mutual knowledge is preserved over long
periods of time: once A and B are aware that they are
both members of the community of educated Americans,
they are likely to bear that fact in mind for use in
reference to all sorts of things. Mutual knowledge of
the next three types, however, is ordinarily relevant only
for short periods of time. It is based on evidence that
is in a sense more direct.
(ii) Physical copresence
The strongest evidence for mutual knowledge is
physical copresence, exemplified by the 'candle' example
discussed earlier. The fact that the three relevant
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objects or persons are physically present together plus
the physical/perceptual evidence that each of A and B have
concerning one another's attention to the candle, is
strong enough to render the three auxiliary assumptions
relatively trivial. In such conditions, mutual knowledge
is secure and definite reference to "this candle" is
possible. Mutual knowledge can also be based on past
shared experiences, such as both person A and person B
having seen a cinema film together at some point in the
past.
(iii) Linguistic copresence
Listener and speaker can take as part of their common
ground things that have been referred to in previous
conversation.
(iv) Mixtures
Very often, mutual knowledge is established by use of
evidence based on mixtures of the above three sorts of
evidence; for example, physical copresence and community
membership.
Clark and Marshall argue that the three forms of
definite reference, namely, deixis, anaphora, and proper
names, correlate clearly with the different types of mutual
knowledge. "Deixis corresponds to physical copresence;
anaphora corresponds to linguistic copresence; and proper
names corresponds to community membership. The fit could
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could hardly be more obvious" (Clark and Marshall, 1981,
p.42).
Clark and Marshall argue that the assumptions of
many popular models of comprehension which assume that
memory contains referential indices for separate entities
E1 ••• En' is a mistaken one. Instead, they characterize
memory as being more like a di~ cross-referenced to an
encyclopaedia. The 'diary' component of memory would
record instances of copresence; the 'encyclopaedia'
component would be necessary for mutual knowledge based on
community membership, containing all the generic and
particular knowledge which the person believes is
universal to each community he belongs to (he could belong
to several different communities at the same time, being
in the community of Californians, the community of social..
psychologists, and so on).
This organization of memory underlines Clark and
Marshall's thesis that memory must be organized around
events (hence the diary component), and these events
contain evidence of copresence of one kind or another.
This organization enables a person to decide whether a
given entity is mutually known both to himself and to his
fellow conversant. When a definite reference is made, the
listener must search in memory for an event during which
himself, the speaker and the referent were copresent, and
he can use this event (plus auxiliary assumptions) to
inductively infer mutual knowledge of the identity of the
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referent.
This viewpoint has very interesting social-pragmatic
consequences. Clark and Marshall argue that speakers
prepare themselves to talk or listen to ~ particular other
person every time they enter into conversation. The
identity of our fellow conversant makes a great deal of
difference to the knowledge which we access from our
memory (the 'encyclopaedia' component of memory). lie
access the relevant information pertaining to the
community that both ourself and our fellow conversant
belong.
This in turn implies that we carry around detailed
models of other people we know, and when we are in
conversation with them, we selectively access only the
"common ground" knowledge which we share with that
particular person. I may know, for example, that both I
and my fellow conversant are members of the community of
psychology postgraduate students, and so, when entering
into conversation with that particular other person, I
would selectively access only the body of knowledge
common to that particular community when in conversation
with that person •.
The social-pragmatic emphasis of this concept-
ualization of conversation 1s obvious. It implies that
we do not produce language'within the constraints of
grammar and semantics alone; there are also 'social
constraints' in that the identity of our fellow
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conversant constrains which background knowledge we will
access. These 'social constraints' affect quite detailed
aspects of our linguistic behaviour, even to the level of
something as detailed as our choice of a particular type
of referential device. We construct our conversation
with specific listeners in mind, and this highly specific
construction process is based upon the 'common ground' of
background knowledge which we share with the particular
listener in question.
This social-pragmatic conceptualization of
conversation opens up the possibility that what is
understood by what is said will be a function of the
particular other with whom we are in conversation: we may
understand totally different things by the same sentence
depending upon the identity of the speaker. Indeed, Clark
and Marshall conclude that mutual knowledge ". • • is at
the very heart of the notion of linguistic convention and
speaker meaning" (p, 58). This issue of different
meanings being understood from the same utterance
depending upon the identity of the speaker is explored in
more detail by Rommelveit (1974) and will be discussed
later in this chapter (section d).
To summarize, Clark and Marshall are arguing that we
construct our conversation with particular listeners in
mind. Clark and Murphy (1982) have also examined this
general phenomenon and refer to it as audience design.
The phenomenon of audience design (constructing utterances
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for a particular audience) has been noted in the case of
both speaking (Rommetveit, 1974) and writing (Sanford and
Garrod, 1981).
Audience design is based on mutual knowledge, which
was discussed above.
Speakers' awareness of what knowledge is shared by
themselves and their listeners allows them to construct
their utterances in a way which is perfectly
understandable to the particular addressee in question,
but not to other individuals. For example, if a speaker
and listener share the knowledge that a particular woman
had just been sitting in a particular chair, the speaker
may point at the empty chair and say "That woman is named
Veronica" and be confident that the listener will
understand who is being referred to. Utterances are not
intended to be understood by anyone, but instead are
designed to be understood by particular listeners with
particular momentary thoughts and beliefs.
Clark and Hurphy argue that the listener can use this
in figuring out what the speaker meant. For example, if
a speaker refers to "the man you met yesterday" this
description implicitly instructs the listener to r~ason as
follows: the speaker must have good reason to believe
that the listener can readily identify the referent on the
basis of their mutual knowledge; furthermore, the
listener should believe that the speaker believes this.
They may only share knowledge of the listener meeting one
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person the day before (although the listener may have met
many people the day before), and so, the tacit reasoning
goes, the speaker must be referring to that one person
whom they both know the listener met the day before.
Effectively, the listener reasons "If she thinks I can
readily identify her referent uniquely, she must be
referring to the only person that we mutually know that I
met yesterday, namely Jacques". This use of the audience
design of the utterance by the listener in a tacit
reasoning process is termed the design assumption by Clark
and Hurphy. Thus, audience design works successfully,
according to Clark and Murphy, because listeners tacitly
reason from the assumption that the utterance was produced
for them, reasoning back to the mutual knowledge basis for
the utterance and thereby resolving the definite
reference.
The effectiveness of the 'design assumption'
reasoning by the listener in the resolution of definite
references was demonstrated in an experiment by Clark,
Schreuder and Buttrick (in preparation). Buttrick
approached students on the campus of Stanford University and
showed them a photograph of president Ronald Reagan
standing next to his director of the budget, David
Stockman (an independent survey had shown that people
assumed Reagan was known to everyone but Stockman was not).
Buttrick asked each student one of the two following
questions:
149
(1) You know who this man is, don't you?
(2) Do you have any idea at all who this man is?
The same definite description, this ID£n, was used in
both utterances. However, students replied "Yes, that's
Reagan" to question (1) and "Yes, 'I believe that's
Stockman" to question (2). Question (2) presupposes that
the speaker doubts that the listener knows who is being
referred to, whereas question (1) presupposes that the
listener knows who is being referred to. Clark and
Murphy conclude that the respondents were using the
presuppositions implicit in the questions, and the public
knowledge that Reagan is better known, to enable them to
use the design assumption in order to establish who the
referent was.
In addition to being of importance for definite
reference, audience design is also of importance in
anaphoric reference and word meaning, according to Clark
and Murphy. Novel coinages, such as the following one,
illustrate the importance of audience design:
l1y sis te r rnanaged to Houd in i her vlay into the office
this morning.
Clark and Murphy argue that such innovations have an
indefinite number of possible senses. Clark and Clark
(1979) called expressions whose senses are not enumerable
contextual expressions. Clark and Murphy argue that such
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contextual expressions are ubiquitous and are
interpretable only because of their audience design. A
speaker would only use an expression such as to Houdini
if he were confident that the relevant background
knowledge (in this case the knowledge of Houdini's
capability of going through locked doors) were part of the
mutual knowledge of himself and his listener. Clark and
Murphy argue that contextual expressions are an ordinary
part of language and that they are usually understood
quickly and without special effort or disruption.
Clark and Murphy conclude that listeners can never
know when they hear a word whether it is being used in one
of its well established senses, if it has one, or in an
innovative sense, and that ultimately listeners must· rely
on the design assumption in deciding what the speaker
meant. Thus, audience design and reasoning from the
design assumption is used both for contextual expressions
and for the selection of particular senses of words which
are not used in this innovative fashion.
Whilst Clark and Murphy's examples and arguments
highlight the importance of the phenomenon of speakers
designing their utterances for particular listeners, their
explanation of the phenomenon (in terms of a reasoning
process, outlined above) intuitively seems implausible.
It seems intuitively unlikely that such explicit (or
tacit) reasoning processes would take. place every time a
listener heard an utterance designed specifically for him.
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It would intuitively seem that 'audience design' would
work via some other mechanism, rather than via the
somewhat contrived reasoning process advocated by Clark
and Murphy.
Another theorist who emphasizes the importance of
'audience design' as a ubiquitous phenomenon in everyday
language use is Rommetveit (1974,1979); Rommetveit,
however, explains the phenomenon in rather different
terms, and it is to an exposition of Rommetveit's views
that we now turn.
Ql The 'pragma tic counterrevolut ion': the theor ies of
Rommetveit (1974, 1979, ~)
The title of this section of the chapter is based
upon the notion (Greene, 1972; see chapter 1) that the
work of Noam Chomsky constituted something of a revolution
in thinking about language. Rommetveit, on the other
hand, emphasizes pragmatics and his whole approach (see,
for example, his 1974 book) is set up in explicit
opposition to Chomsky's. The phrase 'pragmatic
counterrevolution' is Rommetvei t's (Rommetvei t, 1984),
and neatly summarizes the changes in theorizing about
language that have taken place in the last thirty or so
years; first, a syntactic revolution and an awareness of
complexities in language which had not hitherto been
adequately appreciated; subsequently, the theories
reported in this chapter explicitly challenge the initial
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'syntactic revolution' by pointing to significant
pragmatic aspects of language use which the
transformational grammar-based approach fails to capture.
The pragmatic counterrevolution is not, however, yet fully
under way, but it is fair to say that an increasingly great
amount of attention is currently being paid to the
influence of pragmatic factors.
Rommetveit's theoretical position can be adumbrated
as follows: what is missing from the psycholinguistic
approach based on transformational grammar is actual ~
of the language to convey messages. We cannot,
Rommetveit argues, analyze language in terms of
propositional analyses of single sentences in vacuo: this
is artificial, since in practice, we make utterances fQ£ g
purpose and the choice of utterance is affected by the
pragmatics of the situation, that is, by whom we are
talking to. We therefore should be analyzing lihat is
!!lgQ~ knQHn by an ut tera nce in g &.i.Y.~n£Q.!11~x1Qf !!§.~,
rather than attempting to assess the 'literal meaning' of
an utterance in terms of its propositional content. In order
to assess what is made known, we need to examine the
semantic potentialities of the utterance, rather than its
'literal meaning', and we have to assess these meaning
potentialities in relation to a social context of actual
use. This necessitates us having a way of characterizing
the social context.
When actually using language, we choose our
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phraseology to suit our audience, as was illustrated by the
work of Clark and Murphy. Conversely, what our audience
understands us to mean by what.we say is a function of the
fact that it is li~ who speak (as opposed to someone else).
When the speaker/listener roles are exchanged, it is our
turn to listen on the premises of the speaker, and he must
then speak on our premises. Communication 1s thus based
on a reciprocally endorsed and spontaneously fulfilled
contract of complementarity - encoding involves anticipatory
decoding (speech is listener oriented), and decoding is
speaker oriented. In other words, speech is
constructed with a specific listener in mind, whilst the
listener must try to reconstruct what the speaker intends
to make known.
This is the essence of the contractual nature of
language use: we tacitly endorse a contract with the
other participant which specifies what we are to understand
by what is said, that is, a contract concerning shared
strategies of categorization: we agree to categorize
things in the same way as the other participant. Speech
is therefore listener oriented to the extent that the
speaker monitors his speech in accordance with his
assumptions about the extent of social world and strategies
of categorization which are shared by him and his listener.
This raises another vital element in speaking and
listening: the taking of the perspective or role of the
other participant. This notion relates to the
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philosopher G. H. Mead's (1934) 'symbolic interactionism'.
In order for a speaker to indulge in anticipatory
decoding, he must take the role of the listener (i.e.
decentrate); conversely, attempting to assess what a
speaker intended to make known involves the listener
adopting the speaker's prespective or role.
These two notions of intersubjectively sharing a
strategy of categorization, and the taking of the role of
the other participant in speaking and listening, are the
cornerstones of Rommetveit's theoretical edifice.
What we understand by a given utterance therefore
depends upon who is actually speaking, and the range of
semantic potentialities inherent in any utterance is a
function of the range of different 'others' whose roles we
can take. For example, consider the utterance:
I too was invited
I went to the ball
and it rolled
and rolled away.
. . .
If we are under the impression that the utterance
originated from a schizophrenic patient, we would most
likely consider the utterance to be incoherent. If,
however, we are under the impression that the utterance is
that of a poet, we are not bewildered by it quite so much and
perhaps we may extract, either intuitively and
emotionally, or even in a verbally expressible fashion,
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a feeling that has been conveyed by the poet. The point
of the example is that radically different
interpretations ensue depending upon who we think the
speaker is. The complementarity of speaking and listening
is based on a tacit contract; Rommetveit's whole approach
is based upon the question of which social contracts are
tacitly and reciprocally endorsed by the participants in a
conversation, and 01 how we take the role or perspective of
different others with whom we speak. This decentering
and taking the role of the other is such a pervasive
feature of normal social interaction that we fail to notice
it at all, according to Rommetveit.
The pragmatic emphasis of this ap~roach ties in very
well with the work of Clark and Murphy discussed above.
We will firstly consider Rommetveit's views on why the
Chomskyan approach is inadequate as a psychological model
of communication, then we will turn to Rommetveit's
characterization of the social context of language use.
i) The ~ against transformational ~mmar-based
analyses of communication
In Rommetveit's (1914) book, he begins by explicitly
challenging the Harvard-M.I.T. (Chomskyan) approach to
language understanding as inadequate and argues in favour
of replacing the Chomskyan approach with a rather more
social-psychological approach. Some of Rommetveit's
criticisms resemble points raised by Clark and Murphy
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(1982).
Initially, the Chomskyan approach advocated the
exploration of language essence rather than its use
(Chomsky, 1968, p. 62). Later, however, this standpoint
was restated as a cautious working hypothesis - by 1972,
the Harvard-M.I.T. school had turned its attention to such
problems as presupposition. Rommetveit is also
interested in what is presupposed by a speaker and
listener, but his approach to the problem is rather
different from that of the Chomskyan psycholinguists.
The work which stemmed from Chomsky's theory
concentrated upon the study of isolated sentences in vacuo;
in particular, speakers of the language were asked to use
their intuitions to judge the grammaticality of word
strings presented to them. This emphasis on the sentence
resulted in some theorists taking the sentence to be the
most natural unit of analysis, especially since larger
segments of discourse are less clearly definable (Lyons,
1968, p. 172). This view has been challenged on two
counts; firstly, as Sanford and Garrod (1981) point out,
exclusively focussing at the level of the sentence results
in a lack of appreciation of interesting and important
phenomena (such as anaphoric reference) which operate at a
suprasentential level. The second challenge to this
methodological convenience is an argument advanced by
Rommetveit, which is based on the notion that the study of
the isolated sentence in vacuo divorces the sentence from
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actual ~ and this renders the task artificial.
Rommetveit points out that in such studies involving
intuitive judgements about the grammaticality or
otherwise or isolated sentences, the instructions are
ambiguous and, as a result, subjects instruct themselves.
What is being judged therefore varies, depending upon what
the informant thinks the researcher wants him to do, and
depending upon the particular judgemental context of the
sentence. Thus, for example, the sentence "My spinster
aunt is an infant" may be judged nonsensical (i.e.
illogical) in the context of having judged 'parents are
older than their children', or it can be judged as
mea ningful (i.e. 'reasonable, can certainly be said') in
the immediate judgemental context of 'sleepless green ideas
sleep furiously'. The judgements, Rommetveit argues, are
related to actual and potential use, and lack of
specification of different domains of use. A judgement
of 'nonsensical' implies that the judged sequence of words
cannot be used, and the discovery of ambiguities implies
envisaging distinctively different ways in which a
particular meaningful sequence can be used. Thus, under
conditions of ambiguous instruction, subjects spontaneously
resort to potential use as a criterion of acceptability for
the experimental materials.
Rommetveit (1974) likens this sort of work to that of
Ebbinghaus on the 'nonsense syllable': Ebb inghaus's
'nonsense' (rmean ingt easr) trigrams were in fact made
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meaningful by subjects relating them to actual words.
Likewise, subjects in studies of intuitive judgements of
grammaticality of word strings spontaneously resort to
potential uses and plausible contextual frames.
Rommetveit (1974, p. 14) describes both the nonsense of
the 'nonsense syllable' and the sentence detached from a
context of use as experimenter-centred illusions.
A further practice of the Harvard-M.I.T. school of
which Rommetveit is critical is the assigning of
propositional content to sentences in vacuo. Deep
sentence structure and propositional conte~t, he argues,
represent abstractions in which the language has been
deprived of its connection with the pre-established
social reality in which communication takes place. Such
abstractions thus tell us nothing about the social
context in which discourse is normally embedded and,
furthermore, do not therefore succeed in explicating the
variety of potential messages which can be made known by
the utterance in different social contexts. Instead of
considering utterances as having a particular
propositional content, we should, he argues, consider them
as having a set of semantic potentialities. That is to
say, a given sentence could make a variety of assertions
depending upon the social context in which it is embedded.
For example, in a situation where two tenants of an
apartment block are engaged in a conversation about the
general property of the neighbourhood, in which all flats
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have been occupied by young couples, and where an elderly
man has recently moved into a vacant flat, one of the
conversants may say:
"The old man is poor".
The word "poor" has a variety of meanings. In this
context, it could mean reliance upon public financial
support; in a dialogue about the third world, it could
mean living below the subsistence level - notice that both
of these meanings are the opposite of 'wealthy' - hence,
simple semantic oppositions do not do justice to the
meaning potentialities of such a lexical item in actual
use. In a different context, 'poor' can convey a sense of
pity in the speaker - as in 'he's a poor old soul'; in
yet another context, 'The old man is poor' could refer to
a dearth of artistic talent in an elderly artist who is
under discussion - etc.
Furthermore, even within the "new tenant" context,
different assertions could be made by the sentence: this
is easily seen by considering intonational variations of
the pronunciation of the sentence:
e.g. "The old !!ls.n is poor" - 1.e. it is a m an rat her than a
woman who is poor.
"The old man i.§. poor" - i ,e, the old man is
currently poor, regardless of
his previous state of wealth
or poverty.
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The Harvard-M.I.T. approach to such a sentence would
be to assign propositional content to the sentence by
breaking it down, as follows:
a) The man is old.
b) The man is poor.
Proposition b) is treated as the "focus" (i.e. the
phrase which should contain the intonation centre and
which is therefore what is being asserted by the sentence)
and proposition a) is the 'presupposition' on to which the
'focus' proposition is nested. This distinction is a
formula for assessing what is novel information as opposed
to what is assumed to be the case.
However, the above example clearly demonstrates that
this propositional analysis fails to capture the variety
of potential messages which could be conveyed by the
sentence even within one given context. Such
propositional analyses, which Rommetveit describes as
'straightjackets', fail to do justice to the inherent
flexibility of natural language, a flexibility which the
poet turns to his advantage. The postulation of
unequivocal literal meanings is a futile exercise,
Rommetveit argues.
A striking example of how propositional analyses fail
to do full justice to an expression's potentialities for
conveying meaning is a line from a poem by Dylan Thomas ,
quoted in Rommetveit (1974):
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I bought sincerity a grief ago.
This would be regarded as semantically anomalous if
analyzed in terms of propositional content, yet it is
beautifully meaningful in a poetic context and (quite
strikingly) succeeds in conveying a message. Rommetvei t
argues that the artist's achievement is often evaluated in
terms of his capacity to create novel social realities,
that is, to make his reader experience aspects of life
which are somehow blurred or even concealed by
conventional language use. What is conveyed by the line
of poetry can only be fully assessed in the light of the
setting in which it is embedded, that is, the partly
institutionalized poet-to-reader-of-poetry setting, as
opposed to other settings in which it could appear. To
quote Rommetveit, "In order to find out what is made known
when something is read or heard we therefore have to
inquire into what kind of contract has been established by
the two participants in that particular act of
communication. This implies, in turn, an exploration
of which aspects of a multifaceted and pluralistic world
constitute the temporarily shared social reality"
(Rommetveit, 1974, p.25).
Rommetveit's case for a pragmatic approach to meaning
relies on the above two pOints; firstly, the consideration
of message potential as opposed to 'literal meaning', and
secondly, the relation of what is said to whatever
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constitutes the temporarily shared social world of the
speaker and listener, i.e. the shared 'here-and-now:
Communication aims at the transcendence of the
'private' world of the participants, setting up what
Rommetveit (1974, 1979) refers to as 'states of
intersubjectivity'. One of the important elements of the
state of intersubjectivity is a degree of overlap in the
strategies of categorization of the two participants.
Rommetveit's "message structure" approach essentially
relates the structure of the message to the architecture
of the particular intersubjectivity onto which it is
nested. Earlier, we noted that one element of what is
intersubjectively shared is a tacit 'contract' to select
among the options of perspectives and categorization.
Another possibility is that of the two participants
tacitly endorsing a meta-contract, that is, a contract
concerning how to deal with the contracts of
categorization implied by what is said. For example, in
reading a novel, we endorse a meta-contract to deal with
the abstract novelties of the first few pages as if they
were already familiar, on the assumption that what is
initially abstract, unknown and undetermined will become
familiar as we continue reading.
The main thrust of Rommetveit's argument against the
Harvard-M.l.T. school is that in a consideration of the
possible meaning of what has been said, we have to relate
the utterance to the particular shared social world of the
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participants in the conversation. By 'shared social
world' he means tacit and reciprocally held
presuppositions, contracts concerning shared strategies of
categorization and attribution, possibly also meta-
contracts (as in the poet-to-reader-of-poetry meta-
contract), the identification of speaker by listener and
vice versa; these are all elements of the shared social
world at the moment of speech. It is to Rom m et veLt t s
characterization of the intersubjectively established
social reality at the moment of speech to which we now
turn.
ii) 'On the architecture of intersubjectivity'
Of the theoretical influences which Rommetveit
explicitly acknowledges in the introduction of his 1974
book, three are of particular interest in the present
context, namely: i) George Herbert Mead's 'symbolic
interactionism', ii) Jean Pf aget r s theory of cogni tive
growth and decentration, and iii) Fritz Heider's work on
attribution. This blend of theoretical concepts results
in a pragmatic approach to meaning which is of·great
interest.
As noted above, among the elements of the shared
social world are identification of speaker by listener and
vice versa, and a host of other factors. Rommetveit
considers that, in order to explore all the significant
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features of the temporarily shared social world of the
dialogue, we need at a minimum a system of three
coordinates of the act of speech, namely:
There
You
(listener)
~~~ .,,Thishere
"~~~~,
~I~
(speaker)
Now
this
There
Figure 3.1
The coordinates.of the act of speech
(Rommetveit, 1974, p. 36).
The coordinates may be defined 1n terms of the point
in real time at which the act of communication takes place,
its location, and (in the case of spoken language) the
identification of the listener by the speaker and vice
versa.
These coordinates cannot be assessed independently
of each other and from the outside. The denotative
extension of the intersubjectively established 'now', for
example, can be this century in historical discourse, or
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this very moment in discourse about an ongoing football
game. Likewise, 'here' can denote Europe as opposed to
Africa in a discussion about geography, or it can denote
this room as opposed to the room next door in other
discourse. Although we may be able to establish using
public indices who is speaking to whom, where and when, we
still cannot characterize these coordinates of the act of
speech and the relevant intersubjectively established
'values' on the three dimensions in public terms. The
'values' on the coordinate axes can only be known by the
participants in the conversation.
Rommetveit describes the I-you coordinate for
any utterance as given as a speaking I addressing a
listening you, that is, in terms of an unequivocal
direction of communication. Two features of the
interpersonal coordinate may account for initial
commonality and shared presuppositions between speaker and
listener, namely:
i) Firstly, some commonality is established by the
very fact that the two persons engage in a dialogue - they
constitute a temporary established li~ engaged in an act of
communication, as opposed to all others who are not so
engaged.
ii) Secondly, there is a complementarity between
speaking and listening. This complementarity can be
thought of as a reciprocally cognized asymmetry between
speaker and listener with respect to what is already
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known. What is said under optimal conditions of
complementarity is monitored in accordance with veridical
assumptions concerning what the listener at that moment does
not yet know, but wants to know.
The temporarily shared social world at any particular
stage of a dialogue can only be assessed in terms of the
participants' identification of one another and their
mutual knowledge. The identification of speaker by
listener and vice versa, their mutual knowledge and their
mutual beliefs are central to the tacit presuppositions
underlying the dialogue.
An example of nearly perfect complementarity and
synchronization of intentions and thoughts is a situation
,
where a middle-aged couple are rather worried about the
behaviour of their teenage son. In such a case, very
cryptic communicaton may take place, yet be perfectly
understood by both participants. The woman may give her
husband an interrogating look on seeing his expression of
tension and receive the reply 'Pot'. And the wife
understands perfectly; what is worrying her husband is
the possibility that their son may start smoking pot.
Such cryptic conversations are not unusual. On such
occasions, whatever is understood can only be assessed
against the background of the intersubjectively
established social reality at the moment of speech. In
the above example, the uttering of the word 'Pot' by the
167
husband makes known to his wife exactly what she wants
to be informed about at that moment - no more, no less.
He uses such elliptical expressions because of what he
kno~~ she kno~~, namel~ that at that particular moment he
is anxious about some aspect of their son's conduct, and he
identifies in one word precisely which particular aspect
it is. The ellipsis is based on a social reality in which
much knowledge is mutually shared.
This leads to Rommetveit's interesting approach to
ellipsis: he states that ellipsis is "the prototype of
verbal communication under ideal conditions of complete
complementarity in an intersubjectively established,
temporarily shared social world" (Rommetveit, 1974, P.
29). Ellipsis is therefore used under ideal conditions,
and full sentences or even larger sequences may be required
to make something known under conditions of deficient
complementarity and less than perfect sychronization of
intentions and thoughts.
The above example relates to states of nearly perfect
intersubjectivity, and highly elliptical communication
takes place; states of partial intersubjectivity can be
established, and yet the intersubjectivity need not be so
deficient that nothing can be made known. Indeed, states of
partial intersubjectivity are the n2£ill, according to
Rommetveit: For example, consider a situation where two
football fans are watching a game. One is experienced in
the rules of the game and has watched football for some
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time, whilst the other fan is a newcomer to the game.
Following a tackle by one of the players, the more
experienced fan says: "That was magnificent!". The
'novice' fan may have taken the remark to pertain to only
one aspect of the tackle, perhaps the speed and skill with
which the final manoeuvre was carried out. However, the
more experienced fan was actually praising the preceding
tactics ~ well ~ the final manoeuvre.
The example illustrates several pOints of note.
Firstly, it demonstrates the point that the social world
is multifaceted and strategies of categorization can vary
from individual to individual. Secondly, it underlines
the openness of language with respect W· experientially-,~
established social realities. Thirdly, Rommetveit's
pOint (1974, P. 39, emphasis in original) that "lihatQ@ be
established only ~ ~ partially shared social reality liill
~main only partially shared whenever that social reality
is made the topic of s. dialogue" is also brought into
focus. Lastly, the example again illustrates the point
that what is made known by "That was magnificent!" can only
be assessed by examining the nature of the partial
intersubjectivity onto which it is nested.
In nesting a message onto a partially shared social
reality, that partially shared social reality is itself
expanded and/or modified. Further messages may be nested
on to the newly expanded social reality, thereby expanding
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it still further; and so on. Intersubjectivity can also
be expanded by means of the participants endorsing a
contract concerning shared strategies of categorization,
as alluded to earlier. Thus, an initial commonality
between speaker and listener by virtue of being participants
in an experientially shared here-and-now and participation
in a dialogue involving complementarity of roles, and so
on, can subsequently be expanded by means of such
contracts. These are, according to Rommetveit, some of
the outstanding features of natural language in action.
Rommetveit also uses his 'coordinates of the act of
speech'as the basis for characterizing the way in which
deictic expressions are used. These are the means by which
experientially shared objects and events may enter speech.
The linguistic devices for introducing such experientially
shared objects and events into speech are expressions like
this/that, here/there, before/now/afterwards, I/you/they,
and suffixes of verbs indicating tense. The origo or
point of reference for these expressions is characterized
by the temporarily established here-and-now as depicted in
the diagram of coordinates of the act of speech (at the
intersection of the axes; see Figure 3.1, p.\bS).
Like Klein (1982), Rommetveit considers that what is
not 'here' is 'there', so to speak; in intersubjectivity,
it is the 'this, here', that is delimited, and by default
everything else is 'that, there'. Thus, whatever is the
focus for convergent attention or intention of the two
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participants may enter their dialogue at that particular
time as a 'this, here', whereas what was attended to and/or
talked about some time ago, and also what is cognized as
being located at a distance by both participants may enter
speech as an intersubjectively established that, there.
Rommetveit's coordinates of the act of speech are thus one
way of characterizing the 'origo' which Buhler also
discussed (see section b) of this chapter).
Deictic devices are therefore linguistic ways of
'pointing out' experientially shared social realities.
Deictic elements do this by tagging what is experientially
common to both participants on to the spatial-temporal
coordinates of the act of speech. As Klein (1982) and
Wunderlich and Rienelt (1982) have also pointed out,
Rommetveit notes that the proper use of deictic
expressions habitually involves the hearer in decentration
from his own perspective and taking the perspective of the
other person. Piagetian egocentrism, which Rommetveit
describes as the initial "imprisonment in the immediate
here-and-now" (1974, p. 42) is a collapse of the I-you
coordinate of the act of speech and Bn incapacity to
decentre and take the role of the other participant in the
conversation. Young children display such egocentrism,
and decentration is " •••• a very general and composite
developmental process by which an individual acquires the
capacity to adopt a variety of interrelated perspectives
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and strategies of categorization in response to
successively more highly differentiated multifaceted
objects, events and states of affa irs" (Rommetvei t,
1974, P. 42). Adult competence in the use of deictic
devices (and also successful participation in dialogue in
general) is therefore contingent upon a capacity to
decentre and adopt the perspective of a variety of other
individuals. states of intersubjectivity can thus be
explored in terms of potentially shared perspectives and
the capacity of the participants to adopt the pOint of
view of one another. The taking of the role of the other
in ordinary speech is a persistent theme in Rommetveit's
work and owes much to the 'symbolic interactionism' of
George Herbert Mead (1934).
This taking the role of different others is the basis
of adult semantic competence, according to Rommetveit.
Adult semantic competence must be conceived of as a
reportoire of interrelated, linguistically mediated modes
of cognition and cognitive-emotive perspectives
(different ways of 'seeing', that is, categoriz ing and
cognizing, the world), rather than as a set of rules for
literal language use. This view is in rather stark
contrast to the 'syntactic' theories of meaning outlined
in chapter 1 of this thesis.
Before leaving Rommetveit's work, it is worth noting
a notion which he briefly introduces in his 1974 book.
It is the notion of control, that is, that one of the
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participants in a dialogue has, in some sense, control
(the 'upper hand', or greater influence upon what is
talked about and the manner in which it is talked about)
of the dialogue. Rommetveit considers control to be in
the hands of whoever is currently speaking. And, to some
extent, this must be the case: the speaker can select and
point out the objects, events and states of affairs
which are to enter the field of intersubjectively shared
attention. Which of all possible entities of an
experientially shared situation will be introduced is in
principle determined by the speaker. The listener,
according to Rommetveit, has to accept and engage in
whatever social reality is being introduced into the formal
framework of intersubjectivity whenever the speaker has
introduced a topic. This notion of control will be
mentioned again in the next section of this chapter, on
the views of the philosopher David Lewis. We might note
in passing, though, that while the above statement of
Rommetveit has a certain amount of truth at one level, at
another level it is possible that there is an overall
degree of control throughout the dialogue by one of the
speakers. For example, consider the case where a speaker
is currently replying to a question asked by the other
participant. Which of the participants is then in control,
the speaker or the questioner? The as yet vaguely
formulated notion of control in dialogue may prove to be
an issue of great importance for the social psychology of
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language.
c) log pragmatics of control of .§. dialogue
David Lewis (1978) raises some interesting socia1-
pragmatic issues in his paper on 'scorekeeping in a
language game'. From the point of view of an interest in
social-pragmatic factors' influence on various facets of
dialogue, two of his notions are of interest. The first
is the notion that one interlocutor is in overall control
of the dialogue (the master in Lewis's terms) and the
other interlocutor, the slave, is under the control of the
master. The reason for this relationship arising can be
one of a variety of reasons - for example, coercion,
deference or common purpose. Control of the slave by the
master is exercised verbally.
The other notion of interest is that there exists a
conversational score which is analogous to a baseball
score in that it has many components. A baseball score
is a septuple of numbers denoting the number of runs by
the two teams, which half of the game it is, which innings
it currently is, and so on. Likewise, Lewis argues,
there is a conversational score which is a multiple-
component score, and the components of conversational
score are abstract set-theoretic entities, such as sets of
presupposed propositions, boundaries between permissible
and impermissible courses of action for the slave, and the
like. As with baseball, what conversation is correct or
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acceptable at any given time depends on the components of
conversational score at the stage of conversation when it
is uttered (for example, the acceptability of what is said
will depend upon the presuppositions presupposed at the
time of utterance. As noted above, presuppositions are
a component of conversational score). Like a baseball
score, a conversational score evolves in a (more-or-Iess)
rule-governed way.
Lewis lists several possible components of
conversational score. These include presuppositions,
permissibility (which courses of action are permissible
for the slave and which are not), standards of precision
(e.g. of descriptions), and the point of reference in a
narrative. All such components obey rules of
~mmodation. This is the major difference between
baseball and language game scores: conversational score
tends to evolve in such a way as is required in order to
make whatever occurs count as correct play. There is no
such rule of accommodation in baseball.
For example, consider the question of what play
(conversation) is permissible for the slave. As noted
above, the master exercises control over the slave
verbally. The master may verbally shift the boundary of
permissibility, by saying to the slave that certain
courses of action are permisSible (or impermissible). If
what the master says would be false were the boundary of
permissibility to remain stationary, then immediately the
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boundary moves appropriately. The range of permissible
slave behaviour expands or contracts so that what the
master says is true after all. All components of
conversational score are governed by such rules of
accommodation.
Thus, the master exerts control over the slave by
changing the components of conversational score using the
rule of accommodation: in saying whatever he says, he
automatically shifts the boundary of (for example)
permissibility, thus altering the range of permissible
utterances of the slave.
Another example would be where the master changed
the standards of precision of descriptions, e.g, by saying
"Italy is boot-shaped". If this were unacceptable given
the current standard of precision in the conversational
score, then the standard of precision in the score would
change in order to make the utterance by the master
acceptable. Thereafter, the slave would be free to say
something of an equivalent standard of precision, such as
"France is hexagonal".
The master's control over the slave is exercised via
the conversational score.
These intriguing notions would seem to be of some
importance for the social psychology of language; it
would be of interest to the social psychologist to know
whether roles, social status, and mood states would have any
influence upon who would be the master and who would be
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the slave in the case of any given pair of dialogue
participants. As yet, however, Lewis's master-slave
notion, although intuitively appealing, has not yet been
subjected to empirical test.
f) Overview
In this chapter, a variety of pragmatic issues of
importance were considered, and it is argued that these
pragmatic issues should be recognized as being of great
importance to a psychological theory of meaning. Such
issues as the pragmatics of deictic reference, mutual
knowledge and audience design were reviewed and it is
concluded that this variety of phenomena pOints to the
importance of social and pragmatic factors in utterance
meaning. In all of these phenomena, the identities of
the interlocutors, and consequently the mutual knowledge
they share, affect the speaker's choice of utterance.
It is perhaps fair to conclude that earlier theories
of meaning (particularly those based on purely linguistic,
formal aspects of language and which focussed primarily on
sense relations) either acknowledged the' importance of but
did not pay any real attention to, or explicitly rejected
as being as-yet-too-complicated-to-study, the pragmatic
phenomena considered in this chapter. It is also fair to
conclude that any complete theory of meaning which
attempts to account for the meaning of natural,
spontaneously-produced utterances in context, will have to
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be able to account for these phenomena.
Some notions considered in this chapter recur in the
work of different theorists and one such notion is that of
perspective. The notion of perspective is used in the
sense of a point in space/time from wich events are
viewed, and also in the more subtle sense of 'orientation'
or 'approach' towards what is being discussed.
Perspective, in the sense of visual perspective, is
central to an understanding of deictic phenomena. In
using deictic expressions, a speaker and a listener set up
a common frame of reference in relation to which the
denotational extensions of deictic expressions are agreed.
This involves the listener decentering from his own
perspective and adopting that of the speaker. Rommetveit
stresses the importance of decentering and taking the
perspective of the other in the course of non-deictic
conversation also.
Perspective can be mentally shifted; listeners adopt
the perspectives of speakers during the course of ordinary
comprehension, and both listeners and speakers shift the
location of their point of reference <'origo') during the
course of the 'imaginary walk' embarked upon when giving
and receiving route directions.
The notion of listeners adopting the perspective of
speakers (and vice versa) has also been stressed in
another but related sphere, by Farr and Anderson (1983).
Farr and Anderson argue that Jones and N~bett's (1972)
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distinction between the attributional tendencies of actors
and those of observers was couched in a fashion which failed
to take heed of the potentialities of individuals to
transcend their own perspective during conversation.
Jones and Nisbett had proposed that actors (acting
individuals) explain their own behaviour in terms of the
characteristics of the situation in which they act (that
is, they make-situational causal attributions), whilst
observers of those same behaving actors explain the
actors' behaviour in terms of dispositions of those actors
(i.e., they make dispositional causal attributions).
Farr and Anderson noted how this hypothesis was very much
couched in the language of visual perception, and argued
that the divergence in perspective between actor and
observer was a divergence in visual perspective. They
further argued, fo~wing Rommetveit, that such a
divergence in visual perspective is ordinarily overcome by
means of conversation (which habitually involves us in
adopting the perspectives of other people). Thus, the
notion of perspective, and of taking the perspective of
another person in the course of conversation has
implications for attribution theory, and may have other
ramifications (see Farr and Anderson, 1983). Attribution
theorists have, in general, failed to take into' account
the importance of language. The pragmatics of natural
dialogue may be of some importance to the area of social
psychology in general.
179
The notion that utterances are designed to be
understood by particular listeners and that listening in
turn relies upon this fact, emerges as also being of some
importance. Clark and Murphy (1982) and Rommetveit
(1974, 1979) emphasize how approaches to language
understanding based around formal linguistic theories are
inadequate in this very important respect: what is
understood by a given utterance depends upon who is
speaking it, and to whom. Thus, standardized analyses in
terms of propositional content and 'literal meaning' are
inadequate to characterize meaning. In order to assess
what is meant by what is said, we must relate what is said
to the social situation in which it is said. Thus, the
identities of speaker and listener as conceived of by one
another, and a characterization of their mutual knowledge,
shared beliefs and shared presuppositions, - in short,
their 'intersubjectivity' or 'common ground' - are
necessarily going to have to be taken into account if we
are to adequately assess the meaning that is conveyed by
what is said. The inherently soc1al nature of the
dialogue is thus emphasized by theorists interested in
pragmtics.
Both Rommetveit (1974) and Clark and Murphy (1982)
emphasize the importance of this phenomenon of 'audience
design', although their explanations of the phenomenon are
rather different, Clark and Murphy explaining it in terms
of tacit reasoning from the 'design assumption', and
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Rommetveit explaining it in terms of contracts of
categorization, the complementarity of speaking and
listening, and taking the perspective of the other.
Rommetveit's views are a challenge for traditional
Psycholinguisticsj his social-pragmatic emphasis stands
in stark contrast to more traditional work. Indeed,
Markova (1981) argues that they in fact stem from
differing philosphical traditions, with Rommetveit's work
being from a Hegelian philosphical tradition, and the
transformationalists' views being based on Cartesian
presuppositions. Although some theorists described as
'Cartesian' in philosophical orientation by Markova might
resist this categorization of themselves, Markova's point
does serve to emphasize how radically different the two
theoretical approaches are.
The last notion reviewed was Lewis's ideas concerning
control of dialogues by one of the participants, and,
although very interesting, it has to be concluded that it
is an as yet empirically unsupported concept.
The overall conclusion to be stressed 1s that
pragmatic phenomena are of some importance in actual
language usage, and pragmatics should therefore be a proper
part of any theory of meaning which attempts to account for
the meanings of utterances in actual use.
It was concluded at the end of Chapt er 2 that an
approach based on mental models of the reference sitUation
is a viable and parsimonious way of characterizing
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language understanding with respect to the phenomena of
semantics. In this chapter, the views of several different
theorists were considered, and a general consensus of the
importance of pragmatic phenomena, particularly 'audience
design', was noted. It could therefore be argued that
there is a good case for supplementing a theory based on
mental models of referents with machinery of some sort for
dealing with pragmatic phenomena.
For example, it is possible that a speaker may nest
within his model of the reference situation another model
which represents to some extent the knowledge and beliefs
of the listener, and use this model-within-a-model to
constrain the speech generation process. It is also
possible that the model is itself a negotiated product
(embodying shared strategies of categorization) and
therefore automatically, as it were, builds in "listener
constraints". These are questions of some importance.
It was noted that the work of Clark and Hurphy (1982)
on "audience design" is supported by empirical study.
Romm&veit's views, challenging as they are for traditional
theories of meaning, are as yet not fully tested
empirically. Still less so are the views of Lewis. In
order to test such notions empirically, a rather different
type of experimental task is required. Instead of
assessing how individuals understand carefully prepared
experimental materials, what is required is a means of
eliciting suitably controlled yet genuinely spontaneous
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dialogue which is in use for a purpose.
Part II of this thesis reports experimental results
obtained using such a speech production task, and attempts
to relate these results to the views of some of the
theorists whose work has been reviewed in chapter 1 - 3.
The next chapter will give an exposition of the task
itself and its historical antecedents as a prelude to the
work reported in Part II.
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CHAPTER E.
THE EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURE: THE DIALOGUE
MAZE GAtlg
a) Introduction
In the previous three chapters, an indication was
given of the variety of approaches there have been to the
study of the meanings of natural language expressions. In
chapters 1 and 2, approaches to the study of meaning which
had their origins in formal linguistic and philosophical
approaches were examined, as was also a theory based on
psychological considerations (that is, the theory of
mental models). In chapter 3, the importance of
pragmatic phenomena, and the necessity of studying
language under conditions of genuine communicative use was
emphasized. In particular, it was concluded that, in
order to investigate the pragmatics of meaning, it is
necessary to examine speech production and understanding
using an experimental task in which speech is produced in a
controlled yet natural way. This methodology of
investigating speech production in a constrained,
experimentally-controlled way, constitutes a rather
different methodology from that of traditional
experimental approaches investigating language
understanding, in which, typically, the subject's task is
to respond in some way to isolated sentences or small
groups of sentences, these materials having been
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carefully constructed beforehand by the experimenter.
In this chapter, an exposition will be given of the
speech production task used in the work reported here.
The task takes the form of a computer-controlled game
played by two individuals, and the nature of the game is
such that it can only be solved by means of the two
individuals cooperating verbally.
The essence of the game task is as follows. The two
individuals who are playing the game are located in
separate sound-proofed booths, with verbal communication
between them being achieved by means of a headset and
microphone, this being their only contact with one
another. Each player is seated at a computer terminal,
and each terminal is linked to a main computer which is
under the control of the .experimenter. Visible to each
sub j ecton his 0 r her screen is a version 0 f a IDs.z,,g,
presented in plan view (see figures 4-3 and 4-4 for
an example of the initial maze configurations presented to
two subjects playing a game). The maze consists of a
configuration of nodes (small box-like structures placed
at equidistant locations, in which players' position
markers can be located between moves), and these nodes are
connected by paths (which are links between nodes along
which players can move: see figures. 4-3 and 4-4). The
subjects' task is that they must both move their
respective position markers through the maze from start
positions to goal positions. The locations of start and
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goal positions are different for the two players;
furthermore, in the studies reported here, each player
sees only his or her Q~n start position (marked by an X)
and goal position (marked by an asterisk), and does not see
his or her partner's location or goal position.
move alternately through the maze.
However, each player's maze also contains obstacles
in the form of gates (blockages which cannot be traversed)
Players
across some of the pathways, and it is in the overcoming
of these obstacles by subjects that verbal cooperation is
required. The mechanism by means of which the problem
posed by the gates is overcome is located in the nodes
which are marked by an S on a given player's screen (see
figures 4-3 and 4-4). If a given player's partner moves
into one of these switch nodes, then the configuration of
gates is reversed for that (given) player. Thus, if
player A wishes to traverse a currently-gated path, he
must enlist player B's cooperation, find out where player
B is located in the maze, and guide B into a switch node
near B and which is,visible to A on A's screen. If the
players achieve this successfully, then the position of
player A's gates is reversed such that previously gated
paths are now open, and previously open paths are now
gated. This does not affect B's gate positions; if B
desires to have his own gate positions changed, he
likewise has to find out where player A is and thence
guide A into a switch node visible to him (B) on his (B's)
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screen. The positions of barriers and S nodes is also
different for both players. Thus, verbal cooperation is
required in order to effect appropriate barrier switching
and to avoid accidental barrier switching (the switching
mechanism operates even if a player moves into one of his
partner's S nodes unintentionally). Each game thus takes
the form of a number of moves, between each of which there
is a certain amount of dialogue which takes the form of
discussions of the locations of players' position
markers, gates, and S positionsi and the formulation of
plans. All conversation is taped.
The game task is thus used to elicit genuinely
spontaneous and natural dialogue which is produced for a
purpose (to play. a game), yet which is also appropriately
experimentally constrained (the domain of discourse being
the game itself). The maze game task employed to
constrain the topic of discourse is unique to the work
reported here; however, certain of its features are shared
by previous studies which have examined spontaneous speech
production. Before giving a detailed .exposition of the
experimental game task used in the work reported here, a
brief review will be given of previous experiments in
'which the investigators have sought to constrain the
domain of discourse in tasks involving the generation of
spontaneous speech.
The disparate theoretical backgrounds of these
precursors to the present task can only be touched upon
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briefly, since the variety of theoretical backgrounds to
these experiments, and consequently the variety of
questions which have been addressed using these tasks, is
very large. These various tasks are of relevance in the
present context in that they all employ the methodology of
(to greater or lesser extents) c?nstraining the topic of
discourse and examining speech production, and also in that
some of them, in addition, share particular features in
common with the maze game task used in the present work.
It is to a brief exposition of these antecedent speech
production experiments that we now turn.
Ql Som~ ~xperimental speech production tasks employing E
restricted domain of discourse: E brief review.
As noted above, several studies have investigated
naturally produced speech in order to examine a variety of
aspects of language production and understanding.. These
studies have also varied in the extent to which the speech
produced by subjects was constrained: some studies (Sacks,
Scheg10ff and Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, Jefferson and
Sacks, 1977) have not constrained the topic of discourse
at all, whilst others (eig , Marslen-Wilson et al, 1982,
Levelt, 1982) have constrained the topic of discourse to
varying degrees.
The first studies to be reviewed (Sacks, Schegloff'
and Jefferson, 1974; Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks,
1977) were conducted in the sociological tradition of
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research known as ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967), in
which one of the primary interests is in uncovering the
background workings of the familiar, 'taken-for-granted'
social world (Pearson, 1975), for example, the background
workings of social interaction in conversation. This
study of practical reasoning, of how people-make sense of
what happens to them in social interactions, manifests
itelf in the case of conversation in the form of studies
of the organizational features of conversation such as
studies of how individuals terminate conversations
(Schegloff and Sacks, 1972) and the organization of turn-
taking in conversation (Schegloff et ar., 1977). These
studies indicate that speakers and listeners are sensitive
to interactionally consequential features of the
conversation, and use quite mundane features of the
conversation to control their interaction with one
another.
The first such study to be reviewed here is that of
Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson (1974), in which the
organization of turn-taking in conversation was examined.
These researchers used transcripts of audio-taped
naturally-occurring (unconstrained) conversation to
investigate turn-taking in conversation, that is, to
examine how the participants in the conversation succeed
in 'meshing' their contributions such that there is little
or no simultaneous talk.
They firstly noted several obvious facts which would
189
have to be accounted for by a model of turn-taking. Their
observations included:- (a) the fact that,
overwhelmingly, one party talks at a time, though speakers
change, and despite variation in the length and sequencing
of turns; (b) the fact that transitions are finely
coordinated, and that techniques are used for allocating
turns; (c) the fact that the length of conversation and
what parties say is not specified in advance; (d) the fact
that the number of parties to the conversation can vary;
and (e) the fact that repair mechanisms exist for dealing
with turn-taking errors and violations (for example, if
two parties find themselves speaking simultaneously, one
of them will stop prematurely, thus repairing the
trouble).
Taking the above five observations as their starting-
pOint, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson propose a model to
account for the organization of turn-taking in
conversation. They specify that the model should be both
context-free (that is, it should be capable of capturing
the most important general properties of conversation) and
capable of context-sensitivity (that is, it should be
Possible to accommodate and be sensitive to various
parameters of social reality in a local context). Before
turning to their characterization of turn-taking, two
other important sources of variation between
conversations should be noted:
1) There are various sizes of 'unit' out of which a
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speaker's turn may be constructed - such 'turn-
constructional units' can be lexical, clausal, or
sentential in length. It is possible for a listener to
'project' (that is, anticipate) the location of the
completion of a unit type - the first possible completion
of a first such unit constitutes a transition-relevance
place. It is around such projectable transition-relevance
places that transfer of speakership is coordinated.
Initially, the speaker is entitled to use one turn-
constructional unit when speaking, but he may use more
than one unit on any particular occasion.
2) Techniques exist for allocating turns, and these
are of two types:
(a) Those in which the next turn is
allocated by the current speaker
selecting a particular individual to
be the next speaker;
and (b) Those in which the next turn is
allocated by self-selection.
Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson characterize the
organization of turn-taking in conversation as a set of
rules which govern turn construction, provide for the
allocation of the next turn to one party, and which
coordinate transfer so as to minimize gap and overlap.
The rule-set is;
(1) For any turn, at the initial transition-relevance
place of an initial turn-constructional unit:
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(a) If using a 'current speaker selects
next speaker' turn allocational
technique, then the party so selected
has the right and is obliged to take
next turn to speak; no others have
such rights or obligations, and
transfer occurs at that place.
(b) If not using a 'current speaker
selects next' turn allocational
te~~que, then self-selection for
next speakership may, but need not,
be instituted: first starter
acquires rights to a turn, and
transfer occurs at that place.
(c) If not using a'current speaker
selects next' turn allocational
technique, then the current speaker
may, but need not, continue, unless
another self-selects.
(2) If, at the initial transition-relevance place of
an initial turn-constructional unit neither rule 1a
(current speaker selects next) nor rule 1b (self-selection
by next speaker) has operated, but instead rule 1c's option
has been employed (current speaker has continued) then the
rUle-set a-c reapplies at the next transition-relevance
place, and recursively at each next transition-relevance
place, until transfer is effected.
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Lower-priority rules constrain the use of higher-
priority options: for example, the current speaker must
select a next speaker before the initial transition-
relevance place, otherwise there is a possibility of self-
selection by some other taking place at the transition-
relevance place. This ordering of the two turn-
allocational techniques, such that the 'current speaker
selects next speaker' option must be exercised before the
'self-selection by next speaker' option is compatible with
the observation that one party talks at a time.
The rules provide for turn-transfers occurring at
transition-relevance places - this confines gap and
overlap to transition-relevance places and thus eliminates
gap and overlap in most single turns. In fact, the rule-
set is fully compatible with the observations noted
earlier. For example, the rule-set does not specify what
is to be said, how long a turn is to be, or the relative
distribution of turns, in advance. The existence of a
range of possible unit types for the construction of a
turn, and the possibility of a current speaker using more
than one instance of a unit type at any time provides for
the possibility of the observed variation in turn length.
The model is a 'local management' system, that is,
all the operations are local in a temporal sense, being
directed to 'next turn' and 'next transition' on a turn-
by-turn basis. The system is locally managed with
respect to both turn size and turn order, and it deals
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with single transitions at a time, allocating 'next turn'.
The model is also a party-administered system, that is,
the variability in turn-size and turn-order is under the
control of the parties to the conversation. The system
fits to conversational interaction - any party's
contribution to turn-order determination is contingent on,
and oriented to, the contributions of other parties.
Turn size is also a product of conversational interaction,
since a speaker must speak in such a way that others are
able to project possible completion pOints of his talk,
allowing others to use the projected transition places to
begin talking. Thus, the turn as a unit is
interactionally determined.
The fact that turn-size and turn-order are locally
managed, party-administered and interactionally
controlled means that turn-size and turn-order can be
brought under the jurisdiction of recipient design.
Recipient design is the feature of talk being constructed
for the particular other(s) who are the co-participants in
the conversation (cf. Clark and Murphy's notion of
'audience design' discussed in chapter 3).
Thus, Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson's model is
compatible with both the grossly observable facts noted
earlier and other phenomena such as recipient (or
audience) ,design. It should be borne in mind that the
phenomena of interaction studied by the ethnomethodologists
(such as turn-taking and the closing of conversation) do
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not rely upon visual contact between the participants;
the same phenomena are exhibited in telephone
conversations, and indeed some of the ethnomethodologists'
data are extracts from telephone conversations (e.g.
Schegloff and Sacks, 1972, reprinted in Turner, 1974,
examples on PP. 249, 250, and 252). In the experimental
task used in the work reported here, subjects are located
in separate soundproofed booths with verbal contact being
achieved via a headset and microphone, and so in the
present experimental task, the situation of speaking and
listening is somewhat akin to the situation of a telephone
conversation. In such situations, appropriate turn-
taking and meshing are of great importance and cannot be
mediated by non-verbal cues such as eye contact, and must
therefore be mediated by linguistic cues (such as
projectability of a turn's completion point) and
paralinguistic cues (such as a falling intonation contour
at a turn's completion pOint).
These last points underline a criticism of Sacks et
al.'s somewhat atheoretical exposition of the turn-taking
phenomena; Sacks et, al. do not deal in any detail with the
relative importance of visual, paralinguistic and purely
verbal cues in the coordination of speaking. Furthermore,
they give a primarily empirical exposition of the
phenomena, unlike Rommetveit (1974), for example, who would
explain the fine coordination of transfers of speakership
in terms of intersubjectivity, complementarity and
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synchronization of intentions and thoughts (see chapter
3, where his example of highly elliptical exchanges
being best explained in terms of nearly perfect
complementarity and synchronization of intentions and
thoughts was discussed).
Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks (1977) used the same
methodology to investigate the organization of 'repair' in
conversation. They noted that self-correction and other-
correction are related organizationally, with self-
correction being preferred to other-correction, and self-
correction being vastly more common than other-
correction. This differential prevalence of, and
preference for, self-correcton rather than other-
correction indicates that speaking is indeed listener-
oriented, as Rommetveit (1974; see chapter 3 of this
volume) has argued. It suggests that speakers are
monitoring what they say and are skilled at detecting and
correcting errors as they occur in the speech stream.
This eases the listener's task inasmuch as he does not
often have to infer beyond an erroneous utterance to what
he thinks the speaker meant to say.
Schegloff, Jefferson and Sacks distinguish between
'repair' and 'correction'; 'repair' is the more general
case. Repair is sometimes found where there is no hearable
error, mistake or fault; and hearable error does not
necessarily yield the occurrence of repair/correction.
Hence, nothing is in principle excludable from the class
196
'repairable', and, in view of the possibility of 'repair'
taking place where no error has occurred, the term
'repair' is a better one for the general range of
occurrences, with 'correction' being a particular type of
repair.
Schegloff et . al. also distinguish between the
initiation and the outcome of a repair, since the person
who initiates a repair is not always the same person who
completes it.
The noted preference for self-repair rather than
other-repair is in practice partly produced by the
following factors:
(i) Opportunities for self-initiation of repair
come before opportunities for other-
initiation. Self-initited repairs can
occur in three places - the trouble-source
turn, the trouble-source turn's transition
space, and in the turn subsequent to that
which follows the trouble-source turn.
Furthermore, possible other-initiations of
repair are often withheld past the possible
completion of the trouble-source turn,
resulting in an 'expanded' transition-space
and giving the speaker more of an
opportunity to initiate a repair himself.
(ii) Massively, for those repairables on which
repair is initiated, same-turn and
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transition-space opportunities for self-
initiation are taken by speakers of the
trouble source.
(iii) Successful self-repair regularly occurs
within the same turn as the trouble-source,
that is, before the other has had an
opportunity to initiate repair.
(iv) Other-initiations lead to self-repair;
the other's opportunity to initiate repair
is used to locate the trouble, affording
the speaker a further chance to effect
self-repair, a chance which he usually
takes.
A last interesting point noted by Schegloff,
Jefferson and Sacks is that even when others do make
corrections they are frequently modulated in form, for
example, either by downgrading the correction on a
'confidence/uncertainty' scale, or by turning the
correction into a joke.
These theorists have thus used unconstrained
spontaneous dialogue in order to investigate
organizational asp~~ of conversation. It would, of
course, have been possible to investigate turn-taking and
repair using a constrained dialogue situation, but it would
have been impossible not to have used spontaneous,
naturally occurring speech, since the phenomena under
investigation are aspects of natural dialogue.
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Other theorists have constrained spontaneous dialogue
by means of an experimental task which itself acts as the
topic of discourse. For example, Deutsch and Krauss
(1960, 1962) used a two-person experimental game to
examine the phenomenon of how two individuals in an
interdependent decision-making situation arrive at
bargaining agreements. Deutsch and Krauss' work belongs
to a tradition in social psychology in which experimental
games are used to examine cooperation and conflict between
individuals in situations of interdependent decision-making.
There is a vast literature in social psychology on this
topic, but it is of little relevance in the present
context, since these studies involve individuals making
their (simultaneous) choices in the games without any
communication occurring between them. Because of this
background of studies involving a complete absence of
communication between individual decision-makers, Deutsch
and Krauss introduced the possibility of communication
between the decision-makers as an independent variable.
Deutsch and Krauss were thus interested primarily in the
question of whether the possibility of communication (either
in an optional or a compulsory communication condition)
would assist their subjects in reaching an effective
agreement which would benefit them both. (In
experimental games from the above-mentioned tradition, it
is possible for individuals to reach an 'agreement' about
their decisions without communication taking place). Like
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the experimental task used in the present work, Deutsch
and Krauss's task takes the form of an experimental game
in which the two individuals are in an interdependent
relationship insofar as their chosen individual courses of
action have conequences for one another.
Deutsch and Krauss's experimental task allows the
examination of the effect of two independent variables on
subj ects' abili ty to reach a barga ining agreement, the
two independent variables being 1) communication and 2)
the possibility of (unilateral or bilateral) threat. The
experimental task takes the form of a 'trucking game':
subjects are asked to imagine that they are in charge of a
trucking company that carries merchandise over a road to a
destination. For each trip that they complete, they
receive 60 cents minus their operating expenses (which
mount up at the rate of 1 cent per second). Thus, the
longer they take, the higher the expenses deducted from
the sixty-cents payout. Each subject is assigned a
name, Acme or Bolt, and has to get from a start point to a
destination, as follows:
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Route 216 \" ./'"
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Acme's alternative route
ACME
DESTINATION
BOLT
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Gate
controlled
by Acme
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controlled
by Bolt
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" , .... _, ,f" START... ~.-, ,,", ,-',-"'"'_..... " ," , ,~.... , , ..... ,,, 'Bolt's alternative route ,.'
Figure 4.1: The roads available to subjects in
Deutsch and Krauss's (1960, 1962) 'trucking game'.
At one pOint, the paths of the two players coincide -
the one-lane road, where two trucks moving in opposite
directions cannot pass each other: one has to back. up.
The alternative route can be taken by the players, but the
alternative route is 56% longer than the main route, and
subjects are aware that they will lose at least ten cents
when using the alternative route. The agreement which
requires to be reached is therefore the effective use of
the two types of route by both players so that each player
may maximize his gains. Subjects were instructed to
individually gain as much as possible, regardless of what
the other player gains or loses. However, all subjects
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were aware from the outset that gains and losses would be
imag inary. Their respective interests are nevertheless in
competition and it is to both their advantages to reach a
bargaining agreement.
The potential for threat lies in the gates located at
either end of the one-lane road. By closing his gate, a
player can prevent his partner from travelling over the
one-lane section of the main route. Threat can be
bilateral (where both players have gates) or unilateral
(where only Acme has a gate).
Players played the game in separate rooms and did not
know who their partner was. A panel indicated to each
player whether the gates were open or closed, the position
of the players' own truck, and also when the two trucks
had met head-on in the one way section.
The players were told the two rules of the game:
(1) Routes could only be changed at the start;
it was not possible for a player to
switch directly from, for example, the main
route to the alternative route. If a
player had already travelled some distance
along a route and desired to change route,
she had to reverse back to the start to do
so.
(2) Where sUbjects had control of gates, the
gate could only be used (closed) when the
subjects were on the main route, not when
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they were on the alternative route or at
their destinations. Gates could be opened
at any point of the game, however.
Subjects were given practice trials to familiarize
themselves with the game. There were three conditions
with respect to the communication variable (no
communication, optional communication and compulsory
communication). There were three conditions with respect
to the threat variable (no threat, unilateral threat,
and bilateral threat). The dependent variable was the
median joint payoff, and the value of this reflected how
quickly an agreement with respect to the use of the one
lane route was reached.
Deutsch and Krauss found that the availability of a
threat potential adversely affected players' ability to
come to an effective agreement.
Agreement was least difficult in the 'no threat'
condition, more difficult in the unilateral threat
condition, and exceedingly difficult to arrive at in the
bilateral threat condition. The communication variable
was manipulated in order to ascertain whether the
opportunity (or requirement) to communicate could
ameliorate the difficulty that bargainers experience in
reaching agreement. In the optional communication
condition, the communication variable had no effect upon
the players' ability to reach effective agreements. Only
a minimum of communication did occur in the optional
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communication condition, and a compulsory communication
condition was therefore run. In the compulsory
communication condition (in which subjects were instructed
that they had to talk on every trial), subjects' mean
jOint payoffs were significantly raised in the unilateral
threat condition but not in the bilateral threat
condition. In the 'no threat' condition, coordination of
actions was sufficiently straightforward for players that
communication failed to produce any visible effect. The
manipulation of the communication variable (particularly,
the compulsory communication condition) only had an
effect in the unilateral threat condition; in the no
threat condition there is a 'ceiling effect' in that
payoffs are already high in the 'no communication'
condition (since coordination is relatively
straightforward) and communication does not therefore
have any significant effect. In the bilateral threat
condition, on the other hand, the competitive motivation
present seems too great to be overcome, even by the
compulsory communication treatment. Thus, there is only
an effect of communication in the unilateral threat
condition.
Although Deutsch and Krauss's study does depart from
the tradition of research in which it originated in that it
does allow communication in the game situation,
communication was treated as an independent variable only
and consequently the resulting transcripts of dialogue
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were not analyzed in any way. Deutsch (1973) says little
about the dialogues produced by his experimental task,
except that communication in bargaining situations serves
several functions, namely a) coordinating efforts
(exchanging bids, etc.), b) conveying information
(threats, insults, etc.) and c) expediting the development
of agreements (see Deutsch, 1973, for a review of these
studies).
The Soviet psychologist B. F. Lomov (1979) is another
theorist who has examined communication in task-constrained
situations. The historical context of Lomov's work is
the Soviet tradition of research on the role of language
in relation to higher cognitive processes in man, and this
tradition goes back via the work of A. R. Luria to the
theories of L. S. Vygotsky (1962). Lomov's work is an
examination of differences in subjects' performance on
tasks under conditions of communication as opposed to solo
performance on the tasks. Lomov is interested in the
differences between solo- and communication-condition
performance of subjects, and also in which aspects of
communication are common to all three tasks studied by him
(visual search, the drawing of a street map, and the
characteristics of text recall).
Lomov begins his paper by criticizing the previous
'abstract functionalism' in investigations of mental
functions and processes, which attempted to detach these
functions from the whole system of psychic phenomena.
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The functions were thus treated as natural, unique qualities
in themselves. Subsequent Soviet theory considered
psychic functions and processes in the context of a real
subject's activity. Lomov argues that communication is an
undetachable part of human life and that it is essential
to take into account the dependence of dynamics of psychic
processes and functions on forms, ways and means of
communication.
Lomov presents evidence that "psychic processes"
(particularly, visual search, conceptualization and memory
processes) "performed under conditions of communication
differ from those of individual activity" (Lomov, 1979,
p. 212).
For example, in the verse-text reproduction task,
subjects were asked to reproduce the first chapter of
Pushkin's 'E~gene Onegin', singly and then subsequently in
pairs under conditions of direct communication. (The
experiment was "natural" in that subjects did not know they
were being audio-taped or that they were taking part in an
experiment). Recording of individual performance yielded
'classic' memory data, such as primacy and recency
effects, substitution of meaningful summaries instead of
word-for-word reproduction, and so on. In joint text
reproduction under conditions of communication, the extent
of word for word recitation was greater than the total sum
of both subjects' individual recitations. The material
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that the two subjects individually remembered forms a
'common memory fund' which acts as a 'skeleton' to help
reproduction of other parts of the text. In jOint
reproduction, 'gaps' (portions of the text which neither
subject can remember) are more clearly identified, and
become the focus of joint efforts. Having discovered the
gaps, the subjects actively propose hypotheses, discuss
and correct them. Lomov also notes that in the process of
reproduction under conditions of communication, correct
recall happens more often than in the case of the
individual process, and the process of jOint reproduction
is more active and emotional than individual text
reproduction, which contributes to its greater
effectiveness.
Lomov notes the similarities in communication across
all three tasks, and these include:
(a) The main function of communication in the three
experiments was the exchange of the result of each
subject's cognitive activity.
(b) The first stage in the process of communication is
the selection of common 'coordinates' of joint activity
(that is, 'reference points' or 'foothold images'). It is
in relation to these that the whole process of
communication is built.
(c) Lomov likens the development of the process of
communication to a spiral. There exists an alternation of
functions of both communicators, and all communicators
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have two-way and reversible relations. Significant
aspects of communication are synchronization of the
communicators' actions, their reciprocal stimulation,
regulation, correction and supplement. During the
process of communication, common programmes and common
strategies of jOint activity are being formed. The
strategy formed under conditions of communication differs
qualitatively from the individual one.
(d) The effectiveness of problem-solving is greater
under conditions of communication than under conditions of
individual problem-solving in all three experiments. The
two subjects taking part in the communication form a kind
of interpersonal psychological 'community' with a 'common
fund' of concepts, ideas, methods of problem-solving, etc.
This increases the effectiveness of the activity.
(e) The role played by speech in communication as
opposed to gestures and facial expressions (etc.) varies
from task to task. In some cases, speech plays the
leading role, whereas in other cases gestures play the
leading role. (The latter case is most characteristic of
the tasks requiring spatial orientation and reproduction of
spatial characteristics of objects). Lomov argues that
in the exchange of information regarding emotional
states, facial expressions probably playa leading role.
Thus, the relative contribution of the various
communication channels varies as a function of the task.
Lomov's work is of interest in the present context
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since he attempts to characterize the general features of
communication in task-oriented dialogues. In a
discussion of Lomov's paper, Segalowitz suggested that two
differences between conditions of communication and
individual situations which might partly explain the
greater effectiveness of joint problem-solving are:
(1) The level of motivation for subjects may be
different.
(2) There is feedback for each individual subject
which might improve his performance.
These remarks will be considered again in part II of
this thesis (chapter 10), where a comparison will be made
between spatial location description under conditions of
communication and in a monologue.
Lomov's work involved the tape-recording of natural
dialogue in task-constrained situations; this represents a
greater level of constraint on the topic of discourse than
does the work of Schegloff et al. which was briefly
reviewed earlier in this chapter. Another study of
interest which used a constrained speech production task
was that carried out by Marslen-Wilson, Tyler and Levy
(1982; see also chapter 3 of this thesis). Marslen-
Wilson et al.'s experimental results were considered earlier,
as was also the theoretical background to their study.
What is of interest in the present context 1s their
methodology. This methodology was unusual in that it
involved a single speaker, a single listener, and a single
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dialogue. The speaker's task was to re-tell from memory
a narrative which he had previously read. The dependent
variable studied was the way in which the speaker
introduced and subsequently referred to the actors in the
story, the speaker being both audio-taped and videotaped.
This usage of ony one speaker and one story constitutes a
rather unusual methodological strategy. Marslen-Wilson
et al. argue that while their results require to be
tested against a larger data-base, the particular aspects
of this particular speaker's performance that were the
most theoretically important are precisely those that are
least likely to be peculiar to him as an individual. The
general sensitivity of the speaker's use of referential
devices to the informational environment in which they
occurred (see chapter 3 of this volume for a summary of
Marslen-Wilson et. al.'s results) would, they argue, be the
case for any other normal speaker.
Marslen-Wil son et al.'s resul ts using the cons trai ned
speech production task dovetailed into their speech
processing theory rather well. They conclude that
language has to be studied both as a cognitive process and
in terms of its natural communicative function in normal
interaction; both these approaches are interdependent.
It is, in general, fair to conclude that in the past, the
latter aspect of language has been relatively neglected as
compared to the former aspect.
Marslen-Wilson et / al.'s study again illustrates the
210
general principle of studying constrained speech
production, and exemplifies the point that theoretically
interesting questions can be addressed using such a task.
Indeed, Marslen-Wilson et al. point out that the study of
referential devices using isolated sentences is of very
limited value compared to their own study using lengthy
naturally-produced discourse, since the experiment using
speech production involving lengthy, connected discourse
allows analysis of the contexts of occurrence of
referential devices. They argue that, without an
awareness of the entire history of a discourse entity,
• • • the proper analysis of any given"
discourse reference to this entity is simply
not possible" (Marslen-Wilson et al ~ 1982, p. 371).
At\.o!-hu s+u.clj wh.'c" uf-iliud ~ c.on..rrrairt.ed .spacn
production task was reported by W. J. M. Levelt (1982).
Levelt concerns himself with the general problem of
linearization - that is, the way in which a speaker orders
clauses in discourse: speakers have to make decisions on
the ordering of clauses. Apart from cases where events
are being described, informational structures have no
intrinsic linear order, and the speaker has the problem of
mapping a two- or multidimensional information structure
onto a linear string. For example, if describing the
layout of an apartment, the two-dimensional structures in
the apartment have to be mapped onto a linear speech
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string such that the listener can, within certain limits,
reconstruct the two-dimensional structure from the
description. In the case of more complicated
informational structures, like the game of chess, for
example, the speaker's task is much more arduous. Levelt's
paper is specifically concerned with the problem of
linearization in describing spatial networks, and he tests
two models of the linearization process using an
experimental set-up where subjects have to generate
descriptions of the spatial structure of simple two-
dimensional arrays.
Previous work on descriptions of spatial layouts had
shown that subjects employed certain consistent strategies
to aid them in linearization. For example, Linde and
Labov (1975) had their subjects describe their apartments
and the strategy employed by subjects was to embark on a
mental tour of the apartment, starting at the front door
and moving through the apartment room by room. At choice
pOints, they take one branch first and after describing it
'jump back' mentally to the last place of choice in order
to select a next branch. Ullmer-Ehrich (1978) observed
that when describing their living-roo~s, subjects use a
gaze-tour, that is, they mentally position themselves at
the living-room door and gaze along the walls, describing
the pieces of furniture one by one in the order of the
gaze-tour; this strategy led some subjects to forget to
mention items of furniture in the centre of the room.
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Levelt remarks that speakers can often be captives of
their linearization strategy, as is exemplified by the
last example (of omitting furniture in the centre of a
room when 'gaze-touring' around its walls). A third case
where such mental touring operations are used as an aid to
linearization in the production of descriptions is that of
giving route directions, mentioned briefly in the last
chapter. Once again, an 'imaginary walk' or mental tour
of the route assists the subject in linearizing a
description of route directions appropriately.
Notice the extent to which the above linearization
strategies are consistent with an interpretation of
cognitive operations in terms of operations on mental
models (see Chapter 2). The spatial layout of an
apartment would appear to be a prime case for 'mental
modelling', so to speak. A gaze-tour would be conceived of
in mental model terms as a scanning operation being carried
out on a model. Likewise, the 'imaginary ,walk' employed
in generating route-directions would appear to be readily
interpretable in terms of internal scanning operations on
a mental model in the form of a 'cognitive map' of the
locality being described.
Levelt notes that the listener's reactions may become
highly important for the speaker's linearization. The
speaker has to take into account the l1stener's presumed
foreknowledge and processing capacities when generating
descriptions.
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Levelt distinguishes between the ideas underlying
speech and the processes involved in the choice of
linguistic form~ for the expression of those ideas, and
hypothesizes that linearization takes place during the
first, conceptualizing, set of processes. The formulating
mechanism operates on a highly specified conceptual input;
most work is done by the conceptual preliminaries.
Linearization is thus a non-linguistic process. Levelt
argues that linearization shows functional properties which
may turn out to be fairly general for different types of
discourse.
Levelt developed two models of the linearization
process. Both take the form of transition networks for
generating descriptions. One is more 'speaker-oriented',
whilst the other is more 'listener-oriented'. The
'speaker-oriented' ATN model was constructed so as to
capture the main features of what Linde and Labov observed
in their study of apartment descriptions, that is, that
the descriptions took the form of a tour with the moves in
the tour preserving maximal spatial connectedness.'
'Jumps' only occur back to unfinished choice pOints, and
'moves' and 'jumps' are as small as possible. The main
difference between this and the listener-oriented ATN model
is that the listener-oriented ATN model does not 'iYmQ'
back to the last choice point but instead 'moves' back
step by step, m~king the descriptions 50% longer.
Leveh tested these two models by having speakers
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describe simple spatial networks consisting of different-
coloured nodes connected by horizontal or vertical arcs,
for example:
a) Linear networks b) Hierarchical networks
Tl-r}
tc) Loops
9fU
1" 1'.
Figure 4.2: Spatial networks to be described by
subjects in Leve1t's experiments,
the description beginning at the arrowed
node (from Levelt, 1982).
The subjects were instructed to describe the network,
beginning at the arrow, in such a way that a listener would
be able to draw the network from the description on the
audio-tape. This restricted domain of discourse allows
the precise formulation of linearization models yet at the
same time it captures some of the important aspects of
other spatial domains like city maps, apartment layouts,
etc.
Levelt also postulated hypotheses which attempted to
predict, probabilistically, which arc would be taken by a
subject at a choice-point. These principles of choice
are of two types, global constraints on choice (general
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constraints arising from the nature of the network as a
whole and which apply in quite diverse domains of
discourse) and local constraints on choice (which consist of
two parameters, the probabil ity of 'going' stra ight, L,e ,
describing the branch straight ahead, and the probability
of describing a right-branching structure. The
probability of describing a 'straight ahead' branch and the
probability of describing a right-protruding-branch are both
postulated to be greater than 0.5).
Three global constraints are postulated by Levelt:
(1) The probability of describing a shorter branch
before describing a longer branch is greater than 0.5.
(2) The probability of describing branches with fewer
embedded choice points before describing branches with
more embedded choice points is greater than 0.5.
(3) The probability that, at choice pOints, loops are
described before other branches is greater than 0.5.
Levelt's experimental findings pOinted to the
existence of two distinct linearization types - 33
subjects out of 53 exclusively 'jumped' in their
descriptions back to choice points, 16 subjects
exclusively 'moved' in their descriptions back to choice
pOints, and only 4 subjects both jumped and moved. The
first global constraint (that shorter branches should be
described before longer branches) was strongly confirmed
for both 'j ump ers' and 'movers'; the second global
constraint (that branches with fewer embedded choice
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pOints should be described before branches with more
embedded choice points) was strongly confirmed for
'jumpers' but its converse (that is, seeking complexity
initially) was the case for 'movers'; and the third
global constraint (that loops should be described before
other branches) was true for 68% of 'jumpers' and 80% of
'movers' (only in the latter case is the figure
significantly different from what could be expected by
chance).
There is thus confirmation of there being two types of
linearization strategy, which correspond to the two ATN
models, and Levelt concluded that, up to the level of
hierarchical spatial structures, the ATN models are in
almost faultless correspondence to the speakers'
behaviour. It is only in the case of loop structures that
deviations from the ATN models' predictions occur, and the
main deviations are incompleteness and the 'cutting' of a
loop and treating it as a two-branch hierarchical
structure. (It was suggested by one of Levelt's
colleagues that the problem with loops may be due to the
difficulty of maintaining one's original deictic
orientation while turning through a loop).
Levelt argues that the functional properties of
linearization which his models embody and which appear to
operate in the experimental data (properties such as
preservation of connectivity, a general minimal effort
principle based upon short term memory economy, etc.) are
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not limited to the particular domain in question but apply
more generally to other discourse also.
Levelt's spatial networks are of interest here in that
they share some features in common with the spatial
networks embodied in the maze shapes used in the game task
employed in the studies reported in this volume
(in particular, the mazes used in the pr~.ent work use arrays
of nodes connected by horizontal and vertical pathways in
a fashion similar to Levelt's networks but on a larger
scale. See appendices I and II). Again, as with the work
of Marslen-Wilson et al., the constraining of discourse
topic to that of (in the case of Leve1t's experiments) a
highly controlled domain of discourse does not preclude
the study of interesting questions pertaining to natural
speech production. Indeed, Levelt argues that the results
from his experiments have a generality which extends
beyond the original restricted discourse from which they
were generated and cites the work of J. Mandler (1978) as
an example of the operation of similar principles in the
retrieval of stories.
A final experimental task which elicits natural speech
in a controlled manner is that described by Blakar (1973),
a colleague of Rommetveit. This task has been used to
examine a variety of aspects of pathological and normal
dyadic communication in a task-oriented situation, and
only some of the major findings obtained using the task
will be reviewed here (see, for example, Blakar and
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Pedersen, 1980;, Blakar and Vald imarsdot tir, 1981;
Mossige, Petterson and Blakar, 1979; Pedersen, 1980;
and Solvberg and Blakar, 1975, for examples of studies
involving the use of this task).
The task involves one subject explaining a route
through a map to another subject, who also has a copy of
the map. In one condition, the task is simple in that
the maps are identical. However, in the experimental
(communication conflict) condition, the maps are different,
with the follower's map having one more street than the
explainer's. This violates one of the most basic.
preconditions for successful communication, that of the
participants having a "shared social reality", a common
here-and-now within which an exchange of messages can take
place (Rommetveit, 1974; see also'chapter 3 of the
present volume).
The difference between the maps induces a situation
of conflict in communication which the subjects have to
resolve by identifying the error in the maps; if the task
is not solved within a fixed time span (forty minutes) the
task is terminated. Solvberg and Blakar (1975)
demonstrated that parents of schizophrenic patients failed
to solve the complex task within the prescribed time limit
on four out of five occasions, whilst all of the control
dyads (matched parents without pathological offspring)
Solved the complex task. Solvberg and Blakar
also undertook a preliminary analysis of the utterances
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produced by the dyads (all conversation having been tape
recorded and transcribed). Among the observations noted
by Solvberg and Blakar were:
(a) A much larger proportion of the comments made by
group S (schizophrenic patients' parents) were task-
irrelevant as compared to the group N (control) dyads _
the figures being 57% and 19%, respectively.
(b) Wives in group S couples gave more active
directives, whereas in the group N couples the distribution
of active directives was much more equal. This result
ties in with Lidz' (1963) notion of "marital skew".
(c) Observations suggested that group S couples were
less willing or able to endorse or adhere to contracts
which regulate and monitor their communication (for
example, contracts concerning the distribution of roles).
(d) Solvberg and Blakar noted that utterances
indicating egocentrism (i.e. where individuals are less
able or willing to take the prespective, and speak on the
premises of, the other with whom they are in
communication) were more frequent in the group S dyads.
An example of such egocentric utterances would be the use
of deictic linguistic elements (for example "here",
"there", "that corner" etc.) without the prior
establishment of any intersubjectivity as to what such
phrases refer to.
The observations regarding the greater egocentrism
and lesser decentration (taking the perspective of the other
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with whom the individual is in communication) were
amplified by a study by Mossige, Petterson and Blakar
(1979), who identified from the tapes of dyads performing
the task every single utterance that could, on the basis of
the ongoing communication process, be assessed as markedly
egocentric or decentred. They found that the ratio of
egocentric to decent red utterances was much higher (in
fact twelve times as high) in the group S families than in
the group N families, replicating Solvberg and Blakar's
earlier findings.
This experimental task has also been used to examine
sex and communication (Pedersen, 1980). In this study,
subjects of two different sexes were given two different
roles (Explainer versus Follower) when participating in
two different kinds of dyads (same-sex versus opposite-
sex) in the two different communication situations (~mQlg,
where the maps are identical, versus conflict, where the
difference between the maps is important). This
experimental design allowed the examination of various
'common sense' hypotheses regarding sex and communication
in two different situations (simple versus conflict).
The communication was analysed in terms of efficiency
(in terms of time taken to solution, as in the Solvberg
and Blakar study) and the qualitative analyses were of
measures of self-confidence and control.
hypotheses postulated by Pedersen were;
Among the
(a) that female
subjects should make better followers, while male subjects
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would make better explainers; (b) that the most
efficient communication should involve a male leader and a
female follower, while the efficiency of same-sex pairs
should be intermediate and the least efficient pairing
should involve a female leader and a male follower.
The results were of great interest and emphasized
the importance of the situational variation (simple versus
conflict situation). It was found that, in the simple
situation, the sex bound communication pattern fits the
common sense assumptions (with a male leader/female
follower pairing being most efficient, and the female
leader/male follower dyad being least efficient).
Female/female same sex dyads were more efficient than
male/male same sex dyads in the simple situation. The
opPosite results were obtained, however, in the conflict
situation: the male explainer/female follower dyad was
least efficient in the conflict situation, and male/male
same-sex dyads were more efficient than were the
female/female same-sex dyads. Similarly, the results of the
qualitative analyses were complex: sex-linked patterns
of communicative behaviour were extremely complex and
varied across situations, roles and the sex of the
person's partner. Thus, the variation in the situation
in which the communication takes place is very important,
and Pedersen's conclusion is that we should be cautious in
making generalizations about sex-bound patterns of
communication across different communication situations.
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Pedersen points out that "At our present stage of
knowledge, until a far broader selection of social
situations has been systematically mapped, we must refrain
from any general conclusions about the relationship between
language/communication and sex. Through these future
tasks a social-psychological perspective will be a
necessary guide" (Pedersen, 1980, p. 113).
£1 Conclusions
This brief review of previous experimental approaches
involving language production tasks has illustrated the
variety of methods employed and the variety of questions
addressed using such methods. The work of Schegloff et.
al. illustrated the use of transcripts of unconstrained
natural dialogue to investigate interactional aspects of
dialogue, namely, how the mechanism for organizing turn-
taking in conversation operates, and how a bias exists
whereby self-correction is preferred to other-correction.
Deutsch and Krauss's experimental 'trucking game'
task was of interest, although Deutsch and Krauss's
interest was primarily in how bargaining agreements were
reached rather than in linguistic aspects of
communication. The interdependence of the dyads (in
decision making terms) in Deutsch and Krauss's work, and
the fact that the task took the form of a game, makes their
study of relevance in the present context, even although
Deutsch and Krauss did not analyze the dialogues generated
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by subjects in the course of solving the task.
Lomov's interest in how cognitive functions like
conceptualizing and memory are affected by communication
demonstrated how interesting facets of language use could
be explored using such task-oriented situations. Marslen-
Wilson et. al.'s experimental task and its results
illustrated that fact that important aspects of reference
could be studied using a constrained speech production
task, and Levelt's research demonstrated also that
important general questions (in this case about
linearization in speech production) could be addressed
using a task where speakers had to describe simple,
abstract, experimentally-controlled networks. The last
experimental task involving task-constrained speech
production reviewed was the 'communication conflict' task
devised by R. M. Blakar. Blakar's task has been used to
investigate a variety of questions of importance to SOCial
psychology, clinical psychology, and the study of
communication in general. The two studies reviewed, one
being concerned with communication efficiency in couples
with and without a schizophrenic offspring, and the other
being concerned with sex-bound patterns of communication,
serve to illustrate the variety of aspects of language use
which could be studied using such a task.
The task which was employed in the work reported in
the present volume and which will be described in the next
sections of this chapter contains features which are
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similar to those in some of the above tasks. Like
Deutsch and Krauss's 'trucking game' the task used in the
present work takes the form of a game in which the courses
of action taken by each player affects the other player
and in which cooperation is crucial. Like the task set
to subjects by Levelt, the present game task involves
subjects describing spatial networks (although subjects in
this case have to identify specific locations within a
spatial nework rather than having to describe the entire
network). Like Lomov's subjects, subjects participating
in the task used in the present work are engaged in a
cooperative effort, jointly solving a problem. Finally,
1ike Blakar's 'commun ication conflict' task, the present
task can be used to examine a variety of interesting
questions - semantic aspects of location descriptions
generated by subjects, aspects of their strategies in
solving the problem, and social psychological questions
concerning control of dialogues, in addition to mainstream
linguistic questions such as the development of ellipsis,
etc., can be studied using the game task described in the
next sections of this chapter and used in the present
work.
The principal study to be reported in this thesis is
of the meanings of the descriptions of locations within a
variety of spatial networks. In the meantime, however, an
exposition of the details of the task itself will be
given.
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&1 The experimental procedure: the dialogue ~ game
As outlined earlier in the present chapter (see
section a», the maze game task essentially involves two
subjects alternately moving their respective position
markers through a maze from different starting positions
to different goal positions. The game task requires the
subjects to cooperate with one another by coordinating
their moves in such a way that the problems posed by
obstacles in the maze in the form of gates are overcome.
The mechanism underlying this gate-switching was
sketched briefly earlier (in the introduction to the
present chapter) and is dealt with in greater detail below.
The important feature of the task is that, since subjects
require to coordinate their moves through the maze, and
since the subjects are located in separate soundproofed
booths with only verbal communication being possible via a
set of headphones and a microphone for each subject, the
successful playing of the game requires that the subjects
engage in fairly lengthy dialogues with one another. It
is with the analysis of certain detailed aspects of these
dialogues that the present work concerns itself.
Before proceeding to a description of the data and
analyses, however, it is important that the reader be well
acquainted with the nature of the task itself. In order
to thoroughly acquaint the reader with the various
features of the task, therefore, the following description
of the task will be divided into three sections. The
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first section will reiterate some of the features of the
task touched upon briefly ~n the introduction, specifying
the rules of the game, the nature of the mazes, and so on.
The second section will describe the opening move from a
typical game from the subjects' perspective, in order that
the reader may be well versed 1n what the task involves for
the subjects. The last section will provide details of
what, from the experimenter's perspective, is important
about the task; what can be studied using the task, which
variables can be manipulated, and so on. Taken together,
the three sections should provide the reader with a
suitably deep understanding of the game from the points of
view of both experimenter and subject.
(i) The features of the task
As noted earlier, the game task involves two subjects
jointly solving a problem by moving their position markers
from (different) start positions to (different) goal
positions within a !!LE.Zg. A version of the maze in plan
view is presented to each subject on the visual display
screen of the computer terminal at which each of the
subjects is seated. Subjects are seated at separate
terminals, each being located in separate soundproofed
booths. The subjects' only communication is verbal, and this
is achieved by means of a headset and microphone for each
subject. (See figures 4-3 and 4-4 for diagrams of the
maze display presented to two players at the start of a
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particular game).
Each maze display consists of:
(a) A collection of paths along which players can move,
and nodes, which are located at the ends or at the
intersections of these paths. During the course of the
game, players move from node to node via available paths.
(b) The players' starting positions and goal~ (these
are marked by an X and an asterisk, respectively). In
the case of the games reported in the present work,
subjects could only see their Qlin position and goal
position, they could not see their partner's location or
goal position. (It is, however, possible for the
experimenter to allow subjects to see their partner's
position throughout the game in one of the optional game
types available in the maze game program. This option
was not employed in the work reported here - all subjects
were unable to see their partner's position).
(c) Gates: these are blockages in some of the paths
of the maze. Gate positions are denoted in the diagrams
(see figures 4.3 and 4.4) by a small line across the
centre of the path and perpendicular to the direction of
the path. Gate positions were similarly denoted in the
displays on the subjects' screens. If a player attempts
to move across a gate by moving towards it, his position
marker is automatically rebounded from the gate back to the
node from whence it came: this type of move is illegal
and impermissible.
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Approximately half of the paths in each subject's
maze have gates.
(d) ~liitch nodes Approximately, beween a third and
a half of the nodes in a given subject's maze shape are
~liitch nodes, and this is denoted (both in the diagrams
used in this chapter and in the actual screen displays on
subjects' computer terminals) by their containing an S
(see figures 4-3 and 4-4). These switch nodes are the
means whereby players can assist one another's passage
through the maze. This is achieved as follows: a player
who requires to pass along a currently gated path has to i)
find out the position of the other player, and 1i) guide the
other player into one of the S nodes visible to him (the
blocked player) on his terminal display, but lihich ~
invisible to the player being guided. The positions of
gates and switch nodes are different for the two players
and each sees only those relevant to himself or herself and
not those of his or her partner. If a player does succeed
in guiding his or her partner into one of the switch nodes
on his or her screen, that player's gate configuration is
completely reversed. Thus, if player A successfully
guides player B into one of her own (A's) Snodes, then
player A's gate configuration changes such that all
previously gated paths become open and all previously
open paths become gated. Player B's gate configuration is
unaffected by this. Player A's gate configuration will
change if player B moves into any node marked by an S on
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player A's screen even if player B does so unintentionally
(she might do so unintentionally simply because she is
unable to see the locations of her partner's S nodes).
Thus, the moves the two players make matter critically to
each other, and in the course of playing the game,
subjects learn quite quickly how to effect deliberate gate
switching and avoid unintentional gate switching.
(8) At the bottom of the display on each player's
-scre en, a 1s.11.Y 0 f the tot a 1 nu m ber 0 f m 0ves m adeb y QQ1h
players up to the current point in time. When subjects
attempt to cross barriers and in so doing make illegal
moves, a number of penalty points (arbitrarily set at two
in the present studies) registers against them, and the
total number of penalty points incurred by both subjects
is also displayed in the tally.
Each player moves in turn from his starting node to
any other node by an open path. Only one node can be
reached on each move and a player's turn terminates at
this node. The subjects are exhorted to move to their
respective goals in as few moves as possible, and
incurring as few penalty points as possible. The game is
terminated when both players are simultaneously located in
their respective goals - that is, the game solution
requires that firstly one player should reach his or her
goal, and the other player must then enter his or her goal
so that both are simultaneously in their respective goals.
When this is achieved, the game is terminated, an
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appropriate message is displayed on the screen (for example
"Task successfully completed on move 30 with 18 penalty
pOints") in place of the tally, and players are allowed to
make no further moves.
An additional optional feature of the maze game
program was the possibility of a maze 'monster' being
present in the maze. This monster, denoted by a capital M
when present (visible to both players and occupying the same
node on their respective mazes), is a semi-intelligent
third player,whose task it is to occupy the same node as
one of the players. If this is achieved, that player is
considered to be 'eaten' and the game is thenceforth
terminated, an appropriate message being displayed on both
players' screens in place of the tally. The monster's
presence makes the task more difficult for the players, as
they then have to not only solve the task by cooperating
with each other, but also avoid being 'eaten'. The
monster moves once for every third move of both players,
pursues one player at a time, and obeys the gate
configuration of that player, that is, the monster will
not traverse a closed gate in the pursued player's maze.
Prior to playing the game, subjects were fully informed
of the rules of the game, and it was emphasized to
subjects that they should cooperate with each other. They
were informed that the solution of the game requires both
subjects to be in their respective goals simultaneously,
and the necessity to cooperate in order to achieve this
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aim was emphasized to the subjects.
(ii) The maze ~m_g task: the subject's perspective
An appreciation on the reader's part of what the game
task involves for a pair of subjects playing it is best
achieved by considering the opening moves in a typical
(hypothetical) game: this will better acquaint the reader
with the operation of the gate-switching mechanism.
Consider figure 4-3: this illustrates what player A sees
of the maze at the start of the game. Player A's start
position is represented by an X, and her goal position 1s
represented by an asterisk. There is no indication on
player A's maze of where her partner (player B) is located
or where she is headed for. Consider now figure 4.4:
this illustrates what player B sees of the maze at the
start of the game; her own (B's) goal and start positions
are marked on the maze, but, like player A, she has no idea
where her partner's start and goal positions are. The
players are thus initially in mutual ignorance of each
other's position and destination.
Comparison of figures 4-3 and 4-4 reveal several
points of note:
a) The overall shape of the maze (the configuration
of nodes and paths) is identical for both players; there
are no extra paths or missing paths for one of the players
as compared to the other (cf. Blakar's 'communication
conflict' task maps);
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Figure 4-3: Typical Game: State of Game at Game
Start for Player A
Key: .X = Start Position '. : ,-
Asterisk = Goal Position
Small Black Barriers in some Paths Represent
Initial Blockage Positions (i.e. Gates)
S = St-.'itchNode
.. ~
. Key: x = Start PositionAsterisk = Goal PositIon
Small Black Harriers in some Paths
Represent Initially Gated Paths
S = Switch Node'
Typical Game: State of Maze at Game
Start for Player B.
I i
I
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Figure 4-4:
b) Both mazes are absolutely symmetrical about a
vertical centre line (in this particYlar case;
asymmetrical mazes were also used. See the later
section in this chapter). This symmetry is true for both
the maze structure itself (paths and nodes) and also for S
node and gate positions;
c} The two players are set the task of moving in a
parallel fashion: their start and goal positions are
symmetrically placed, although they do not know this
initially (and they may not realize that this symmetry
exists even when they are aware of one another's
position).
d} The locations of S nodes and gates, although
symmetrical for each player, are different for the two
players (cf. figures 4-3 and 4-4). This difference is
non-systematic in that A's gate and switch nodes are not
simply the 'converse' of B's (i.e. located at the nodes
where B's gate and switch nodes are absent). This means,
in effect, that sometimes S nodes coincide for both
players (for example, the two topmost S nodes coincide for
both players) and sometimes they do not coincide (for
example, consider the bottom-most horizontal line of nodes
in the two versions of the maze and compare the locations
of S nodes). The same is true for barriers. This
effective non-predictability of the locations of the
other's switches and barriers forces the subjects to
discuss their positions, and this in turn guarantees the
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generation of dialogue.
The first task is for both players to describe their
locations and goal positions. Player A might do this as
follows:
"I'm on the second row from the top, and the
second box from the left, and my goal is on the
second row from the bottom, third from the
left".
The main emphasis of this thesis will be an analysis
of such descriptions. Note, for the moment, that this
description involves treating the maze shape as if it were
an array of parallel horizontal lines (rows) of nodes and
generating descriptions by first identifying the relevant
line of nodes in which the node to be described is located,
and then identifying the particular node involved. (A
fuller discussion of these descriptions will be presented
in chapters 6, 7 and 8 of this thesis). Suppose that player
B describes her location in a similar manner:
"Well, I'm on the second top row, fifth from
the left, and my goal is on the second bottom
row, fourth from the left".
Having thus described their locations and goals, the
players now start planning to move. In all games, player
A was first to move (this was indicated to her by her
position marker flashing in and'out on the computer
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terminal screen. B's position marker flashed when it was
her turn to move, and stayed on continuously on the screen
when it was not. Obviously, it is impossible to represent
this on these diagrams).
Suppose, then, player A is first to move. Inspection
of figure 4.3 reveals that, in effect, only two options
are available. There is no path above her position, so no
movement is possible at all in that direction; she could
move one node to the left or one node downward, where
paths are available and there are no gates blocking her
way. There ~ a path available to her right but it is
gated, so if she were to move to the right, she would
rebound on the barrier and incur a penalty move, ending up
at the node from which she started, no further forward and
with two penalty points against her. Thus, she really
only has tw::>options of movement. That to the left takes
her further from her goal, and that downward is in the
general direction of her goal.
The node directly beneath player A's initial position
is one of her own S nodes. Moving into this will not
affect either player, (provided of course that it is not an
S node for player B - see figures 4.3 and 4.4).
Consultation with player B establishes that the node
directly beneath player A is not an S node for player B,
and player A makes her first move by pressing one of four
computer terminal keys marked with arrows to signal
movement direction relative to the plan view presented on
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the screen. Suppose she moves down, which is in the
correct general direction. She moves into her own S
node, which affects neither player, since that particular
node is not one of player B's S nodes. The state of A's
maze is now given in figure 4-5 (see figure 4-5). The
only thing that has changed is A's position. B's maze is
unaffected and would be as depicted in figure 4-4. As
things stand at the moment; player A will be able to move
to her right, or back up, on,her next move if her maze is
unchanged by player S's next move. It is now player Bt s
turn to move.
Consider figure 4-4. B has available paths to her
right, to her left, and downwards from her. However, those
to her right and downwards contain gates, and so moving in
either of those directions would not advance her passage
through the maze. Her best option would be to move to her
left, that is, towards the centre of the maze, provided,
of course, that this move did not actually worsen the
situation for player A. A consultation with player A
reveals (see figures 4.3 and 4.4) that the node located
one move to the left of B is a switch gate for A. If B
moved to her left, this would change player A's entire
barrier configuration. This would, in fact, be to their
mutual benefit (see figures 4.4 and 4.5): player B would
be slightly nearer her goal, and player A's gates would
change such that the paths below her and to her left would
become open, and those to her right and above her would
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Figure 4-5: Typical Game: state of Game after one
Move for Player A.
x = Current Position
Asterisk = Goal Position
Small "Black Barriers insome Paths
Currently Gated (Blocked) Paths.
S = Switch Node
Represent
I
become blocked. This would allow player A to move down
on her next move, taking her in the direction of her goal.
Suppose, then, that player B does move to her left.
figure 4.6 shows the state of player B's maze following
her move. She is now nearer the maze centre and in direct
vertical line with her goal, which is three movements
below her in a direct path (see figure 4.6). Her own
configuration of gates does not change; only player A's
moving can achieve that. Player B has, however, moved
into an S node for player A, and so player A's entire
configuration of barriers has changed (see figure 4.7 and
compare it with figure 4.5 in terms of gate positions).
Notice that the change is in terms of gate positions - the
locations of S nodes do not change. Where gates
previously eXisted, they no longer exist, and where there
were previously no gates, they are now in evidence.
Player A is now free to move to her left or down, two
courses of action that were impossible before player B
made her move.
This discussion of the opening moves in a typical game
thus illustrates the essence of the task. The
interdependence of the players on one another, and the
necessity for_ them to cooperate and coordinate their
patterns of moving is clear. The successive removal of
gates is necessary for a solution to the game to be
attained. Notice that several changes of gates are
necessary for the solution of anyone game - examination
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Typic~l Game: Stat~ of Player B's
Maze following 2 Moves
~....
~: x = Start Position'Asterisk = Goal Positions
Small' Black'Barriers insome Paths Represent
Initially Gated Paths
S = Switch Node
I"
• d'
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Figure 4-7: Typical Game: . $ta te of ~layer A',s
..,.' .Maze after ~ Moyes I ; <,
~: X = ~tart Position
Asterisk = Goal fosition
~mall Black Barriers in' some Paths Hepresen t
Initially 9ated Paths 'I
S = Switch Node
of figure 4.7 will reveal that player A will soon require
to enlist player B's cooperation again, since, as things
stand, A can now move down one node, but after she has
made that move, she can go no further towards her goal
without having her gates changed again.
The typical game would continue with players A and B
discussing possible moves, node positions, and the positions
of one another's location markers. It should be borne in
mind that neither player can see her partner's position,
and so the repeated reporting of positions is necessary,
particularly since players' positions change with each
move.
The game would proceed, sometimes smoothly, sometimes
with difficulty, until a solution is attained, at which
point several minutes of dialogue have been spoken by both
players and recorded by the experimenter.
The foregoing serves to illustrate the subjects'
perspective on the task. Now we turn to examine the
experimenter's perspective.
(iii) The maze ~m~ task: the experimenter's perspective
The game has been discussed from two points of view
in the previous sections, namely, its properties as ~ ~m~
(the rules involved, and so on), and its properties from
the po Ln t of view of a subject playing the game
(illustrating what the game involves for the subject, and so
on). We shall now consider the game from the
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experimenter's point of view, that is, in terms of how the
task is realized in practice (with what equipment, and so
forth) and also in terms of what variables can be
manipulated and what sorts of aspects of dialogues can be
studied using the task. Each of these aspects will be
dealt with in turn.
a) Apparatus
The mazes were presented to sub j ects on Imlac
corporation PDS1-G and 'Intel' (Intelligent systems
corporation) Intecolor 8001 terminals, driven from a Data
General Nova 210 computer using hard disks. (See figure
4.8 below).
DATA
~
'" GENERAL
, -¥
INTEL ' , IMLAC
NOVA "
TERMINAL ' , ' TERMINAL
I 210 I IPlayer PlayerA' COMPUTER I BIIHeadphones Microphone Headphones Microph one
-
Move
Tones .. ~
TEAC.. ' .. ..
~Ir, TAPE ~AMPLIFIER..,. ~...
RECORDER
Figure 4.8
The experimental set-up
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Each terminal was located in a different soundproofed
room and subjects were seated in front of either terminal.
Subjects communicated with each other through microphones
and headphones, this system being linked up via a
Ferrograph '20 + 20' amplifier to a TEAC A-3340 4-channel
tape recorder. Each player's speech was recorded on a
different track of the tape, while moves by the players
were signalled on the other two tracks by means of a tone
'blip' generated by a pulse supplied by the Nova. The
tone was of a different frequency for the two players.
All dialogues were recorded from start to finish on the
TEAC recorder, using EMI and BASF 6 inch reel tapes.
As noted earlier, the terminals displayed an
indication of which player's turn it was to move by means
of that player's position marker (X) flashing on and off.
A tally was kept of the number of moves of both players
and of the total number of penalty points incurred up to
that point. This tally was also displayed on the screen.
Players made their moves by pressing keys located on
the keyboards of the terminals, these keys being
appropriately marked with arrows indicating the direction
of the chosen move relative to the orientation of the
display on the screen, that is, t 1s up,~ 1s right, etc.
If a button was pressed where no movement was possible,
i.e. when the subject attempted to move where there was
no path whatsoever (neither open nor gated), the subject
was free to move again. All moves and times of moves
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were recorded by the Nova and subsequently printed out.
The maze game program was written in the appropriate
machine codes by Mr. J. T. Mullin, computer manager in the
*department of psychology of the University of Glasgow.
b) The study of task-oriented dialogues using the m~
game task
As noted in section (ii) above, the dialogues produced
when using the task are usually several minutes in length
each, and contain location descriptions, planning of
moves, and so on. As such, a variety of facets of
spontaneous task-oriented dialogue can be studied using
this type of task. In the present work, a detailed
analysis of the semantics and pragmatics of the location
descriptions generated by subjects in the course of
playing the game is undertaken. As such, only games where
players could not see their partner's position were
analyzed here, since such 'unseen partner' condition games
force subjects to generate location descriptions.
his partner's position is visible to a subject,
description of that position by his partner is
Where
superfluous. Thus, the option in the program allowing
subjects to see their partner's location was not employed
in the games used in the present work.
The general advantage of studying task-oriented
* See also Appendix VI for further details of the maze
program.
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dialogues hinge on the fact that, when subjects are busy
attempting to solve a task, they are not self-conscious
about the dialogue they produce, and their speech ~as a
spontaneous and natural quality. As Grosz (1977) puts
it, "Task-oriented dialogues are a good source of unbiased
data on discourse. Concentration on the performance of a
task keeps the participants from becoming self-
conscious about their language. The resulting dialogues are
spontaneous and unrehearsed". (Grosz, 1977, p. 11). In
social psychological terms, subjects are in the state of
awareness termed "awareness-of-self-as-subject" (or agent,
or problem solver) rather than being in the state of
awareness-known as "awareness-of-self-as-object" (i.e. as
an object being studied by someone else).
Thus, although the topic of discourse is constrained,
it can be argued that the data produced is quite natural
due to the spontaneous nature of its production. It
should be emphasized that, although the topic of discourse
is constrained, the subjects' choice of phrase is entirely
unconstrained. This is true of dialogue in general;
the topic of discourse constrains what can be said, but
how it is said is entirely up to the participants.
A casual inspection of the transcripts suggests that,
as was the case with the various studies employing
Blakar's 'communication conflict' task, subjects in the
maze game experiments become quite task-involved. This
task-involvement further enhances the spontaneity of the
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dialogue produced. Furthermore, post-experimental
comments by subjects indicates that they were often quite
highly motivated to perform the task successfully. All of
these factors suggest that the dialogues produced were
natural rather than artificial in nature.
Subjects were recruited from the first- and second-
year (undergraduate) classes of psychology students in the
University of Glasgow, and, in some cases, from among
students found playing computer games in the University
of Glasgow refectory at lunchtime. This selection of
subjects ensur-ad. that the subjects involved were familiar
with computers in general and computer games in particular,
ensuri ng that the task was not an unnatural one for the
subjects. Pairs of dyads were recruited at a time
such that subjects within a dyad were already acquainted
with one another. This obviated any difficulties 'which
might have arisen for subjects playing a complex computer
game with a person unknown to them. All subjects were
paid for participating in the studies at the rate of £1.00
per hour.
It can be argued, therefore, that the dialogues
produced by subjects were of a genuinely spontaneous and
natural type.
Only a brief summary of the variables manipulated in
the various studies will be reported here, since greater
detail concerning the studies undertaken and the results
obtained are given in the following chapter.
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It is in fact possible to manipulate three types of
variable, namely; i) the type of game played by the
subjects (i.e. whether the game involved the 'monster' or
not), ii) the nature of the maze shape on which subjects
played the game - the structural configuration of the
paths could be varied in any way desired to produce
symmetrically- or asymmetrically-shaped mazes (see
appendix I), and iii) subject variables t r.e,
deliberately assigning subjects to dyads on the basis of
how they played the game previously).
Four studies were in fact run. Experiment 1 was a
'baseline' study in which subjects played games on mazes
which were symmetrically shaped (see appendix I).
Experiment 2 involved the subjects playing on the same
symmetrically-shaped mazes as were used in experiment 1
but in this case the 'monster' was present in the maze.
Experiment 3 involved a manipulation of the maze
shape variable:subjects played games on vertically
symmetrical and markedly asymmetrical pairs of mazes (see
appendix I; see also next chapter). Experiment 4
involved manipulating subject variables. In this
experiment, subjects were paired up with one another to form
dyads on the basis of their previously having used
different ways of describing maze locations.
Experiment 1 acted as baseline study, against which
the results from experiments 2, 3 and 4 were compared.
The foregoing serves to introduce the reader to the
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task employed in the present work and its properties.
The present task does share certain of its features with
previous studies which have used a similar methodological
strategy. The maze game task is, however, unique and
has not been employed in studies previous to those
reported here •.
The next, empirical, chapters will present analyses
and results from the above studies using the maze game
task, and the relation of these results to the theories
reviewed in part I of this .thesis will be an interesting
matter which will be taken up in the later chapters of the
present volume.
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Part II
The Semantics and Pragmatics of Spatial
Location Description in Spontaneous
Dialogue:
The Empirical Studies
24~
CHAPTER .5.
PRELIMINARY ANALYSES: THE EFFICIENCY
OF PROBLEM SOLVING IN THE MAZE GAME
s_l Introduction
In the last chapter, a number of speech production
tasks were reviewed, and an exposition was given of the
task employed in the work reported in this volume. The
speech production tasks antecedent to the present maze
game were reviewed in order to indicate the range and
variety of issues which can be addressed using such tasks.
As noted in the last chapte~, all these tasks have the
common advantage that the language produced by the subjects in
performing the tasks is produced for ~ purpose, thereby
alleviating the problem of the artificiality of both
materials and data which some language· understanding
experiments run the risk of.
A further advantage which was noted previously is that
the task-involvement of subjects helps to ensure a true
spontaneity in the language produced. In addition to
these twin advantages (of speech being produced for a
purpose, and of subjects being task-involved) which ensure
genuine spontaneity and naturalness, the maze game task
used in the work reported here possesses one further
advantage: there is an independent record of what is
being talked about by the subjects in the form of a
computer printout of successive game states.
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This makes possible an analysis of the semantics and
of some of the pragmatics of spatial location description,
since we can relate any spatial location description to a
particular game state. In this respect, the present task
differs from most of its predecessors which were reviewed
in the last chapter: only Levelt possessed a similar
independent record of what was being described in his
experiments, as well as constraining tightly the topic of
discourse. Levelt's task, however, involved monologues as
opposed to the present dialogue task. Thus, the present
task permits an examination of a range of pragmatic
issues, since we can examine whether particular dialogue
partners constrain the other participant's choice of
phrase, for example.
The major focus of the work reported here will be a
detailed analysis of the location descr~tions generated by
subjects in the course of playing the game. In the next
chapter, sample data will be given to exemplify the
nature of the location description task ~i'vet'\ '-to the '
The next chapter will also summarize the
statistical analysis of the data, and the results obtained
will be presented in chapter 7.
In the meantime, however, some preliminary data
analyses are presented in terms of the efficiency with
which subjects solve the game task in the different
experimental conditions. Since the primary interest lies
in the location description data, this preliminary
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exposition will be brief.
Ql Preliminary analyses; the efficiency of QrQblem
solving in the various types of game,
As alluded to in the previous chapter, a total of
four studies were conducted:
1) a baseline study using symmetrical mazes,
2) a study involving the 'maze monster',
3) a study utilizing specially-constructed
(asymmetrical and 'column biased') mazes, and
4) a reassignment study.
Details of the studies, hypotheses and variables
manipulated in the different comparisons are given below.
The measures employed to summarize the efficiency of
subjects at solving the game task under these different
conditions were:
a) The number of moves required by players in order
to achieve solution.
b) The amount of real time required by players in
order to achieve solution.
Data from these two measures are included in the data
summary table (table 5-1, below). However, statistical
comparisons of different conditions employing these two
measures were not carried out. The reason for this is
that, although, for example, monster games and standard
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games employed identical mazes and similar start and goal
positions (see appendix II (b) and (d)), the mere presence
of the monster, in addition to complicating the game
strategically, may alter the optimal solution to this
type of game. This would render the two types of game
incomparable on this particular measure. The same is also
true for analyses of the amount of real time taken by
subjects to achieve a solution in the task. If
the number of moves required for an optimal solution 1s
changed by the presence of the monster, then the amount of
time required until solution is achieved is also likely to
change. (We would expect these two measures to be.correlated to some extent, with games requiring more moves
also taking subjects longer).
The non-comparability of different game types on th~se
measures is even more marked if we consider the comparison
between baseline games and games played on specia1ly-
constructed mazes. The specially-constructed mazes
contain fewer paths, allowing subjects fewer options in
their moves. This would probably result in the optimal
solution to these games on specially-constructed mazes
being different to that in games using symmetrical mazes,
and again the two types of game will not be comparable on
the 'number of moves' and 'time taken' measures.
For these reasons, summary statistics on these two
measures will be presented for the different game types,
but no statistical comparisons will be made between
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different game types (for example, in the comparison
between monster games and baseline games).
However, study 2, the baseline study, involved two
unseen-partner games on symmetrical mazes, and this
allows an examination for a possible effect of practice on
subjects' efficiency at solving the task to be
undertaken. In this case, the two game types being
compared (earlier-played games as opposed to later-played
games) involve the same mazes and similar problems being set
to subjects (i.e. similar start and goal positions,
similar distances to be moved through the maze structure,
and so on) and therefore they '§'J:~ comparable on the number
of moves/time taken to solution measures.
The other two measures employed to assess efficiency
at problem-solving circumvent the above-mentioned
problem of different game types not having comparable
optimal solutions. These measures avoid this problem
because they are measures of rate, and are not absolute
measures. They are:
c) The rate of movirg (the number of moves made by both
players per minute).
d) The mean number of utterances spoken by both
subjects per move.
The rate of moving measure controls for differing
numbers of moves in different game types by measuring how
much time is required by subjects, on average, between
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successive moves. It could be expected that this measure
will correlate with the amount of difficulty experienced by
subjects in the different game types: games which are more
difficult for subjects (whether for strategic or other
reasons) would require more careful planning of moves, and
this would result in subjects spending more time, on
average, planning each move. For example, it could be
expected that monster games would involve a slower rate of
moving than would baseline games, since subjects would
spend greater amounts of time planning each move, taking
greater care in order to evade the hazard presented by the
monster. The presence of the monster would also constrain
freedom of movement within the maze, since moving along
some of the paths might be inadvisable in that it would
take a subject's position marker closer to the monster,
even though these paths were free to be moved along.
Thus, subjects in baseline games would effectively have
greater freedom of movement within the maze, and have less
complicated planning, and thus would be expected to move at
a quicker rate.
The other measure, d), the mean number of utterances
spoken by both subjects between moves, reflects the average
amoun~ of speech generated by subjects between successive
moves and again this obviates the comparability problem
by measuring the average number of utterances between
successive moves (and is therefore effectively a 'rate'
measure). Absolute values of moves or utterances are not
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involved. Again, it would be expected that, in the case
of games where subjects are experiencing greater
difficulty (whether strategic or communicative
difficulty), more utterances would be required on average
between successive moves. This greater number of
utterances between moves might be needed to formulate more
complicated and lengthier plans, for example.
Statistical comparisons between different game types
were made on these two measures (rate of moving and mean
number of utterances between successive moves - see
results section below).
The details of the four studies are set out below.
Study ~ Baseline study
In this study, sixteen subjects (eight males and eight
females, comprising four pairs of males and four pairs of
females) took part in an exploratory study. Subjects
firstly played a practice game on a small, symmetrical
maze based on a 4 x 4 matrix of nodes (see Appendix I for
diagrams of all the maze shapes used). This was
followed by four games, one on each of four different
larger mazes based on 6 x 6 matrices of nodes (mazes 5B,
6B, 7A and 8A: these mazes were horizontally symmetrical,
that is, symmetrical about a vertical line passing through
the centre of the maze. See Appendix I). Two of the
games involved a 'seen partner' condition, and two
involved an 'unseen partner' condition. A counterbalanced
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design was used to balance the orders in which the different
mazes were used. One of each of the seen- and unseen-
partner games involved subjects traversing symmetrical
distances of identical length in the same direction (e.g.
from the bottom part to the top part of the maze) and the
other games involved subjects traversing symmetrical
distances of identical length but in opposite directions
(one subject proceeding from the bottom part of the maze
to the top part, and the other proceeding from the top to
the bottom). Appendix II (b) and (c) illustrates these
two types of game. Again, their order of occurrence was
counterbalanced.
Only the unseen-partner games have been analyzed
here. The data from study 1 constitute a 'baseline'
against which data from the other studies were compared
in an 'independent samples' design.
Since subjects in study 1 played two unseen-partner
games, an analysis for the possible effects of practice on
efficiency at solving the task was possible by comparing
data (number of moves, time taken, rate of moving, and the
mean number of utterances between moves) from earlier games
with those from later games. This repeated-measures
comparison would allow us to ascertain whether or not
subsequent games were solved more efficiently than were
earlier games.
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Study 2.... Hanipulation of &.Q.!l1~ ~ llionster E..§.m~ Y§..,_
baseline game).
In study 2, ten pairs of sUbjects (four pairs of
males and six pairs of females) took part in a total of
eleven practice games on the small practice maze (maze 1A,
as in study 1), three in a seen-partner condition and eight
in an unseen-partner condition. These practice games
were recorded but not analyzed.
These were followed by a total of twelve unseen-
partner games based on the same larger, horizontally
symmetrical mazes as were used in study 1 (mazes 5B, 6B,
7A, and 8A) but in which the monster was involved. Only
the twelve non-practice games involving the larger mazes
and the monster are analyzed here. In all cases,
subjects were set the task of proceeding from the bottom
end of the maze to the top end of the maze (starting and
goal positions being symmetrically placed, see appendix
II (d), and the monster's initial position was at the top of
the maze, i.e. the opposite end of the maze from the
region in which the players' starting positions were
located. start and goal positions for players were
similar to those involved in study 1. The data from
study 2 were compared with those yielded in study 1,
constituting an 'independent samples' design.
It was anticipated that the presence of the monster
would complicate the game for the players from the pOint
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of view of solving the task, for the reasons outlined
earlier. When the monster is present, players not only
have to cooperate with each other, make plans, develop
strategies and so on, but they also have to avoid occupying
the same node as the monster. Furthermore, the monster
moves once for every three moves made by both players and
actively pursues one player at at time.
This strategic complication, it could be
hypothesized, would force the subjects to consider more
carefully their patterns of moving in order to avoid being
'eaten'. Thus, we would anticipate that subjects in
'monster' games would move at a significantly slower rate
and require significantly more utterances per move on
average than would subjects in baseline games: this would
reflect the greater care required in planning moves in the
monster games.
From the point of view of the location description
aspect of the subjects' task, the monster constitutes a
moving reference point (visible to both players at
identical locations within their respective maze displays)
relative to which location descriptions can be generated.
This feature was sometimes used by subjects playing
'monster' games, players' position marker and goal
positions being described in terms of distances (in terms
of numbers of nodes in the pathway) between the location
being described and the monster's position.
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study .h. Hanipulation of maze shapes
In this study, eight pairs of subjects (three pairs of
males and five pairs of females) took part in a total of
fourteen games using mazes 9B (the 'column biased' maze)
and 10A (the asymmetrical maze: see appendix I), both of
which are based on the 6 x 6 matrix of nodes. All games
were in the unseen-partner condition and all were analyzed.
Data from this study were also compared with data from
study 1, constituting an 'independent samples' design.
The principal interest in the comparison between data
from study 1 (baseline study) and study 3 (using
asymmetrical and 'column biased' mazes) lies in the
manipulation of maze shape and its possible effect upon
the nature of the location descriptions generated. Mazes
9A and 10B were constructed in a manner such that they
would contrast with the symmetrical mazes 5B, 6B, 7A and
8A used in study 1. Hence, maze 10B was constructed such
that it possessed a markedly asymmetrical shape in both
planes of orientation. The 'column biased' maze (maze
9A) was constructed such that it retained horizontal
symmetry, but with the continuity of horizontal lines
destroyed, resulting in a maze shape featuring complete
columns and incomplete rows, hence the term 'column
biased' used to describe it.
As indicated above, therefore, study 3 was designed
to manipulate maze shape, and this enables us to assess
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whether this manipulation affects the nature of the
location descriptions generated. The result of this
aspect of study 3 will be given in a later chapter.
It is possible that the specially-constructed mazes
used in study 3 would, since they contain fewer paths than
the symmetrical mazes used in study 1, allow fewer options
of movement within the maze and thereby present greater
difficulty for subjects than do the baseline games. The
greater difficulty inherent in games which allow fewer
options of movement would arise because fewer options of
movement would allow fewer possible alternative routes
towards goal for each of the players. When a player's path
towards goal is blocked by barriers, he might be unable to
take an alternative route towards goal and instead would be
.forced to plan with his partner how to remove the barriers
from his path. This planning can be quite complicated,
involving the blocked player taking penalty moves until
his partner can get to one of the blocked player's switch
gat es, Furthermore, the fact that there are fewer paths
available increases the possibility of one or other of the
players being unable to move at all on some occasions.
This might occur because the few available pathways
radiating from the node occupied by him all contain
barriers simultaneously. (For example, his partner may
have unwittingly moved into a switch gate and hemmed the
player in). In such cases, he must plan with his partner
how to effect a switching of his barriers and take penalty
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moves in the meantime. Games involving fewer options of
movement are thus more difficult for subjects, since the
possibility of one of the players being completely
blocked arises, and quite complicated planning and
sequences of moves may be required to circumvent this
problem.
Thus, an independent samples comparison on the two
'efficiency' measures (rate of moving and mean number of
utterances per move) was drawn between data from study 3
and data from study 1, with the hypothesis that subjects
in study 3 would show a slower rate of moving and a greater
number of utterances per move being postulated.
Stud X .!L. Manipulation of subject variables
In study 4, subjects who had previously taken part in
either study 1 or study 2 were contacted and each
allocated a new partner with which to play the maze game,
such that each member of a dyad was paired with a subject
known to him or her but with whom he or she had not played
th game previously. One pair of male subjects and two
pairs of female subjects played a total of six unseen-
partner condition games, each pair playing two games. The
first-played game was played on one of the symmetrical
mazes used in study 1 (mazes 5B/6B/7A/8A), and this was
followed by a game on the asymmetrical maze (maze 10A).
Again, data from study 4 used the data from study 1 as a
control comparison, constituting an 'independent samples'
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design. As with the comparison between study 3 and
study 1, the main interest in this manipulation of
subject variables was in the possible effect upon the type
of location descriptions generated.
Subjects had been paired together on the basis of
their having used different types of location
descriptions, and the main interest of study 4 was an
attempt to ascertain how subjects would overcome this
initial difference. An exposition of the different
description types found in the data is given in the next
chapter, and an examination of the effect of the
manipulation of subject variables upon the descriptions
generated will be undertaken in a subsequent chapter.
It is possible that such a pairing of individuals
who had previously used different description types could
affect subjects' efficiency of performance in the task
adversely; and so an analysis in terms of rate of moving
and mean number of utterances per move was undertaken,
comparing study 4 data with data from study 1.
In all cases, the rules of the game were explained to
subjects beforehand and subjects were instructed to
attempt to complete the game in as few moves as pOSSible,
in as little time as possible, and incurring as few
penalty points as possible. In all, 48 games were
analyzed across the four studies.
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Exclusions
Some games were excluded from the efficiency analyses
for four main reasons:
(a) In some games, both of the subjects failed
to understand the instructions properly at
first, particularly, failing to understand
switch box functioning. As a result, they
moved around in an uncoordinated fashion,
thereby rendering the games in which they
participated spuriously long. Three games
out of 48 were excluded on this basis.
(b) On two occasions, one of the subjects
playing a 'monster' game was 'eaten' by the
monster in an extremely short time span,
resulting in two games which were
spuriously short. The two games excluded
from the analysis on this basis were only 6
and 12 moves in length, corresponding to 1.35
and 5.1 minutes of dialogue, respectively.
(c) There were cases where the tape on the
tape-recorder had to be changed during the
course of a game, thus spuriously
lengthening the time taken by the players,
but not affecting the number of moves
taken. Accordingly, such games (4 in all,
3 being from study 1 and 1 being from
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study 2) were excluded from the 'rate of
moving' comparisons, but not excluded from
the 'mean number of utterances per move'
comparison. In such cases, the sUbjects
were not allowed to discuss the game during
the period in which the tape was being
changed.
(d) There were cases where players were set an
insoluble task due to experimenter error.
This occurred on two occasions with games
from study 3, involving asymmetrical mazes.
In all the tables of data in this chapter, the numbers of
subjects (N) shown in each table is the number of subjects
after exclusions had been made.
c) Results
In drawing the various statistical comparisons
(between data from first-played as opposed to data from
later-played games in study 1, and between data from
studies 2, 3, and 4 as opposed to data from study 1),
appropriate non-parametric statistical tests were used.
This was because variances in the me~sures employed were
not equal in the various conditions,and this violates one
of the assumptions on which the use of parametric
statistical tests are based. The Mann-Whitney U test
for independent samples was thus used for comparisons
between studies (i.e. when data from studies 2, 3 and 4
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were being compared with data from study 1) and the
Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test was used for
comparisons involving repeated measures (that is, in the
comparison between data from first-played as opposed to
later-played games in study 1).
The first comparison of interest is the comparison
between first-played games and later-played games in study
1. This comparison allows an assessment of the possible
effects of practise on subjects' efficiency at solving the
game task. The relevant summary statistics are shown in
table 5-1, below:
Efficiency Firs~-played Game Later Game
Measure X S.D X S.D N
1• Number of moves
to game solution 36.57 8.25 29.33 10.307 7
2. Time taken to game
solution (mins) 9.8198 3.373 8.05 3.4289 6
3. Rate of moving
(Number of moves per
min.) 3.6824 0.4162 3.243 0.8013 6
4. Mean number of
utterances by both
players between
successive moves. 6.81 1.212 8.377 3.33 7
Table 5=1L Subjects' efficiency at solving the gsm~ task
in first-played as opposed to later-played KEillesin stud~
1, comparing the two types of game on each of four
measures of problem solving efficiency.
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Examination of the data table reveals that the mean
number of moves and the mean time taken to solution both
differ between the two types of game in a direction
consistent with a practice effect. That is, the mean
number of moves required to solution is lower in the later
game (the mean being 29.33 moves to solution) than in the
first-played game (the mean in this case being 36.57
moves to solution). Likewise, the amount of time
required before a solution is reached is slightly lower in
the later game (with a mean of 8.05 minutes) than in the
case of the first-played game (with a mean of 9.82
minutes). There is a slightly slo~~ mean rate of moving
in later-played games (3.24 moves per minute) as compared
to first-played games (which have a mean of 3.68 moves
per minute), but the difference is slight. Lastly, there
is a slightly higher mean number of utterances per move
required in the later played games (a mean of 8.38
utterances per move) as compared to earlier-played games
(with a mean of 6.81 utterances per move). Both of these
later differences'are in a direction opposite to that
which one might expect on the basis of a hypothesized
practice effect; one might expect subjects to require
fewer utterances on average between moves in later games.
However, the differences are small ones.
The significance of these differences was tested
using a Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. This
demonstrated that the number of moves required for a
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solution to be achieved by subjects was significantly
lower in the later game as compared to the earlier game (T
= 1, N = 7, critical T = 2, p < 0.025 (1 tail». The
difference in time taken to solution, however, was not
significant (N = 6, T = 6, critical T = 0, NS). The
difference in rate of moving proved also to be non-
significant (N = 6, T = 6, critical T = 0, NS), as did the
difference in mean number of utterances per move (T = 15,
N = 7, critical T = 2, NS).
The only significant difference between first-played
and later games is, therefore, in terms of the number of
moves required to solution, with later games requiring
significantly fewer moves before a solution is reached.
This suggests that subjects are becoming more efficient in
problem-solving terms with increasing practice at playing
the game. They do not, however, appear to be becoming
verbally more efficient: they are in fact speaking
slightly, but not significantly, more between successive
moves on average,and this could reflect the greater
planning and strategic care required in order that a
significant reduction can be made in the number of moves
required to solution.
That ls, players would appear to be learning how to
coordinate their moving, learning which strategies of
moving are more efficient in problem solving terms (for
example, learning that sometimes the deliberate making of
illegal moves against barriers - see chapter 4 - is
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strategically advantageous rather than the converse), and
generally improving in the problem-solving aspects of the
task.
The next comparisons of interest are those between
the data from the different game types ('monster' games
versus baseline games, games on specially constructed mazes
versus baseline games and reassignment study games
versus baseline games). In all cases, the comparison is
between the later studies' games and the first-played
games of study ,1, since a practice effect has been shown
to be in operation, and later-played games from study 1,
may not, therefore, be strictly comparable to the games
from studies 2 and 3. That is, it was felt desirable
that the games from study 1 which were being compared with
the monster games should be as equivalent as possible in
terms of the subjects' experience and amount of practice
at playing the game. Since the monster games were played
after one practice game, it was decided to compare the
data from the monster games with the data from the
earlier-played games in study 1, which were also played
following one practice game.
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Efficiency Study 1 ~tudy 2 Study 3 .§tudy 4Measure ~ S.D. X S.D. X S.D. X S.D.
1• Number of 36.57 8.25 42.0 11 .07 34.7 12.64 31 .16 5.8moves to
game
solution N = 7 N = 10 N = 10 N = 6
2. Time taken 9.82 3.37 17.69 5.43 14.74 7.39 12.15 3.9to game
solution N = 6 N = 9 N = 10 N = 6
3. Rate of 3.68 0.4 2.40 0.57 2.45 0.63 2.63 0.6
moving
(No. of
Moves/
Min). N = 6 N = 9 N = 10 N = 6
4. Hean No. of 6.81 1.21 10.49 10.24 10.27 4.55 9.42 2.16
utterances
between N = 7 N = 10 N = 10 N = 6moves
Table 5=2 Summ££Y statistics of ~mes showing means,
standard deviations, and numbers of subjects in study 1
(baseline study) study 2 (monster games study) study 3
(specially constructed mazes study) and study 4
(reassignment study) on four measures of efficiency at
solving the task.
Comparing data from study 2 ('monster' games) with
data from study 1 (baseline games), the differences on
measures 3) and 4) (see table) are in the directions
predicted; monster games involve a slower rate ?f moving
(a mean of 2.40 moves per minute as against a mean of
3.68 moves per minute in the baseline games) and a greater
mean number of utterances between successive moves (a mean
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of 10.49 utterances between successive moves, as against a
mean of 6.81 utterances between successive moves in the
baseline games), as compared to the baseline games.
The differences in rate of moving and mean number of
utterances per move both proved to be significant - i.e.
monster games involved a significantly slower rate of
moving (Mann-vJhitney U = 3, n , = 6, n2 = 9, p < .01 (1
tail», and a significantly greater average number of
utterances between moves (U = 2, n, = 7, "z = 10, p < .00'
(1 tail» than did the baseline games.
Both of these findings uphold the hypotheses outlined
earlier. Monster games would appear to be strategically
more complex and this is reflected in their requiring a
greater number of utterances between successive moves on
average. This greater mean number of utterances between
moves significantly slows the rate of moving.
Comparing the data from study 3 (from games played on
specially-constructed mazes) with data from study 1
(from baseline games), differences on the appropriate two
efficiency measures (rate of moving and mean number of
utterances between successive moves) also appear. The
rate of moving is slower in the games played on specially
constructed mazes (with a mean of 2.45 moves per minute as
compared with a mean of 3.68 moves per minute in the
baseline games). The mean number of utterances between
successive moves is higher in the games played on
specially constructed mazes (the mean being 10.27
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utterances per move as compared with a mean of 6.81
utterances per move in the baseline games). However,
only the difference in the rate of moving is a significant
one. Games played on specially-constructed mazes involve
a significantly slower rate of moving than do baseline
games (Mann-\-lhitney U = 4, n, = 6, n2 = 10, p < .01, (1
ta11». The higher mea n number of utterances between
moves in the games played on specially constructed mazes
turned out to be non-significant (Mann-Whitney U = 21, n1
= 7, n2 = 10, N.S.). The size of the difference between
the mean number of utterances per move in the two studies
is of an order such that it could be expected to be
significant. However, the variance in the case of the
games played on specially-constructed mazes is very large,
approximately triple that of the baseline games, and this
is why the difference is a non-significant one.
The manipulation of maze shape did have the effect of
slowing down subjects' rate of moving, as noted above.
This could be because the games involving specially-
con~ucted mazes afford subjects fewer options of moving
than the baseline games, and are therefore more complex
strategically in that they require more careful planning
of moves.
Another factor which could contribute to the
apparently greater difficulty presented by the specially
constructed mazes is that, being of a less regular shape,
they are more difficult to describe locations within.
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Comparing data from study 4 (the reassignment study)
with data from study 1, differences on the two efficiency
measures of greatest interest are again apparent.
Reassignment games show a slower rate of moving than do
the baseline games (with mean values of 2.63 moves per
minute and 3.68 moves per minute, respectively).
Reassignment games also involve a higher mean number of
utterances between moves as compared to the baseline games
(9.42 utterances per move on average and 6.81 utterances
per move on average, respectively). Both of these
differences are significant. Thus, the rate of moving
was significantly slower in reassignment games (Mann-
Hhitney ~.= 5, n1 = 6, n2 = 1, p < 0.04,-(2 tail», and
the mean number of utterances between moves was
significantly higher in the reassignment games, as
compared to the baseline games (Hann-\-1hitney U = 6, n, =
6, "z = 1, P < 0.011 (2 tail».
These last two findings are of the greatest interest
in the present context. Here we have evidence that
manipulation of subject variables (that is, directly
manipulating pragmatic factors) results in a decline in
subject's performance in the game task. Specifically,
pairing subjects who had previously employed differing
types of location description had a significant effect in
that their efficiency as a dyad in solving the task was
reduced; subjects required significantly more time to
make moves, and they made significantly more utterances
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between moves.
It is possible that, since each pair of subjects in
the reassignment study played one game on a symmetrical
maze and one game on an asymmetrical maze, the significant
difference between reassignment- and baseline games (in
terms of rate of moving and mean number of utterances
between successive moves) could be due entirely to the
games played on the asymmetrical mazes being more
difficult. A comparison was therefore drawn between
games played on symmetrical mazes in the reassignment
study and in the baseline study on both measures. In this
comparison, the games (reassignment and baseline) are
played on the same mazes, and the result is unequivocal;
reassignment gamess involving symmetrical mazes require
significantly more utterances between moves on average
than do baseline games played on the same mazes (Mann-
Whitney U = 1, n1 = 3, n2 = 7, p < 0.017 (2 tail». The
rate of moving in the ~ssisnment games played on
symmetrical mazes is significantly lower than baseline
games played on the same mazes (Mann-Vlhi tney u = 1, n, =
3, n2 = 7, p < 0.017 (2 tail».
Thus, the significant difference between reassignment
and baseline games in terms of the rate of moving and the
mean number of utterances between successive moves cannot
be explained in terms of some of the reassignment games
being played on the asymmetrical maze. The same
significant difference holds true for comparisons between
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rassignment and baseline games played on the same
symmetrical mazes. This supports the interpretation that
the subjects' increased difficulty in the reassignment
games is not due to the type of maze involved but is
instead due to pragmatic factors.
d) General discussion
As was expected, the results from study 1 indicate
that there is a practice effect in operation such that
subjects tend to solve later games in significantly fewer
moves, without significantly lengthening the total time
taken, or altering the rate of moving or the mean number
of utterances required per move. Furthermore, it was
noted that 'monster' gam~s are significantly more
difficult for subjects than are baseline games, requiring
significantly more utterances between moves and involving a
significantly slower rate of moving. Games played on
specially-constructed mazes also proved significantly more
difficult for subjects in that the subjects' rate of moving
was significantly slower; however, the mean number
of utterances between successive moves, although higher in
the 'specially-constructed mazes' games, was not
significantly so. Both of these results were explained
in terms of the monster games and the games played on
specially constructed mazes being more difficult in
problem-solving terms than were the baseline games.
The interesting findings were those which indicated
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that the reassignment manipulation had the effect of slowing
down subjects' rate of moving and resulting in subjects
using significantly more utterances between moves. This
indicates that reassignment games were significantly more
difficult for subjects, and occurs despite the fact that
there is an effect of practice on subjects' performance
of the task. The effect of practice is to significantly
reduce the number of moves required to game solution, and
this occurs with no significant change in the rate of
moving or the mean number of utterances spoken between
moves. The present finding that the reassignment games
are significantly more diffiult for subjects than the
baseline games is counterintuitive in that, if anything, we
would expect subjects in the reassignment games (and
therefore with more practice) to play the game at least
as well as subjects in the baseline games, and one would
certainly not expect them to deteriorate significantly in
efficiency.
The fact that sUbjects in reassignment games show a
significant deterioration on both efficiency measures
indicates that manipulation of subject variables, that is,
the bringing into play of pragmatic factors, has an
important effect upon subjects' efficiency at solving the
task.
The above results and conclusions, whilst dealing
with only basic features of the data in the transcripts,
raise many interesting questions. For example, the fact
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that pairing subjects up on the basis of their
previously having used different description types
significantly impairs their efficiency at solving the
task, despite their having had more practice in the game,
is very interesting. It suggests that the description of
spatial location within the maze is indeed an important
aspect of playing the game, important enough for the
manipulation of it as an independent variable to
significantly affect subjects' performance. Thus, despite
the fact that, as noted earlier, description-giving is
only used instrumentally, the findings from the
reassignment study indicate that it is important to the
successful playing of the game and a detailed analysis of
the location descriptions may therefore raise interesting
further questions. It can be argued, therefore, that by
focussing primarily on the location description aspect of
the transcripts, we are addressing ourselves to a
significant problem.
The next chapter will begin by giving examples of
different types of location description generated by
subjects. This will immediately raise interesting pOints,
some of which relate back to the theoretical exposition in
part I of this thesis. Later in the next chapter,
details will be given of the analyses employed in the
attempt to describe statistically the different location
description types and to relate them to one another. The
following chapter will then present the results of this
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analysis in detail, and later in the present thesis, some
of the issues raised above can be re-viewed in a new
light - for example, why the reassignment games caused
difficulty for the subjects.
In the meantime, an exposition of the different
description types generated by subjects will illustrate
the nature of the data and \-1111itself raise further
theoretically interesting questions.
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CHAPTER Q.
THE SEHANTICS AND PRAGMATICS
OF SPATIAL LOCATION DESCRIPTION
= l~ INTRODUCTORY
£1 Introduction
In the last chapter, preliminary analyses of
subjects' efficiency in achieving a solution to the maze
game task in different types of game were undertaken. The
results demonstrated certain differences between the
various types of game such that some experimental
manipulatlons appeared to cause difficulty for the
subjects, since subjects' rate of moving, for example, was
significantly reduced in particular game types of game
(for example, in the reassignment games as opposed to the
'baseline' games). These results raise interesting
questions to which we shall return in a later chapter.
In this and in the next three chapters, the problem of
the semantics of location description by subjects will be
examined. This chapter will contain an introduction to
the location description problem, and provide details of
the analysis undertaken. This analysis was designed
to produce a statistical description of the various ways
in which subjects described their locations within the maze
structure.
The descriptions generated by sUbjects were extracted
from the 48 transcripts of data yielded in the various'
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studies. Since each transcript contained several
descriptions, this constitu~es a substantial body of data.
The semantic and pragmatic aspects of these spontaneously
generated descriptions constitute an interesting set of
problems for analysis, particularly in relation to some of
the theories of meaning summarized in part I of this
thesis (see chapters 1 - 3). It was decided to
concentrate upon the meanings of the descriptions
generated, and other problem-solving aspects of the
transcripts were only analyzed insofar as they had any
bearing on the description problem. The comparatively
crude measures of problem-solving used, and the results
from the analyses using these measures, were detailed in
the previous chapter.
We now turn to an exposition of the location-
description problem.
Ql Th~ location-description problem
As described already in chapter 4, the maze game
requires, for its successful solution, that the subject
describe their locations within the spatial array of the
maze to one another from time to time during the course of
playing the game. The subject therefore has the problem
of uniquely identifying different locations within a
complicated spatial array. An example is shown in figure
6-1, which depicts a typical starting position and goal
position for a subject in the baseline study (study 1).
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figure 6-1: diagram showing typical description
problem set to subject at the outset of
the game. ('baseline' game)
x = start position• = goal position
(Switch node and barrier positions omitted for
clarity)
IThe subject has the problem of uniquely identifying
both of these locations. /
,
Correct identification of one's location is crucial for
the proper coordination of moves if barrier switching is
to be effected appropriately. Therefore, the generation of
unambiguous descriptions is an important aspect of playing
the game, even though it serves only as a means to the end
of effecting appropriate barrier switching. There are,
in fact, several different strategies which a subject
could use in order to achieve this identification goal, and
a convenient introduction to the data would be in terms of
several examples which illustrate the various types of
description generated. Therefore, before dealing with
the formal statistical description of the data, some
*sample descriptions will be considered.
In the examples quoted below, details will be given of
the type of game involved and the sex of the subjects.
However, descriptions from all 48 transcripts were analyzed
as one large data matrix (see parts d) - f) of this
chapter, and also the following chapter).
A casual inspection of the transcripts suggests that
there are four major types of description generated by
*N.B. All diagrams in this chapter will show only the
basic framework of the maze shape with the subject's
position, or the position being described, being marked
in. Barriers and switch positions will be omitted in the
interests of clarity. It should, however, be borne in
mind that the positions of barriers and switches were
always indicated on the subjects' mazes, making the maze
shapes more complex as visual stimuli compared to the
outlines shown in this chapter. Examples which show
barriers and switch node configurations of different game
types at the start of each game are set out in appendix II).
277
subjects. These four generic categories of description
could themselves be further subdivided; however, the
generic description types will be illustrated here, with
differences in detail being discussed later. The four
generic description types are as follows:-
i) Path ~ descriptions
In this type of description, as the name suggests,
subjects describe their locations in terms of path
movements from a specified start point. This is
exemplified by the following extract from a transcript
(transcript AALOG15C, standard, 'baseline' game, female
dyad) :
B I am: if you go to the top right corner,
and go down one and along two to the left,
that's where I am.
(The location being described is depicted in figure 6-2)*
In this example, player B describes the location by
means of specifying a starting position (the top right
corner of the maze), then gives details of path movements
away from that starting position until the required point
is reached. An interesting feature of this description
is that it can be regarded as being procedural in nature;
the first part of the description directs the listener to
See Appendix III for a summary of symbols used in the
transcripts of subjects' speech.
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Pigure 6-2: The paint described by player U in
transcript AALOU 15C as e , t "go to the top right
corner and go down one and along two to the left,
that's where I am".
: ....
locate the starting point for the path description ("the
top right corner"), and the second part of the description
instructs the listener to scan from that starting position
in specified directions (" ••• g.Q. Q..Q.~n one and .E.l.Q.n& 1~.Q.
tot he l.§.f.!:. • • •" ) • That is, w e c0 uId con sid er the two
parts of the description as constituting a set of
instructions to the listener as to how to visually scan the;
maze shape; first, scan for a particular prominent paint,
then scan in specified directions from that pOint. This
interpretation of the meaning of the descriptions ties in
well with the theory of meaning known as procedural
semantics, which was discussed in chapter 2.
The above example illustrates the basic principle
behind the 'path' type of description. The speaker first
locates a visually prominent pOint, such as a corner of the
maze, and identifies it for his listener, and then locates
the position to be described relative to that prominent
point by means of specifying path movements along available
paths from the start to the desired location.
Other sample descriptions from the same pair of female
subjects illustrate further properties of path-type
descriptions. For example, the following description again
illustrates th~ general principle behind path-type
descriptions (transcript AALOG15E, female dyad, 'standard'
or 'baseline' game); see figure 6-3):
A Well that- where a-wait a minute, where are you?
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Figure 6-3: The paint (Xl described by player B in
transcript AALOG1~E as " ••• if you go to the
bottom right corner, one along, two up".
B I'm: if you go to the bottom right corner
{one along, two up}
A {one along } two uP.
The start point for the path movement is different in
this example as compared to the last example. Notice
also that the direction of horizontal movement is left
implicit (it can only be to the left; it is not specified
in this example, but was specified in the last one).
An interesting 6harac£eristic of the true path-type
description is exemplified by the following goal position
description, also from transcript AALOG15E, where subject B,
having described her location (shown as an X on figure 6-4)
is asked to describe her goal position (shown as an
asterisk on figure 6-4). Her goal is in fact located
directly above her, two nodes away, but with a gap
intervening (see figure 6-4). Her description is as
follows:
A And where are you wanting to go?
B Ehm: sort-I wa nt to go tw 0 above my se1 f,
but there's sort of - an empty space, I've
got to go a long way round.
Player B pauses initially; she then describes the
location of her goal relative to her own location (which
she has just described). There is, however, no directly
available path between herself and her goal position. She
describes her goal using the direct straight-line, two-node
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Figure 0-4: The goal position (~) described (by
player H in game AALOO'~E) relative to the position
marker location (X) in the following manner:
Ij •• I ~ant togo two above myself, but theres Sort of:
an empty space, I've got togo a long way! round".·
I :..,
distance between herself and her goal, but acknowledges
that there is a gap which has been mentally 'traversed' in
her description. It is·possible that the initial filled
pause and short hesitation at the beginning of the
description was due to her awareness of the gap and being
reluctant to 'talk across it', so to speak; however, she
decides on the shorter description which violates a true
path-type description but which has the virtue of being
less complex. This apparent unwillingness to 'talk.
across gaps' is a hallmark of the true path-type
description, and it would be of interest to know whether
pausing and self-correction are significantly more
prevalent under conditions where a subject's preferred
description type is inapplicable or violated in some way.
The apparent unwillingness to 'talk across gaps' is
again illustrated by a description from transcript
AALOG27B, a 'monster' game with female subjects; see figure
6-5 for an illustration of the position being described.
Player A is asked to describe her position:
B Oh, wait a minute, where are you? Hhere are
you?
A Right. See the bottom left hand corner?
B The bottom left.
A There's a box and then there's a gap:
B Uh-huh.
A And then there's a box: and then there's
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Figure 6-5: The point described by player A in
transcript AALOG278 as "See the bottom left hand
corner1 ••• theres a box and then there's a gap.
and then theres a box and then theres another box .
right, I'm there".
• •. ' .
another box:
B Uh-huh
A Right I'm there.
Once again, gaps are not 'talked across' without explicit
acknowledgement of their existence. Also of note is the
fact that the direction of scanning (upward) is left
implicit.
In sum, path type descriptions are generated by first
directing the listener to a suitable perceptually
prominent point (usually a corner of the maze) and
instructing them (explicitly or implicitly) to scan along
available paths until the relevant point is reached. A
corollary of this general strategy is that gaps (that is,
spaces where no paths are available to be traversed) are
explicitly acknowledged before being 'talked across'.
This implies that path type descriptions are, to some
extent, dependent upon the particular maze structure being
described: this is in contrast to two of the other
description types, which are next described in turn.
ii) Line ~ descriptions
The second major type of description generated by
sUbjects could be called the line ~ of description. In
this type of description, the maze shape is treated as if
it were an array of parallel lines. A particular line is
firstly identified, then the speaker describes a
particular location on that line. The first example comes
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from a 'baseline' game with female subjects. The
locations being decribed are the players' starting
positions (A and B, respectively, for the appropriate
players on fig. 6-6). The descriptions are as follows:
B Where are you for a start, where are you?
A Oh- oh yes. Second row.
B Second row.
A Second from the left.
B Second from the left, O.K.
A Second row going up the way, that is.
Three utterances later, player A asks player B to describe
her (B's) location:
A Where are you-? (B interrupts - 2 utterances)
B Oh: (laughs) ehm: I am: on the top line:
A Uh-huh:
B One, two, third box from the right.
(AALOGI3A)
Both subjects describe their location by treating the
m aze as ifit w ere an array 0 f par a11 e1 h0 rizan tal 1ines
(rows). Descriptions are generated by first specifying the
relevant row containing the location to be described, and
subsequently specifying the relevant place within that
row. Once again, we can regard the meaning of this type
of description as being procedural in nature; the
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~~ure b-§: The point tX) described by player A in
AALOG13A as "Second row, second from the left", and
the point tY) described. by player H as "••• on the
t op line....·•'. one, two, third box from. the r1ght".
e . I
listener, firstly, has to find the appropriate row, then to
find a (given) point on that row. Player B is heard
to count node positions aloud when generating the second
description. We can imagine the listener executing
scanning procedures firstly to scan for the correct row
from an implicit or explicit start point, and then to scan
along that row, using a node-counting procedure to 'mark'
the different nodes, from an implicit or explicit start
point until the appropriate node is reached. Player A in
the example cited above initially leaves the start point
for the 'row-finding procedure' implicit but subsequently
supplies it for her listener.
It is interesting to note how the descriptive and
interpretive task is simplified by using this sort of
simplification of the maze shape (that is, treating it as
an array of parallel 'rows'). This simplification of the
maze shape in row-type descriptions is in contrast to the
'path' type descriptions outlined earlier.
Whilst 'row' type descriptions are used in study 1
and study 2 by subjects, the 'column biased' maze was
deliberately designed to contain incomplete rows and
complete columns and thus encourage the generation of
line-type descriptions using columns rather than rows.
An example where subjects did adopt this strategy comes
from transcript AALOG41B, where subjects were playing the
game on the 'column biased' maze. The (female) subjects
are describing their initial starting positions and
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goals (see figure 6-7 (i».
A Vlhere- where are you?
B Ehm: (1 sec) Oh: oh hell (laughs)
A Do it by vertical lines:
B Right: I'm (laughs)
A (laughs)
B (laughs) Hell's teeth: second (2.5 sec) :
vertical line: from the: right:
A Uh-huh
B O.K.? And: second from the bottom.
Player A then describes her own position in an identical
fashion:-
A Ah, well I'm in the second vertical line from
the left and second from the bottom.
B Hal {Where's your asterisk?}
A {And wh-: } My asterisk is
the: the third vertical line: a-the square at
the top- where's yours?: ( 1 sec)
B The third a-: ( 1 sec) line from the right:
A The square at the top?
B Yes. (See also fig. 6-7 (ii»
The principle behind these descriptions is identical
to that underlying the row descriptions of the two previous
examples, namely, the identification of a line (in this
case, a vertical line) followed by the identification of
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figure b-'l li) the paint lX) described by~s0bject'H
in transcript AALUG41B as " •• second vertical line·
rr omt tne right ••• second from the bottom",
The diagram <\lSO snows t ne :paint l'iJ described :by,player A .
as vert1cal line from the left and second from the. bottom",
J
I ••
1".lgure _?-'( : l~~J vue poa.nt (G ) described as
"the third vertical line: the 1square at the top"
and the point (Oi described as the third vert±ca!
line from the right: the square at the top". ;"',
Diagram.a!s~ shows point (er.described as "Th~ec rows
in and four up". (All taken from transcript AALOG41B)
a position located within that line. Thus, the term line
iYQQ will be used to refer to the generic type comprising
both row- and column-type descriptions.
The possible reason for the hesitations apparent in the
above example is that the above descriptions are the very
first in the whole game; later descriptions from the same
pair of subjects, whilst still involving some pauses
(presumably to 'encode' the description) give the impression
of, as it were, 'flowing' better, and also illustrate an
interesting quirk (see figure 6-7 (ii); point C is being
described):
A • • • where are you now?
B Oh I'm: (1 sec)
A Three rows in?
B Three rows in and four up (1 sec).
Two things are notable; firstly, the two pauses.
The first pause occurs while speaker B is encoding her
description (she is, in fact, 'beaten to it' by her
partner), whilst· the second pause occurs after B has
generated her description, a gap in the dialogue which is
presumably because it is taking player A a certain amount
of time to 'decode' the message and to execute the
relevant procedures. (Whilst this interpretation is
necessarily speculative at this stage, it does lead to
hypotheses which are testable). The second interesting
point is both speakers' use of the term 'row' to refer to
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Notice that the description given ('three rows
in and four up') is Iiterally nonsensical, since rows are
ordered in the vertical plane, not the horizontal plane.
It makes no sense, therefore, to talk of 'rows in (from
one side)'. These two subjects, however, are using the
term 'row' to refer to both horizontal and vertical lines;
this reflects a certain looseness of usage of the term
'row' by any formal criterion, but plainly it causes no
problem since both speakers use it in the same way, and
there appears to be no evidence of misunderstanding at any
point in the transcript. Whilst this may'appear to be
something of an idiosyncracy, it has occurred in more than
one dialogue and underlines Rommetveit's point about the
inadequacy of formal criteria based on 'literal meaning';
provided two speakers tacitly agree to use a particular
term in an unconventional way and do so consistently, no
problems arise with regard to meaning.
These last examples illustrate the properties of
line-type descriptions; the next generic type of
description we shall refer to as the matrix or coordinate
~.
iii) Matrix ~
This type of description is very similar tot he
Cartesian coordinates of mathematics. In this case, the
speakers agree upon a notation with which to identify
individual rows and columns, and thereafter generate
287
descriptions by quoting two numbers or a letter and a
number, each of which denotes a particular row or column.
Thus, the descriptions generated are two-item coordinates,
which correspond to count procedures operating vertically
and horizontally from an agreed-upon origin point (always
either the top or the bottom left hand corner of the
maze).
Some examples are given below to illustrate the
properties of this type of description. The first
example (see figure 6-8) comes from a 'monster' game with
a female dyad (transcript AALOG28B). Player A describes
her position:
A Right, will I try and tell you with - as if:
it was just s: 'all squares? ( 1 sec)
B Uh-huh
A Right, and that'll ma-: right, I'm like:
( 1 , 1) ( 1 sec) •
B Right, well I'm er: (1.5 sec) (5, 1):
A \-1ait a minute: hhh 1,2,3,4,F- (5, 1) 5-:
(B interrupts)
B No: no, no, no, no. ( 1 sec)
A {4, 1)?
B { 1 , 2, 3, ( 4, 1)
A (4, 1)
B Yeah.
In the above example, the columns are numbered zero
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Figure 6-8: The point (A) described as "(1, 1)" and
t he poin t (B) des cri bed as" (t. , 1)". A1so i llu s t rat ed
is th~ point (2) described as "(3, 1)" (all three
descriptions from transcript AALOG28B)
to five from left to right, and the rows are numbered zero
to five from bottom to top. Stating the column followed
by the row numbers (as in the ordering of X and Y axis
positions in Cartesian coordinates) is implicitly
procedural. The listener's task would be to scan from
the origin point to find the relevant column, then scan to
find the relevant row, and thence to seek their
intersection, thus yielding the point in question.
This type of description could be regarded as highly
elliptical and rather abstract. We noted earlier that
path descriptions relate directly to available paths in
the maze structure and so 'depend' on the maze structure.
Line-type descriptions on the other hand, abstract
parallel lines from the maze structure even though on the
actual maze some of the, for example, rows, are
incomplete. Line-type descriptions thus tend to ignore
gaps in the path structure of the maze. Matrix or
coordinate descriptions abstract from the maze structure
still further, and ignore missing paths in both horizontal
and vertical planes, and even, to some extent, overspecify
the maze locations since they implicitly include a certain
number of 'imaginary' points, for example, in matrix
descriptions of the asymmetrical maze. ThUS, matrix
descriptions represent a further level of abstraction than
do line type descriptions.
Matrix descriptions are highly elliptical since they
specify only a number for each of the row and column
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combinations corresponding to the particular location
being described: the listener has rather a lot of
'decoding' to do. We would therefore expect even more in
the way of hesitating and pausing in generating and
understanding matrix type descriptions than was the case
with row- and column-type descriptions, a hypothesis
which will be tested later.
Casual inspection of the transcripts does tend to
support the impression of pausing and hesitations being
prevalent whilst subjects are producing and understanding
matrix descriptions.
Also prevalent is a good deal of counting aloud
whilst the listener or speaker executes the scanning
procedures. Both pausing and counting feature in this
example (from transcript AALOG28B, see figure 6-8, point
2; this' example comes from the same game as the previous
example).
A Right, where are you now?
B I'm now: (1 sec) at (3, 1) (2.5 sec) And. . .
A (3,1) Wait 1, 2, th-: (1 sec) One (3 sec) And • •
The pausing by both players to encode and decode the
description is readily apparent, as is the counting out
(i.e. the execution of the count procedures marking the
row and column positions).
A final example, from a 'monster' game with a male
dyad (transcript AALOG25B, see figure 6-9) again
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Figure 6'-9: The point (X) described as "(4, ~)" by
subject B in AALOG2~B. The origin point for the
coordinate counting in this example i~ the top left
',hand cor-ner, and ,"Y" coordinates are here specified
before the "X".value. This is different to the situation
illustrated in figure 6-e where the origin was the bottom
left hand corner, and "X" values were quoted before "Y"
values. I
illustrates these two features noted above, that is,
pausing and the counting:
B Er: I'm in (4, 5), where do you want me?
A (4,5): Er: 4: 1,2,3,4, 1,2,3,4,5: (2 sec).
Could you move ••••
Thus, matrix descriptions function in much the way
that Cartesian coordinates do, and are highly elliptical,
being short in actual utterance length but implicitly
packaging a great deal of information into each pair of
numbers, and thus there is a good deal of pausing and
counting out apparent when reading transcripts of games
involving this type of description.
The final type of description 1s much less frequent
in occurrence than the other three types, but does
constitute a genuinely different category of description
in its own right. This type shall be referred to as the
figural ~ of description.
iv) Figural ~ descriptions
In this type of description, sUbjects identify
particular locations in the maze by making a metaphorical
reference to a figure which constitutes part of the maze
structure, such as a rectangle, T or L shape. This
serves to identify a particular region in the maze
structure, and the particular point to be described is
located relative to the named figure. Examples (below)
will help to clarify this general strategy. For example,
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from transcript AALOG38A, involving a male dyad and the
asymmetrical maze (see figure 6-10) came the following
description (of point X in figure 6-10):,
B I can only go backwards, I'm: quite near a
corner, there's a sort of: T shape: I'm in
, .
one corner lo f it: J ~' 'and no matter what way I
go I'll be stuck.
Another example of a figural description is one which
refers to a point also shown on figure 6-10, and the
description comes from transcript AALOG35B (female dyad,
asymmetrical maze). Player A is asked to describe the
location of her goal box (i.e. point Y in figure 6-10):
B Where's the asterisk? (2 utterances)
A Er:mine is: if you take the uppermost left
hand side: right?
BRight
A See where that Lis?
BYes
A Right: ehm: my asterisk is at the: (1 sec)
sort of: (1 sec) last part of the L: see
what I mean? In the middle square of that
line:
B O.K.: ehm:
Once again, this type of description could be interpreted
to be procedural in nature: the listener must scan for
292
,.
'.
~. o
I I
ligure 6-10: The point lX) described as "one
corner" of a "T shape" lAALOG3t3A)
The point (Y) described as "last part of" an
" L" l AALOG 3 5 }The point (Z) described as "sticking out like
a sore thumb . • 1ike a right indica tor"
(AALOG40B)
" ~.
the appropriate figure and then scrutinize the region in
which the figure is located, in a manner described by the
speaker, to find the relevant point.
Another example of such a description comes from
transcript AALOG40B, again from a game involving the
asymmetrical maze (see point 4 in figure 6-10):
B O.K. Stan, right, let's- let's talk about
this, whereabouts a-whereabouts are you?
A Right: er: I'm: I'm: extreme right:
B Extreme right
A Yes, the o-the-there's one er: what d'you
call it, there's just one box:
{to the extreme right:
B {H- away out on the right?
A a-on my right, I don't know which way you're
facing the screen but 1:1 suppose it should
be the same.
B {Yeah
A {You know, the extreme, there's one box.
B Yeah, right, the extreme right, st-sticking
out like a sore thumb?
A Yes
B Yeah O.K.
A That's where I am.
B It's like a right indicator?
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A Yes.
This example is an interesting one. The
metaphorical references to 'sticking out like a sore
thumb' and 'it's like a right indicator' serves to
emphasize the physical isolation of the point being
described. The term 'right indicator' is a metaphorical
reference to a bicyclist's hand signal for turning right
(the protruding of the right arm perpendicularly from the
vertical line of body symmetry). Interestingly, this term
'right indicator' was adopted by these two players to
refer to all three right-protruding parts of the maze (that
is, the bottom-most horizontal line, the protruding node
just described, and the topmost right-protruding node which
the first description on fig. 6-10 described as part of a
'T shape').
Another point worthy of note is that, at one
point, player A questions player B's, deictic orientation
relative to the screen. This is not unique to this
particular pair of players. In normal face-to-face
conversation, of course, A's right would be B's left, and
vice versa, and as Buhler pointed out in his example of a
physical training instructor, A would try to adopt B's
perspective and use his (B's) orientation to generate
discourse. This player A tries to do; however, the
orientation of both players' bodies relative to the maze
on the screen is identical and A's effort is unnecessary.
This attempt by player A to antiCipate the other's spatial
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orientation is interesting in relation to the discussion
in chapter 3 of Rommetveit's notion, based on Mead's
philosophy, of speakers and Iisteners taking one another's
perspective.
The reference to analogues in the maze stucture of
certain figures is the main characteristic of figural-type
descriptions. This helps the listener to narrow the
search zone by indicating the region of the maze within
which, or near to which, the point to be described is
located.
Figural descriptions have also been used by subjects
to describe locations within symmetrical mazes; an example
is given below (see also figure 6-11> from transcript
AALOG36A (female dyad, study 3). Player B describes her
position:
B O.K.: My-I'm now: see-see the three columns,
there's three rows: (1 sec) tak- takingi t
downwards: there's three groups:
A One: (1 sec) two: (1 sec) three?
B Three groups:
A Right:
B Well I'm on: the second group at the left
hand side:
A Second group up at the top.
B Uh-huh:
The three vertically oriented groups described by
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! ~ Figure6-11: The point (X) described as "the second
.group at the left hand side •. up at the top"
(AALOG36A) I
. .
player B are the three pairs of columns in the maze shape
(see figure 6-11); the groupings are apparent because of
the discontinuity of the top horizontal line of the maze.
Once again, the use of figures (in this case, 'groups' of
columns) and the identification of the second (centre)
group narrows the search zone. As it turns out, the
listener already has an idea of where player B's position
marker is located and guesses correctly.
These four examples serve to illustrate the general
properties of the figural type of description. It should
be emphasized in passing that figural-type descriptions
are far less frequently observed than are path, line and
matrix descriptions, and tend to be accompanied by path-
type descriptions, resulting in a mixture of path- and
figural type descriptions. The figural type of description
does, however, constitute a genuinely distinguishable type
of description in its own right.
£.1 Conclusions
The examples given illustrate the four generic types
of description used by subjects, which have been termed
the path, line, figural and matrix types. Common to all
four, it has been argued, is an implicit or explicit
procedural component: the descriptions take the form of
tacit instructions regarding visual scanning operations.
Indeed, in a study to be described subsequently in which
the experimenter was present in the same room as both
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subjects whilst subjects generated and listened to such
descriptions, subjects were observed to execute the
procedures hypothesized above using ostensive gestures
with their fingers or a pen in a manner consistent with
the above interpretation during the course of
understanding and generating descriptions. The
procedural interpretation of the descriptions is therefore
backed up by informal observation.
Within the generic categories outlined above, certain
detail differences in the extensional semantics of the
procedures implicit in the descriptions arise, which will
be discussed more fully later. In the next section, the
methodological rationale behind the analysis will be
introduced. The analysis was an attempt to describe
statistically the place-descriptions by means of a
categorization of lexical item types, and to ascertain
which groupings of lexical item types consistently
occurred.
For the moment, we can conclude that the descriptions
generated comprise four broad classes which we have
described as path, line, matrix and figural. These four
types of description exhibit certain commonalities,
notably their use of procedures for generating and
interpreting descriptions. It was argued that. some
description types involve conceptual simplifications of
the complex stimulus of the maze structure: this is
particularly true of line- and matrix-type descriptions.
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(Paradoxically, these simplifications result in implicit
overdescription of the maze, as happens, for example,
when line- or matrix-type descriptions are used to
describe locations on the asymmetrical maze). The
classes of description differ in the particular manner in
which they conceptually "dissect" the maze shape in order
to simplify the description task.
Having thus indicated some of the semantics of the
location descriptions in informal terms, we now turn
to examine the background to the statistical analyses
undertaken.
Ql The statistical description of the data: methodological
considerations
In the first part of this chapter, an exposition was
given of some typical descriptions of spatial locations
generated by subjects in the course of playing the game.
In particular, four broad classes of description type were
informally identified, corresponding (it was argued) to four
different ways of conceptualizing the maze shapes and
visually scanning them. The classes identified were:
a) line-type descriptions, in which the maze is treated as
if it were an array of parallel lines, and the subject
firstly identifies lines followed by positions on those
lines; b) matrix-type descriptions, in which the array of
nodes is treated as a two-dimensional space and particular
nodes are identified by means of Cartesian-type two-place
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coordinates; c) path-type descriptions, in which
descriptions are generated by means of firstly identifying
a visually prominent point in the maze structure, and the
desired location is then described relative to that
visually prominent point by means of path movements from the
visually prominent point to the location to be described;
and d) figural-type descriptions, in which the subjects
generate descriptions by referring metaphorically to a
figure (a shape of some kind) which forms part of the
structure of the maze's network of pathways, and the
relevant position is then described relative to that
figure. These four types actually constitute,classes of
\
i idescription, within which detail differences occur. An
example of such a detail difference aleady encountered is
the contrast between line-type descriptions which use
vertical as opposed to horizontal lines.
Another detail difference is whether in counting node
positions, subjects count ID~ments from node to node or
instead count the nodes themselves. (See figure 6-12 for
an exposition of this difference). The difference is
exemplified by comparing figure 6-3 (illustrating a path-
type description) and figure 6-7 (i) (illustrating a line-
type description). In the line-type descriptions shown
in figure 6-7 (i) (i.e. the nodes themselves are counted -
the right-most vertical line' of nodes is line 1, the next
line is the 'second line from the right', and so on.
Thus, node positions are counted. This contrasts with
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.Figure'6-12:The difference between the extensional
semantics of node-counting, as opposed ,to path~movement-
counting, scanning procedures, A node - counting scanning
procedure would designate X in the above diagram as I
"third onlfrom the left" (numbering the nodes from 1 to 6
frpm left to right), A path-movement-counting scanning
procedure would designate X in the above diagram as
. ".t\vO from the left" or "two al ong" (numbering the nodes
from zero to five from left 'to right),
the path description in figure 6-3, in which 'one along'
counts a path mQYgment, as does 'two up' - 'two up' as a
path movement brings the visual scanning procedure to the
third node from the bottom (cf. figures 6-7 (i) and 6-3;
see also figure 6-12). Such a detail difference could
cause confusion if one subject in a dyad counts nodes
whilst his partner counts path movements between nodes
when executing scanning procedures, and so this detail
difference is of some importance.
The point to be emphasized here is that, although the
four-category classification given above is a reasonable
summary of the major categories of description type, the
individual categories are by no means uniform classes.
As is readily apparent from a casual inspection of
the various sample descriptions presented earlier in this
chapter (see figures 6-2 to 6-11), there is a great deal
of variation between descriptions in terms of the lengths
of descriptions and how explicit or elliptical they are.
These, quite considerable, variations in the length and
explicitness of descriptions occur both within and between
description classes. For example, compare the
descriptions of the points illustrated in figures 6-6
("second row ••• second from the left") and 6-7 (i)
("second (2.5 sec) second: vertical line: from the:
right: ••• O.K.? And: second from the bottom"). Both
of these descriptions are line-type descriptions, yet one
is approximately twice the length of the other in terms of
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the number of words employed. There is thus a
considerable variation in the amount of speech used to
produce one description.
A more formal statistical classification of subjects'
location descriptions than the earlier-presented informal
four-fold classification was thought to be desirable.
This formal classification would have to be achieved despite
the above-noted variation in the length and explicitness of
different location descriptions. It was hoped that the
formal classification would produce results which would
provide more detail than, and at least partially confirm,
the informal four-fold classification presented earlier.
Details of how the formal analysis was conducted are set
out below.
The formal analysis of the subjects' location
descriptions involved two aspects: i) a descriptive
aspect, and (ii) a classificatory aspect. These are
each dealt with in turn.
11 ~ descriptive aspect of the formal analysis
The first aspect of the formal analysis employed was
a descriptive aspect: the raw data (that is, the actual
location descriptions generated by subjects, with all their
variations 1n length and explicitness) had themselves to be
described. This was achieved by means of the development
of a set of thirty-eight lexical categories, to which
individual lexical items in subjects' raw data could be
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assigned. The description of the raw data thus took the
form of a categorization: each description generated by
each subject in each game was examined, and the key lexical
items employed by the subjects were assigned to, that is,
counted as instances of the use of, particular categories
in the set of thirty-eight lexical categories. (The
rationale behind the choice of the particular lexical
categories employed is set out below, and a listing of the
lexical categories is given in table 6-1).
Thus, all descriptions generated by each subject in
the course of playing each game were examined for their
usage of lexical items corresponding to each of the thirty-
eight lexical categories. The subject's usages of each of
the thirty-eight lexical categories were summed across
all descriptions generated by him or her in that particular
game. This resu~ed in a profile for each subject in each
particular game of the number of occasions on which
lexical items corresponding to each of the thirty-eight
lexical categories were used. When this is done for all
subjects in all 48 games, it is possible to utilize the
resulting matrix (of usage of lexical categories by all 96
subjects) as the data matrix for a classification study in
which the lexical categories are classifed into groups.
111 The classificatory aspect of the formal analysis
The second aspect of the formal analysis was the
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classification of the thirty-eight lexical categories.
That is, a classificatory analysis of the thirty-eight
lexical categories was undertaken in order to ascertain
whether clearly identifiable clusters of lexical categories
existed such that the categories within a cluster tended to
occur together in the subjects' location descriptions.
Such clusters would thus correspond to sets of lexical
categories related in such a way that all lexical
categories within a set tended to be used together
by subjects _ for example, it would accord with our earlier
informal classification if a cluster of lexical categories
corresponding to all the types of lexical item employed in
generating 'path'-type descriptions were to be identified.
A suitable descriptive statistical procedure capable
of generating such a classification is that of Hierarchical
Cluster analysis. A summary of the functioning of this
technique is provided in the technical appendix (appendix
IV; see also Gordon, 1981, for further details).
Essentially, hierarchical cluster analysis operates by
treating each of the thirty-eight lexical categories as
variables, generating a measure of similarity between each
pair of variables (for example, using the correlation
between the variables as the measure of similarity between
them), and it then imposes a best-fit hierarchical
structuring upon the variables. This result in a kind of
tree diagram known as a dendrogram .which displays
groupings (clusters) of related variables nested in a
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hierarchical fashion (see appendix IV). In the case of
the present analysis, the interest centres on how
individual clusters are made up rather than with higher
level relationships between clusters.
Thus, the formal analysis involves the two aspects of
(i) initially describing the data in terms of thirty-eight
lexical categories and then (ii) subjecting the summarized
data in the thirty-eight lexical categories to
hierarchical cluster analysis in order to ascertain which
groups of lexical categories tend to be used together by
subjects.
In the remainder of the present chapter, a
discussion of the methodological rationale behind the
selection of the particular lexical categories employed in
the descriptive aspect of the analysis is undertaken, and.
the final section of the chapter will briefly discuss the
uses to which hierarchical cluster analysis was put in the
present set of studies.
~ The selection of lexical categories
As noted above, the lexical categories used for the
purposes of describing the raw data numbered thirty-
eight in total. The selection of the thirty-eight lexical
categories was based upon a detailed inspection of the raw
data. That is, the actual location descriptions
themselves were used to assist the process of devising a
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categorization; the lexical categories were not devised in
advance in an arbitrary fashion. In fact, the set of
thirty-eight lexical categories was the successor to an
earlier set of twenty-seven lexical categories which was
initially devised but which had been felt to be
insufficiently "fine-grained" in its categorization of the
lexical items in the subjects' location descriptions.
The thirty-eight category categorization was developed in an
attempt to provide a suitably detailed categorization of
the lexical items in the location descriptions which would
be sufficiently sensitive to enable the categorization of
all the descriptions in the data.
The selection of lexical categories was thus 'data
driven' in the sense that it was based on the actual raw
data; the categories were selected in an attempt to
capture the broad semantic distinctions which the subjects
appeared to be making. For example, a feature which was
common to all of the different types of description was
the counting of node positions (or path movements). This
counting was of two types, ordinal counting (that is,
,fir st" 'secon cl, , third' • • • '1ast') and £,gr:5!1ngl
QQ.1!.!l11ns (that is, ,0 ne ! , 'tw o t , , three', . . . etc. )
Each of these two types of counting was treated as a
separate category of lexical item. This treatment of
ordinal- and cardinal counting separately was undertaken
in case there was a systematic difference in their patterns
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of occurrence; it is quite possible that ordinal counting
is used by subjects under one set of circumstances and
cardinal counting is used by subjects under a different
set of circumstances. Treating them as separate
categories~ hoped,' ., would capture this, with the two
categories showing different patterns of clustering, such
that they belonged to different clusters of lexical
categories. The sheer prevalence of counting in the
descriptions indicated that the inclusion of categories
which recorded instances of this feature was necessary.
The same rationale was employed in order to select
the other lexical categories. Each of the description
types (see the earlier informal four-fold classification)
was examined in order to ascertain which sorts of semantic
distinctions were being made, and these suggested further
lexical categories for inclusion in the categorization.
Some examples will illustrate the operation of this
principle for devising suitable lexical categories.
Consider, It~stly, the row-type descriptions, such as
the following description (which was discussed earlier,
and the location described was illustrated in figure
6.6):
"Second row • • • second from the left"
In this example, two ordinal counts are involved, one
for marking the different rowS and the other for marking
the positions of nodes within the rows. The count
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denoting the position of the individual node within the
specified row is expressed as a distance from an edge ("••
• • second f.rQll lh,g l,gfl"). Notice that in the above
example, the specification of the particular row is
elliptical in that the relevant edge with respect to which
the counting of rows takes place is not specified. In
other line-type descriptions, however, the specification
of lines and node positions on those lines is less
elliptical. Consider, for example, the following
description which was also discussed earlier and whose
referent is illustrated in figure 6-7 (1):
. . .second: vertical line: from the right: ••"
O.K.? And second from the bottom".
In this example, both the line position and the node
position are specified with respect to a relevant edge
(the right edge for specifying the relevant vertical line,
and the bottom for specifying the relevant node position).
This specification of line and node positions with respect
to edges is quite common in line-type descriptions, and so
a category for recording instances of usage of each of the
edge names (~ botto~ left and right) was included in
the categorization, as was one category for recording
instances of usage of the prepositional phrases which were
sometimes used in these constructions (for example, " ••
third 211 lh~ rig ht", " • • third f.rQ!!1 1.h~le ft")• The
reason that the use of such prepositional phrases was
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recorded in one category was that in some line-type
descriptions the prepositional phrases were absent
altogether (as in examples where a subject might say "I'm
on the second bottom row"). Thus, a lexical category
which recorded instances of "preposition (plus edge name)"
was used, in order that the relationship of such
prepositional phrases' usage to the usage of other lexical
categories could be ascertained. (Specifically, if
consistent groupings of lexical categories were revealed
by the cluster analysis, it was felt desirable to
ascertain which grouping the prepositions would cluster
with).
Inspection of line-type location descriptions reveals
certain other lexical items used by subjects quite
frequently. These were also judged to reflect relevant
semantic distinctions and consequently were included as
separate lexical categories - these were '£Q~',colum~
'line~ 'horizontal' and 'vertical'.
An inspection of path-type location descriptions
suggested further lexical categories for inclusion in the
descriptive categorization. Consider, for example, the
following description (see also figure 6-3 and section b)
i) of the present chapter):
"If you go to the bottom right corner, one
along, two up".
Two cardinal counts are involved here. Key terms
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suggested as important for inclusion in the descriptive
cat ego rizat ion are '£Q.r.n_g~ '!'£lQ.n~ .!Jd~ and 'mQ'y_gLg~.
These terms are of importance in path descriptions; path
movements are often specified with respect to corners,
and movements in specified directions are important
semantic elements of path descriptions. Thus, a lexical
category for recording instances of usage pf the term
'corner' was included in the descriptive categorization,
as were separate lexical categories for recording instances
of usage of terms denoting movement in (either vaguely or.
precisely) specified directions, namely:
lex ical ca tegory), '~lQ.n~.!Jd~ .!..QQ1:l~ ,!1,gf.t!.. and
'right'. These last two categories were distinguished
carefully from the edge names 'left' and 'right'; each
term 'left' and 'right' has two senses, a) a name of an
edge, and b) a direction of movement. These two senses
were kept separate: separate lexical categories were
involved for each of the two senses (see table 6-1).
Other lexical categories were suggested by an
inspection of the path descriptions, notably 'half/hand
side', this category being used to record instances where
sUbjects indicated that a particular half of the maze
about a vertical centre line was under discussion. '~,
was also included in the categorization as a separate
lexical category, since mention of gaps or spaces without
paths did seem to be a feature of true path-type
descriptions. 'start'. 'own/other' and 'monster' were
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included as separate lexical categories, since subjects
often used their own start position, a previously
specified position of themselves or their partner, or the
monster's position, respectively, as reference points with
respect to which path descriptions were generated (for
example, "I'm three to the left of the monster", "I'm just
two above where I started from", etc.).
An inspection of the figural-type descriptions
revealed several terms used by subjects which required to
be accounted for in the descriptive categorization. The
generic category of 'shape' was used to count instances of
usage of a variety of terms of this genre - T shapes, L
shapes, rectangular shapes, etc. Whenever the term
'shape' was used to refer to a figure in the maze
structure, this was recorded as an instance of usage of
the lexical category 'shape'. Other key terms suggested
by an inspection of figural descriptions as meriting
inclusion in the descriptive categorization as separate
lex ical cat ego ries we re' ID1QQl~ (asin " • • • the mid d t e
oft hat lin e") and '11m!2.' (as 1n, for exam pIe , "ther e's a
limb sticking out to the right").
An inspection of the coordinate descriptions (see
section b) iii) of the present chapter and figures 6-8 and
6-9) suggested two further lexical categories of -'
importance: one for recording instances of usage of
coordinate descriptions themselves (e.g. ".A.5.", ".Q.3.",
etc.), and a lexical category for recording instances of
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what might be termed 'alphabeti~ counting', (for example,
where a subject might say "I'm in ~ lL.L JL_: D5").
The above categories, which total 29 in all, were
devised in the manner indicated above: careful attention
to the raw data suggested that certain categories of
lexical item were distinguishable, these categories
corresponding to semantic distinctions which the subjects
appeared to be making.
The remaining nine lexical categories of the total of
thirty-eight were included in the categorization in an
attempt to describe more idiosyncratic terminology on
the part of the subjects.
The above description exemplifies how the descriptive
categorization of the lexical items used by the subjects
was devised, and simultaneously illustrates that the basis
for the categorization ~as the distinctions m~de Qy the
subjects themselves: their choice of lexical items guided
the descriptive categorization.
It is of importance that a full d t scu ss f cn of the
rationale behind the selection of lexical categories
should be given here, since the selection of descriptors of
the data is a crucial part of the use of the technique of
cluster analysis. As Gordon (1981, p. 8) remarks, it is
quite possible (and even desirable) that there are several
different ways of classifying the same set of objects. It
follows that careful thought should be given to the
selection of variables (in this case lexical· categories)
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with which to describe' each object (in this case, the set
of place descriptions generated by a subject). That the
content of the subjects' location descriptions was the
basis of the categorization employed to describe the data
rather than any theory about how the descriptions were
generated is an important principle in this regard.
A complete listing of the 38 lexical categories is
given in table 6-1. It was noted earlier that some
features corresponding to particular lexical categories
were used frequently by many subjects (for example, the
counting of node positions), whilst other features were
used by far fewer subjects. In table 6-1, an exposition
will be given of which particular lexical items would
qualify as exemplars of each of the lexical categories in
addition to comments on those lexical categories of
notably high or low frequency of usage. A further point
of note is that some lexical categories were used for
recording instances of usage of single lexical items,
whilst other lexical categories were used for recording
instances of usage of any of a group of synonymous lexical
items. For example, the name of an edge like 'top' or
'left' has no synonymous expression and so each of these
lexical categories were used to record instances of usage
of single lexical items. Other lexical categories, on the
other hand, like 'middle', were used to record instances of
any of a group of synonymous expressions (in this case,
two: 'middle' and 'centre'). Table 6-1 is situated at
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the end of the present chapter.
The thirty-eight lexical categories were devised in
an attempt to account both for descriptions of a common,
frequently occurring nature and also for those of a more
idiosync ratic nature.
Each description generated by each individual subject
in each game was examined and instances of usage of
lexical items corresponding to each lexical category were
recorded and summed across descriptions. This count was
not conducted in terms of the absolute frequency of usage
of lexical items corresponding to a given category in a
given description but on a presence/absence basis. Thus,
each description was examined in order to ascertain which
features were present (corresponding to different lexical
categories.) If an exemplar of a given lexical category
was present more than once within one description, this
was recorded as Qllg instance of usage. The count was
conducted in this fashion in order to circumvent the
problem of variation in the length of the descriptions.
Long descriptions might repeat the use of particular
lexical items', and an absolute frequency count could thus
misleadingly inflate the value of the count for those
lexical categories corresponding to lexical items used in
long descriptions. Such lexical items would have
associated with them a high value of frequency of
occurrence were the count conducted on an absolute
frequency basis, despite the fact that these particular
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lexical items may have been used in only a small number of
descriptions.
Thus, what was counted in the initial description of
the data was the presence or absence of a given feature
within a given description, the count being incremented by
1 if a feature was present in a given description,
regardless of whether it was used more than once in that
description. The counts for each category were summed
across descriptions for each subject, yielding a profile
for each subject of the ngmbers of descriptions in ~hich
he used each lexical category.
Examples are given below to illustrate how sample
descriptions were classified in terms of the lexical
categori es, The underlined terms are those being counted
and the relevant lexical category numbers and names of which
they are an example are given below each term (terms used
repeatedly are underlined repeatedly but the associated
lexical category is only named once):
1) " • • • ~~£QnQ
!(13, order)
. . . from the---r ---
(21, to edge)
left" (from transcript AALOG13A).-J,--:-
(3, left
2) "Second: vertical line:..J; . J, T"
(13, order) (26, vertical) (22, line)
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right: ••• and
,J,
(4, right)
second from the bottom ~
.J..(2, bottom)
(from transcript
AALOG41B)
3) "I am: if you .&Q
J,(15, moveL..gQ)
to the 1QQ right corner. and gQ
J, l'
(1, iQQ) (6, corner)
down oneT-
(18, down)
and along two to the left, that's where
.J, ~(16, along) (19, left).
I am". (from t ran script AALOG15C) :
4) "I can only go backwards, I'm: quite near a corner,
"(6, corner)there's a sort of: I shape:
. J,
(7, shape)
I'm in one corner
of it. ". . (from transcript AALOG38A).
5) "Hell, I'm in L. ~.l,..!4l. (1s) Er: (t s ) •• (14 .!!.)"
~ ~(12, count) <33, £.Q.Qrds)
(from transcript AALOG25B).
When the numbers of descriptions in which exemplars
of each lexical category were employed were summed up for
all subjects, the result was a data matrix of 38 lexical
categories X96 subjects (representing 48 dyads) and this
matrix served as the data for a cluster analysis of lexical
categories. The uses to which cluster analysis was put
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in the present set of studies are outlined below.
fl The analyses employed in th~ £resent set of studies*
As noted above, the data description phase of the
analysis yields a matrix of the scores of 96 subjects in
48 games on a set of thirty-eight lexical categories. As
has been indicated already, the first analysis to be
undertaken was the cluster analysis of lexical catep;ories.
This was carried out in order to ascertain which groupings
of lexical categories consistently resulted across
different measures of similarity and different clustering
criteria (see appendix IV for the rationale behind
comparisons of results from different cluster analyses).
It was hoped that the groupings of lexical categories
yielded would be readily interpretable in terms of the
earlier-presented informal four-fold classification of the
location descriptions. The results yielded in this
analysis will be examined in detail in the next chapter.
The second analysis undertaken was also an analysis
involving the same data matrix. It is possible to
mathematically transform the data matrix, rotating it
through 90 degrees. Having done this, one then has a 96
subjects X 38 lexical categories matrix (having started
with a 38 lexical categories X 96 subjects matrix).
* The reader is urged to consult appendix IV which
presents a summary of the cluster analysis technique and
the method of comparing the results from different
cluster analyses of the same data.
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Itis the n po ssib 1e top erfor m a £.lY.21.§...!: 211.2.1.1.21.2 Qf
individual sUbjects. This analysis would be of interest
for several reasons. Firstly, an informal inspection of
the transcripts suggests that dyads are consistent with
respect to their usages of particular types of
description: the casual impression that each dyad uses
one form of description (fer example, using line-type
descriptions) throughout their game, rather than changing
the type of description used from time to time within a
game, is difficult to resist. It would be of great
interest to ascertain whether consistent groupings of
subjects could be detected across cluster analyses such
that all individuals within a grouping used similar types
of description. It would also be of interest to find out
whether two individuals within a dyad playing the game
were more likely to be located within the same cluster of
individuals rather than in different clusters. If this
were the case, it would point to the possibility that
subjects within a dyad were entraining one another
linguistically - that is, subjects within a pair playing a
game were constraining one another's choice of referring
expressions, such that both used the same type of
description rather than using different types of
description, and this would suggest that pragmatic factors
are indeed of importance.
Thirdly, it would be interesting to relate the cluster
analysis of individual subjects to the cluster analYSis of
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lexical categories in order to ascertain whether the
groupings of sUbjects were sampling from the groupings of
lexical categories in a consistent way. If this were
the case, it would suggest that not only are clusters of
lexical categories detectable and clusters of individual
subjects are detectable, but also that the individual subjects
are clustering together in the particular way that they do
because everyone within ~ given cluster of subjects
selects £illQli& the lexical categories in £ similar ~£X.
There is, unfortunately, no formal statistical methodology
with which to carry out such an analysis, other than by
simple inspection. More details of this analysis will be
provided in the next chapter.
The next chapter will report the results obtained
using the three analyses outlined above.
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Table 8
The thirty-eight lexical categories for the description of
Category
Number
1
2
3
4
5
Category
Name
Top }
Bottom}
Left }
Right}
Explanation of the Category
The categories numbered 1 to 4 were
used for recording instances of
usage of edge names. For example,
where a subject said something like
"I'm third ill line, three in from
the left" an increment to the counts
recorded in categories 1 and 3 would
,
be made.
Handside This lexical category was used to
record instances where subjects
referred to a particular half of the
maze (on either side of an imaginary
central vertical line); for
example, "I'm away over on the far
left hand side". This lexical
category was a multiple item
category: the expressions "half"
and "handside" or "hand" were used
synonymously by subjects and
instances of usage of any of these
Category
Number
6
7
Category
Name
Corner
Shape
Explanation of the C ta eg.2l:..Y
three expressions were counted in this
lexical category.
This single-item category was used
to record instances where subjects
referred to a corner of the maze (or
of part of the maze structure), and
its count would be incremented in
the case of expressions like "I'm at
the bottom left hand corner"
(categories 2, 3 and 5 would, of
course, also have an increment made
to their counts in this example) or
"••• there's a wee T shape: I'm in
one .QQ.r:.n,g.r: 0 fit" •
This lexical category is a multiple-
item category, and its count would
be incremented in the case of any of
a variety of expressioris being used,
particularly those encountered in
figural-type descriptions, such as
"I'm in a the corner of that T
.§.D'§'Q'§''', "Ther e's an L .§.D'§'Q'§' upat
the top left", and "I'm in the
middle grouping, the column on the
left at the top".
Category
Number
7
8
9
~ategory
Name
Shape
(continued)
Middle .
Limb
Explanation of the Category
The idiosyncratic expression "right
turn indicator" (see the earlier
discussion of figural descriptions
in the present chapter) was also
counted as an instance of his
category, since it is being used by
the subjects as a description of a
shape. In all cases, examination
of what was being described by
subjects when they used an
expression (that is, examination of
the computer printout of the
relevant game state) was carried out
for clarification.
This lexical category's count was
incremented whenever the terms
"middle" or IIcentu" were used by
subjects.
This was a multiple-item lexical
category used for recording instances
of reference to a protruding part of
the maze structure in terms of a
"llmQ_" or a path "jutting out" or
"sticking out on its own".
Category
Number
10
,,
12
Category
Name
No path
Symmetry
Count
Explanation of the Category
This multiple-item category was used
for recording instances of reference
to a gap in the network of paths in
the maze. A variety of terms were
used by subjects to refer to such
gaps, notably "space" "g@" and "nQ
This lexical category was used for
recording instances of reference to
a figural resemblance between parts
of the maze structure, such as
".§.,Ymmetry","oppos it e" and
"parallel".
This was a highly frequently-used
lexical category which was used to
record instances of cardinal
counting; an example given earlier
was the description" • • •
,!h, F-(5, 1) s-: "Any separate
instance of a cardinal count being
used would result in the current
count in this category being
incremented. The exception to this
was two-place coordinates, which were
recorded in a separate lexical
category (number 33). other
Category
Number
12
13
14
15
Category Explanation of the Category
Name
Count examples where an increment to the
(continued) value of the count in this category
would be made are examples such as
"I'm l~Q along from the left on the
top row".
Order This was another heavily-used lexical
category, and its count was
incremented whenever a subject used
an ordinal term (namely, first,
second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth,
or last). For example, "I'm
second top row, three from the
right".
Node This multiple-item lexical
category was used for recording
instances of usage of expressions
referring to nodes in the maze
structure. Expressions used to
refer to nodes included "node",
"box", and, more infrequently,
"place'~ or "~".
Move This multiple-item lexical category
was used to record instances of usage
of instructions regarding
visual scanning of the form "QQ to
the bottom left hand corner.
Category Category
Number Name
16
17
18
19
20
Hove
(continued)
Along
Up
Down
Left
Right
Explanation of the CateGory
one along to the right •• "• •
'Move' and 'go' were the principal
lexical items counted as belonging
to this category.
This multiple-item lexical category
was used to record instances where a
subject specified a horizontal
movement, as in, for example, "I'm
three in fro m the rig ht • • •"
"Three g£..r.2.~~ "• • "In " "gl.2.ng,!!.. .
and "across" were the principal
lexical items counted here.
Lexical categories 17, 18, 19 and 20
were used for recording instances of
specification of path movements in
descriptions, for example, "I'm
two iQ i.h~ l~fi Qf you", "I' m three
.!:!Q from the monster", and so on.
Such cases were quite distinct from
cases where the edge names 'left' and
'right' were specified, and could
readily be disambiguated from them
by reference to the computer
printout showing the particular game
state in question.
Category Category Explanation of the Category
Number Name
21 To Edge This multiple-item lexical category
(continued) was used for recording instances
where distances were specified
relative to an edge- for example,
"I'm third from the right". The
lexical items "to" , "on" and "from"
were the principal exemplars of this
22 Line
category.
This was a single-item lexical
category and was used for recording
instances of usage of the lexical
item "line".
23 Row This single-item lexical category was
used for recording instances of
usage of the word ".r:Jlli,".
24 Column This single-item lexical category
was used for recording instances of
usage of the word "column".
25 Horizontal These three single-item lexical
26 Vertical categories were used for recording
27 Diagonal instances of usage of the lexical
items in their respective category
names, for example, "I'm diagonally
one away from my goal ••• " or
"second vertical line from the left
Category Category
Number Name
Explanation of the Cate~ory
". . .
28 End This multiple-item lexical category
was used for recording instances of
reference being made by subjects to
the end of a line of nodes, as in,
for example, "I'm in the last box on
that lin e",or ." • • • the very ~nQ
node". The term s t 1.§..2i.!.. and t~nQ '
were the principal lexical items
which were counted in this category,
but the term 'outside' was also used
by subjects in this fashion.
29 Extreme This multiple-item lexical category
was used to record instances of
usage of lexical items qualifying the
'end' of a line of nodes (see
category 28). An example would be
"I'm at the Y~r:.Yend", 0 r " • • •
the extreme edge".
30 Groundfl This multiple-item lexical category was
used very infrequently, in fact
being used by only one pair of
subjects to metaphorically describe
row positions and was of the form
"I'm on the first floor line, say,
rather than the ground floor line".
Category category Explanation of the category
Number .N~
31 Rowpcol This is another infrequently-used
32 Dfedges
33 Coords
lexical category and was used to
record instances where subjects
specified their position in terms of
both row and column (row Qlus
col umn) asin "l' m at !.QJi five
This type of
description is similar in nature to
matrix- or coordinate-type
descriptions but was infrequently
observed.
This is another infrequently-used
category and was used for recording
instances where subjects described
their positions in terms of distances
away from two edges, for example,
"I'm three froID the to14 lJiQ froID
ill right". Again, tfiere is a
similarity to matrix-type
descriptions and again this is
an infrequently-used strategy for
generating location descriptions.
This frequently-used lexical
category was used to record
instances of coordinate descriptions
category
Number
Categou
t-lame
Explanation of the Category
being generated by subjects, for
example" (2.... 1)", "A5.", "~l," etc.
34 ABCDEF This lexical category was used
to record instances of cases where
subjects 'counted' out the letters of
their coordinate system, for example:
"Let's see I'm in: A~B,C,D~ D5."
35 start These three categories were used to
36 Ownother record instances where subjects
37 Monster described their location relative to
a previously specified position,
which might be a start or goal
position (category 35), one's own or
one's partner' s position (category
36) or the monster's position (category
37). For example, "I'm three to
the left of 1..QJd "(category 36),
"I'm one above the monster"
38
(category 37) or "I'm right back to
wh~ 1. started" (category 35).
Junction This very infrequently-used single-
item lexical category was used for
recording instances of usage of the
term 'junction' as in, for example,
"I'm at the junction of the T".
CHAPTER 1
THE SEMANTICS AND PRAGMATICS OF LOCATION DESCRIPTION--- --- -- ---
=. II: DATA ANALYSES
II Introduction
In the previous chapter, an exposition was given of
the nature of subjects' descriptions of locations within
the maze. The formal statistical treatment of the
subjects' location descriptions was also outlined. This
formal treatment consisted of two aspects, i) a
descriptive aspect (in which subjects' location
descriptions were themselves described in terms of their
usage of each of thirty-eight lexical categories) and ii)
a classificatory aspect (in which the lexical categories
were classified into groups (clusters) by means of
hierarchical cluster analysis). The hierarchical cluster
analysis was conducted in order to ascertain which clusters
or groupings of lexical categories could be identified.
Such groupings could then be examined in the light of the
earlier informal four-fold classification of location
descriptions.
Since the technique of hierarchical cluster analysis
to some extent imposes a hierarchical partitioning on the
data, it is necessary to compare the results from several
analyses in order to assess which particular clusters of
variables (in this case, lexical categories) occur
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consistentlY across different cluster analyses. One could
be more confident about the reality of these consistently-
occurring groups: they would be less likely to be an
artefact of the technique of cluster analysis and would
be more likely to reflect the actual structure of the data.
Therefore, several different cluster analyses of the
lexical categories were conducted and compared in order to
ascertain which clusters of lexical categories were
consistently revealed by different clustering techniques.
It is also possible to conduct cluster analyses of
individual subjects, the object of these analyses being the
assessment of whether consistently-occurring groupings of
subjects could be identified on the basis of their having
used location descriptions of a similar nature. Again,
several different cluster analyses were conducted and
compared in an attempt to ascertain which groupings of
individual subjects occurred consistently across different
cluster analyses.
Finally, it was also noted that it would be of
interest to relate the results from the cluster analyses
of subjects to the results from the cluster analyses of
lexical categories. The purpose of this analysis would
be the assessment of whether particular identifiable
groupings of subjects were generating location
descriptions which were themselves· readily explicable in
terms of the clusters of lexical categories revealed by
the first set of analyses. That is, it.would be of
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interest to know whether the groupings of subjects
revealed by ,the cluster analyses of individual subjects
,<..; ",, , , sampled
from the set of lexical categories in a manner consistent
with the groupings obtained in the cluster analysis of
lexical categories (e.g. cluster X of subjects using only
those lexical categories present in cluster F and G of
lexical categories and no others, rather than sampling one
or two lexical categories from each of the clusters of
lexical categories).
In the present chapter, we will consider the results
obtained from (a) the cluster analyses of lexical
categories and (b) the cluster analyses of subjects, after
a cluster comparison technique (Gordon, 1981, see appendix
IV) had been employed. That is, only those groupings
which are consistently revealed by more than one cluster
analysis will be presented. Following this, an attempt
will be made to fit the two sets of results «a) and (b)
abov e) together.
Ql Cluster analysis of lexical categories
As noted in the last chapter, the Biomedical computer
programs (BMDP) statistical software package was used to
analyze the data, and the particular program involved was
program P1M (Hartigan, 1981, in Dixon et al. 1981), which
cluster analyzes a set of variables. In the case of the
present data, the thirty-eight lexical categories (in
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terms of which subjects' location descriptions were
themselves described) were treated by the BMDP P1M program
as thirty-eight variables and were analyzed to yield
clusters of lexical categories. In program P1M, it is
possible to manipulate both the measure of similarity or
distance between variables on which the clustering is
based, and also the criterion or linkage rule according to
which clusters are formed (see appendix IV of this thesis
and Gordon (1981) for an explanation of the principles
behind cluster analysis). Two measures of similarity,
and two measures of distance between variables are
available in program P1M. The measures of similarity are
(i) the correlation between the variables and (ii) the
absolute value of the correlation between the variables,
and the measures of distance available are (iii) the angle
between the two variables (i.e. the arccosine of the
correlation between the variables) and (iv) the acute
angle corresponding to the arccosine of the absolute value
of the correlation between the variables.
Three criteria for combining clusters are available
in program P1M. These are (i) the minimum distance or
maximum similarity over all pairings of the variables
between the two clusters (single linkage), (ii) the
maximum distance or minimum similarity over all pairings
of the variables between the two clusters (complete
linkage) and (iii) the average distance or average
similarity over all pairings of the variables between the
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two clusters (average linkage).
In the first analysis of the groupings of lexical
categories, four cluster analyses were conducted, all
using the average linkage clustering criterion and each
using one of the four measures of similarity or distance
between variables noted above (see table 7-1 below).
Analysis (a)
Chosen
Clustering
Criterion
Chosen Heasure
of Similarity
or Distance
(i) Average Li nkag e Correlation
(ii) Average linkage Absolute
correlation
(iii) Average linkage Angle of
correlation
(iv) Average linkage Absolute angle
of correlation
Table ~ The four cluster analyses conducted in analysis
i9J...,. varying 1h~ measure of llmilarity/distance be111een
variables fOL £ given clustering criterio~
Thus, there were four cluster analyses, involving the
average linkage clustering criterion coupled with each of the
,four measures of similarity/distance between variables.
These four cluster analyses were compared using Gordon's
(1981; see appendix IV of this volume) cluster comparison
technique.
The second analysis of the groupings of lexical
categories involved a further three cluster analyses, the
323
results from which were again compared with each other. In
this case, the measure of similarity between variables was
held constant (the correlation measure of similarity
between the variables being used in all three analyses) and
the criterion on which clustering was based was varied.
This resulted in three cluster analyses (see table 7-2,
below) :
Analysis (b)
Chosen
Clustering
Criterion
Chosen Neasure
of Similarity
or Distance
( i) Single linkage Correlation
( i i)
(iii)
Average linkage Correlation
Complete linkage Correlation
Table ~ The three cluster analyses conducted in
analysis ~ varying the clustering criterion for g given
measure of similarity.
All four cluster analyses in analysis (a) above were
compared with one another, and the resulting
consistently-occurring clusters appear in the left-hand
colUmn of table 7-3 (overleaf). Likewise, the results
from the three analyses of procedure (b) above were
compared. The results of this comparison are shown in
the right-hand column of table 7-3. The results of the
two sets of analyses (a) and (b) are shown side by side
for easy comparison.
The analyses which vary the measure of similarity on
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which clustering is based (i.e. analysis (a» yield six
consistently-occurring clusters of lexical categories,
whilst the analyses which vary the clustering criterion and
hold constant the measure of similarity (analysis (b»
yield nine consistently-occurring clusters. Hhat is
striking is the similarity between the results from these
two sets of analyses. Examination of table 7-3 reveals
the following (see table 7-3):
(i) Clusters (1) and (2) in analysis (b) taken
together are identical to cluster (1) in
analysis (a).
(ii) Cluster (8) in analysis (b) is identical
to cluster (2) in analysis (a).
(iii) Cluster (4) in analysis (b) is identical
to cluster (3) in analysis (a).
(iv) Cluster (5) in analysis (b) is identical to
cluster (4) in analysis (a), except that the
lexical category named 'start' is included
in cluster (5) of analysis (b) in two
analyses out of three. However, this
lexical category is also included in
cluster (6) of analysis (b) on two cluster
analyses out of three and is therefore
1ikely to be intermediate between clusters
(5) and (6) of analysis (b).
(v) Cluster (3) in analysis (b) is identical to
cluster ( 5) in analysis (a).
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(iv) Cluster (6) in analysis (b) is identical to
cluster (6) in analysis (a), except for the
lexical category 'start' discussed above.
(vii) Two clusters are yielded on at least two
analyses out of three in analysis (b),
these being the clusterings (7) and (9) of
analysis (b), which do not have
counterparts in analysis (a).
The striking similarity between the overall results
from these two sets of analyses pOints to the existence of a
definite structure in the data, and claims can be made for
the veridicality of the clusters numbered (1) to (6) in
analysis (a) of table 7-3, since they are identical to
clusters (1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (8) of analysis
(b). Furthermore, each of these groupings of lexical
categories is readily explicable in terms of the intuitive
analysis of place descriptions presented in the last
chapter. Each of these clusters will be discussed in the
light of this analysis.
Considering cluster (1) of analysis (a) in table 7-3,
which corresponds to clusters (1) and (2) of analysis (b) in
table 7-3, the grouping of lexical categories is as
follows: the categories, TOP, ORDER, ROW, BOTTOM, LEFT,
TO EDGE, RIGHT and LINE cluster together. This cluster
therefore contains lexical categories corresponding to all
of the edge names, ordinal counting, prepositions, and the
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terms 'row' and 'line'. This cluster of lexical
categories thus contains all those lexical categories
involved in the generation of row-type descriptions. For
example:
(Bottom or
"I'm on the third row from the IQQ)
J: ~ -:j:"- J,(ORDER (ROH) (TO EDGE) (BOTTOH or TOP)
(Left or
second from the Right)-r ~ J,(ORDER) (TO EDGE) (LEFT or RIGI-lT)
Thus, a prototypical row-type description could be
generated using the lexical categories clustered together
in cluster (1) without the use of any other lexical
categories from other clusters being necessary. Cluster
r
(1) of analysis (a) in table 7-3, therefore, does appear
to agree well with our earlier intuitive analysis,
appearing to correspond to that grouping of lexical
categories used in row- or line-type descriptions.
Considering cluster (2) of analysis (a) in table 7-3,
which corresponds to cluster (8) of analysis (b) in table
7-3, the clustering of lexical categories is as follows:
categories COORDS and ABCDEF group together. This
grouping makes good intuitive sense in terms of our
earlier informal classification of description types, and
there are numerous coordinate-type descriptions in the
data which use these two lexical categories and no others.
For example:
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III'mat h 14-r !L. L:F-: E~II
(ABCDEF) (COORDS)
The third major cluster in analysis (a) in table 7-3,
which corresponds to the fourth major cluster in analysis
(b), consists of the lexical categories COUNT, UP, ALONG,
DIAGONAL, and DOWN. This clustering of lexical categories
could correspond to the lexical items used in the more
elliptical path-type descriptions (see chapter 6).
Elliptical path descriptions often omit the starting point
for the path movement which comprises the description. ('
For example:
"I'm three along, three !W."'J: Jf J# ~(COUNT) (ALONG) (COUNT) (UP)
The lexical category DIAGONAL included in this
cluster is used by subjects in a variety of contexts, one
of which is in the form of a 'short cut' of such path
descriptions as the example above, as in the following
example:
IIDiagonally I'm one up from the bottom left corner".
'I>(DIAGONAL)
Cluster (4) of analysis (a) in table 7-3,
corresponding to cluster (5) in analysis (b) in table 7-3,
contains lexical categories which are associated with
figural-type descriptions. This cluster also contains
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lexical categories corresponding to lexical items used in
path-type descriptions. The cluster is as follows:
SHAPE, HORIZONTAL, MIDDLE, MOVE, NODE and LIMB. It has
already been noted (see chapter 6) that it is difficult to
describe an entire maze in terms of figures or shapes and
so path descriptions are employed in addition to figural
des~Ptions. A sample description which uses lexical
items corresponding to the above lexical categories in
cluster (4) of analysis (a) would be:
"I'm in the middle of that T"
T !
(MIDDLE) (SHAPE)
or
"You see that limb?--r-
(LIMB)
Move ho ri zont.aLfv along one, I'm there".-1-- ------r----~
(MOVE) (HORIZONTAL)
The small cluster (5) in analysis (a) in table 7-3
appears as cluster (3) in analysis (b), and consists of
two lexical categories, HANDSIDE and CORNER. Lexical
items corresponding to these two categories are often used
by subjects as parts of larger descriptions, and are used
in a variety of path- and figural-type descriptions, such
as the following example:
"From the bottom left-hand corner I'm one along, one up".-r ~(HANDSIDE) (CORNER)
or
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"At the top right
T shape". TT
(HANDSIDE)(CORNER)
of the maze there's a wee
The last cluster common to both analysis (a) and
analysis (b) of table 7-3 consists of four lexical
categories and appears as cluster (6) of analysis (a) and
cluster (6) of analysis (b). It consists of the lexical
categories LEFT, OWNOTHER, START and RIGHT. This cluster
would seem to reflect the groupings of lexical items found
in the often-used strategy of describing one's location in
terms of a previously specified position, as in the
following example:
"I'm to the left of vou"--~- .l.T
(LEFT) (OWNOTHER)
or
"I'm just to the rith,t.of where I started".
Jf(RIGHT) (START)
These six clusters occur consistently across two sets
of analyses. Intuitively speaking, each cluster consists
either of a group of semantically related lexical
categories, or of a group of lexical categories which
grouping is readily explicable in terms of the manner in
which the subjects generate place descriptions.
Thus, the clusters yielded are both consistent in
occurrence and do appear to correspond to the sorts of
phrases which subjects do in fact employ in the data.
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The next analysis conducted was the cluster analysis
of individual subjects on the basis of their usages of the
lexical categories. In this analysis, the aim was to
ascertain whether any clearly identifiable groupings of
individuals could be discerned such that all of the
individuals within a cluster employed similar types of
description. It is to a summary of the results of this
analysis that we now turn.
£1 Cluster analysis of individual subjects
As noted in chapter 6, the cluster analysis of
individual subjects was conducted on the same data matrix
as was used for the cluster analysis of lexical
categories: the 38 lexical categories X96 subjects data
matrix was mathematically transformed through 900 to yield
a 96 subjects X38 lexical categories data matrix. This
transformed matrix was again analyzed using BMDP program
P1M, which treated each subject as a variable and
performed the standard cluster analysis of variables.
As was the case with the analysis of lexical
categories, two sets of analyses (holding the clustering
criterion constant whilst varying the measure of
similarity, and holding the measure of similarity constant
whilst varying the clustering criterion, (a) and (b)
respectively), were conducted.
table 7-4:
These are summarized in
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Chosen Chosen measure
Analysis (a) clustering of similarity
criterion of distance
(i) Average linkage Correlation
(ii) Average linkage Absolute correlation
(iii) Average linkage Angle of correlation
(iv) Average linkage Absolute angle of
correlation
Analysis (b)
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Single linkage Correlation
Average linkage Correlation
Complete linkage Correlation
Table 1=S The 1~Q sets of cluster analyses employed in
the cluster analysis of individual subjects. Analysis (a)
holds the linkage criterion constant and varies the measure
of similarity on which clustering is based and analysis
(b) varies the linkage criterion and holds the measure of
similarity constant.
Thus, analysis (a) involved four cluster analyses,
the results from which were compared with one another in
order to ascertain which groupings of subjects occurred
consistently, and analysis (b) involved three cluster
analyses, the results from which were also compared with
one another. The consistently-occurring groupings of
subjects found in both sets of analyses are set out in
table 7-5 (over). The consistently-occurring groupings
of individual subjects found in analysis (a) are set out
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in the left-hand column of table 7-5, and the
consistently-occurring groupings of individual subjects
found in analysis (b) are set out in the right-hand column
of table 7-5.
The following convention is employed for denoting
individual subjects. Each dyad of subjects who played a
game or games has a number assigned to it, for example 11
or 43. Following this number is a letter which denotes
an individual game (A, B, e, D, E, or F). Thus, the
subjects in dyad number 11 played two games, games 11D and
11F. The second letter after the dyad number denotes the
individual player, A or Bj player A always played the
game using the 'Intel' terminal and player B always played
the game using the 'Imlac' terminal. Thus, subject 11DB
is player B in dyad 11 playing game Dj subject 43AA is
player A in dyad 43 playing game A, whilst subject 43AB is
the partner of subject 43AA in game A of dyad 43j and so
on (see table 7-5, overleaf).
As can be ascertained from an inspection of table 7-
5, there is a striking similarity in the clusters
consistently yielded across both sets of analyses (for
ease of comparison, the order of items within the clusters
of analysis (b) has been altered slightly in some cases to
conform with the ordering of the corresponding items
within the clusters of analysis (a): this has been done
to facilitate comparison of the two sets of analyses,
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since the fact that a particular set of items cluster
together is more important from the present point of view
than is the internal structure of each cluster).
There is a close correspondence between the result
from the two sets of analyses in the case of all clusters.
Where differences do exist, they are small ones, usually
being the inclusion of one or two subjects in a particular
cluster in one analysis but not in the corresponding
cluster of the other analysis (for example, subject 43AB
is included in cluster (1) of analysis (b) but is not
included in cluster (1) of analysis (a». Thus, the two
clusters numbered (1) in both analyses are identical
except for the fact that cluster (1) of analysis (b)
contains the 'extra' subject 43AB.
The two clusters numbered (2) in both analyses agree
in the case of 15 of the subjects comprising them, the
difference between the two clusters being that cluster (2)
of analysis (a) contains one subject (40AB)
who is not included in cluster (2) of analysis (b) (see
table 7-5).
The cluster numbered (3) in both analyses agree on
eight out of the nine subjects in each cluster, the
solitary 'extra' subjects not common to cluster (3) in
both analyses being subject 11FB in cluster (3) of
analysis (b) and subject 43AB in cluster (3) of analysis
(a) (see table 7-5).
The two clusters numbered (4) in both analyses (see
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table 7-5) are identical except that cluster (4) in
analysis (b) includes subject 29BB, whereas the cluster
numbered (4) in analysis (a) does not.
The two clusters numbered (5) in both analyses show
the greatest number of differences, agreeing on the
clustering together of eight subjects (24BB, 41AB, 29BA,
33AA, 35BB, 40BA, 33AB, and 35AB), and differing from one
another on a total of 5 subjects; analysis (a) includes
subjects 40BB, 31BA, and 35BA whereas analysis (b) does
not, and analysis (b) includes subjects '1FA and 38AA
where analysis (a) does not.
Cluster (6) in analysis (a) is absolutely identical
with cluster (6) in analysis (b); agreement on the
inclusion of all 26 subjects within one cluster is
perfect.
Since the two sets of six clusters in the two sets of
analyses agree so closely, there is a good basis for
concluding that there is a definite structure in the data.
There is a substantial core of the 96 subjects who are
consistent in their choice of description type to such
an extent that they are consistently classified into six
groups by several different clustering criteria. An
investigation of the basis for this consistency is reported
in the next section.
Before leaving the cluster analyses of individual
subjects, however, there are one or two further paints of
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note. Notice, for example, that in cluster (1) of both
analyses in table 7-5 that both subjects in both games
played by dyad number 10 cluster together. This suggests
that both subjects within this dyad are repeatedly using
the same type of description as one another. other cases
where both members of a dyad playing a particular game
cluster together are games 13A and 13C (cluster 2), 170
and 17F (cluster 2), 180 and 18F (cluster 2) 110, 43B and
38B (cluster 3) 15E, 27B, 37A and 37B (cluster 4) 33A
(cluster 5), and games 20B, 200, 23B, 26B, 270, 28B, 28C,
19F, 42A, 44A, 44B, 25B and 42B (cluster 6). In the case
of all of these 29 games, both of the subjects within a
dyad and playing a particular game conSistently cluster
together on the basis of the descriptions they generate.
This consistency is striking and suggests that subjects
are linguistically entraining one another to some extent,
that is, both subjects with~~dyad playing a particular
game are using the same type rather than different types
of location description as one another.
Thus, the cluster analyses of individual subjects
reveal consistently-occurring clusters of individual
subjects such that all individuals within a cluster use
the same type of description. Furthermore, the above
observation suggests that there is a strong tendency for
both members of a dyad to group together. This supports
the impression one gets on reading transcripts of games
that each individual subject was consistent with respect
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to the type of description he or she used, and that the
two members of a dyad were broadly consistent with respect
to one another's choice of description type.
\venow turn to examine the basis for the above-
revealed consistency in the composition of the clusters of
individual subjects.
Ql The lexical content of subjects' descriptions: the
relation bet~een the cluster analysis of individual
subjects and the cluster analysis of lexical
categories
In section (b) of this chapter, the results of several
cluster analyses, when compared with one another, revealed
a consistently-occurring set of clusters of lexical
categories. An examination of the content of each of
these clusters of lexical categories suggested that the
particular groupings of lexical categories which were
revealed by the analyses partly reflected subjects' usages
of lexical items corresponding to the lexical categories.
That is, each cluster seemed. to comprise a grouping of
lexical categories which made sense, intuitively speaking,
in relation to our earlier informal classification of
subj ects' loca tion desc riptions (see chapter 6). A
cluster of lexical categories might, for example, group
together those lexical categories corresponding to the
types of lexical item found in line-type descriptions.
In section (c) of the present chapter, the results of
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two sets of cluster analyses of individual subjects
revealed a set of consistently-occurring clusters
comprising groupings of subjects. Subjects within a
cluster were grouped together on the basis of their having
used similar description types.
In the present section, we turn to examine exactly how
each of the clusters of subjects (see section (c) of this
chapter) samples from (i.e. uses lexical items
corresponding to) each of the lexical categories in the
different clusters of lexical categories (see table 7-3).
That is, we wish to ascertain whether the lexical
categories used by the clusters of subjects relate in a
systematic way to the clusters of lexical categories: do
each group of subjects use lexical items corresponding to
lexical categories which are all grouped together in the
cluster analyses of lexical categories, or do the subjects
sample more randomly?
Reference to table 7-5 reveals six groupings of
subjects. The data for each subject in each group was
examined in order to ascertain which categories in the
classification of lexical categories were used by that
subject. The results of this examination of each
subject's data (the frequencies with which the subject
used lexical items corresponding to each of the lexical
categories) were summed across all subjects in a given
cluster of subjects (see table 7-5) in order to ascertain
which lexical categories were used by the group as a
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whole. The results of this analysis are shown in table 7-
6 (over).
In table 7-6, the left-hand column shows the
consistent clusters of lexical categories already
tabulated in table 7-3 and discussed in section (b) of
this chapter. These clusters of lexical categories are
lettered (a)-(l)~ The numbered columns «1) - (6» in
the main body of table 7-6 correspond to the six clusters
of subjects revealed by the analyses presented 1n section
(c) of the present chapter. The ticks (~) located
alongside the different lexical categories represent those
categories used at least once per game, on average, by
each subject in the group.
The first cluster of subjects, (cluster (1) in both
analysis (a) and analysis (b) in table 7-5 and comprising
subjects 1DBA, 10BB, 10GA, 10GB and 41AA) use the
follow ing lexical categories (see table 7-6); TOP, ORD ER,
ROW, BOTTOM, LEFT, TO EDGE, RIGHT, LINE, COUNT, ALONG, UP
and START. That is, they use all of the lexical
categories in clusters (a) and (b) of the lexical category
classification (see table 7-6) and selected items from
cluster (e). The other i tern they use is 'start' from
cluster (g) of the lexical category classification.
Thus, these subjects appear to be using row-descriptions,
using some path movement terms, and occasionally
describing their positions in terms of path movements
relative to previously specified goal or start positions.
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Example descriptions from individual subjects ~lithin this
cluster back up the above interpretation:
e.g. "I'll ¥ ~ to the tlird T on the: fifth T".
U1OVt) (UP) (ORDER)(NODE) (ORtER)(ROH)
(Subject 10BA)
"I'm on the rT forth r aIrS" (10GB)
(TOP)(LINE)(ORDER)(NODE)(ALONG)
As can be seen from table 7-6, the description of
one's position relative to a previously specified start or
goal position is quite common, since the·subjects in
clusters 2, 4 and 5 of tables 7-5 and 7-6 do this also.
Cluster (2) of subjects (see table 7-6) use the
following lexical categories: TOP, ORDER, ROW (cluster
(a) in the cluster analysis of lexical categories in table
7-6), COUNT, ALONG, DOWN (from cluster (e) of the cluster
analysis of lexical categories in table 7-6), plus the
category START from cluster (g). The particular lexical
categories used by this group of subjects would suggest
that they are also using row-type descriptions, but row-
type descriptions of a more elliptical nature than those
used by the sUbjects comprising cluster (1) of table 7-6.
The lexical categories used would suggest descriptions
being couched in terms of 'row plus counts along that
row'• Examination of the data of subjects in cluster
(2) bears this out:
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e.g. "I'm on the:fp riw• thtrd lett". (17FA)
(TOP) (ROIol)(ORDER) (LEFT (EDGE»
"Second rlw, second from the left" (13AA)-r TT-T
(ORDER)(ROW) (ORDER)(TO EDGE)(LEFT EDGE»)
Thus, according to the present analysis, the subjects
in clusters (1) and (2) of the cluster analysis of
subjects both use row-type descriptions but of slightly
differing types, those used by cluster (2) of subjects
being slightly more elliptical in nature. The subjects
in cluster (2) of the cluster analysis of subjects would
seem to specify the edges relative to which the row
descriptions are being generated less often than the
subjects in cluster (1), according to the present
analysis.
Cluster (3) of subjects (see table 7-6) use the
following lexical categories; ORDER, ROW (cluster (a) in
table 7-6), LINE (cluster (b ) and ALONG (cluster (e».
This combination of categories would again suggest row-
type descriptions, in this instance of a highly elliptical
nature. An example from a subject in this group bears
this out:
. . . the third: row:
~ t(ORDER)(ROW)
third along. •
(OtDER)(AONG)
" (43AA)"
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Thus, the subjects in the first three clusters of the
cluster analys~Jindividual subjects all use row-type
descriptions, but of slightly differing types.
The subjects in cluster (4) of the cluster analysis of
individual subjects (see table 7-5) would appear to use the
following lexical categories (table 7-6); TOP, ORDER
(cluster (a) of the cluster analysis of lexical
categories) BOTTOM, LEFT, TO EDGE, RIGHT '(cluster (b) of
lexical categories) COUNT, ALONG, UP (cluster (e»,
HANDSIDE {cluster (c» and START and OWNOTHER {cluster
(g». This collection of lexical categories would appear to
suggest that the subjects in this group generate path-type
descriptions; both types of counting, edge names and the
movement terms 'along' and 'up' are included among the
categories used by this cluster of subjects, as are
previously_specified-position-denoting categories
(start/goal and own/other's previous position). The term
'row', furthermore, is not used by this group of subjects.
Typical descriptions generated by some of the subjects in
{cluster (4) lend support to the conclusion that this group
of subjects generate path-type descriptions:
e. g. (37 BB) "I'm just Jre .1Ing from Ylu: to the:
(COUNT){ALONG) (OWNOTHER)
to the left: {3.5 sec)".r(LEFT (direction»
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(37B3 ) "I'm four PlreS r from the bottom and(cI) (IIODE) (UP)rEDGE) (JTTOM)
I'mTT inr the rlw,
(COUNT)(COLUMN) (TO EDGE) (RIGHT)
(15EA) " ··r alr and r r er the
(COUNT)(ALONG) (COUNT)(UP)(TO EDGE)
rtjler
(LEFT)(BOTTOM)(LEFT (EDGE»
(15CA) "Yp 1ft · · r a1rg , · · to
(TOP)(LEFT) (MOVE)(ALONG)(COUNT)
(EDGE)
the
These typical descriptions from some of the subjects
who group together in cluster (4) of the cluster analysis
of individual subjects confirm that these subjects do
indeed use path descriptions.
Cluster (5) of individual subjects (see tables 7-5
and 1-6) use the following lexical categories: TOP (from
cluster (g) of the cluster analysis of lexical
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categories), BOTTOH, LEFT, RIGHT, LINE (cluster (b»
HANDSIDE (cluster (0» COUNT, ALONG, UP, DOWN (cluster
«», SHAPE, HIDDLE (cluster (f» and LEFT, START,
OWNOTHER and RIGHT (cluster (g». This is quite a varied
selection of lexical categories from the different
clusters. Noticeable for their absence from the set of
lexical categories used by cluster (5) of subjects are the
lexical categories 'row' and 'order'. the lexical
categories used by this group of subjects include path
terms (along and up) edge names, and the figural term
'shape'. This would seem to indicate that these subjects
are describing their locations in terms of a mixture of
path- and figural-type descriptions (see chapter6).
Sample descriptions taken from protocols from the
subjects in this group would seem to bear this impression
out. For example:
(35BA) " •• t1y asterisk is at the: (1s) sort of: (1s)
last part the.Lt: see what I mean?
(kAPE)
In the middle soua re---- - -~1---
(MIDLE) (NODE)
of that line"-1 ·
(LINE)
Furthermore, the above analysis suggests that
subjects extensively use prespecified positions to
generate descriptions (that is, describing locations
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relative to a-previously specified start, goal, the other
player's or one's own previous, position). This is also
confirmed by an examination of the data:
(34BA) "See where I sttrted? •
(START/GOAL)
• I'm ~ along to the1 1(COUNT)(ALONG)
left from that.r(LEFT (direction»
(35BB) "I'm one below where I started from".
t(START)
Thus, the subjects comprising cluster (5) of the
cluster analysis of individual subjects do appear to be
using the earlier-noted (see chapter 6) mixture of path-
and figural-type descriptions.
The sixth cluster of subjects revealed by the cluster
analysis of subjects use only four categories of lexical
item _ COORDS and ABCDEF from cluster (d) of the cluster
analysis of lexical categories (see table 1-6), COUNT
(cluster (e» and OWNOTHER (cluster (g». In other
words, this would appear to be the group of subjects who
use matrix- or coordinate-type descriptions. As with
other types of description, these subjects appear to
sometimes describe their positions relative to a
previously specified position (of the self or of one's
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partner).
This is also done by the subjects in clusters 1, 2, 4
and 5 of the cluster analysis of subjects.
The impression that cluster (6) of subjects use
coordinate-type descriptions is again borne out by an
inspection of their data:
e•g. (20 BA) "I am (1, 5sec) present1y at: ~i..5. (4 sec) O. K • ?
t(COORDS)
(4488) "O.K. I'm now then on three: ~ ~ 1:
(COiNT)
',!4 ra; .!D O.K.?"1,
(COORDS)
(26BA) " ••• Ehm: A...~L
(AJDEF)
Ll. 1 (6
t(COORDS)
sec)"
Thus, this group of subjects are indeed using
coordinate-type descriptions, confirming what our analysis
had suggested.
tl Conclusions
In conclusion, the results obtained from the cluster
analyses substantially confirm our earlier, informal,
observations. Firstly, the lexical item categories group
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together in a fashion which is consistent with the types
of grouping one would expect from our earlier informal
analysis. For example, all of the types of lexical
categories corresponding to the lexical items used in row-
type descriptions (edge names, prepos itions, 'row', '1ine'
and ordinal counting) consistently group together.
Secondly, the earlier observation that subjects are
consistent with respect to the type of description they
use, with one type of description (e.g. path-type
descriptions) being used by a given dyad of sUbjects
throughout a given game (rather than switching from
description type to description type within a game) was
confirmed by the two latter analyses in the present
chapter. These analyses demonstrated that consistent
groupings of subjects are revealed across different
cluster analyses (the groupings being on the basis of the
descriptions used by individual subjects) and each of
these groups of subjects consistently use particular
selections of lexical categories. The selection of
lexical categories used by all of the members of each
group relates in a systematic way to the earlier cluster
analysis of lexical categories. Thus, for example, the
subjects in group (1) use the lexical categories in
clusters (a) and (b), plus three lexical categories from
cluster (c) of the lexical category classification (see
table 7-6) and also one lexical category from cluster (g).
The y d0 not sam pIe fro m a11 0 f the c1usters 0 f
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categories.
One group of subjects (group (5) in tables 7-5 and 7-
6) do sample from several of the clusters of lexical
categories (see table 7-6). They do, however, sample the
individual categories from the different clusters of
lexical categori~s in a fashion consistent with our
informal four-fold classification of descriptions
presented in chapter 6: they use a variety of lexical
categories associated with figural- and path-type
descriptions but they never use terms like 'row' nor do
they use the 'coordinates' category. Thus, although they
do sample lexical categories from a large number of
different clusters of categories (see table 7-6), they do
not do so in an entirely random fashion, but instead in a
fashion which is consistent with our earlier informal
classification of the location descriptions.
The analyses presented in the present chapter thus
indicate that the following conclusions can be drawn:
(1) The lexical categories, in terms of which
subject's descriptions of locations were
described, cluster consistently across several
analyses to form groupings which are readily
explicable in terms of our earlier, informal,
four-fold classification of the location
description's.
,(2) When the subjects are treated as variables and
cluster analyzed, consistently-occurring
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groupings of subjects emerge across different
cluster analyses. This suggests that there are
clearly identifiable groups of subjects which
are homogeneous with respect to the type of
location description used by individual subjects
within each cluster of subjects.
(3) The groups of subjects revealed in the cluster
analysis of individual subjects use lexical
items corresponding to the lexical categories in
a systematic way which is consistent with the
four-fold classification of descriptions into
path-,line-,figural- and matrix-type
descriptions presented in chapter 6.
Thus, one group of subjects (cluster (6) in table 7-
6) appear to use coordinate- or matrix-type descriptions;
another group of subjects (cluster (5) in table 7-6)
appear to use the mixture of path- and figural
descriptions discussed in chaper 6; a third group of
subjects (cluster (4) in table 7-6) appear to use path
descriptions exclusively; and a further three groups of
subjects (clusters (1), (2) and (3) in table 7-6) appear
to use row-type descriptions exclusively. The row-type
descriptions would not, however, appear to be a unitary
class of descriptions, since the analyses presented in
this chapter distinguish three distinct classes of row
description, the three classes varying in explicitness.
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Overall, the analyses presented in this chapter
entirely confirm the earlier informal classification of
the location descriptions into four broad categories:
line-, matrix-, path- and figural-type descriptions.
The next chapter will be devoted to a further
examination of the four types of description. Firstly,
some hypotheses which were first raised in chapter 6 will
be "tested empirically: in particular, the notion that
matrix-type descriptions involve greater amounts of
hesitating and explicit counting than do the other three
types of description will be subjected to empirical
scrutiny.
The final section of the next chapter will be devoted
to a reconsideration of the four generic description
types. The possibility that they each represent a class
of mental models of the maze shape ('models' of a type
similar to those described by Johnson-Laird (1980, 1981a,
1981b» will be considered and this interpretation of the
data will raise some theoretically interesting issues
which will be taken up again in chapters 10 and 11.
350
· Table 1=1 Clusters arising consistently in different
analyses
(a) Across variation in
measures of similarity/
distance
(b) Across variation in
cluster linkage
(1) TOP (1) rap
ORDER ORDER
ROvl ROH
BOTTOM ( 2) BOTTOM
LEFT (edge) LEFT (edge)
TO EDGE TO EDGE
RIGHT (edge) RIGHT (EDGE)
LINE LINE
(2 ) COORDS ( 3) rANDSIDE
ABCDEF CORNER
(3) COUNT (4 ) COUNT
ALONG UP
UP (ALONG)
DIAGONAL (DIAGONAL)
DOWN (DOWN)
(4 ) SHAPE ( 5) SHAPE
HORIZONTAL HORIZONTAL
MIDDLE (HIDDLE)
MOVE MOVE
NODE (NODE)
lLUm
CLIMB
(START)
( 5) (HANDSIDE (6) LEFT (direction)
CORNER OHNOTHER
(START)
RIGHT (direction)
(6) LEFT (direction) (7) [EXTREt1E
START ROHPCOL
m-lNOTHER
RIGHT (direction)
(8) eOORDS
ABCDEF
(9 ) [( GROUNDFL)
(COLUHN)
N.B. In analysis (a) (left-hand column) groups (1) and (2)
cluster together to form one large cluster in three analyses
out of four. In analysis (b) (right-hand column) those
lexical categories in parentheses group with the others on
two analyses out of three, whilst all others group
together on all three analyses.
Table 1=5 Clusterings of subjects consistently occurring
across different cluster analysesl
(a) Across variation in
measure of similarity or
distance between
variables
(b) Across variation in
cluster linkage
criteria
(1) 10BA,10GA,10BB,10GB,41AA,(1) 10BA,10GA,10BB,10GB,41AA,43AB,
(2) 13AA,17FA,13CA,17DB,13AB,(2) 13AA,17FA,13CA,17DB,13AB,
13CB,31CA,17FB,17DA,18DB,
18FB,18FA,41BB,18DA,31BB,
40AB
(3) 11DA,11DB,41BA,43BB,43AA,(3) 11DA,11DB,41BA,43BB,43AA,
13CB,31CA,17FB,17DA,18DB,
18FB,18FA,41BB,18DA,31BB
43BA,38BA,38BB,43AB 11FB,43BA,38BA,38BB
(4) 15EA,32BA,37AA,27BA,15EB,(4) 15EA,32BA,37AA,27BA,15EB,
39BA,27BB,37AB,37BB,39BB, 39BA,27BB,37AB,37BB,39BB,
37BA 37BA,29BB
(5) 24BB,41AB,29BA,33AA,35BB,(5) 11FA,24BB,41AB,29BA,33AA,
31BA,40BA,40BB,35BA,33AB, 35BB,40BA,33AB,35AB,38AA,
35AB
(6) 20BA,27DA,25BA,28BB,28CB,(6) 20BA,27DA,25BA,28BB,28CB,
27DB,19FA,23BA,20DA,42AA, 27DB,19FA,23BA,20DA,42AA,
26BB,23BB,28CA,44BB,28BA, 26BB,23BB,28CA,44BB,28BA,
44BA,44AA,44AB,25BB,26BA, 44BA,44AA,44AB,25BB,26BA,
42AB,20BB,42BA,20DB,19FB, 42AB,20BB,42BA,20DB,19FB,
42BB 42BB
KEY _ The number refers to a particular dyad; .the first
letter after the number refers to a particular game; the
second letter after the number refers to a particular
individual player (A or B).
Table H Usages of lexical categories Qy sUb,jects in
clusters 1=Q of the cluster analysis of subjects
Grouping of lexical Cluster of
categories subjects
(1) (2) (3) ( 4) (5 ) ( 6)
TOP V ,/ /' ./
V' v v' v(a) ORDER
V V'
..,/
ROW
BOTTOH V &/ ,/'
LEFT V' V c/'
(b) TO EDGE V V'
V V vRIGHT
LINE ./ ,/
(c) [HAHDSIDE V ~
CORNER
(d) ( COORill V
ABCDEF V
COUNT V ./ V V v'
(e) ALONG V / V' vr
UP V V' v'
DIAGONAL
DOWN c/
SHAPE &/
NIDDLE ~
(f) MOVE
NODE
LIMB
Table 1.:Q cont.
Grouping of lexical
categories
Cluster of
subjects
(1) ( 2) (4 )
(g)
LEFT
START v"
OWNOTHER V"
RIGHT
(EXTREME
RO\'IPCOL
(h)
(6)
Ticked lexical categories are those used at least once per
game by each subject within each cluster of subjects.
CHAPTER .a
SEMANTICS, MENTAL t10DELS, AND THE
DESCRIPTION OF HAZE LOCATIONS
£1 Introduction
In the last chapter, the results from three sets of
analyses were presented. These results were interpreted
to formally confirm the earlier informal classification
(see chapter 6) of subjects' descriptions of locations
within mazes into four broad classes: path-type, line-
type, figural-type, and matrix-type descriptions. The
results presented in the last chapter indicate that:
(i) Consistently occurring clusters of lexical
categories are found in several different
cluster analyses, and these clusters comprise
groupings of lexical categories such that the
composition of each cluster is readily
explicable in terms of the above four-fold
typology.
(ii) Consistently occurring clusters of individual
subjects are obtained in several different
cluster analyses.
(iii) The groups of subjects revealed in analysis
(ii) above can be shown to use lexical items
corresponding to the lexical categories
classified in analysis (1) above in a manner
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which is consistent with the four-fold typology
presented above. Thus, for example, one group
of subjects use lexical items corresponding to
several different lexical categories in such a
fashion that only those lexical categories
which correspond to the terms used in path-
type descriptions are in fact used. The
different groups of subjects revealed by
analysis (ii) sample from (that is, use
lexical items corresponding to) the lexical
categories in a highly consistent manner
rather than a random manner, and the manner in
which the different groups of subjects do
sample from the lexical categories is readily
explicable in terms of their using one of the
four types of description listed above (i.e.
either path-, line-, figural-, or matrix-type
descriptions).
The analyses presented in the last chapter thus lend
support to the view that there are four broad categories of
descriptions of locations within mazes, representing four
distinguishably different ways of describing locations
within the maze.
In the present chapter, some further properties of the
four types of location description will be explored.
This empirical exploration will involve the testing of
some hypotheses which were first postulated in chapter 6.
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In short, the hypotheses postulate that matrix-type
location descriptions should be shorter (in terms of the
lengths of the individual utterances which comprise them,
and/or in terms of the number of utterances comprising
each description) and less fluent (in terms of involving a
greater number of pauses, that is, speechless gaps during
the production of a description) than path- and figural-
type descriptions. (The rationale underlying these
hypotheses is stated below). In testing these
hypotheses, a comparatively crude analysis was conducted:
the length of location description was measured in terms
of the average number of words in each utterance and the
average numer of utterances in each description, and the
pauses during speech production were classified in a
binary fashion into hesitations (these being speechless
gaps of less than 1 second duration) and pauses (these
being speechless gaps which lasted longer than 1 second).
Pause lengths were measured to the nearest half second.
The relative imprecision of the 'hesitation' and 'pause'
measures is justified by the fact that no 'microscopic'
hypotheses were being postulated (that is, hypotheses
concerning the relative difficulties of psychological
processing to the level of the individual word in the
different types of description). The hypotheses
postulated were rather more macroscopic in nature
(involving comparison of the different types of
description at the level of the utterance), and for this
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reason, a 'fine-grained' analysis with pauses being
measured in a rather more precise manner than to the
nearest half second was not necessary: the comparatively
crude analysis used was sufficient.
In chapter 6, differences were noted between the
various types of description in terms of the extent to
which the actual configuration of paths within the maze
constrained the description being generated. In
particular, it was suggested that path- and figural-type
descriptions involve the speaker and listener in attending
to the particular configuration of paths present in the
maze, whereas line- and matrix-type descriptions are more
abstract in nature, involving the subjects in ignoring
such features as gaps in the network of pathways in the
maze.
A possible consequence of this would be a difference
in the overall lengths of descriptions generated, with the
more 'abstract' types of description being shorter in terms
of the number of utterances employed in the description, or
in terms of the number of words comprising each utterance.
The reason for this difference would simply be that matrix-
and line-type descriptions (the more 'abstract' types of
description) employ a standard format for all
descriptions, whereas path- and figural-type descriptions
are lengthened because of subjects having to consider the
particular features of the area being described (for
example, having to acknowledge gaps in some of the pathways
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which have to be mentally 'traversed' in the execution of
the scanning procedures corresponding to the description).
The brevity of the standard description formats of the
more 'abstract' types of description reaches its logical
extreme in the two-place coordinates of matrix-type
descriptions. Thus, a reasonable hypothesis would be
that matrix- and line-type descriptions are shorter than
are path- and figural-type descriptions.
It was also argued in chapter 6 that, since matrix-type
descriptions are more abstract and brief, they require more
'work' on the part of both speaker and listener in encoding
and decoding: thus, we hypothesize more pauses
(i.e. periods of time during which speech is absent) during
both the generation and the acknowledgement of understanding
of matrix-type descriptions. For the same reason (that
is, because more cognitive 'work' is hypothesized to be
involved during the generation and comprehension of
matrix-type descriptions) instances of explicit counting
aloud should be more prevalent in the case of matrix-type
descritions as compared to the other three types of
description.
The final section of the present chapter will be
devoted to an exploration of the details of, and some of
the potential consequences of, the hypothesis that the
four different types of description observed in the data
from the maze game studies correspond to four ways of
conceptualizing the maze shape, and are in fact
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manifestations of different mental models of the maze.
This interpretation of the descriptions raises questions
which will be examined in the final three chapters of
this thesis.
Ql A comQarison of the four types of location description
in term~ of their brevity and the relative prevalence
Qf pausing, hesitation and explicit counting in each.
In chapter 6, a broad outline was given in informal
terms of the four basic categories of location description
generated by subjects in the course of playing the maze
game. These were termed the path-, line-, figural- and
matrix-types of description. The actual descriptions
themselves were interpreted in procedural terms; it was
argued that the descriptions constituted a set of tacit
instructions regarding visual scanning operations to be
carried out by the listener. To recapitulate briefly:
(i) Path descriptions involved the subjects
generating a description by means of firstly
identifying a perceptually prominent point in
the maze structure and then describing the
desired location relative to that prominent
pOint in terms of visual scanning movements
along available paths (for example, "from the
bottom left hand corner, I'm one along, one
Up"). The listener is thus tacitly instructed
to firstly find the relevant prominent pOint (in
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this case, the bottom left hand corner of the
maze) and then to 'move' (i.e. visually scan) in
specified directions through specified
distances.
(ii) Figural type descriptions involve the speaker
identifying a particular region of the maze by
means of drawing the listener's attention to a
1-figure or shape within the network of pathways
comprising the maze, and then specifying the
desired location relative to that shape. For
example, "At the top left of the maze there's
an L shape: I'm at the last part of the L,
if you see what I mean". In this description,
the listener is tacitly instructed to look for
a particular configuration of paths; having
found that, his attention is then drawn to a
particular part of the figure, and he is then
told that this is where the speaker's position
marker is located. Again, the description is
readily interpretable in procedural terms.
(iii) Line type descriptions involve the speaker
firstly identifying a particular line of nodes
(a row or a column of nodes) within which the
location being described is located, and then
spec ify Lng a scann ing 'movement' along that
line until the desired location is reached.
For example: "I'm on the third row from the
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bottom, third from the left". The listener is
first directed to find a particular row of
nodes (in this case, the third row of nodes
from the bottom of the maze) and is then
directed to scan along that row a certain
distance from a specified edge (in this
instance, the left-hand edge of the maze).
(iv) Matrix-type descriptions are implicitly
procedural in nature. In this type of
description, both subjects agree upon a coding
system for denoting individual rows and
columns, and the descriptions are given as
two-place coordinates (for example, "A5").
When given such a description, the listener's
task would be to firstly locate the
relevant row and column relative to a
previously agreed-upon origin, and then find the
intersection of the two.
The matrix class of description, like the other broad
classes of description, is not a unitary class; sub-
variations on the basic principle exist. In fact two
different types of matrix-type description can be
distinguished. The first operates in the manner outlined
above (the listener firstly finds the relevant row and the
relevant column, and then seeks their intersection). The
second type of matrix description functions in a similar
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manner to the Cartesian coordinate system of mathematics
in that the two pro~edures corresponding to the two numbers
of a given coordinate description are executed
cont iguous lYe For example, the desc ription "(3, 2)"
would be interpreted in this 'Cartesian' matrix scheme as
follows: first a scanning movement is made in the
horizontal plane through a distance of three nodes from an
agreed-upon starting position (for example, the bottom
left-hand corner of the maze shape). This would result in
the scanner being focussed upon the third node from the
left on the bottom row. Immediately afterwards, a
vertical scanning movement of a distance equivalent to two
nodes (or one path movement) is executed. In this case,
there would be no need to seek the intersection of the
corresponding row and column; contiguous execution of the
two procedures would result in the arrival of the
scanner at the desired node. This is identical to the
manner in which the Cartesian coordinates of mathematics
are used, and is rather like a highly elliptical path-type
description, except, of course, that, as is the case
with all matrix-type descriptions, gaps are 'crossed'
without acknowledgement.
This 'Cartesian' type of matrix system contrasts with
the first-mentioned type inasmuch as the first-mentioned
type involves finding the relevant row relative to the
origin, returning the scanner to focus upon the origin,
finding the relevant column relative to the origo, and,
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having established the relevant column and the relevant
row, their intersection is then sought. That is, the
first-mentioned matrix system involves a return to the
origin when establishing the extension of the second
coordinate, whereas in the 'Cartesian' scheme, the
procedures are executed contiguously, without a return to
the origin when seeking the extension of the second
coordinate, and without the necessity to seek an
intersection of the two axes. As such, the 'Cartesian'
system is simpler.
Thus, like the other classes of location description,
the matrix-type descriptions are not a unitary class.
Having thus examined briefly the characteristics of
each type of location description, several points are
worthy of note.
Firstly, path- and figural-type descriptions are
inherently less abstract than are line- and matrix-type
descriptions. Path- and figural-type descriptions are
constrained by th€ actual configuration of paths in the
maze, whereas line-type descriptions involve treating the
maze shape as if it were an array of parallel lines of
nodes. Gaps within those lines and connections between
the lines are ignored for the purposes of generating
location descriptions. Matrix-type descriptions are even
more abstract and involve treating the maze as a two-
dimensional array of nodes, ignoring the actual
configuration of paths entirely.
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For this reason, we can hypothesize that path- and
figural-type descriptions would be lengthier than line-
and matrix-type descriptions. This would be because
path- and figural-type descriptions are constrained by the
configuration of paths in the maze structure involving the
speaker in, for example, having to acknowledge gaps, or
having to give a complex alternative description rather
than a simple direct one which procedurally 'crosses' a
gap (examples of this are given in chapter 6). Line- and
matrix-type descriptions, on the other hand, have a
'standard format' which can be used regardless of local
constraints in the path structure of the maze.
Secondly, since line-type descriptions abstract the
horizontal (or vertical) parallel lines of the maze
structure and effectively involve ignoring the vertical
(or horizontal) connections between these lines, they are
less abstract than are matrix-type descriptions, which
involve ignoring the configuration of paths in both planes
of orientation and instead involve treating the maze as an
array of nodes. Thus, it can be argued that path- and
figural-type descriptions are the least abstract types of
description and are most constrained by the configuration
of paths in the maze, line-type descriptions are of an
intermediate level of abstraction from the maze structure,
and matrix-type descriptions represent a conceptualization
of the maze that is abstracted from its actual structure
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to the greatest degree.
A further difference exists, it could be argued,
between the matrix-type descriptions and the other three
types of description, and this difference is related to the
abstractness of the matrix descriptions. The difference
is one of what Marslen-Wilson, Tyler and Levy (1982) refer
to as the on-line resolvability of referential devices.
Put more simply, this means that a given referential device
is understandable at the point at which it occurs in the
speech stream.
This is most clearly exemplified by line-type
descriptions. For example, "I'm third row from the
bottom, third from the left". It is possible that
a listener would have time to execute the scanning
procedures implicit in this description ~ the description
is spoken. Thus, as soon as he has heard the first
clause of the description, he could set about finding the
relevant row. Indeed, if he expects a row-type
description, it is possible that he could begin to execute
the row-finding procedure as soon as he hears the phrase
'third row'. Thus, he can interpret the description as he
is actually hearing it. This is, in principle, also
possible for the path- and figural-types of description,
provided that the prominent point from which the path
description commences procedurally, or the 'shape' of the
figural-type description, is stated first in the
description.
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It is argued here that this 'on-line resolvability' is
not possible for the matrix-type descriptions. The
principal reason for this is that the matrix descriptions
are so brief in duration: the entire description could be
spoken before even the first of the procedures corresponding
to the description can be executed. Furthermore, in the
case of the 'QQQ-Cartesian' matrix-type description, that
is, that which does not involve contiguous execution of
the two procedures corresponding to the two coordinates
(see above), a strain is placed upon the listener by the
very nature of this type of description. This is because
he has to find the relevant row relative to an agreed-upon
origin, 'go' back to the origin, find the relevant column
relative to the origin (bearing in'mind which row was the
relevant row) and then seek the intersection of the
relevant row and column. Thus, the listener has to
remember the results returned by the execution of the
procedures corresponding to the earlier parts of the
description whilst he executes the procedures
corresponding to the later part of the description. He has
to keep the description in memory as he executes the
procedures corresponding to it, since the description is
too brief for 'on-line' execution of the procedures. This
is in fact true for both types of matrix description
('Cartesian' and 'non-Cartesian'): the actual verbal
descriptions are too brief to permit the on-line execution
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of the relevant procedures, even if they were to be
executed contiguously.
For this reason, it is hypothesized that associated
with matrix-type descriptions will be a greater number of
pauses (i.e. speechless gaps of more than 1 second's
duration) and more frequently-occurring instances of
explicit counting out (this latter being a verbal
manifestation, it is hypothesized, of the visual scanning
procedures being executed). The pauses, it is
hypothesized, would correspond to a subvocal version of
the explicit counting: the pauses would be periods during
which the procedures corresponding to the description are
being executed by the listener. In the other three types
of description (line-, path-, and figural-types) it is in
principle possible for the listener to execute the
procedures 'on-line', and fewer instances of explicit
counting would be necessary.
Thus, the procedural interpretation of·the meanings of
the location descriptions has testable hypotheses
associated with it. The above hypotheses (that line- and
matrix-type descriptions should be shorter in terms of the
number of utterances in each description and/or the number
of words in each utterance than path- and figural-types,
and that the matrix type of description should be the
least verbally fluent of the four types of description in
terms of their being associated with the highest frequencies
of pausing, hesitating and explicit counting) were tested
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on the data base of those dialogues which had been clearly
identified by the analyses reported in chapter 7 as having
employed path-, line-, figural-, or matrix-type
descriptions predominantly.
The analyses presented in tables 7-5 and 7-6 showed
that six clear groupings of individual subjects
consistently emerged across different cluster analyses of
individual subjects, and of these six groups, three used
line-type descriptions, one used path-type descriptions,
one used figural-type descriptions, and the sixth group
used matrix-type descriptions (see tables 7-5 and 7-6).
Those dialogues in which both interlocutors were
repeatedly grouped together by different cluster analyses
as belonging within a group of subjects which was
identifiable as having used a particular type of
description· were selected for analysis. ThUS, for
example, cluster (1) of subjects in table 7-5 was
comprised of five individuals - 10BA, 10BB, 10GA, 10GB,
and 41AA. These five individuals were grouped together
by both sets of cluster analyses «a) and (b) in table 7-5).
Furthermore, this cluster of subjects was identified (see
table 7-6) as having used line- (specifically, row-) type
descriptions. The descriptions from dialogues 10B and 10G
were selected as exemplars of row-type descriptions, since
both subjects in each game clustered together on the basis of
the descriptions they generated within a cluster of subjects
identifiable as having used row-type descriptions (see
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table 7-6 and section d) of chapter 7). Dialogue 41A, on
the other hand, was not included in the analysis, since
only one of the participants in dialogue 41A (subject A)
had clustered within a group of subjects using row-type
descriptions and dialogue 41A may therefore have been more
heterogeneous with respect to the types of description
used by both subjects than would justify its inclusion
within the group of dialogues identified as comprising
subjects who predominantly used row-type descriptions.
Thus, the earlier analyses were used to aid the
selection of the most prototypical examples of different
description types in different dialogues. On this basis,
a total of 26 dialogues were selected and all location
descriptions spoken by both subjects in these dialogues
were analyzed: both sUbjects in five of the dialogues
used path-type descriptions predominantly, both subjects
in three of the dialogues used figural-type descriptions
predominantly, both subjects in nine of the dialogues used
line-type descriptions predominantly, and both subjects in
nine of the dialogues used matrix-type descriptions
predominantly (see table 8-1, below). In addition, a
further four dialogues were identifiable on this basis as
having involved the predominant use by both subjects of
matrix-type descriptions (dialogues 42A, 42B, 44A and
44B). However, these four games were 'reassignment'
games, which have already been shown (see chapter 5) to
have been significantly more difficult for sUbjects than
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other, otherwise equivalent, types of game. To have
included the above four dialogues among the dialogues
identified as having used matrix-type descriptions could
have resulted in an unfair comparison between dialogues
using matrix-type descriptions and the other dialogues
using the other types of description, _since it is possible
that one manifestation of the greater degree of difficulty
experienced by subjects in the reassignment games could
have been a lesser degree of verbal fluency on the part of
these subjects. This would, if it were the case, have
artificially inflated the mean values of the 'pausing' and
'hesitation' measures (see below) for matrix-type
descriptions. For this reason, the four reassignment games
in which the participants were identified as having both
predominantly used matrix-type descriptions were excluded
form the present set of analyses.
111 Analyses of the lengths of the different types of
description
The first hypothesis to be tested was the question of
whether line- (or, more specifically, row-) type and
matrix-type descriptions were indeed shorter than were
path- and figural-types. Two measures of description
length were taken of ali descriptions in each of the
dialogues identified as cases in which both interlocutors
predominantly used one of the four types of description (see
table 8-1). These measures were:
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1El The number of utterances in each description, starting
from and including the wh-question initiating a location
description (for example, "Vlhere are you now?"), if any,
to the final acknowle.dsement of com prehe ns ion, if any. The
number of utterances comprising each description was averaged
for each dialogue in a class (e.g. for all dialogues using
path-type descriptions, et.c,) and for the class as a
whole;
and iQl The m~ Jength of each utterance within ~
description, in words or word units, including filled
pauses ("uhm" •• , "er •• ") and instances of counting
(each increment to the count being recorded as a separate
word). The mean length of the utterances within a
dialogue's descriptions was obtained for each dialogue
within a class,and these means for each dialogue were
themselves averaged to give a value for the class as a
whole.
The summary statistics of those two measures are shown
in table 8-2:
As can be observed from table 8-2, there are
differences in the predicted direction between path- and
figural-, as opposed to row- and matrix-type descriptions,
such that path- and figural-type descriptions appear to
involve more utterances per description on average (with
mean values of 3.84 and 4.98, respectively) than do row-
and matrix-types of description (with mean values of 2.647
and 2.507, respectively). These.differences were tested
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using Mann-Whitney U tests, and were found to be
'significant: row-descriptions involve significantly fewer
utterances, on average, than do path-type descriptions
(Mann-Hhitney U = 9, n1 = 5, n 2 = 9, p < .05 (1 tail».
Likewise, matrix-type descriptions involve significantly
fewer utterances, on average, than do path-type
descriptions (Mann-1rlhitney U = 8, n, = 5, n2 = 9, p < .05
(, tail», and significantly fewer utterances than
figural-type descriptions (Mann-Whitney U = 1, n, = 3, n2
= 9, p < .01 (1 tail».
The differences between the two sets of description
types (path and figural- as opposed to row- and matrix-
types) were much smaller in the case of the 'mean length
of utterance' measure, and in fact, none of the predicted
differences were significant on this measure. Thus,
matrix-type descriptions were not significantly briefer in
the mean length of the utterances comprising the
descriptions than were path- (Mann-Whitney U = 12, n, = 5,
n2 = 9, NS) or figural-type descriptions (Mann-Whitney U =
12.5, n1 = 3, "z = 9, NS). This latter result may seem
surprising' initially, especially when considered in
relation to,the apparent brevity of the two-place
coordinates which comprise matrix-type descriptions.
However, it should be borne in mind that matrix-type
descriptions are often considerably prolonged by the
explicit counting aloud corresponding to the execution of
scanning procedures (e.g."I'm: A,B,C,D: 1.... ~ 3.: D5") and,
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as a result, are not any shorter than the other types of
description in the final analysis.
Thus, our initial hypotheses that row- and matrix-
type descriptions are more brief than are path- and figural-
types, was confirmed for the 'mean number of utterances
per description' measure, but was not confirmed for the
'mean length of the utterances within a description'
measure. Thus, row- and matrix-type descriptions £Lg
shorter than are path- and figural-type descriptions
insofar as they involve briefer verbal interactions
overall, but are not shorter in terms of the length of
the utterances comprising the descriptions. The mean
number of utterances per description in row- and matrix-type
descriptions, of approximately 2.5 utterances per
description, suggests, perhaps, that a typical description
might take the form 'question-description-acknowledgement'
with the 'question' or the 'acknowledgement' sometimes
being omitted, giving a mean length of descriptions of
around 2.5 utterances. The lengthier path- and figural-
type descriptions (of approximately 4.5 utterances per
description on average) could be lengthier because the
'description' component of the above hypothesized sequence
is split into two utterances (rather than being achieved
in only one utterance as is usually the case with row- and
matrix-type descriptions) with acknowledgement of
understanding in bet~een the two utterances of the
'description' component.
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Whilst this interpretation is speculative in nature,
there are large numbers of descriptions in the data which
do conform to these suggested patterns, which indicates that
this interpretation is not an unreasonable one.
i.i1l Hanifestations of difficulty on the part of the
speaker in the generation of descriptions: an analysis of
pauses, hesitations, explicit counting, and self
corrections in the different types of location description
As noted earlier, the procedural interpretation of
the maze location descriptions has associated with it
certain hypotheses, notably the hypothesis that certain
manifestations of difficulty on the part of the speaker
should be in evidence most frequently in the case of
matrix-type descriptions as compared to the other types of
description. Specifically, it is hypothesized that
pausing (gaps in the speech stream of longer temporal
duration than one second) and instances of explicit
counting should occur most frequently in the case of
matrix-type descriptions as opposed to the other three
types of description, and these manifestations of
difficulty should be Significantly more prevalent in the
case of matrix-type descriptions than is the case with the
other three types of description. Other manifestations
of difficulty on the part of the speaker are also found in
the transcripts, for example, self-corrections, and the
hypothesis is postulated that these latter indicators of
'trouble' should appear equally frequently in the
different types of location description: there would
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see m t0 ben 0 com pe11 ing .E. .12.1:1.21:1 rea son toe xpect self -
corrections to be significantly more prevalent in any of
the four types of location description as opposed to the
others.
To test the above hypotheses, five measures of
evidence of difficulty on the part of speakers were taken
for all of the descriptions in the dialogues representing
usages of the four different description types (see table
8-1) • The measures were:
19l The nYIDber of hesitations QgJ: utterance. A hesitation
is defined as a brief pause in the speech stream of less
than 1 second's duration, and which is therefore too brief to
be timed using a digital watch during transcription of the
tapes of dialogue. The number of such hesitations were
summed for all the descriptions within a given dialogue,
and then averaged across the total number of utterances
in all of the descriptions of that given dialogue.
ill The nYmber of pauses ~ utterance. A pause is
defined as a gap in the speech stream of more than 1
second's duration, and which is therefore able to be timed
during transcription. Pauses were timed to the nearest
half second, and the number pf pauses was summed for all
descriptions within a given dialogue and averaged across
all utterances of the descriptions in that dialogue. (The
introduction section of the present chapter summarizes the
reasons why this relatively crude treatment of time was
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adopted in the present analysis).
i£l The ngmber of filled pauses ~ utterance. A filled
pause is an expression such as 'er' or 'ehm' which is used
to verbally 'fill' a pause. Such non-lexical expressions
did occur sometimes during descriptions. Their
incidences were totalled and averaged across all
utterances comprising all of the descriptions within each
dialogue.
iQl The ngmber of instances Qf counting ~ utterance.
This measure is simply an average, across all utterances
comprising all of the descriptions in a given dialogue, of
the number of instances of explicit counting out (which, of
course, we have hypothesized to correspond to the
execution of scanning procedures).
1Ql The number of self corrections ~ utterance. This
measure is an average of the number of times a speaker
corrected himself or herself during each utterance
involved in generating or acknowledging one's
understanding of a location description. The total number
of such occurrences of self corrections in all of the
utterances in all of the descriptions of a given dialogue
was averaged to yield a value corresponding to the average
number of self corrections per utterance in each dialogue.
An example of such a self-correction would be:
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(27AA) "If I move again I'll be 1:.::1. in the bottom right
hand corner".
The underlined part of the above example is the self
correction: the speaker begins to articulate a word,
stops doing so, and corrects herself by articulating a
rephrased version of what she wishes to say.
The above five measures are all hypothesized to be
evidence of processing difficulty of some sort on the part
of the speaker: all involve breaks in the fluency of the
speech being produced, and this could reflect some
processing difficulty which the speaker is experiencing.
The five measures were computed for all of the
descriptions in all of the dialogues representing uses of
the different types of description (see table B-1). The
result is tabulated below (see table B-3).
Significant differences between matrix-type
descriptions and the other three types of description were
hypotheSized on the 'counting' and 'number of pauses'
measures, but not on the 'hesitations', 'self corrections'
or 'number of filled pauses' measures. (The reason that
significant differences are hypothesized to exist between
matrix- and the other three types of description on the
'pauses' measure but QQ1 on the 'hesitations' measure is
that only pauses (that is, gaps in the speech stream of
longer duration than one second) are sufficiently long to
allow the hypothesized subvocal counting out corresponding
to the scanning procedures implicit in matrix-type
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descriptions to take place).
Examining the respective scores of the dialogues
representing the different types of description on the
three measures on which no significant differences are
hypothesized (the sItat tcns", 'self corrections' and
'filled pauses') first, the uniformity of the mean scores
of all four description types on the 'self corrections'
and 'filled pauses' measures is noticeable. Indeed, no
significant differences were found between matrix- and the
other three types of description on these two measures.
On the 'mean number of hesitations per utterance' measure,
there is again a uniformity in the mean scores of three of
the description types, the exception to this uniformity
being the score for the row-type descriptions, with a
value on this measure (0.37 hesitations per utterance)
which is considerably lower than those pf the other three
types of description (which are 0.871 hesitations per
utterance for the path-type descriptions, 0.784
hesitations per utterance for the figural-type
descriptions, and 0.7057 for the matrix-type
desc riptions). Matrix-type descriptions proved to
involve significantly more hesitations per utterance than
did the row-type descriptions (Mann-Whitney U = 14, n, =
9, n2 = 9, p < .02 (2 tail». Hatrix-type descriptions
did not, however, involve a significantly different
number of hesitations per utterance than did path- or
figural-type descriptions.
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This is a slightly surprising set of results, which
might suggest that row-type descriptions are spoken with a
greater degree of fluency (as far as the number of
hesitations in the flow of speech goes) than is the case
with the other three types of location description. This
apparently greater fluency of speech in the case of row-
type descriptions was also evident in the case of the
scores on the two measures of interest (i.e. those on
which differences between different types of descrip~ion
had been hypothesized, namely, the number of pauses per
utterance and the number of instances of explicit counting
per utterance).' ,. Cl, '.
On those two measures of greatest interest in the
present context (rpaus ing' and 'counting'), the mean value for
the matrix-type descriptions as compared to those of the
other three types of description were as predicted:
matrix-type descriptions showed the highest rate of
pausing per utterance (with a mean rate of pausing per
utterance of 0.253 as opposed to 0.019,0.15 and 0.19 in
the case of the other three types of description) and the
highest mean number of instances of counting per utterance
(0.099 as opposed to 0.012,0.026, and 0.032 in the case
of the other three types of description). Conversely, as
was the case with the,'number of hesitations per
utterance' measure, row-type descriptions involved the
lowest 'difficulty' scores, 0.019 pauses per utterance on
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,average, and 0.012 instances of counting per utterance on
average. The low scores ass~ciated with row-type
descriptions on these two measures again pOints to row-
type descriptions being associated with greater verbal
fluency than is the case with the other three types of
description.
Turning to statistical comparisons on these two
measures, the matrix-type descriptions involve
significantly more frequent rates of pausing than do row-
descriptions (Mann-VJhitney U = 1, n, = 9, "a = 9, p < .001
(1 tail». However, although the mean values on the
'number of pauses per utterance on average' measure lie in
the correct directions, matrix-type descriptions are not
significantly different from path-type (Mann-Whitney U =
14, n, = 5, n2 = 9, NS) or figural-type (Mann-Whitney U =
8, n, = 3, n2 = 9, NS) descriptions on this measure.
Thus, the overall result is that whilst the mean values on
the 'number of pauses per utterance' measure were as
predicted, the matrix-type descriptions did not involve
significantly more pausing per utterance on average than
did path- or figural-type descriptions. They were found,
however, to involve a significantly higher rate of pausing
than the 'row'type r of descriptions.
On the measure 'the number of instances of explicit
counting per utterance', again, the mean values lay in the
direction predicted, with the matrix-type descriptions
involving a rate of counting out three times as high as
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was the case with any of the other three types.
When statistical comparisons are drawn between
matrix-type descriptions and the other three types of
description on the 'number of instances of explicit
counting' measure, the results substantially confirm the
\hypothesis. Thus, matrix-type descriptions involve a
significantly greater prevalence of explicit counting
than do path-type descriptions (Mann-Whitney U = 7.5, n, =
5, "a = 9, p < .05 (1 tail» and row-type descriptions
(Mann-v.lhitney U = 5, n, = 9, "z = 9, p < .001 (1 tail».
In the comparison between matrix- and figural-type·
descriptions on this measure, the result approaches but
does not quite reach significance at the .05 level (Mann-
Whitney U = 4, n1 = 3, n2 = 9, NS, required U = 3). The
small number of figural transcripts involved in this
comparison may have been problematic here.
Overall, our hypotheses regarding the greater
prevalence of pausing in matrix-type descriptions as
compared to the other three types of description was not
confirmed; the only significant difference obtained was
in the comparison between matrix- and row-type
descriptions. The hypothesis that matrix-type
descriptions should involve more frequent instances of
explicit counting than the other three types of
description was confirmed for the comparison between
matrix- and row-type descriptions, and it was also
confirmed for the comparison between matrix- and path-
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)type descriptions. It was not confirmed, however, for
the comparison between matrix- and figural-type
descriptions. The partial confirmation of these
hypotheses despite the small data base involved suggests
that the hypotheses were not unreasonable and would merit
further investigation on a larger scale.
The unexpected difference which these studies suggest
is the apparently greater fluency associated with row-type
descriptions as compared to the other three types of
description. This fluency was manifested in the form of
lower rates of hesitating, pausing, and the explicit
counting out of procedures. The explanation for the
apparently superior fluency of row-type descriptions would
most probably be quite complicated and involve a number of
factors; however, one possibility which might have an
influence and which has been discussed before is the level
of abstraction from the actual details of the stimulus
which the row-type descriptions represent. Earlier in
the present chapter, it was argued that matrix-type
descriptions were most 'abstract' in the sense that they
involve the ignoring of all of the structural features of
the maze shape. Indeed, it was their abstractness and
brevity which led to the proposal of the hypotheses that
greater amounts of pausing and counting should accompany
the ir use.
On the other hand,path- and figural-type descriptions
are highly constrained by the actual shape of the maze
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stimulus, and this lack of abstraction could be a source
of difficulty for subjects - the problems posed by gaps in
the path structure of the maze have already been ,noted.
The choice of figures with which to metaphorically
describe parts of the maze structure could also present
problems for speakers, since a large variety of shapes are
interlocked in the network of the maze paths (T shapes, L
shapes, upside-down F shapes, rectangles, squares and so
on: see, for example, the diagram of the asymmetrical
maze in appendix I ), and this decision could conceivably
interfere with the fluency of a speaker's discourse as he
generates it.
The row-type descriptions, on the other hand,
constitute a medium level of abstraction. They present a
readily-applicable description format which is neither too
brief nor too abstract and does not involve the subject
in awkward decisions about the best choice of description
to make. It is a ready-made descriptive framework which
is, in principle, resolvable 'on-line', as noted earier.
Whilst this explanation is speculative, it could well
be partly true, and would fit the observed data: whilst
matrix-type descriptions involve the operation of abstract
procedures which are encoded in a very brief verbal
format, path- and figural-type descriptions (particularly,
figural-type descriptions) could result .in the OPPOSite
problem arising i.e. that of of not abstracting enough
from the particularities of the maze being described.
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Row-type descriptions, on the other hand, suffer fom
neither of these problems and it could be partly for this
reason that row-type descriptions are associated with a
greater degree of verbal fluency than are the other three
types of description.
In the next section,we go on to a more general
discussion of the semantics of the location descriptions.
£1 Mental models and the description of maze locations
When characterizing the four different types of
location description (path-, line- figural- and matrix-
types: see chapter 6), it was briefly mentioned that
these four different ways of describing the maze could
reflect four distinguishably different ways of
conceptualizing the complex stimulus of the maze shape.
In particular, it is suggested in the present
interpretation of the data that the four different types
of location description which have been discussed in this
thesis are associated with different underlying types of
mental model of the maze shape (cf. Johnson-Laird, 1980,
1981a, 1981b; see chapter 2 of the present volume).
Thus, for example, a set of descriptions generated by a
subject which are all of the 'row' type could reflect his
underlying mental model of the maze shape which takes the
form of a series of -pe raLLeI , '..
horizontal rows; he has paid attention to the horizontal
lines formed by those pathways in the maze which run
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horizontally from left to right, treated them as
prototypical features of the maze shape, and built a model
accordingly.
The present section of this chapter will explore the
possible consequences, both theoretical and empirical, of
interpreting the maze location descriptions in this
fashion.
Firstly, it is worth briefly recapitulating the most
important features of mental models as Johnson-Laird (1980,
1981a, 1981b) conceives of them. The most important point
about the structure of a mental model is that it mirrors
that of whatever is being described. Thus, one may build
a mental model of the room one is reading about in a novel.
Any description of such a spatial layout is liable to be
radically indeterminate, i.e. an infinity of mental models
could be built which would satisfy the described layout.
Mental models embody arbitrary assumptions built in by the
thinker, and this does not matter provided that the
important structural properties of the room are mirrored
in the model. Thus, to some extent, a particular model
constructed on the basis of a given piece of discourse is
arbitrary in nature. Different listeners construct
different models on the basis of the sarm piece of
discourse; this is possible because of the radical
indeterminateness of any given description of (e.g.) a
spatial layout. These different models would all share
the property of mirroring the structure of what is being
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described (yet they could all be different from one
another). It is important that the model that the listener
builds on the basis of the discourse he hears does mirror
the structure of what is being described.
Secondly, mental models are intermediate between
language and the world. Linguistic input results in
change in a mental model, and need not necessarily result
in changed behaviour in the listener. The mental model
account of semantics thus dissociates the understanding of
an utterance from the taking of action by the listener in
response to the linguistic input.
Johnson-Laird concentrates his attention on the
modelling by a listener or reader of a visually absent
stimulus which is being described. He does, however,
point out that models can be built of stimuli which are
present in the model-builder's visual field at the time he
is building the model. In such a case, attention is paid
to particular features of the stimulus, these are treated
as prototypical, and an idealized model is built, which is
in fact an assemblage comprising a number of these
prototypical features. For example, the hypothetical
interlocutor discussed above who builds a row-type mental
model of the maze does so by paying attention to the
horizontal lines formed by the maze pathways which run in
the hori zontal plane, treating this 'horizonta 1 line'
feature as being prototypical, and the resulting mental
model has as its basis six parallel horizontal lines.
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This model would, like those discussed by Johnson-
Laird, provide semantic interpretations of linguistic
input. Thus, if given the following description
"I'm third row from the bottom, second from the left",
our hypothetical interlocutor would conceptually 'mark'
(in some way) a particular location within his mental
model. The 'marked' model representation would be used as
the basis for conducting visual scanning operations on the
actual stimulus, for example, if the listener were asked
the following further question by the speaker who had just
generated the above description:
"Are there any Ss" (switch nodes) "on your screen near me?"
Similarly, if he were asked to describe the location
of his own position marker on the maze, our hypothetical
subject would consult both the maze stimulus on the screen
and his mental model of it, since his mental model
embodies the semantics for generating, as well as
interpreting, descriptions.
As can readily be appreciated from the above
discussion, mental models are intermediate between
language and the world in a very real sense; the
understanding of an input utterance results in a change to
the model, and a request to generate a description results
in consultation of the model as well as
the actual physically-present visual stimulus. The
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structure of the model would assist the speaker in the
generation of location descriptions, since it would
constitute a framework with respect to which descriptions
could be couched (e.g. the rows of the row-type model
providing a framework in relation to which descriptions
could be couched). This point will be explored more fully
in chapter 11.
An interesting case study which relates, in some
respects, to the present interpretation of the maze
location descriptions as reflecting different types of
underlying mental model of the maze was conducted by
Pailhous (1984). Pailhous studied the mental models of
the spatial topography of the city which taxi drivers build
and use to assist them in planning journeys. Pailhous
examined a) the ~ by Parisian taxi drivers of their
mental models of the city in order to plan journeys, b) the
relation between freehand maps drawn by the taxi drivers
and professionally constructed maps of the city which
faithfully represented the spatial interrelations between
streets, etc.; and c) how the taxi drivers build YQ a
mental model of a town in which they had not travelled
before.
Both the analysis of journeys (in which taxi drivers
were set spatial problems in the form of getting to
various destinations without resorting to the aid of a map)
and the comparison of the maps drawn by the taxi drivers
with the professionally-constructed maps pointed to the
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existence of two components in the drivers' mental models,
these being termed the Qrim~ net~ork and the secondary
net~ork. The primary network involves the faithful
representation of localities with respect to their true
geographic position and spatial interrelationships with one
another, and when using the primary network to plan a journey,
the driver would use an algorithmic procedure to assist
him in attaining his goal, the algorithm involved being
that he take a route which makes the minimal angle with the
destination. The secondary network is represented with
considerable geographic distortion, is indexed to the
primary network by the relation of proximity, and is
associated with the use of a heuristic rule (namely, the
regaining of the primary network) when being used to plan
journey s, The heuristic procedure associated with the
secondary network is not always effective; it increases
the distance to be covered and the mistakes made increase
with the distance of the point of departure from the
primary network.
Similarly, when building his mental model of the
spatial layout of a town in which he has not driven
before, the driver firstly builds up a primary network and
then indexes points to the crossroads and pathways of the
primary network, and these localities form the secondary
network.
Clearly, although Pailhous writes of 'images', he is
describing the building and use by subjects of a species
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of mental model of the topography of a city. Associated
with these models are procedures (heuristics and
algorithms) which assist the planning of a journey •. This
is comparable in some ways to the subjects in the maze
game studies modelling the maze and using the resulting
model and its associated procedures to assist in the
generation and comprehension of location descriptions.
Pailhous's work serves to emphasize again the variety
of types of mental model and the variety of uses to which mental
models can be put.
The present interpretation of the location descriptions
generated by subjects in the course of playing the maze game
(that is, as reflecting four different underlying types of
mental model of the maze) suggests that the four different
underlying models would involve different semantic
interpretations being assigned to a given location
description. Indeed, one could envisage situations in
which, if two subjects engaged in playing the maze game were
simultaneously entertaining radically different mental
models of the maze shape, then a location description
generated by one subject (for example, a location
description of the matrix type) could entirely fail to be
interpreted by the other player (who might, for example, be
currently entertaining a figural-type model of the maze).
It would thus be of importance that both interlocutors
should entertain similar types of model for even partial
understanding (or indeed, misunderstanding) to occur. As
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such, one could hypothesize that there would be some tacit
pressure exerted by both subjects on one another to model
the stimulus in similar ways in order for successful
location description generation and comprehension to
occur.
ThUS, aIthough the choice of one type of mental model
of the maze rather than another is to some extent
arbitrary, as are the precise structural details of a
given individual's mental model, it is important that both
participants in a dialogue entertain models which are
similar to the extent that they return similar semantic
interpretations for a given expression.
The advantages of the use of mental models in the maze
game situation would be considerable. Provided that both
partiCipants in a dialogue entertained mental models of a
similar type, which returned identical semantic
interpretations for terms like 'row' and count values, the
task of description generation and interpretation would be
greatly simplified. One need only attend"to those
features of the maze which are modelled (for example, the
arrays of nodes if one is currently entertaining a matrix-
type moder) and could readily ignore the other features of
the maze structure (such as gaps in the network of
pathways, figures formed by the particular spatial
configurations of some of the pathways, and so on) for all
practical purposes.
Interestingly, the present conception of a mental
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model resembles the 'models' of model-theoretic semantics
in its functional aspects: that is, the 'model' as
conceived of here functions as a semantic system with
respect to which particular expressions are interpreted.
The common model entertained by both participants in a
dialogue is, from this perspective, a tacit agreement as
to the extensional semantics of particular expressions
(for example, that 'three along' refers to the third node
position in the horizonal plane, counting from the left:
cf. 'model structure lexical rules' in the extensional
metalanguage of model-theoretic semantics).
The present experimental maze game task differs from
the experimental 'communication conflict' task used by
Blakar and his colleagues (see chapter 4) in one very
important respect: in the present maze game task, both
interlocutors are trying to build a common mental model of
the sam~ stimulus, whereas in the 'communication conflict'
task the two subjects are developing models of different
stimuli (the stimuli are different in that one of the maps
has an extra street). In the maze game task, there is a
possibility that the two individuals playing the game
might(initially at least) build different mental models of
the maze; however, such,a difference would be a
systematic difference (the subjects employing different
designations for the same referents). This is the type
of difference to which a solution could readily be
negotiated; the subjects are modelling the same referent
389
and their task would be one of arriving at a 'common
language' with which to describe that same referent. The
subjects would have to change, as it were, the 'rules of
designation', (for example, agreeing that count values had
as their extension node positions ordered from left to
right rather than path movements ordered from left to
right). In this case, a general rule is being changed. In
Blakar's 'communication conflict' task, on the other hand,
the two subjects suffer from the problem that their
respective stimuli (and hence, their respective models)
differ in a QQll-systematic way, and it would be extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to develop a common model
associated with which there is a 'common language' when
the two stimuli being modelled by the two individuals
differ in a non-systematic way. There 1s no general rule
that could be changed which would help these subjects
develop a common model. Hence the difficulty of the
'communication conflict' task for subjects.
The intepretation of the maze location description
data in term s 0 f men tal mod e1 s' oft hem aze shap e, w hichi s
an essentially mentalist position, can be contrasted with
what could be termed a 'behaviourist' approach to the
location description data. The radical behaviourist
would not entertain the theoretical concept of a 'mental
model'; for him, such a concept would be redundant. He
would prefer instead to think of the procedures
corresponding to the location descriptions as being
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executed directly on the actual visual stimulus on the
computer terminal screen, without any intermediate
'modelling' stage taking place.
A corollary of the 'behaviourist' approach would be,
however, the notion that the most convenient description
to generate at any point in time would be that which is
most consonant with the location being described on the
stimulus. Thus, figural-type descriptions would be used
when one was describing a location which was part of an
obvious shape in the maze structure, row-type descriptions
would be generated when one described a location on the
bottom or top horizontal lines of one of the symmetrical
mazes, and so on. That is, if the 'behaviourist' account
were accurate, there would be no compelling reason for
subjects to use one type of description with great
consistency, and there would certainly be no reason for
subjects to use matrix-type descriptions when describing
locations on an asymmetrical maze, in which many of the
locations implicit in a matrix-type coordinate system of
notation are entirely absent.
Thus, two corollaries which follow from the 'mental
models' account but which do not necessari~ follow from
the 'behaviourist' account are a) that both interlocutors
should entertain the same, or very similar, models and
hence generate similar descriptions, and b) that the
interlocutors should generate descriptions which are
consonant with their mental model rather than those which
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are consonant with local features of the area being
described.
If we accept, for the moment, that the four types of
-location descriptions do ,reflect different underlying
mental models of the maze shape, the question naturally
arises as to how the two subjects within a dyad playing
the maze game come to share very similar mental models.
By means of what mechanisms is such commonality achieved?
This question will be explored further in chapter 10.
In chapter 11, the whole question of mental models of
the maze will be examined again in more detail. In the
next chapter, an experiment will be described in which an
attempt was made to ascertain whether the four classes of
location description could be replicated in an experimental
situation in which subjects described locations on mazes,
but independent of playing the maze game.
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Type of Description
Path Figural Line Ha t r t x
Cluster of subjects
using description
(see also Table 7-5) (4) (5) (1),(2),(3) (6)
37B 35B 10B 19F
37A 33A 10G 20B
27B LIOB 13A 20D
Dialogues 39B 13C 238
15E 17F 26B
17G 27B
18F 27D
18D 28B
31C 28C
Table ~ Dialogues identifiable as involving the Qse of
path~ fisural~ matrix~ and line (particularly. £Q~=1YQg descriptions. In these games, both interlocuturs
were identified as having consistently used the same type of
desc rLpt i on, N.B.: Reassignment games were exc1uded from
the above classification of games (see text).
No. of utterances t~eanlength of
in the descriptions each utterance
in the descriptions
(in wor'ds)
Type of - -Description X S.D. X S.D.
Path (N=5) 3.837 0.841 6.514 0.714
Figural (N=3) 4.985 0.906 5.859 0.447
Row* (N=9) 2.647 0.58 6.404 0.834
Matrix (N=9) 2.507 0.654 5.858 0.918
Table a:~ Summgry statistics Qll lengths of descrigtionslin utterances) and lengths of utterances i1n words) in
each of the four types of description
*Footnote: All line-type descriptions within this
category were in fact row-type descriptions, and hence
they will be described as 'row-type' in the subsequent
discussion.
No. of No. of No. ofType of Hesitations Pauses filled pausesDescription per Utterance per utterance per Utterance
- - -X S.D. X S.D. X S.D.
Path. (N=5) 0.871 0.191 0.1919 0.125 0.109 0.041
Figural (N=3) 0.7839 0.2415 0.1524 0.073 0.068 0.034
Row ( N=9) 0.372 0.2195 0.019 0.033 0.09 0.026
Hatrix (N=9) 0.7057 0.226 0.253 0.123 0.099 0.061
Type of
Description
No. of
Instances of
Explicit
Counting per
utterance
No. of
Self
Corrections
per
Utterance
x -S.D. X S.D.
Path (N=5) 0.0032 0.0197 0.166 0.071
Figural (N=3 ) 0.026 0.019 0.154 0.1049
Row (N=9) 0.012 0.019 0.15 0.0408
t·1atrix (N=9) 0.099 0.066 0.1183 0.0504
Table ~ SumID~£Y statistics Qn five indicators of
difficulty Qn ~ part of speakers in the four different
types of location description
THE HAZE-GAHE INDEPENDENT LOCATION
DESCRIPTION TASK
.§.l Introduction
In the last three chapters, the nature of subjects~
descriptions of maze locations generated during the course
of playing the maze game task were discussed. The broad
conclusion of both the informal and the formal analyses
presented in chapters 6, 7 and 8 was that subjects'
location description strategies could be grouped into four
classes, which have been named the path-, line-, figural-
and matrix classes of location description. In chapter
8, some analyses were presented which illustrated the
differing properties exhibited by the four classes of
description, and some speculations were advanced as to the
wider significance of the different classes of description
(specifically, that they may reflect four distinguishably
different ways of conceptualizing, or mentally modelling,
the maze shape).
It was decided to attempt to replicate the above
result (i.e. that there exist four classes of location
description) in an experiment in which subjects had to
describe locations within mazes QQ1 independent of playing
the m~ ggm~. If the above four-fold typology of
descriptions were to emerge again in the results from a
study which did not involve the subjects playing the maze
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game, this would support the view that the observed
structuring in the data is better explained in terms of
the semantics of describing stimuli of the sort used in
both studies (i.e. maze shapes) than in terms of the
structu ringin the datab e i ng a. speci {;'c o(,,(nQrtte. Qf the.
.9~. wt.
An experiment was therefore designed in which
subjects described locations within mazes which were
*presented to them in the form of photocopied diagrams
of the maze shapes (similar in nature to the illustrations
used in the present thesis). The experiment involved
three conditions, of which results from the first two
conditions will be discussed in the present chapter. The
results from the third condition will be discussed in
chapter 10. The three conditions were as follows:
11 Interactive condition. In this condition, a pair of
subjects had to describe locations within mazes
alternately to one another. Five mazes were involved and
eight locations required to be described in each maze.
The procedure involved was as follows: first, subject A
successively described the eight locations in maze 1 to
subject B, then subject B successively described the eight
locations in maze 2 to subject A, and so on in alternating
* Hence the subsequent references in this chapter to this
experiment as 'the paper-and-pencil experiment'.
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fashion.
ii) Non-interactive condition. In this condition, the
same five mazes with eight locations in each had to be
described, but in this case one subject exclusively
described all of the locations on all of the mazes, whilst
the other subject acted as listener throughout.
iii) Monolor,ue condition. In this condition, one subject
at a time described all locations on all five mazes but
without a listener being present.
The three conditions allow differing degrees of
interaction between the subjects. In condition 1),
both subjects were involved in describing locations to one
another. In condition ii), only one of the subjects
generated descriptions, but (as was the case in condition
i» the listener was allowed to ask questions of the
speaker if he failed to understand the description
generated. In condition iii), of course, no listener was
present at all.
The stimuli involved were drawings of two of the maze
shapes used in the maze game studies (one symmetrical and
one asymmetrical), and three other maze shapes ~hich had
been specially-constructed for the experiment. These
latte~ employed similar principles in their construction as
did the mazes used in the game task (consisting of arrays
of nodes connected by paths), but exhibiting certain
deliberately manipulated features (notably, the distance
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between adjacent nodes was not uniform in the case of two
of these mazes, and diagonally-oriented paths were
included in the third maze: see Appendix V). These
features were manipulated in an attempt to ascertain
whether they had any effect upon the nature of the
location descriptions generated~
The listener's task was to place a mark for each
location (1 - 8 or x, - X8) described by the speaker on
a blank diagram of the maze in which the locations were being
described. Listener and speaker were located in the same
room but with a screen placed between them to prevent the
possibility of eye contact and non-verbal communication
between subjects taking place. This helped to ensure
that the maze game and the 'paper-and-pencil' experiment
were comparable with respect to this possibility, since
eyecontact and non-verbal communication were not possible
in the maze game (the subjects being located in separate
soundproofed booths).
The present experiment aimed to replicate the results
noted earlier (i.e. to replicate the four description
types found in the maze game studies). Subjects'
descriptions were analyzed using the same thirty-eight
lexical categories as had been used to describe the raw
data of the maze game experiments (the thirty-eight
lexical category classification was designed to be able to
des cri bed ata fro m QQ1h set S 0 f stu die san d was in fact a
modified version of an earlier twenty-seven lexical
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category classification which had been used on the maze
game data but which would not have adequately described
the data from the 'paper-and-pencil' study because of the
unusual features of the mazes employed in this study).
The use of the same descriptive classification for both
maze game and 'paper-and-pencil' experimental data ensured
comparability of the two analyses.
As was the case with the maze game, the described
data from condition i) and ii) of the present study were
subjected to hierarchical cluster analyses in order to
ascertain which groupings of lexical categories would
emerge. It was hypothesized that similar clusters of
lexical categories would emerge as had emerged from the
maze game data - in short, it was expected that the
familiar path-, line-, figural- and matrix-type location
descriptions would be replicated.
!U Method
1.1 Subjects
The subjects were recruited from the same pool of
first year undergraduate psychology students as had been
involved in the maze game studies. Subjects were
selected and assigned to same-sex pairs, and were paid
£1.00 each for participating in the study. Sixteen
pairs of subjects were involved, four pairs of males and
four pairs of females participating in each of conditions
i) and ii), and eight single subjects (four males and four
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females) were involved in the monologue study.
iil Apparatus and Stimuli
The apparatus used in the present experiment was the
same TEAC A-3340 four-channel tape-recorder which was used
in the maze game studies. Two recording channels were
used, one channel for recording the speech of each
subject. Subjects were seated side by side in the same
room but with a wooden screen placed between them to
prevent eye contact. The stimuli took the form of forty
photocopied diagrams of maze shapes kept in a ring-binder
folder. Each subject described maze locations in blocks
of eight descriptions of different locations on the same
maze. One such maze location was depicted on each page
of the folder containing the stimuli. The listener had a
similar ring-binder folder containing diagrams of the
mazes in which locations were being described by the
speaker but on which none of the locations was marked in
any way. The listener's task was to place appropriate
marks (1 - 8 or X1 - X8) in the locations in his blank
maze which corresponded to the speaker's eight
descriptions.
iiil Design and Procedure
As noted earlier, the design was a complex one,
involving 5 stimuli in each of three conditions. The
interactive condition (in which both participants were
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involved in describing locations) and the non-interactive
condition (in which only one participant was involved in
describing locations) were both analyzed together in the
present analyses. The sequence of mazes being described
was altered for each pair of subjects in order to
counterbalance the possible effects of order on the way in
which locations were described.
In the interactive condition, the two subjects
alternately described blocks of eight locations on a
given maze, as follows:
Subject Maze 1 Maze 2 Maze 3 Maze 4 Maze 5
A describes listens describes listens describes
B listens describes listens describes listens
In the non-interactive condition, one subject
(subject A) described blocks of eight locations on each
of the five mazes.
In both of these conditions, listeners were allowed
to ask questions of the speaker in the event of failure to
understand a description.
All speakers (including those in the monologue study)
were instructed to generate descriptions which were
precise enough to permit a listener to uniquely identify a
given location solely on the basis of the speaker's
description of it. All speakers were aware that their
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listener had an identical, but blank, maze on which to
mark the relevant locations.
The procedure was as follows. Subject A (for
example) had a folder containing eight diagrams of a maze
shape, on each of which was marked a different location.
Subject B, correspondingly, had one diagram of the same
maze shape on which none of the locations was marked in
any way. Subject A's task was to describe the locations
in succession in enough detail to enable subject B to find
the relevant locations unambiguously. In the interactive
condition, the speaker/listener roles would switch from
maze to maze, whereas in the non-interactive condition the
same speaker described all locations on all five mazes.
Each dyad thus generated a total of forty descriptions,
which were themselves described in terms of the same
thirty-eight lexical categories as had been employed to
describe the location descriptions in the maze game
studies (see chapter 6). The classificatory technique of
using hierarchical cluster analyses of differing types and
ascertaining which groupings of lexical categories
consistently occur across different analyses was again
employed. The results are discussed below.
Ql Results
11 The cluster analysis of lexical categories
A casual inspection of the raw data reveals
two striking features, namely:
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a) Path-type descriptions predominate in frequency of
occurrence as opposed to other types of description.
This is in contrast to the data obtained in the maze game,
in which matrix- and line-type descriptions predominated
(compare the numbers of subjects in clusters 6, 1, 2 and 3
as opposed to the number in cluster 4 in the cluster
analysis of subjects in the maze game data (see table 7-
5). Clusters 6, 1, 2, and 3 of subjects are comprised of
those subjects using matrix- and line-type descriptions,
whereas cluster 4 is the group of subjects who use path-
type descriptions. Matrix- and line-type descriptions
clearly predominate in the maze game data).
b) Matrix-type descriptions ~ entirely absent from
the data of the present experiment. No subjects used
matrix descriptions at all. A small number,however,
used the related strategy of generating descriptions in
terms of specifying QQ1h row and column, for example:
"The sixth: X: is on the sixth: row: third column:"
(4.5S.)
This method of describing locations is similar in
principle to the coordinate systems employed by some of
the subjects in the maze game studies, but is rather less
elliptical in nature.
The apparent prevalence of path-type descriptions and
the absence of matrix-type descriptions in the present
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experiment contrasts strongly with the results from the
maze game studies (see chapter 7).
The actual path- and row-type descriptions generated
in the present experiment are similar in nature to those
generated by subjects during the course of playing the
maze game. For example, a typical path-type description
generated in the experiment is:
"Ehm:start at the bottom left-hand corner of the page: (2
s) er: move up two boxes: (1.5 s) turn right: and its the:
..,. ~'
(2 s) third box:·,(4·s)'."
The principle behind this path-type description is
identical to that behind the path descriptions generated
during the course of playing the maze game (see chapter 6)
_ a prominent point in the maze structure is identified,
and a location description is generated by describing the
location in question relative to the prominent point in
terms of path movements from the prominent point to the
location in question.
Interestingly, the presence of unusual features in
some of the mazes (namely,. irregular node spac ings and
diagonally-oriented pathways) did not prevent locations
within these mazes being described using the classic path
description format. Indeed, there were cases where, for
example, path-type descriptions were generated which
involved scanning along such unusual diagonal pathways.
For example (see figure 9.1 for an illustration of the
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Figure 9-1. The location described by a subject in
the, 'paper-and-pencil' experiment as "The top: right.
• • • across diagonally downwards ••• towards the left
• • • straight along towards the left the: .cross is
in there".
location being described):
A ehm: the top:right.
B O.K.
A Across diagonally: downwards
BRight
A Towards the left: along: ehm: straight along
towards the left the: cross is in there:
Thus, a path-description was employed in this
instance which involved mentally 'traversing' a diagonal
path. These unusual features did not, therefore,
preclude the use of the same principles for generating
path-type maze location descriptions as were used by
subjects in the maze games.
Likewise, the row-type descriptions generated by
subjects in the present experiment are identical
in principle with those used by some subjects in the maze
game. For example:
"Third row down: (1 s) second from the left (3 sec)".
The same principle of firstly identifying a row and
subsequently identifying a location within that row is also
employed by the subjects who use row-type descriptions in
the maze game.
A small number of figural-type descriptions were also
generated by subjects in the present experiment. As was
the case with the maze game data, however, the Occurrence
~03
of figural-type descriptions in the present experiment was
infrequent in nature.
Thus, a casual inspection of the transcripts of
dialogues generated in the experiment suggests that three
of the four description types noted in chapter 6 have been
replicated: path-, row-, and a few figural-type
descriptions were generated by subjects in this 'paper-
and-pencil' experiment. Matrix-type descriptions were
absent from the data of the experiment, although the
related strategy of generating descriptions couched in
terms of stating both the row and the column of nodes
whose intersection yields the relevant location was noted
to occur (albeit infrequently).
The unusual features of some of the mazes in the
'paper-and-pencil' experiment (irregular node spacings and
diagonally-oriented pathways) thus did not appear to
greatly affect the semantics of the descriptions
generated.
The raw data generated in the 'paper-and-pencil'
experiment were subjected to the same analyses as were the
data from the maze game studies: the descriptions were
themselves described in terms of the same thirty-eight
lexical categories, and the resulting data matrix was
cluster analyzed (several cluster analyses being
conducted, manipulating both the measure of similarity on
which the clustering was based and the clustering
criteria, comparisons of the results from which yielded
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groupings of lexical categories which repeatedly clustered
together across different analyses). The results
obtained after cluster comparisons were conducted on the
results from the two sets of cluster analyses (across
variation in the measure of similarity on which clustering
is based and across variation in clustering criteria) are
presented in table 9-1 (overleaf).
As was the case with the results from the maze game
data analyses, the two sets of cluster analyses of lexical
categories in the present experimental data show a
considerable degree of similarity to one another,
suggesting that there is indeed a definite structure in
the data.
The largest groupings of lexical categories are the
clusters numbered (1) in both analysis (a) and analysis
(b) of table 9-1, and they agree in their content very
close Ly, They are made up of a set of lexical categories
which would be used when generating path-type descriptions
- corner specification terms, movement terms ('move/go'),
terms directing direct ions of movement ('up', 'left',
'down', 'right' and 'along') and cardinal coun t i ng for
counting out node positions or path movements during
the execution of-the scanning procedures. Both analYSis
(a) and analysis (b) (see table 9-1) contain the same
lexical categories in their respective clusters numbered
(1), except that cluster (1) of analysis (a) includes the
movement-denoting category 'along' where cluster (1) of
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analysis Cb) does not.
The clusters numbered (2) in both analyses agree on
the inclusion of three lexical categories - 'left',
'right' (edge names) and 'node'. The clusters numbered
(3) in both analyses are in perfect agreement on the
inclusion of all three constituent lexical categories
('order', 'to edge', and 'row'). Taken together,
clusters (2) and (3) comprise a selection of lexical
categories which correspond to lexical items which are
usable in row-type descriptions. This is in agreement
with the analysis of the maze game data (see table 7-3) in
which the lexical categories 'order', 'to edge', 'row',
'left', 'right' (and also 'top', 'bottom' and 'line')
clustered together. (Taking clusters (2) and (3) together
in the present analysis 1s justified by the fact that
subjects actually sample the clusters of lexical
categories in this fashion: subjects' sampling of the
lexical categories is dealt with in the next section).
The clusters numbered (4) and (6) in the present set
of results group together a set of lexical categories
corresponding to lexical items which are usable in
figural-type descriptions ('shape' and 'column' in cluster
(4), and 'middle', 'limb', 'symmetry', 'extreme' and
'diagonal' in cluster (6».
The clusters numbered (5) in both analyses
consistently group together two semantically-related
lexical categories, 'horizontal' and 'vertical', whilst
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the clusters numbered (7) in both analyses consistently
group together two lexical categories, 'ownother' (i.e.
previously specified position of self or other) and
'junction'. Both of the lexical categories in cluster
(7) correspond to lexical items which are usable in path-
type descriptions, for example, when describing a location
in terms of a path movement from a previously specified
position or towards the junction of two paths.
The classification of the set of lexical categories
by means of cluster analysis thus yields consistently-
occurring clusters which, since they are uncovered
repeatedly by different cluster analyses, could be held to
reflect the structuring of the data. The next question of
interest is the question of how the subjects actually use
the lexical categories within each cluster. The analysis
of the maze game data (see chapter 7) demonstrated that
subjeCts' sampling of the lexical categories was highly
systematic such that, in the case of five out of the six
groups of subjects identifiable from the cluster analysis
of subjects, most of the lexical categories in one or two
of the clusters of lexical categories were used, but few
or none of the other lexical categories from other
clusters were used. Furthermore, subjects' sampling of
the lexical categories was readily explicable in terms of
the four-fold classification of description types. It
was, therefore, of interest to examine whether a similar
type of sampling from among the lexical categories by
~;
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subjects could be detected in the present experimental
data. The results of this analysis are set out in the
next section.
ii) The analysis of subjects' usages of the lexical
categories
The first part of the attempt to ascertain the manner
in which subjects selected among the lexical categories
involved a cluster analysis of individual subjects. This
was achieved in the same manner as was the case in the
cluster analysis of individual subjects in the maze game
studies: the data matrix of 38 lexical categories X 80
subjects* was transformed through 900 to yield a data
matrix of 80 subjects X 38 lexical categories, each
subject was treated as a variable, and the 80 variables
(subjects) were cluster analyzed using BMDP program P1M.
Once again, the results from different cluster analyses
were compared, and a number of consistent groupings of
individual subjects' data was found to obtain. In fact,
3 major groupings of subjects were identified (containing
12, 8~ and 16 subjects, these being clusters a), b) and c)
respectively) and a total of seven lesser groupings, each
of four or five subjects, were identified (clusters d).to
j) ).
* Each dyad (16 in all) described five mazes in total.
Each maze's data was treated separately, resulting in 16 x
5 = 80 'subjects'.
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The frequencies with which each subject within each
of these groupings used lexical items corresponding to
each of the lexical categories were summed across all
subjects within a given cluster of subjects and averaged
for the group. This allowed an assessment of which
lexical categories were used by each group of subjects as
a whole. Thus, for example, each subject in cluster a)
of subjects used the category 'top' an average of 2.5
times in describing eight locations on one maze, the
category 'row' an average of 7.166 times, the category
'order' an average of 7.92 times, and so on. \'lhenthis
was completed for all subjects in all groups, those
categories which were used at least once on average by
each subject were noted, and the results from this
analysis are summarized in table 9-2 (overleaf).
Table 9-2 shows which lexical categories within the
various clusters of lexical categories yielded in the
analysis described in c)1) above were used by each
grouping of subjects «a) - (j». A casual inspection
of the distribution of ticks in table 9-2 reveals that
subjects' sampling of the lexical categories within the
different clusters of lexical categories is systematic in
nature. Consider the three major groupings of subjects,
(a), (b) and (c).
Cluster (a) of subjects uses the following lexical
categories - 'top' 'handside' 'move' 'along' and 'down', ,.
(from cluster (1) of the cluster analysis of lexical
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categories, 'bottom', 'left', 'right', and 'node' from
cluster 2), and 'order', 'to edge' and 'row' from cluster
(3). These lexical categories are of the type used by
subjects in generating row-type descriptions, for example:
"It's third
!
(ORDER)
r ow
!
( RO~J
down
!
(DOWN)
from the
,!
top
1
EDGE) (TOP)
and third
1
(ORDER)(TO
node
!
along".
!
(NODE) (ALONG)
Notice that this cluster of subjects do not use any
figural terms (corresponding to the lexical category named
'shape'), nor do they use any path movements away from
specified corners (r co un t ' 'left', 'right', 'corner').
Thus, this group of subjects would appear to be
consistently using those lexical categories from the first
three clusters of the cluster analysis of lexical
categories which are readily usable in"row-type
descriptions.
Cluster (b) of subjects use a similar but smaller
group of lexical categories, namely 'top', 'down',
'bottom', 'left', 'right', 'order', 'to edge', 'row' and
'extreme' and would thus appear to be using row
descriptions of a less specific nature than those used by
the subjects comprising cluster (a) of subjects. This
interpretation is borne out by examination of sample
descriptions from the data generated by one of the
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subjects in cluster (b) of subjects:
"Third
!(ORDER)
row
1
down:
!
second from the
! !
left"1 .
EDGE)(LEFT (EDGE»(ROW) (DOWN)(SECOND)(TO
"Second row down: third
(O}DER)( JOVI) (DtN) (OiDER)
from the
1(TO EDGE)
right:" (5 sec)
(RILT (EDGE»
Cluster (c) of subjects (see table 9-2) use all of the
lexical categories comprising clusters (1) and (2) of the
cluster analysis of lexical categories, except for the
lexical category 'rowpcol' in cluster (2), plus the
lexical category 'order' from cluster (3). This
collection of lexical categories includes counting of both
ordinal and cardinal types, path movement terms, edge
names, and 'corner', but nQl 'row' or 'shape' (the
categories which would seem to be diagnostic of row - and
figural-type descriptions, respectively). This would
suggest that cluster (c) of individual subjects comprises
those individuals who use path-type descriptions, and this
interpretation is supported by examination of typical
descriptions generated by subjects within this group: for
example-
"Er: (2.5 s) start at the top:right hand corner of the
page: (1.5s) come down to the third box: (1 s) turn left:
(1 s) and its the first box: (6 sec)".
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This cluster contains the largest number of subjects
(16) and thus supports the earlier-stated impression of
the predominance of path-type descriptions.
Of the seven lesser clusters of individual subjects,
cluster (f) would again appear to contain subjects who use
path-type descriptions, as would cluster (i) since both
groups of subjects use most of the lexical categories used
by the subjects comprising cluster (c) without the use of
either 'row' or 'shape', the critical categories
diagnostic of row- and figural-type descriptions,
respectively). Cluster (h) of subjects comprises a group
of subjects who use edge names, prepositions ('to edge'),
figural terms (rshap e") and also 'column'. These
subjects would thus appear to be using some figural-type
descriptions. Cluster (g) of subjects comprise five
subjects' data and these five subjects described locations
in terms of 'row plus column' ('rowpcol'). For example:
"My second: X: is in the second: row: and the
fourth: column:"
The analysis of how subjects sample from the lexical
categories confirms the initial casual impression that
three of the four description types (path-, row- and
figural-types) were used by subjects in the present
experiment. As was the case with the data from the maze
game task, clusters of lexical categories which
consistently occur across several cluster analyses are
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identifiable in the data from the present experiment, and
groupings of subjects (which groupings also consistently
emerge across different cluster analyses) can be shown to
sample from the clusters of lexical categories in a highly
systematic fashion which is explicable in terms of the
description types summarized in chapter 6 as path-, row-
(or line-) and figural-type descriptions.
Ql Discussion
The analyses presented in this chapter indicate that
a partial replication of the four types of location
description which had been observed in the maze game data
has been obtained in the present 'paper-and-pencil'
experiment. Path-, row- and figural-type descriptions
have once again been observed in the present 'paper-and-
pencil' experiment; however, matrix-type descriptions are
conspicuous by their absence, an interesting departure
from the maze game results. The relative prevalence of
the three types of description which were replicated in
the 'paper-and-pencil' experiment was different as
compared to that in the maze game data. In the 'paper-
and-pencil'experiment, path-type descriptions were the
most co~mon with row-t~pe descriptions being the next most
popular and with a small number of figural-type
descriptions being generated. In the maze game data, on
the other hand, matrix- and row-type descriptions were
most prevalent, with path-type descriptions being less
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prevalent and with a small number of figural-type
descriptions being generated.
Thus, the principal differences between the results
from the maze game studies and the present experiment were
that in the maze game data, four different description
types were observed, whereas only three of those four
description types were replicated in the present 'paper-
and-pencil' task. Furthermore, the relative popularity of
the three different description types was different in the
'paper-and-pencil' experiment as opposed to their relative
popularities in the maze game data; path-type
descriptions were most popular in the 'paper-and-pencil'
experiment, yet they rated third most popular in terms of
the number of subjects consistently shown to be using them
in the maze game experiments. The replication in the
'paper-and-pencil' experiment is therefore a partial
replication in two senses.
The reason why there should be only a partial
replication of the maze game data in the 'paper-and-
pencil' experiment is an interesting question. The
answer to this question may in fact be rather a complex
one.
The original motivation behind the 'paper-and-pencil'
experiment had been to investigate the nature of maze
location descriptions which had been generated
independently of playing the maze game, using similar
mazes (with slight modifications, as detailed in the
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introduction to the present chapter) and similar subjects.
Thus, the 'paper-and-pencil' experiment was designed
primarily with the semantics of the task in mind; from a
purely semantic point of view, one might have expected
similar mazes to be described in similar ways, regardless
of whether the descriptions were generated within the
context of a computer game or not. To some extent, this
po i nt of view was borne out: three of the four location
description types which were found in the maze game
studies ~ere replicated, despite slight changes in the
nature of the mazes. However, a fourth type of
description was not replicated, and furthermore, the
prevalence of the three description types which were
replicated was different in the 'paper-and-pencil' as
opposed to the maze game task. This result requires an
explanation, and it will be argued that the explanation
lies in the differing natures of the maze game and the
'paper-and-pencil' tasks both in terms of their cognitive
aspects and in terms of the differing types of social
situation which they constitute. It is further argued
that these two aspects, cognitive and social, are
inextricably linked.
In removing the location description subtask from the
maze game scenario and setting it as an experimental task
in its own right, three significant aspects of the maze
game task have been altered; these are (i) its inherently
collaborative nature, (ii) the spontaneity of the
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situation, and (iii) the dynamic nature of the task.
These three aspects of the task have, it is argued, both
cognitive and social consequences and all three are
intimately interrelated, making it difficult to discuss
them separately.
The first point of note is that the collaborative
element of the maze game task is largely removed in the
'paper-and-pencil' location description task. The two
subjects are no longer (more or less) equally involved in
a joint effort to solve a single complex problem in the
'paper-and-pencil' task. Instead, subjects have fixed
roles: at any given time, one subject is a 'describer'
and the other is an 'understander'. This assignment of
roles effectively means that there is less incentive for
the 'understander' to make an active, collaborative effort
to assist the 'describer' in his task (by generating
alternative 'checking' descriptions as a check that he has
correctly understood the description generated by the
speaker, for example). The (initial, at least) equality
and mutual interdependence of the subjects in the maze
game is absent in the 'paper-and-pencil' experiment; the
two subjects are more independent than interdependent.
Furthermore, the potentially deleterious consequences of
failing to correctly understand a location description in
the maze game task (that is, being blocked off from one's
chosen route to goal or even being exposed to the risk of
being 'eaten' by the monster if one has misunderstood
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one's partner's location and agreed to his making a move
which in fact has harmful rather than beneficial
consequences for one) are absent in the 'paper-and-pencil'
task. There is thus less incentive to collaborate in the
'paper-and-pencil' task, and indeed less necessIty to do
so.
The second aspect of the maze game task which is
different vis-a-vis the 'paper-and-pencil' task is the
greater degree of spontaneity inherent in the maze game as
opposed to the 'paper-and-pencil' task. In the maze game
task, the question of which of the two players would
describe a given location and at which point in the game
he should do so was a choice entirely up to the subjects.
In the 'paper-and-pencil' task, on the other hand, these
variables were prescribed by the experimenter beforehand.
NhQ it was that described a location, and sasn they did so
was not under the control of the subjects in the 'paper-
and-pencil' experiment. This lack of spontaneity in the
'paper-and-pencil' experiment allows the sUbjects less
opportunity for negotiation. In the maze game, the
choice of a location description type and the extensional
semantics of the chosen description format are both open
for negotiation (see chapter 10). In the 'paper-and-
pencil' experiment, on the other hand, because the
subjects' roles are to a greater extent prescribed by the
experimenter, and because there is less necessity and
incentive to collaborate, it is more likely that the
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describer's mental model of the maze will prevail
unnegotiated (or at least negotiated to a much lesser
extent). Thus, priority is given to the describer's
mental model of the maze rather than allowing (or
encouraging) the sUbjects to arrive at a joint model.
The third difference noted above was the difference
between the two tasks in terms of their dynamic aspects:
the maze game is inherently more dynamic in nature than is
the 'paper-and-pencil' task. In the maze game task, the
subjects are involved in moving their respective position
markers within the maze from starting positions to goal
positions - indeed, this is the essence of the game as far
as the subjects are concerned. Subjects in the maze game
task occasionally describe their position as a subgoal of
the larger, ongoing task of getting to the goal position.
Subjects in the 'paper-and-pencil' task, on the other
hand, have to describe a series of different locations one
after the other. These different locations are not.
connected in any way; the task set to the subjects is one
of discretely describing separate locations -.these
successive separate locations do not represent progress
towards a longer term goal as they do in the maze game
task. Thus, the. 'paper-and-pencil' task is effectively a
series of discrete tasks, whereas the maze game task
involves the generation of descriptions as part of a
single larger ongoing process. As such, it 1s not
unreasonable to suppose that the subjects are not
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cognitively operating on the mazes in the same fashion in
the two tasks; the 'paper-and-pencil' task is more like
map-reading, whereas the maze game task is more like
travelling within the area represented by a map plus
occasional 'map-reading'.
It should be emphasized that the differences between
the maze game and the 'paper-and-pencil' tasks in these
three aspects (collaboration, spontaneity, and dynamics)
are differences of degree; for example, although
collaboration is not required to the same extent in the
'paper-and-pencil' as opposed to the maze game task, ~Qm~
collaborative effort (e.g. to ensure that correct
understanding has taken place) is still necessary in the
'paper-and-pencil' task.
Some of the potential social consequences of removing
the location description subtask from the maze game
scenario and treating it as an experimental task in its
own right have been touched upon above (for example, the
fact that the two subjects are more independent than
interdependent in the 'paper-and-pencil task). other
potential social consequences are implicit in the above
discussion. Specifically, in the maze3ame task, the
subjects are jointly involved in a collaborative problem-
solving task. This task, it was noted above, is of a
spontaneous nature: how the subjects set about solving it,
when they describe locations and how they do so (etc.) is
under their control. As such, the possibility that one
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subject might exert overall control over the choice of
moves, location description format, (etc.), can arise in
the maze game. This is less of a possibility in the
'paper-and-pencil' task, because of the fixed roles of the
subjects; by prescribing their roles and when
descriptions are to be generated, the opportunity for
spontaneous negotiation of who (if anybody) should be in
overall control of the task is removed.
Another aspect of interest in the present context is
this: so far, we have explored differences between the
maze game and the 'paper-and-pencil' task in terms of
spontaneity, collaboration and dynamics. There are also
differences between the 'interactive' and 'non-
interactive' conditions of the 'paper-and-pencil' task.
In the interactive condition of the 'paper-and-pencil'
task, both subjects are involved in generating location
descriptions. In the non-interactive condition, on the
other hand, only one subject is involved in generating
descriptions, whereas the other subject is exclusively
involved in listening to descriptions. There is thus a
greater opportunity for the two subjects to negotiate the
choice of a description format in the interactive
condition as opposed to the non-interactive condition.
There are in fact examples in the data from the
interactive condition in which there does appear to be
some negotiation of the choice of a description format.
In the following extract of dialogue, for example, player
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A had previously described the eight locations on the
first maze and (it being the interactive condition) it was
.then player B's turn to describe the eight locations on
the second maze (which is the symmetrical maze with
irregular node positions: see Appendx V).
B Ehm: the first X: is ehm: (5 sec) ehm: (2 sec)
oh: right: we'll stick to the rows and columns.
A {Mmm-hmm
B {Even although some:bits are missing, O.K.?
A Right: (laughs) Fine:
In this extract, player B offers to continue using
the description format used by player A to describe the
previous set of eight locations (which she did in terms of
stating row position plus column position), despite the
fact that this format of description is less appropriate
for a maze with an irregular spacing of nodes and having
gaps in the path structure. Player 1\ agrees to this. In
the non-interactive condition of the 'paper-and-pencil'
experiment, on the other hand, only one player is involved
in describing the maze and therefore the other
interlocutor never has the opportunity to choose between
continuing with the previous speaker's chosen description
format and changing to another format. In both
conditions, of course, the extensional meaning of a
profferred description is open to negotiation (see the
discussion of negotiation in chapter 10).
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In addition to the above-noted differences between
the maze game and 'paper-and-pencil' tasks (i.e. in terms
of spontaneity, dynamics and collaboration) it is not
unreasonable to suggest that there exist further, perhaps
more subtle, differences of a social psychological nature.
The discussion of these differences will necessarily be
somewhat speculative in view of the fact that these
differences were not directly tested for. Nevertheless,
such possible differences are potentially of importance
for the data produced.
In essence, it is argued that the subjects are likely
to represent the two tasks (maze game and 'paper-and-
pencil' tasks) rather differently, that is, what the
subjects understand their task to be is different in each
case. This relates to the literature on 'demand
characteristics' (Orne, 1962) and that on 'social
representations' (Abric, 1984; Codol, 1984). Orne (1962)
discusses the experiment as a social situation and notes
an apparent willingness on the part of experimental
subjects 'to be good subjects', that is, to help validate
the experimental hypothesis. Orne defines demand
characteristics as ' ••• the totality of cues which
convey an experimental hypothesis to the subject •• '
(Orne, 1962, p, 779). Orne notes that a subject's
behaviour in an experiment will be determined by two sets
of variables: (1) those which are traditionally defined as
experimental variables, and (ii) the perceived demand
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characteristics of the experimental situation. It is
argued that the perceived demand characteristics are
different in the maze game studies as opposed to the
'paper-and-pencil' experiment, and that this difference
may partly account for the difference in the results of
these two sets of studies.
It is suggested here that the subjects who
participated in the maze game studies most probably
understood their task to be one of playing a game - that
is, solving a problem. This problem (getting to the goal
position in the maze game in as few moves as possible and
incurring as few penalty points as possible in the
process) requires the generation of location descriptions
as an incidental part of the whole task. It is thus
argued that in the maze game task, the subjects are
9riented towards solving the problem that the experimenter
appears to have set them (i.e. solving the maze game as
efficiently as possible) and consequently do not dwell on
the location description aspect of the task. Their
concern is with strategy in the game and the achievement
of a maximally efficient solution. Generating location
descriptions is, for them, a purely instrumental matter
which helps them achieve a solution to the larger problem
of the game task. It is thus highly likely that they
generate descriptions in an unreflecting fashion - indeed,
it is this facet of the game task which ensures true
spontaneity and naturalness of the location description
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data, as was argued in chapter 4.
In such situations, where the generation of location
descriptions is a purely incidental matter to the solution
of the task in hand, any 'short cut' which appears to aid
the subjects in generating location descriptions quickly
and efficiently will be regarded as useful. Matrix-type
descriptions could function in this fashion, being an
apparently convenient, brief (in terms of the lengths of
the utterances in the descriptions in words) coding system
which appears to simplify and speed up the location
description process, thus allowing subjects to concentrate
on the 'real' task. (The phrase 'apparently convenient
brief •• coding system' is used because the results
presented in chapter 8 suggest that the impression that
matrix descriptions are more brief and convenient is
somewhat illusory).
In the 'paper-and-pencil' experiment, on the other
hand, subjects are explicitly aware from the outset that
the 'study is conce~ned with the location descriptions that
they will generate. (Even although they are not
explicitly told this, it is the sole task set to them).
Subjects are thus likely to be aware that the generation
of location descriptions is the object of the
experimenter's interest, and their attention 1s directed
to this task. Furthermore, subjects in the 'paper-and-
pencil' experiment are not under pressure of time, and
there is no 'monster' to harass them, and so there is less
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necessity for them to employ 'short cuts' of the type
exemplified by matrix-type descriptions.
Thus, it is argued that the two tasks differ in their
peceived demand characteristics such that the subjects in
the 'paper-and pencil' experiment focus their attention on
the location description task, whereas the subjects in the
maze game studies pay attention to the problem-solving
aspects of the game, employing 'short cut' descriptions to
enable them to devote more attention to the 'real' task.
The importance of how subjects represent the
experimental task in which they are engaged is emphasized
by Abric (1984) and Codol (1984). Abric (1984) has
demonstrated that how the subject represents the
experimental task, the other person engaged in the task,
and the context of the task is critical to how the subject
behaves in the task. For example, 1n the Prisoner's
Dilemma game (a mixed-motive, two-person, exp~rimental
game derived from games theory in economiCS, in which the
subject can behave either cooperatively or competitively)
different behaviours are evoked from the subject depending
upon whether he ha s repre sented the ta sk as a g_gm~ (in
which case his behaviour is rather more competitive) or as
a problem-solving activity (in which caseh1s behaviour is
rather more cooperative). Similarly, varying the context
of the task has effects on the subject's behaviour. For
example, in one case, the Prisoner's Dilemma game is given
a 'work scenario' context in which the subject has to put
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himself in the place of one of the contestants in a work
scenario (a trade unionist or a manager) and in another
case, he has .to place himself in the position of one of
the contestants in a casino-gaming scenario. The results
obtained confirmed the effect of the context. Abric
concludes that it is not the logical structure of the
situation which determines subjects' choices in the
experimental game task but the meaning of the situation
for the subjects.
Thus the work in French social psychology on 'social
representations' underlines the importance of how subjects
represent the various aspects of the experimental
situation (the experimental task, themselves, the other
subject(s), and the context of the experimental task) for
the outcome of the experiment. This emphasis is entirely
in accord with the above interpretation of the difference
between the maze game and the 'paper-and-pencil' task in
terms of a difference in perceived demand characteristics
and a consequent change in the subjects' behaviour.
Implicit in the earlier comparison of maze game and
'paper-and-pencil' tasks in terms of differences in .
perceived demand characteristics (see above) is another
possible source of differences between the two
experimental situations: this difference is one of
differing degrees of conscious awareness on the part of
the subjects of the language they produce in the two
experimental situations. It was argued earlier that in
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the maze game task, the subjects' attention is focussed
upon the problem-solving aspects of the task. Subjects
in the maze game studies are thus likely to be in that
state of awareness known as 'awareness-of-self-as-subject'
(or agent) and are less likely to be consciously aware of
the language they produce when generating location
descriptions than is the case with subjects in the 'paper-
and-pencil' experiment. These latter subjects, it was
argued above, are more likely to be aware of the fact that
the location descriptions that they generate are the
object of the experimenter's interest. They are thus
more likely to pay conscious attention to the location
descriptions which they produce and be 'aware-of-self-as-
object' than is the case with the subjects in the maze
game studies. It is therefore argued that the two
experimental tasks differ in the extent to which subjects
are consciously aware of the language that they produce
such that subjects in the 'paper and pencil' task pay more
attention to the descriptions they generate (and thus
generate those descriptions in a less spontaneous and
natural fashion) than is the case with the subjects in the
maze game studies.
In sum, several differences between the maze game and
'paper-and-pencil' tasks were noted which could account
for the observed differences in the results yielded by the
two tasks - specifically, the maze game involves more
collaboration between the subjects, involves greater
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spontaneity on the part of the subjects, and is more
dynamic than is the 'paper-and-pencil' task. Other
differences between the tasks were hypothesized - notably
that the perceived demand characteristics, and
consequently the subjects' behaviour, differ in the two
tasks, that the two tasks might be represented differently
by the subjects, and that the subjects are more likely to
be 'aware-of-self-as-object' and consequently conscious of
the language they produce in the case of the 'paper-and-
pencil' task. How subjects did in fact represent the
tasks, and what they perceived the demand characteristics
of the tasks to be, were not measured in these experiments
and hence these latter hypotheses are somewhat
speculative. Nevertheless, they do indicate the
complexities of the change from game task to 'paper-and-
pencil' task from a social point of view (in addition to
the, perhaps more obvious, changes from a cognitive point
of view).
ThUS, the differing natures of the two tasks as
social situations was highlighted. Also touched upon were
the potential differences from a social point of view
between the different conditions within the 'paper and
pencil' task. If the points raised in this discussion
were correct, then a very interesting series of
experiments could be set up using the 'paper-and-pencil'
task and varying the nature of the social situation. For
example, one could have the two subjects generating
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individual location descriptions alternately, giving more
scope for negotiation; one could introduce penalties of
some sort for failure to correctly understand one
another's descriptions, thus increasing collaboration;
and one could change the context of the task by describing
the same location description task as involving the
identification of locations within a maze, locations
within a street map, and so on. One could also alter
the monologue condition by instructing the subject to
generate location descriptions which were precise enough
for he himself to later identify the described position.
In conclusion, the failure to replicate all of the
location description types found in the maze game
studies in a task in which maze locations were described
independently of playing the maze game was explained in
terms of many factors, including changes in the nature of
the social situation which the two tasks constitute.
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Table 2=1 Clusterings of lexical categories ~hich
consistently emerge across different cluster analyses -
of the data from the ~me-independent location
description task
(a) Across variation in Cb) Across variation in
measure of similarity/ cluster linkage
distance on which criteria
clustering is based
1- TOP 1- TOP
HANDSIDE HANDSIDE
CORNER CORNER
MOVE HOVE
ALONG UP
UP LEFT (Direction)
LEFT (Direction) RIGHT (Direction)
RIGHT (Direction) DOWN
COUNT COUNT
DOtH!
2. BOTTOM 2. LEFT (Edge)
LEFT (Edge) RIGHT (Edge)
RIGHT (Edge) NODE
NODE
ROHPCOL
3. fORDER 3. rORDER
TO EDGE TO EDGE
lROH lRm{
4. [SHAPE 4, ~HAPE
COLm1N COLUHN
5. (HORIZONTAL 5,[90RIZONTAL
VERTICAL VERTICAL
6. MIDDLE 6. Lum
Lum
sn1METRY Syr,1METRY
EXTREt1E DIAGONAL
7 • DIAGONAL 7'[O'INOTHER
m,TNOTHER JUNCTION
JUNCTION
8. ~OTTOH
ROHPCOL
Table ~ Subjects' usages of individual lexical
categories in the maze-game independent location
description task
Clusters of
lexical a b c d e f g h i j
categories N=12 N=8 N=16 N=5 N=4 N=5 N=5 N=5 N=4 N=4
1 • TOP v: / ./ ./ ./ V V" t/
HANDSIDE v ./ V' t/ v
CORNER V' ./ ./'
HOVE ./ V t/ ./ ./'
(ALONG) V ./ v v v c>
UP II'" ./ vi' ./
LEFT (D) v ttl'" v
RIGHT (D) ./ v .,/ v
COUNT ./ ~ ./ r/
DOl~N ./ ./ ,/ r/ V"" ,,/ ./'
t/'" V
2. (BOTTOM) e/ ./ ./ v v ./ 'v' I/"
./'
LEFT (E) V' v J v
....,.. .,/ t/ ./'
RIGHT (E) ........ ......... v ........ ........ ......... ."... .......
v v ....... ......... .", ........ V VNODE
(ROHPCOL) V
.."", v .". ,,/' V"
3. ORDER V v' ........ t/
TO EDGE v v V" v'
ROW v v'
4 "[SHAPE
V
COLUHN V v
Table .9.=..2. Cont
Clusters of
lexical a b c d e f g h i j
categories N=12 N=8 N=16 N=5 N=4 N=5 N=5 N=5 N=4 N=4
5.[HORIZONTAL
VERTICAL
6. (~lIDDLE)
LH1B
SYMMETRY
(EXTREME)
(DIAGONAL) ./7.
OWNOTHER ,/ v
JUNCTION t/
N.B. Those categories marked with a tick (V) are used by
subjects within a cluster, on average, once or more than
once. Those in parentheses are included in the cluster
they are in in only one analysis, either analysis (a) or
analysis (b) (see table 9-1) Categories with (D) written
alongside in parentheses are direction - specifiers, those
with (E) alongside are edge names.
CHAPTER l.Q
PRAGHATICS Arm t1ENTAL r~ODELS
.£1 Introduction
In the previous three chapters, formal analyses were
presented which confirmed the informal four-fold
classification of location descriptions which was first
presented in chapter 6, and some further properties of
the four description types were also explored. In chapter
8, it was suggested that a potentially profitable
approach to the data, theoretically speaking, would be in
terms of interpreting the four location description types
as reflecting different underlying types of mental model
of the maze shape.
Some of the semantic aspects of this interpretation
of the data were explored in chapter 8, in w hIch it
was pointed out that mental models ,of the maze shape, as
conceived of in the present theoretical treatment, would
be truly intermediate between language and the 'world'
under discussion (t ,e, the maze shape on the screen).
ThUS, a description of a location would be translated into
a procedure (to pursue the procedural semantics metaphor)
which WOUld, in the first instance, be executed in relation
to the model and, having thus conceptually 'marked' the
relevant location on the model, only then would scanning
of the 'world' take place.
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This theoretical approach has one important
advantage: if a model is constructed by the subject, then
the greater the simplicity of the model as compared to the
original stimulus, the easier it is to generate and
interpret descriptions. A 'row'-type model of the maze,
for example, would simply consist in a series of parallel
lines representing the horizontal pathways of the maze.
Vertical pathways, and gaps in the horizontal pathways on
the actual maze, would be ignored on the model, thus
simplifying description generation and interpretation.
The present chapter will focus on pragmatiC, rather
than semantic, considerations in relation to the 'mental
models' interpretation of the data. It is perhaps best to
state clearly at the outset of the present chapter what the
present interpretation of the data is. It will be argued
tha t the da ta are bes tin terp reted in .I21::§.g!!latic te rm s: we
shall emphasize heavily the importance of the meanings that
a particular speaker and listener attach to a given set
of expressions, and we shall argue that these meanings
will, in all probability, be different from those attached
to the £Em~ expressions by a different speaker and
listener.
The largest section of this chapter is devoted to a
discussion (with reference to examples taken from the
data) of one possible mechanism by means of which an
individual speaker and listener can come to select one
interpretation (from the many possible interpretations) of
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their chosen type of location description: it is argued
that speakers and listeners tacitly (or sometimes
explicitly) nep,otiate the meanings of the expressions
that they !J..g.
Thus, for example, a particular speaker and listener
may both conceptualize the maze shape in terms of a 'matrix'
type of mental model, and consequently generate expressions
like '(3,2)' when describing maze locations. It is
argued here that the extensional meanings of the procedures
corresponding to that expression are negotiated by the
speaker and listener. The expression '(3, 2)' could
refer to a variety of locations depending upon the location
of the origin of the coordinate system and depending upon
whether the count procedures corresponding to the two
numbers in the description involve counting path mQYgmgn1~
or node positions (see the discussion in chapter 6 and
figure 6-12 for an explanation of this distinction).
Thus, within each class of mental model, there is great
scope for variation in the extensional meanings of the
procedures implicit in the location description of that
model type, and it is argued that the extensions of the
procedures implicit in the location descriptions are
tacitly negotiated and agreed-upon Qy particular ~peakers
and listeners.
A number of examples from the data will be discussed
and, it is argued, will illustrate these points: both the
choice of a description type, and the meanings of the
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expressions comprising location descriptions are
negotiated outcomes.
This view of mental models, as social representations
in which both the choice of model and the meanings of its
procedures are negotiated outcomes, contrasts with the
views expounded by Johnson-Laird (1980, 1981a, 1981b).
Johnson-Laird emphasizes that function of language which
enables us to gain access to another person's experience
of the world: models of perceptually absent objects,
persons and situations are built by a listener (or reader)
on the basis of the discourse which he hears (or reads).
As such, Johnson-Laird's emphasis is less explicitly
social than is ~~e present notion of a 'mental model'. The
implications of ~~ present notion of a mental model and
the contrast between the present account and that of
Johnson-Laird will be further explored in the following,
final chapter.
This consideration of the data from the maze game
(that is, in terms of negotiated models) will allow an
examination of the reassignment games from the maze game
studies and the monologue condition of the 'paper-and-
pencil' experiment in the light of the hypothesis that
the extensional meanings of the location descriptions are
negotiated.
In the following chapter, the'potential theoretical
implications of the results from the present set of
studies will be explored.
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Ql The negotiation of the meaninr,s of the location
descriptions
Given that there appears to be a tendency for both
interlocutors participating in a given dialogue to use the
same type of referring expression as one another (see
chapter 7, section c» the question naturally arises as to
how the choice of a particular description type by a pair
of subjects is achieved.
Another, related, question also demands an answer:
given the variety of interpretations of a given
expression (e.g. 'row') across dialogues, how do a
given pair of subjects using that expression manage to use
it in such an apparently unambiguous, trouble-free
fashion? Each expression does appear to have a variety of
possible interpretations. Why are subjects not in
difficulty in the face of such ambiguity of meaning? For
example, the term 'line' has been observed to have (at
least) four possible intepretations in the context of the
maze game. These are: (L) 'Line' could be used to refer
exclusively to horizontal lines of nodes (rows) or,
alternatively, to refer exclusively to vertical lines of
nodes (columns). Both of these 'narrow' usages are
observed in the data of different dyads. (ii) 'Line' could
have a more generic interpretation: it could be taken
to refer to any line of nodes within the maze structure,
regardless of orientation or length (it need not refer to
lines of nodes which span the entire distance across the
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maze structure as 'rows' usually do). (iii) 'Line" could
refer to an imaginary line of symmetry dissecting the
maze. (iv) Hore unusually, the term 'line' was, once used
by a pair of subjects playing a 'monster' game on a
symmetrical maze to refer to an imaginary pair of diagonal
lines in the maze structure from bottom left hand corner
to top right hand corner, and from top left hand corner to
bottom right hand corner. These :imaginary diagonal lines
were used to generate 'descriptions of the following type
(see figure 10-1 for an illustration of the point being
described):
A Yeah: {I'm: s-: two up alo~g the diagonal: from
{
,bottom left.
B {Yeah:
A To top right: . . .
This last interpretation, of an imaginary diagonal
line, whilst more idiosyncratic in nature than
interpretations (i) - (iii) of 'line', is no less
intuitively reasonable.
Thus, there is a great deal of variation in the
extensions of a given term, and it is a matter of great
interest to attempt to ascertain how it is that subjects
use such highly ambiguous expressions without any apparent
difficulty of interpretation. For example (see figure
10-2 for an illustration of the points being described):
1) A I'm on: the second row, second box along.
435
.'
'Figure 10-1; the location (X) described as "two up
along the diagonal from bottom left to
top right".
.' ~
Figure 10":2: The po Lnt l Xr described as on "the
second row, second box along" and. the
point (Y) described as "the second row,
second Last box along • • • f r cm' the left".
2) B And I'm on the second row on the second last box
along.
3) A O.K.
4) B From the left.
In this extract, player A generates a highly ambiguous
description (second row from where? Second box along from
where? Is 'second' the second nod~ position or the second
path movement? etc.) Player B does not appear to ponder
on the potential ambiguity of the description profferred
by player A, but instead immediately (without any delay
whatsoever) generates a similar description of her own.
In the present section of this chapter, a discursive
exposition of some of the description sequences in some
transcripts of dialogues will be given and the
interpretation placed upon the data will be that each pair
of subjects tacitly (or explicitly) negotiates the
extensional meaning of their chosen type of location
description. A discursive, rather than a statistical,
hypothesis-testing approach will be adopted, because the
data base from the maze game studies is insufficiently
large for a proper statistical test of the hypothesis that
negotiation of meaning takes place. Nevertheless, the
qualitative data presented do provide interesting support
for a hypothesis couched in terms of the negotiation of
meaning.
Essentially, it is argued that both subjects come to
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entertain similar mental models of the maze. This is
achieved by their negotiating the choice of a description
type and subsequently negotiating the extensional
semantics of the chosen description type, until a tacit
agreement is reached as to how the expressions comprising
the descriptions are to be interpreted. This effectively
eliminates the potential ambiguity of the referring
expressions, and thereafter, rapid interpretation is
achieved of what are, at face value, rather ambiguous
expressions.
The sort of negotiation of meaning adumbrated above
is readily apparent in some of the transcripts of practice
games (and those games'played on full-size mazes which
were first-played games). An example of the negotiation
of the cho Lc e of a type of description comes from a game
in which two female subjects were playing a 'baseline'
game (see figure 10-3 for a depiction of the locations
being described). The players describe their locations
as follows:
1) B So where are you aiming for?
2) A I'm aiming for: right. If you take each wee
box as a coordinate position, (3, 4).
3) B Oh.
4) A (3, 5) rather.
5) B What's three? Three is - (A interrupts)
6) A Right, O.K., say the top left and you go along
two and down one.
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~. 0 T~19ure 1 -3: he,point (X} described both as "t], ,',"
and "the top left and you go along two
and down one" •• "you're (Y) just in the
one to t~e right of that."
7) B Yeah - oh yes.
8) A Right? And you're just in the one to the right
of that.
9) B Have you got - wait a minute, you're going along
two -
10) A Right - Top left.
11) BRight.
12) A Go along two.
13) B One, two.
14) A To the right, and down one.
15) B One. Yeah, I'm just to - (A interrupts)
16) A You're just to the right of that.
This extract is interesting. In utterances 1) - 4),
player B asks player A's position, and player A generates
a matrix- or coordinate-type description which has as its
origin the bottom left-hand corner node of the maze, and
which involves the counting of node positions (as opposed
to path movements) in the execution of the procedures
implicit in the description (see figure 10-3). Player B's
initial response (utterance number 3)} is non-committal
but in utterance 5), she attempts to clarify for herself
the nature of the procedures implicit in player A's
description (specifically, she needs to know the location
of the origin of the matrix system and whether the
scanning procedures involve counting node positions or
path movements). Player B seems ready to accept this form
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of description provided its extensional semantics are made
clear; she seems willing enough to negotiate. In the
next utterance, however (utterance 6), player A does not
take up player B's implicit offer to negotiate, and
instead tries an entirely different type of description, a
path-type description which counts path movements in its
scanning procedures, in contrast to the previous matrix-
type description generated Qx.the ~m~ player (see figure
10-3). In utterance 7), player B seems to understand
this path description ("Yeah-oh yes") and player A follows
the path description up in utterance 8) with a further
confirming and clarifying description in terms of player
B's (previously specified) position. However, player A's
path-type description of utterance 6), although specifying
the prominent point from which scanning movements are to
be made, does not specify whether, in the execution of the
scanning procedures, node positions or path movements are
to be counted. Consequently, player B is heard to
commence the generation of a further clarifying
description in utterance 9). In utterances 10) - 15), a
decomposed path,type description is given by player A, and
player B is heard to execute the relevant scanning
procedures as the parts of the description are given by
player A. A final checking of the description is made in
utterances 15) and 16), where player B begins to describe
her own location relative to that which has just been
described, but is interrupted. Thereafter, and also in a
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succeeding game played by the same dyad, path-type
descriptions were used consistently.
An interesting point is worth noting as an aside:
on reading the preceding extract of dialogue and
considering it carefully, one gets the impression that
player A is in some sense in overall control of what is
going on at this point (cf. the discussion in chapter 3 of
this thesis of Lewis's notion of control). Player A
initiates more than one type 9f description and interrupts
player B three times (in utterances 5)/6),9)/10), and
15)/16)i, Little more can be said about the notion of
control, except that the number of 'initiatives', in the
sense of introducing new terminology, and.the number of
interruptions made by each interlocutor might also be
indicators of which player is 'master' and which is 'slave'.
This extract of dialogue illustrates how the choice
of a type of description to be used throughout the
dialogue is negotiated; more than one type of description
is used initially, one of these types is selected for use
and the details of the extensional semantics of its
implicit procedures are clarified, and thereafter the
negotiated description type is used predominantly
*throughout the game.
~ It is used only predominantly, rather than exclusively,
because players often describe their locations,
particularly towards the end of a game, in terms of path
movements away from their, previously specified, goal
positions. This type of description, relative to a
previously specified position, is used in the case of all
types of game and all types of predominant description
type.
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It was argued above that not only the choice of a
description type to be used predominantly is negotiated,
but the details of the chosen type of description's
extensional semantics are also negotiated. Perhaps the
most obviously negotiated type of description is the
matrix-type: being of 'an abstract nature, the
clarification of the extensional semantics of the scanning
procedures of matrix descriptions by means of negotiation
is often a necessary practice. The following extract of
Idialogue comes from a practice game (which was played on the
small '4 x 4' practice maze) by two male subjects.
Again, the choice of a description type to be used overall
had been under negotiation: both row and path-type
descriptions had been used by the subjects.
In the following exchange, player A begins by
clarifying a previous statement to the effect that'he would
move in an upward direction (see figure 10-4 for a diagram
of the location being described).
1) A And that'll put me: (1s) on: the third row up:
first square from the left:
2) B O.K.
3) A Second square: you know:
4) B Aye
5) A On: on the right if you see:
6) B (laughs)
7) A If you see what I mean (laughs)
8) B You're getting me confused here.
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o· Figure 10-4: the. location lX)
descri bed as ." .. first.
square t'r omr tne lert",'a'nd as (3, '1):
and the location (Y) described as
"(2, 2)". Note ·the difference in the
count procedure corresponding to the two
'coordinates; one, the horizontal .
coordinate, counts· node positions, the
other coordinate counts path movements •
9) A We should have a little - we should: O.K. right:
make an imaginary grid: starting from the
[bottom left: that's 1, 2, 3, 4, y'know?
10) B [O.K.
bottom left:
11) A Bottom left and along.
12) B 1,2,3, 4.
13) A So always the: the first number you say is the
bottom, right?
14) B 1, 2, 3,4: 5,6,7,8: 9,10,1',12: 13,14,
15, 16:
15) A No, no, no, no, just make it a grid:
16) B O.K. Ah, right. [O.K.
17) A You know, like Cartesian [thingies: and- and the
same-starting from the bottom: er: right hand
corner, 1, 2, 3, 4 up:
18) B O.K. Right: [Got you now]
19) A [Y-: y-: see:] so I am on: let's
think: (2.-5 sec) (laughs) (3, 1).
20) B (3:1 O.K.: right, I'm on: (1s) oh thr-: (t s) A-:
aye (3,1) means you're on the bottom grid then?
21) A Oh, it depends which way you're reading it I
guess: O.K.: Y coordinates first: that - Y is
going down along the bottom, right, imagine along
the bottom, 3 along and 1 up, O.K.?
22) B Count 3 along: and 1 up:
23) A Starting from the left:
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24) B Right.
25) A (3, 1)
26) B You're in one of my asses-: my-s-asses.
27) A Yeah, that's right, that's how I changed it.
28) B And: I'm on: (3 sec) 2: (1s) (2, 2): (3 sec)
29) A Oh you're: damn high
30) B Yeah.
(A discussion of S box positions follows, after which the
following exchange takes place).
31) B 1, 2, 3 and then: oh, do you count the bottom
square as one?
32) A Yeah: you must.
33) B Right, one, two, three, yeah: (3, 3):
The above lengthy extract illustrates clearly the
problems posed by the negotiation of the extensional
semantics of a matrix system of descriptions. In
utterances 1) - 8), player A attempts to clarify the
extension of the 'count along row' scanning procedure
which he employed as part of the row description which he .
has just generated. It is a node- rather than a path-
movement-counting scanning procedure (see figure 10-4 and
utterances 1) - 8) above). In utterances 9) - 13) player
A suggests 'making an imaginary grid' and proceeds to
clarify the extensional semantics of the scanning
procedure corresponding to one of the coordinates of the
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matrix-type description (that coordinate which denotes
locations on the horizontal axis of the coordinate system,
that is, that axis corresponding to the X-coordinate of
the Cartesian system - although note that player A
describes it as the Y coordinate in utterance 21». In
utterance 14), player B effectively suggests numbering
each node of the maze individually, a suggestion which is
rejected by player A in utterances 15) and 17), in which
he expl icitly, ment ions the Cartes ian-type coord inate
system which he has in mind. He wishes to set up a two-
place coordinate system which numbers nodes from 1 to 4
from the left in the horizontal plane and from 1 to 4 from
the bottom in the vertical plane. At this point, a
satisfactory coordinate system appears to have been set
uP.
However, further confusions follow: player A describes
his location as (3, 1) in utterance 19) when he should in
fact have decribed it as (3, 2) according to the coding
system which he has just set up with player B (see figure
10-4). Player B correctly deduces that this description
'( 3, 1)' would place player A on the bottom horizontal 1ine
of nodes if A's description were true and the coordinate
system worked as they had just set it up to work. In
utterances 21) - 27) the actual position of the location
is clarified. Notice that this involves a path-type
description (in utterance 21): 'three along and one up').
Notice also that, in clarifying the working of the
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coordinate system, the system itself is modified: the
nodes are still numbered 1-4 in the horizontal plane but
are now numbered 0-3 in the vertical plane; that is, path
movements are being counted in the vertical plane.
Player B also uses this modified system to describe his
location in utterance 28).
Following a short discussion of S box locations, the
above inconsistency in counting is resolved in utterances
31) - 33), where player B questions the counting procedure
in the vertical plane, which has been a source of
inconsistency in previous utterances. Having thus
finally clarified the situation, the matrix system is
used again in the subsequent dialogue until a solution to
the game is achieved. However, this dyad subsequently
discarded the coordinate system in the 'monster' game that
followed the practice game from which this extract of
dialogue came: path-type descriptions were used instead.
The above extract does illustrate the negotiation of
the semantic system which the matrix-type mental models of
the maze constitute: both the selection of a particular type
of description and the clarification of the extensional
semantics of the procedures corresponding to the
descriptions are negotiated outcomes.
The final extracts from transcripts illustrate the
negotiation of the extensional semantics of procedures
corresponding to particular description types.
The first such extract involves a game played on the
445
'column biased' maze in which the two female subjects were
generating line-type descriptions which were of the 'column'
type. The third description of the game involves
negotiation of the 'move along line' procedure of the
column-type description (see figure 10-5).
1) A Right: well I'm in the: left hand side: (1s)
2) B Vh-huh:
3) A And I've got: an S: uhm: (B interrupts)
4) B No wait a- which- which- which column of
[the six? (A interrupts)
5) A [On the very: on the very: first: [line:right?]
6) B [uh-huh:yeah]
7) A I'm not in the- ( t s) not the ground line, the
first floor line: say:
8) B O.K. : right.
9) A No: I'm in the second floor line, sorry:
10) B So you're: three: one, two, three from the: (1s)
11) A From the: [thirty-nine moves, where it says moves]
12) B [Bottom Yes: uh-huh]
13) A One, two, three, right?
In the game from which this extract of dialogue is
taken, the choice of 'column'-type descriptions has already
been settled upon. As can be seen from figure 10-5, it
is quite a natural choice. In utterance 1), player A
initially fails to completely specify which column her
asterisk is located in; it is in fact located in the
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r'igure' 1U-5: The location described as»the very
first line: ••• not th~ grourid'line,
the first floor lin~ ••• No: J'r-m
in the second 'floor lin~, sorry."
i
leftmost column. utterances 2) - 5) involve
clarification of which is the appropriate column. Notice
that in utterance 5), player A refers to this as 'the very
first line'; the notation which denotes columns has
already been tacitly agreed by both subjects. The
columns are termed first, second, third, etc. in order from
left to right.
In utterances 7) and 9), player A employs a fairly
ingenious solution to the problem of whether she is
specifying path movements or node positions when counting
out the 'move along line' scanning procedure, a problem
which bedevilled the male subjects whose dialogue was
discussed above, in the previous dialogue extract (see
also figure 10-4). Her solution is to describe the
vertical node positions by means of metaphorical reference
to the floors of a building, with the 'ground floor'
horizontal line of nodes being the bottom-most horizontal
line of nodes, the 'first floor' line being the line above
it, and so on. In utterance 10), player B checks the
description profferred by player A by counting nodes, and,
in order to establish the node-counting procedure firmly,
player A makes reference in utterance 11) to the tally of
moves and penalty points on the screen display, which is
located immediately below the bottom of the maze on the
screen. Thus, the two subjects establish that the 'move
along line' scanning procedure counts nodes rather than
path movements, each subject doing so in her own terms in
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a negotiation process. The negotiation involves one
subject generating a description, and the other subject
restating the description in different terms as a check
that the first description was properly understood and
that both descriptions did refer to the same maze
location.
This same phenomenon of negotiation by means of
checking the extension of a profferred description by
generating a slightly different 'checking' description is
again exemplified in the final extracts of dialogue, which
are from a practice game with female subjects. The
following extracts of dialogue also illustrate strikingly
the confusions which can arise because the extension of a
count-type scanning procedure has not been adequately
clarified (i.e. whether node positions or path movements
are being counted). The extracts again point to
negotiation as the solution to the problem (see figure 10-
6 for a diagram of the location which is being described):
1) B Right: I'm in the: I'm: what: (25) second from
the right:
2) A \-lai-:oh: (laughs)
3) B Second from the bottom (laughing)
4) A Second from the right: sec-: so you're in: still
in the top: left hand corner?
5) B No, I'm in the bottom right hand corner.
6) A (laughs) You're joking. Hait a minute (15) Oh
second from the left?: second- (B interrupts)
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Figure 10-6: th~ location tX) which
player B describes as ~Psecond from the
right • • • second from the bottom"
tY) is where her·partner believes her
to be.
_, ,
7) B No second from the: second from the right.
8) A (laughs) Wai-: take it from the right hand
corner.
9) BRight
10) A And: right, go along and uP. Tell me what
you've done.
11) B One along, one UP.
12) A One al-: yeah that's: (2 sec) right:
13) B O.K.?
Later in the same game, the following lengthy extract
again illustrates the fact that player B counts nodes when
scanning the maze and player A counts path movements (both
extracts are discussed below): (see figure 10-7):
14) A ••• and where are you then?
15) B I'm in the: second from the 1: left and I'm the:
second from the top.
16) A Second from the left, second from the top:
right: that's one of my Ss.
17) B Is it? (1 s) It's one of mine.
18) A Wait a minute. Second: second from the top?
19) B Uh-huh.
20) A No you're not: second • • .
21) B So you're still in the bottom: left-right hand
corner, the corner of it?
22) B No: {yeah
23) A {Oh: yeah
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Figure 10-7: The·location (X) described
by player 13as "second from the left·
.•. second from the toP!, and the
·~location (Y), which is where player A
understands player H's position marker
to be located. .
.. ' .
24) B I'm in the bottom right hand corner of the top
left hand square: (laughing) is that what you
mean?
25) A No (laughs)
26) B (laughs)
27) A Right: take it: (1 sec) take it from the left,
27) A right? {like - (B interrupts)
28) B
29) A
{Right I'm: one along: {and two up}
{One along: } and
two up , One a-: right. So you're really:
diagonally opposite the asterisk?
30) B I'm: well: your asterisk, aye.
In the first extract, player B describes her location
in utterances 1) and 3) in terms of distances from two
edges, an infrequently-used type of description, the
procedures of which operate in a manner similar to those
of matrix descriptions (yielding an intersection of two
I
lines of nodes). Player B is describing location X in
figure 10-6; she is counting node positions. Player A,
however, eVidently counts path mQY~ments in her execution
of the scanning procedures corresponding to this
description. This results in her believing player B to
be occupying the position Y in figure 10-6: that this is
the case is evidenced by her description of B's location
as 'in the top: left hand corner' in utterance 4) and B's·
reply that her position marker is in fact located in the
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bottom right hand corner (it is indeed located in the
lower right area of the maze) takes player A by surprise
('You're joking'). In utterances 8) and 10), player A
attempts to clarify the position for herself by asking her
partner to generate a path-type description, which she
does in utterance 11). This description appears to
succeed, although notice that player B in utterance 13)
('O.K.'?')continues to check that player A is sure she has
understood the description fully.
In the second extract from this dialogue, the same
problem arises again: player B again generates a
description couched in terms of distances from two edges,
the relevant distances being specified in terms of node
positions (see figure 10-7 for an illustration of the
location being described). Again, player A understands
player B's location to be diagonally opposite where it
actually is (in figure 10-7, X is player B's position
marker's actual location, and Y is where player A thinks
player B's pos i t ion marker is located). In uttera nee
22), player B appears to be confused by player A's
clarifying question in utterance 21), and consequently
generates a further 'checking' description which is
intended to clarify the situation. This description
(utterance 24) - 'the bottom right hand corner of the top
left hand square') is a figural-type description: the
'square' described is a square in the path structure of
the maze shape. Player A rejects this clarifying
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description and in utterance 27) again requests a path-
type description, which player B generates in utterance
28). This is checked by player A by mea ns of a further
,
checking description phrased as a question in utterance
29). This is again a figural-type description.
Perhaps not surprisingly, this pair of subjects used
path-type descriptions in the subsequent discourse, since
other types posed problems for them. In fact, some of the
path-type descriptions subsequently used.by them were
highly elliptical, resembling matrix-type descriptions:
A So you're like: (1,3) from the left hand side
(2 sec)
B Yeah
(See figure 10-8).
This is a path-movement-counting path-type
description of such a highly elliptical form that the
horizontal scanning movement (of one path length) and the
vertical scanning movement (of three path lengths) in the
path description are stated as two numbers. HOHever,
the use of path-type descriptions, regardless of how
elliptical they are, is seen to be a negotiated outcome in
this instance: path-type descriptions are the least
problematic type of description for this pair of subjects
and come to be used by this pair of subjects for that
reason.
The foregoing extracts of dialogue and the discussion
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" Figure 10-8:' 'I'he iLoca t Lon described as
"(1, J) from the left. hand
sidell,
_ ..
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of them serve to underline the hypothesis that the
meanings of the location descriptions, and indeed the choice
of location description type, are negotiated by each pair of
subjects.
The extracts also underline the point that both
subjects within a dyad need to entertain very similar
interpretations of the expressions they use: the last
extract in particular illustrated the confusions that result
when the two subjects execute their scanning procedures
slightly differently.
The examples chosen involve fairly explicit
negotiation; in other transcripts, the negotiation is much
more subtle, and in some cases it appears to be absent
entirely. This latter eventuality is possible where
subjects are describing locations on a simple maze (for
example, the practice maze) and both players hold similar
interpretations of what the count procedures actually
count (node positions or path movements) from the outset.
In such cases, the commonality of interpretation occurs
more by happy accident than by negotiation.
As can be readily appreciated from the discussion of
the extracts of dialogue presented in this chapter, a
hallmark of the hypothesized negotiation process is the
clarification of what the extensional semantics of the
procedures corresponding to the descriptions are. Such
'procedure clarification statements' (or questions) would
appear to some extent to be diagnostic of negotiation.
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The classic example of such a procedure clarification
question is 'Do you count the bottom row as one?' (which,
in effect, is an effort to ascertain whether the count
procedures implicit in a speaker's description count node
positions or path mQYgments). If the hypothesis that the
extensional semantics of the maze location descriptions
are negotiated is correct, one would expect such
statements and questions to be more prevalent in earlier-
played rather than later-played games, and one would also
expect such statements and questions to appear earlier
within a given game rather than later. This latter
distribution of these statements could reflect a process
of negotiation taking place during the early part of a
given game, and the comparative dearth of such statements
later in the game would suggest that the interpretation of
the procedures had been tacitly agreed upon earlier and
were not, therefore, called into question later in the
game.
In order to shed some light on the negotiation
hypothesis, twenty-four first- and second-played games
were examined for the presence of such statements and
questions. It was observed that eleven games contained
at least one such statement. Thus, roughly half of the
games considered contained such statements: that is, the
sort of (fairly explicit) negotiation exemplified in the
extracts of dialogue considered in this chapter is in
evidence in roughly half of the games. Furthermore, the
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hypothesis that such statements should appear earlier within
a given game rather than later was tested by comparing the
number of such statements occurring during the first 50%
of the descriptions within a given game as compared to the
number occurring during the second 50% of the descriptions
within the game. Ten of the eleven games containing such
statements conformed to the expected pattern (i.e. having
more 'procedure clarification statements' earlier in the
game rather than later in the game). The eleventh case
had as many procedure clarification statements during the
first 50% of descriptions as during the second 50% of
descriptions. Thus, there were no cases which actually
went against the hypothesis. A sign test provided
confirmation that this was a significant result (N = 10, S
= 0, p < .01 (1 tail». Thus, although this is a crude
test of the negotiation hypothesis, the result does
suggest that the procedures implicit in the descriptions are
clarified by subjects earlier rather than later within a
given game, a pattern consistent with a hypothesis of early
negotiation and subsequent tacit agreement as to the
extensional meanings of the procedures implicit in a
description.
The hypothesis that each pair of subjects entrain one
another linguistically, and that the uniformity of their
description types (and the agreed interpretation of those
descriptions) is achieved by means of negotiation, has
several important consequences. The general consequences
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of the possibility that meaning is, to some extent,
negotiated in natural dialogue is explored more fully in
the next chapter. In the next section of the present
chapter, however, the consequences of the hypothesis for
the difference (see, for example, the review of Lom ovt s
work in chapter 4 of the pre~t thesis) between monologue
and dialogue, and the possibility that the apparently
increa sed difficul ty of the reassigmertega.mesof study IV of
the maze games studies could have been in part due to
difficulties of negotiation, will be considered.
£1 The reassignment and monologue tasks re-viewed
The view that the extensional meanings of the
location descriptions is negotiated by each pair of
subjects is an interesting perspective with which to
approach the reassignment games of the maze game studies
and the monologue condition of the maze-game-independent
location description experiment. One would expect that in
the case of the reassignment games (in which the pairs of
subjects playing the games had been made up on the basis
of each individual within a pair having used a different
type of description in a previous game than did his
current partner), the negotiation of a common mental model
of the maze would be more difficult than would be the case
if the same two subjects were starting 'from scratch', as
it were. Likewise, one would expect the impossibility of
negotiation in a monologue to affect the type of
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description generated. These propositions will be
examined in turn.
The reassignment games were found to present
significantly more difficulty for subjects than did the
baseline games (see chapter 5), this despite the fact that
the subjects playing the reassignment games had had more
experience of playing the game than had subjects in the
baseline study. This result suggests that the location
description aspect of the task is an important one.
Of.the six reassignment games, in five games the
SUbjects predominantly used matrix-type descriptions whilst
in the sixth game, row-type descriptions predominated.
On inspecting the transcripts of dialogues of reassignment
garnes, one or two unusual features are apparent. For
example, consider the following extract from a
reassignment game involving two female subjects; player A
had previously used matrix-type descriptions, whereas
player B had previously used row-type descriptions (see
also figure 10-9 for an illustration of both locations
being desc ribed):
1) A Where are you? (laughs)
2) B \rJell-uhm: I am on the fourth:block from
the: (2 sec) what, the right or left, I
can't see: hold on: 1, 2, 3. yeah the
fourth block.
3) A Uh-huh
4) B Ehm: (1 sec) where are you?
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~igure 10-9: The point (X) described as "the fourth
block from,the left on the bottom row" and
the point (Y) described as "l3,~)".
5) A The fourth block?
6) B You know: fourth from: CA interrupts)
7) A O-on the bottom row?
8) B Yeah, on-on the bottom row.
9) A Yeah, well I'm in (three:one): ( 1 sec)
10) B Uh-huh:O.K.
11) A That's the third one:
In this extract, what is rather odd about the
exchange as a whole is the fact that it violates the usual
tendency to adopt a similar description style to that of
one's partner. Player A's matrix description in utterance
9) has been preceded by no discussion of a coordinate
system at all, and it follows a row-type description (part.
of which player A herself supplied). Player A's
clarifying comment in utterance 11) ('that's the third
one') is of little help in clarifying the matrix system
she is usLng , since she does not specify on which row her
position marker is located at 'the third one'.
In the subsequent discourse, it becomes clear that
player B misunderstood player A's matrix-type description
to mean that player A's position marker was located on the
second row from the bottom when in fact it was located on
the bottom row. The two players then decide to refer to
the bottom row as 'zero' rather than 'one' in the
coordinate system and use the coordinate system
thereafter. Notice that player B assumed she correctly
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understood player A's description and did not question it.
This is rather odd, given that the coordinate description was
generated 'out of the blue', so to speak.
In another reassignment game, in which two male
subjects were playing on an asymmetrical maze, the two
subjects spoke a total of no less than fifty-eight
utterances in describing their initial positions and goal
positions alone. In this instance, they set up a
coordinate system for generating descriptions, but
described their locations in terms of a mixture of
coordinate and figural descriptions, with one or two path-
type descriptions in addition. The following extract
(see also figure 10-10) illustrates the mixtures of
descriptions produced. In this extract, the two players
are discussing their goal positions. Player A had used
path-type descriptions in a previous game, whereas player B
had previously used matrix-type descriptions.
1) A •• Now: we'll find out: (1 sec). By: goal
box: would be: (, s) B2
2) B B2
3) A B2, it's right under nothing (laughs)
4) B Aye: (laughs ) Right, so:so another:
another way of describing it would be to:
from the top:
5) A {Uh-huh
6) B {Left hand corner, go down one and one: one in.
7) A That's it exactly, {right:}
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Figure 10-10: the point t x i described as "132" and
"from the top left hand corner, go dot-m one and one
in" and the point (YJ described as lie and two up from
the bottom", "or three in and two up if you.t i ikev ,
8) B {Right:} now: my goalbox
is:er: right: taking the A sort of stuff
it's: (1 sec) C: (2 sec) C and
two up from the bottom:
9) A C in:
10) B Two up from the bottom:
11) A Two: one-: ( 1 sec) So: or: or (B interrupts)
12) B Or three in and t\-TOup if you like ( 1 sec)
13) A Three in: two up, so i- from the right
hand co- the right hand corner,
it's three in: two up? (1 sec)
14) B The bottom left hand co-: well, bottom-
bottom left or bottom right, its
in the middle.
15) A Aye oh ah-O.K. right I: I know where you are,
exactly in the middle?
16) B Uh-huh:
17) A Right and - and you've nothing above you?
(1 sec) Well y- (B interrupts)
18) B Er: no {there's no path,} I can only go
sort of
19) A {There's no path}
20) B left or right from there.
The mixture of description types (cf. utterances 11)
and 12» and the protracted checking descriptions (e.g.
utterances 13) - 20» are interesting. This pair of
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subjects did settle down to the subsequent predominant
usage of matrix-type descriptions, but as can be judged
from the above extract, the first four descriptions
involved protracted negotiation.
It is difficult to draw any general conclusions from
the small data base of six dialogues as to what might have
caused the observed significant slowing of the rate of
moving in the reassignment games as compared to the
baseline games. Certainly, the two extracts considered,
the first featuring insufficient negotiation and
consequent misunderstanding in the subsequent discourse,
and the second featuring somewhat protracted negotiation,
do seem to point to unusual features in the negotiation of
meaning in these games. Definitive conclusions would
probably require a larger data base for adequate testing.
The 'negotiation of meaning' hypothesiS and its potential
consequences for a 'reassignment'-type experimental
manipulation would be a very interesting matter for
further detailed study.
Turning to the monologue condition of the maze-game-
independent location description experiment from the
perspective of the 'negotiation of meaning' hypotheSiS, it
is interesting to note the general characteristics of
monologue-type descriptions as opposed to dialogue-types
(in which a listener is present who can ask appropriate
questions if there has been a failure to understand a
description). Subjects taking part in the monologue
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study were instructed to generate descriptions which would
be sufficiently precise for a listener to be able to
uniquely identify the appropriate node purely on the basis
of their descriptions.
Of the eight subjects who generated descriptions in
the monologue condition (i.e. with no listener present) six
of the subjects generated path-type descriptions, although
these varied in their degree of ellipsis. For example:
Er:one: (3 sec) one up: one across (3 sec)
This type of description could be expected to fail to
identify a particular individual location within a large
maze, since the starting point for the path movement is not
specified, nor is the counting procedure clarified. One
would reasonably expect that, if the above description were
the first in a maze game, the listener would ask questions
of the speaker to clarify the situation for himself and
more detailed descriptions would subsequently be
profferred. In the monologue study, the speaker
who generated the above description (it was the very first
description he gave) did not have the benefit of such
feedback and went on to give a further thirty-nine such
descriptions.
Some of the other path type descriptions generated in
the monologue study would have a better chance of
success. For example: "•• er: (1 sec) top: top right
hand corner: (1 sec) three down: and one along to the
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right".
This description, being more explicit, would stand a
better chance of comprehension (provided, of course, that'
the listener were entertaining a mental model of the maze
of the path type).
Another type of description which was found in the
monologue data was the row type of description. This had
,the classic format found in row-type descriptions
generated in the dialogue studies. For example:
Er: the cross is on the: (1 sec) second row
from the bottom, second in from the left.
Again, this would stand a reasonable chance of
success provided that the listener was not in doubt as to
the extensions of the count procedures.
Two rather unusual description strategies were
encountered, both of which could reasonably be expected to
fail utterly in the task of uniquely identifying a
particular node. One was of a figural type and took the
format exemplified by the following description, the
referent of which is depicted in figure 10-11:
Er: point number one's: surrounded by three
paths:er (1sec) one coming from the west, one
from the north, one from the east: there's
nonet- coming from the south: (2 sec) er:
This description would be expected to fail since it
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Figure 10-11: The point described as "surrounded
by three paths: er: one coming from the west,. one
from the north, one from the east: tner-es none:
coming from the south". This description does
not uniqu~ly identify the referent;: point Y al~o fits
the description. ' /,
does not uniquely describe its intended referent: other
nodes in the maze structure also fit this description.
One would expect a listener to question this description
immediately if he were present.
The other unusual description strategy which, it is
hypothesized here, would fail to uniquely identify a
particular node, was generated by a subject who was having
difficulty in describing locations on the asymmetrical
maze. Her solution to this problem took the following
format (see fig. 10-12):
On the second: image: the X: is: (1.5 sec) ehm:
(2 sec) twenty-:five: (1 sec) percent in from
the right hand side: (1 sec) and: (2.5 sec)
two-thirds up from the bottom: (3 sec).
The distances being specified in this case are
distances from specified edges of the ~ Qn ~hich the
maze diagram ~~ printed. The ambiguity of what twenty-
five per cent of the width of the page actually refers to
would again be expected to evoke questioning from a
listener, and probably also an alternative description
framework.
The examples considered illustrate the general point
about monologue-type location descriptions as compared to
those generated under conditions where the speaker is a
participant in a dialogue; the speaker's personal,
idiosyncratic way of conceptualizing and describing the
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~igure 10-'~: The point (X) described as "twenty-
five percent in from the right hand side and two-
thirds up from the bottom" (of the ~)".
maze is allowed to prevail unchecked and unaltered by
negotiation. From this perspective, the feedback of the
listener's responses to profferred descriptions is vital to
the subsequent modification of the speaker's descriptions.
The speaker in a monologue does not have the benefit of
feedback from his listener; indeed, given the pragmatic
interpretation of the present data, it could be argued that
a monologue location description task is a slightly unfair
task for a subject in that it is one which he would be
expected to fail (in the sense of failing to uniquely
specify the referent so that any listener could find the
described location purely on the basis of the speaker's
description of it).
The present approach to the data is in agreement with
Segalowitz's comments on Lomov's work (see chapter 4 of
this volume) that among the important differences between
dialogue and monologue is that the participants in a
dialogue have the benefit of feedback; and feedback,
according to the present interpretation, is the basis for
the negotiation of the meaning of the descriptions •
.9.1 Conclusions
The examples considered in the present chapter do lend
support to the view that the meanings of the location
descriptions generated by each pair of subjects are
negotiated products. This perspective throws interesting
light on the difference between monologue and dialogue
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(which is seen as partly involving a difference in the
ability to negotiate meanings and description formats) and
also on the reassignment task (the special difficulties
of which could in part be due to difficulties of
negotiating a common mental model of the maze, given that
both subjects start with a preference for different types
of model).
What has been implicit in the foregoing discussion has
been the proposition that it is necessary for both
participants in a dialogue to entertain highly similar
mental models of the maze (similar enough to return
identical extensions of a given description to both
interlocutors) in order for the semantics of the location
descriptions to be effective. The 'mental model', as
conceived of here, is thus a form of social representation
in that it is entertained by both participants in the
conversation: it is a negotiated (and therefore social)
product.
The very notion that meaning is to some extent
negotiated is a very interesting one and is one which
could potentially throw some light upon certain
theoretical dilemmas. Notably, Rommetveit (1974, see
chapter 3 of the present volume) writes of 'contextually
appropriate optional elaborations' of the meaning of a
word or phrase (the example he chooses is the sentence
'The old man is poor'). Rommetveit does not, however,·
suggest how the options of elaboration are selected among
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by the participants in a dialogue. Likewise, in his
notion of drafts of contracts concerning shared strategies
of categorization and attribution, negotiation could be
the mechanism by means of which the drafts of such
contracts are, to continue the metaphor, 'drawn up'.
Once negotiated, however, the meanings of utterances
have very precise interpretations: speakers and listeners
do not appear to ponder over potential ambiguities in what
is said. Thus, language is seen to be both inherently
flexible and inherently precise in its functioning;
negotiation would allow interlocutors to select among the
many potential meanings of a given utterance, and,
following this, the selected, agreed-upon meaning
functions in a precise way: there is no ambiguity.
Thus, the hypothesis that meanings are, to some
extent,negotiated products not only goes some way towards
explaining many of the features of the pre~ent data but
also provides insights into some intriguing theoretical
issues, some of which will be explored in the following,
final chapter.
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CONCLUSIONS
The research reported in the present thesis
constitutes an attempt to examine certain aspects of the
meanings of natural language expressions. Specifically,
the work reported here focusses upon the semantics and
pragmatics of descriptions of spatial location in
spontaneous task-oriented dialogue. Certain tentative
conclusions can be drawn on the basis of the work reported
in this thesis, and these conclusions are discussed below.
Perhaps more interesting, however, are the questions
raised by the data and results reported here, and these
questions are discussed later in the present chapter.
Considering, firstly, the semantics of the
descriptions of maze location generated by subjects in the
course of playing the maze game task, the data and the
formal analyses from the present set of studies (see
chapters 6 and 7) suggest that there exists a
comparatively small number of strategies for generating
descriptions of locations within such a spatial network.
Four basic ways of generating descriptions of spatial
location were observed in the maze game experiments, and
two other, rather less frequently occurring, types of
location description were also noted. All of these
different ways of describing locations within a spatial
network were interpreted to be implicitly procedural in
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nature, taking the form of tacit instructions to the
listener as to how and where to look to find the desired
location.
The four major classes of location description each
comprise several subvariations, but each generic class can
be characterized in a manner which accounts for all
subvariations. The four generic description types which
were observed in the data are:
(a) Line-type descriptions, which involve the
speaker and listener treating the maze
shape as if it were an array of parallel
lines of nodes and generating descriptions
by first identifying the particular line of
nodes within which the location being
described is located, and then identifying
the position on that line which corresponds
to the relevant location;
(b) Path-type descriptions, which involve the
speaker generating descriptions by firstly
identifying a perceptually prominent point
in the maze structure, such as a corner,
and describing the desired location in terms
of path movements from the prominent point
to the location in question;
(c) Figural-type descriptions, which involve
the speaker identifying a region or area of
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the maze by means of referring
metaphorically to a shape formed by part of
the network of paths in the maze structure,
such as an L- or T-shape, and then
identifying the desired location relative
to that shape; and
Cd) Matrix-type descriptions, which involve the
speaker and listener in treating the maze
as a regular two-dimensional array of nodes
and developing a coding system for denoting
positions on each dimension, thus
generating descriptions taking the form of
two-place coordinates. In fact, two
distinct subvariations on the matrix theme
can be discerned on the basis of how the
speaker and listener execute the relevant
scanning procedures. One is rather like
the Cartesian coordinates of mathematics in
that the procedures corresponding to the
two coordinates are executed contiguously.
For example, a horizontal scanning movement
through a specified distance is made,
followed immediately by a vertical scanning
movement through a specified distance,
after completion of which the scanner is
located at the relevant node. This is
rather like the 'move along X then move up
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Y' (where X and Yare specified distances)
strategy employed in path-type
descriptions, except, of course, that gaps
in the pathways are mentally 'traversed'
without acknowledgement in the case of the
matrix-type descriptions. The other, 'non-
Cartesian', type of matrix description also
involves the use of two-place coordinates
as a standard description format, but the
corresponding procedures to be executed by
the listener are rather more complicated.
On hearing a description like '(3, 4)', for
example, the listener's task is to scan
horizontally through a distance of three
nodes (for example), thereby establishing
the relevant column of nodes in which the
location being described is situated, then
go back to the (previously agreed-upon)
origin, scan vertically through a distance
of four nodes, thereby establishing the
relevant row of nodes in which the location
being described is situated, and, having
established the relevant row and the
relevant column of nodes, he then has to
find their intersection. The location
being described is, of course, situated at
that intersection. The scanning procedures
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involved in this latter case are more
complicated than is the case with the
'Cartesian' type of matrix description:
whereas the 'Cartesian' type of description
involves two scanning procedures operated
contiguously, the 'non-Cartesian' type of
matrix description involves seeking the
relevant row and column and obtaining their
intersection.
The two less frequently occurring
classes of location description which were
observed in the data could in fact be
argued to be akin to the matrix-type of
description in their procedural aspects.
These two types of description are:
(e) The description of locations within the maze
in terms of specified distances (either in
terms of node positions or path movements)
from two of the edges of the maze
structure. For example: "I'm two from the
right, two from the top". This is rather
akin to the 'non-Cartesian' matrix type of
location description, discussed above, in
that two lines of nodes (a column and a
row, respectively), are specified, and the
listener's task is to locate these lines of
nodes and to seek their intersection.
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(f) The description of locations within the
maze in terms of a specified row and a
specified column; for example "Third row,
fifth column". Once again, an individual
row and an individual column are specified
relative to a previously established origin,
and the listener has to locate these two
lines of nodes and seek their intersection.
Thus, four major classes and two minor classes of
description can be distinguished, all of which are (it is
argued) implicitly procedural in nature. The procedural
interpretation of the meaning of the location descriptions
was supported by informal observation of subjects in the
'paper-and-pencil' experiment reported in chapter 9, in
which listeners were observed to execute the procedures
hypothesized above with the aid of ostensive gestures
using their forefinger or a pen during the course of
interpreting the descriptions.
It w a s argued in chapter 8 of the present thesis that
each of the four broad classes of location description
could in fact correspond to a class of underlying
conceptualizations, or m~ntal models of the maze shape
(cf. Johnson-Laird, 1980, 1981a, 1981b). According to
this interpretation of the data, the mental modelling of
the maze shape would involve each subject in extracting
some feature of the maze structure, treating it as
prototypical~ and setting up a representation which
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represents ~he maze as an assemblage of a number of those
features. Thus, for example, a given subject might pay
particular attention to the horizontally-oriented lines of
pathways in the maze structure, treat this feature as
prototypical, and represent the maze as a set of parallel
horizontal lines (rows). This mental model would thus
represent the maze shape in a simplified fashion and serve
as an intermediate representation in terms of which
descriptions could be produced and understood.
This model would be 'intermediate' between language
and the 'world' under discussion in a very real sense.
According to the 'mental models' interpretation of the
location descriptions, the procedures implicit in a
description would be executed initially on the internal
mental model of the maze shape, and the appropriate
location would be 'marked' (in some sense) on the model.
This 'marked' model, in turn, would be the basis for the
subject's visual scanning of the maze display on the
computer terminal screen.
This would obviate the subject havine to consult the
screen every time he heard a location description; he
would have the option of 'marking' the relevant location
on his model and taking action later (for example,
consulting the actual maze display on the screen in order
to ascertain whether he possesses any switch nodes near to
the recently-described location).
There is another sense in which such a mental model is
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intermediate between language and the world: the mental
model constitutes a kind of 'framework' which is
intermediate between the complex perceptual stimulus of
the maze display on the computer terminal screen and the
sorts of semantic distinction encoded in the lexicon, and
location descriptions can be more readily formulated with
respect to the mental model than is the case with the
actual stimulus. Thus, for example, the asymmetrical
maze presents a complex shape to the subject, and the
description of any given location within it is rather a
difficult task for a speaker. If the speaker builds a
row-type mental model of the maze, however, his model
consists in a series of parallel horizontal lines which
are simplified vis-a-vis the original stimulus but which
are also more language-encodable: terms like 'row', .
'Ii net , 'horizonta 1', and so on, are more consona nt with
the model than with the original stimulus.
Johnson-Laird (1980, 1981a, 1981b) emphasizes the
benefits conferred upon the language understander by the
building of mental models; however, as can be judged from
the above, mental models also confer considerable benefits
on the speech producer: models represent perceptually and
conceptually complex entities in a manner which more
readily permits the formulation of descriptions.
Thus, by representing the original stimulus in a
somewhat idealized way, the model simplifies both language
production and language understanding.
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As noted already in chapter 8, Johnson-Laird
emphasizes the processes whereby a reader or listener
constructs a mental model of an object (or person, or
situation) which is not perceptually present on the basis
of discourse about that object. This 'listener's
disdourse model' is a considerable aid to comprehension
and inference (see chapter 2). The above formulation, in
which a mental model of a perceptually-present object (in
this case, the maze display on the computer terminal
screen) is built as an aid to language production and
understanding, is not at variance with Johnson-Laird's
account.- Indeed, in his 1980 paper, Johnson-Laird
hypothesizes that a mental model of a perceptually present
object could be constructed in precisely the manner
indicated above, and for the reasons outlined· above.
Where the present account does differ from Johnson-Laird's
formulation is in the detail of its application of the
notion of a 'mental model' to the dynamic social situation
that is the dialogue.
It was argued in chapter 8 that, in order for
location descriptions to be satisfactorily produced and
interpreted, it is necessary that both of the participants
in a dialogue should model the maze in a similar way.
This is necessary because, as was argued in chaptei 8,
different models of the maze return different semantic
interpretations of the same referring expression, and it
is necessary in the context of the present game studies
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that both subjects should interpret a given referring
expression in an identical fashion. Thus, it is
hypothesized that there should be pressure on both
interlocutors to develop similar models of the maze, and
this should manifest itself in the form of subjects
constraining one another's choice of description.
chosen a particular type of description to be used
predominantly in the subsequent discourse~ there should
then be some negotiation of the extensional semantics of
Having
the descriptions. A corollary of this 'common mental
model' hypothesis, therefore, is that a certain amount of
tacit, or even explicit, negotiation of the meaningi of
the location descriptions should take place in order that
the two subjects can modify their (probably) initially
different representations of the maze in such a way that
they come to share a common mental model.
In chapter 10, some extracts of dialogue which appeared
to lend support to the hypothesis that subjects negotiate a
common mental model (and consequently a common set of
interpretations of referring expres1sions) were discussed.
The hypothesis that the meanings of referring expressions
are, to some extent, negotiated products was not tested
formally in the present set of experiments and remains an
intriguing speculation for future research to examine
empirically.
Thus, the interpretation that was placed upon the
maze location description data is as follows. It was
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argued that each of the four major types of location
description reflect different types of underlying ill~tal
!!lodelof the maze shape. It w as also argued that, in
order for referring expressions to function satisfactorily
(i.e. in order that the same interpretation should be
placed upon a given referring expression by both speaker
and listener), both interlocutors should entertain highly
similar mental models of the maze. Thus, the mental
model, in the present interpretation of the concept (L,e,
as applied to the dynamic, ongoing social situation that
is the dialogue), is a kind of social representation which
is shared by both interlocutors. Furthermore, it was
suggested (and several examples from the transcripts of
dialogue are readily interpretable to be supportive of
this suggestion) that the mechanism by means of which a
particular type of mental model is selected for use and
the precise details of its extensional semantics are
agreed is the mechanism of negotiation.
The semantics of the maze location description data
were therefore explained in the present thesis in terms of
mental models of the maze shape, and the pragmatics of the
experimental situation were discussed in terms of the
mechanisms by means of which particular speakers and
listeners jointly select a particular mental model with
respect to which referring expressions can be produced and
interpreted. The social-pragmatic emphasiS underlying
this interpretation of the data is clear; the question of
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greatest interest is that of how particular speakers and
listeners negotiate such necessarily highly similar
representations of the same object, and it also becomes
necessary to discuss what particular individual speakers
and listeners understand by a given referring expression,
as opposed to what its 'literal' or 'public' meaning, so
to speak, might be.
The possibility that the meanings of expressions are,
sometimes at least, negotiated has several interesting
implications. Among these are the possible insight that
this notion offers into the potentially problematic
theoretical dilemma between 'literal meaning' and 'meaning
potential'. On the one hand, some theorists, notably
those following in the tradition of Chomsky's work,
advocate the analysis of meaning in terms of semantic
components, selection restrictions and 'literal meanings'
(see chapter 2 for a brief review of this worl<). These
theorists therefore emphasize the precise functioning of
language, and, as was noted in chapter 1, their analyses
QQ see m to cap tures 0 m e asp ects 0 f m eani ng• 0nth e
other hand, some theorists, who emphasize the importance
of pragmatics and the inherent flexibility of language,
particularly Rommetveit (1974), have pointed out that a
given expression or word has a large variety of potential
meanings, some aspects of which are not describable in
terms of 'propositional content' or 'literal meaning', and
that a proper assessment of the meaning of a given
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expression should include details of the particular
speaker and listener involved, the context, and the
par tic uIar .ld.2.~ tow hich the expre ssion was put, inth e act
of communication.
The possibility that each pair of interlocutors
engaged in dialogue negotiate a particular set of
interpretations for the expressions that they use could
resolve this dilemma. Having negotiated a tacit agreement
to interpret the expressions that they use in'a particular
way, the language would thereafter function in the precise
manner which the advocates of 'literal meaning' would
hypothesize. The possibility of meanings being negotiated
thus allows a theoretical compromise to be made between
the two positions adumbrated above, according to which
both of the theoretical positions are correct. llords and
larger linguistic expressions do have an inherently great
flexibility of meaning but the negotiation of the meaning
of a particular expression by two interlocutOrs would
allow the selection of one of the potential meanings of
the expression to be made, and the expression could
thereafter be used unambiguously in their discourse.
Thus, if we examine the different meanings understood
by, for example, a particular row-type description across
different pairs of subjects who use row-type descriptions,
the expression would seem highly ambiguous. Yet each pair
of subjects could be using the expression in a highly
precise way, having previously negotiated the extenSional
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semantics of the component parts of the complex
expression. Hence the pragmatic emphasis of the present
interpretation of the location description data, and the
advocacy of studying what particular dyads of subjects
take a given expression to mean.
Turning from the semantics and pragmatics of the
experimental maze game task to the importance of the
social situation which any given experimental task
constitutes, the experiment reported in chapter 9
indicated that the nature of the experimental task, both
in cognitive terms and in terms of the social situation
which the experimental task constitutes, is vitally
important to the nature of the data produced by subjects
engaged in that task. Thus, in an experiment in which
subjects had to·describe locations on mazes similar to
those which had been used in the maze game studies but
independent of playing the computer-controlled maze game,
the resulting distribution of types of description was
different as compared to that obtained in the maze game
studies, with one of the most popular types of location
description in the maze game studies - the matrix-type-
being entirely absent in the game-independent location
description task. In removing the maze location
description task from its setting within the context of an
ongOing experimental game and setting it to subjects as an
experimental task in its own right, a number of complex
and subtle changes had been made which could have produced
481
the observed change in the distribution of the different
types of description in the data. In addition to the,
perhaps more obvious, changes of a purely cognitive nature
(see chapter 9) there may also have been a number of more
subtle changes of a social psychological nature when
setting the location description task to subjects as a
'paper-and-pencil' type of experiment.
For example, the subjects' representation of the task
could have changed in the 'paper-and-pencil' task vis-a-
vis the maze game task, resulting in a difference in the
perceived demand characteristics of the two tasks.
Furthermore, there are good reasons for hypothesizing that
subjects in the 'paper-and-pencil' experiment would be
more consciously aware of the language they produce than
would be the case with subjects in the maze game.
Setting the location description task within the context
of an ongoing computer game would result in subjects
becoming more task-involved and the location descriptions
would be produced in a genuinely spontaneous, natural way.
Indeed, this was listed as one of the advantages of
studying task-oriented dialogues in chapter 4. On the
other hand, subjects in the 'paper-and-pencil' task have
no such task-involvement to draw their attention away from
the location-description aspect of their experimental
task.
It should be emphasized that these analyses in terms
of variatiori in the two experimental tasks as social
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situations (in terms of differences in the degree of
conscious awareness on the part of subjects of the
language produced, differences in the perceived demand
characteristics of the two experimental tasks, and so on)
are post hoc interpretations: such social variables were
not measured in either of the two tasks. However, they
are discussed here because they could indeed have borne an
influence in the experimental situations, and because the
discussion of them highlights the sheer complexity both of
dialogue itself and of the study of dialogue.
Thus, the importance of the experimental task used to
obtain linguistic data as a social situation comes into
focus and would appear to merit further investigation.
The present set of experimental studies have
constituted an attempt to do on a limited scale what
Marslen-Wilson et al. (1982) strongly advocate, namely,
to stu dy 1anguage QQ.th asac 0 gnit ive pro cess .an.f! in term s
of its natural communicative function in normal
interaction. Both of these facets of language are
fascinating in their own right, but as Marslen-Wilson et
al. argue, they are interdependent facets. The present
set of studies have involved an examination of both of
these facets in relation to but one limited aspect of the
data produced by the dialogue maze game, yet the
complexity of the issues raised, both from a cognitive and
a social-interactional point of view, is considerable.
Indeed, the present set of studies have no more than
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scratched the surface of the rich data produced by the
experimental game task, but in so doing a number of
important questions are raised which would merit the
attention of future research.
For example, the maze location descriptions were
interpreted to reflect mental models of the maze. There
are a large number of testable hypotheses which follow
from this interpretation. For example, do subjects' eye
movements during the course of intepreting descriptions
match what a mental model-based set of hypotheses would
predict? A second aspect of the 'mental models'
hypothesis which is well worth empirical study is the
question of whether the subjects memory of the maze shape
(either recall or recognition) would exhibit deviations
from a 'literal' recall or recognition in directions
predictable from the 'mental model' theory. An example
of this would be a case in which a subject who (we
hypothesize) built a 'row' type model misremembers
complete rows and provides only vague recollections of the
vertical connections between the rows in his recall of the
maze shape after having played the game. This would
appear to be an interesting question for future research
to tackle.
Similarly, a whole host of questions pertaining to
the domain of pragmatics spring to mind in connection with
the maze game. The first question is Lewis's notion of
control, a notion of great interest to social
484
psychologists. It would be of great interest to compare
the participants of a given dialogue in terms of how many
tactical plans each member of the dyad initiates, how many
location descriptions each generates, how many questions
each asks, how many interruptions each initiates, and so
on. This would be exceedingly interesting in relation to
the hypothesized negotiation of meaning, and one could
also devise a number of intriguing social psychological
experiments (for example, taking two dyads of subjects,
establishing which subject in each dyad in 'master' and
which is 'slave', and then pairing the two former 'slaves'
together). Similarly, a much more extensive set of
'reassignment' studies would prove of ereat interest·in
relation to the notions of control and negotiation.
The hypothesized negotiation itself is, of course, a
highly worthwhile topic for further study. A set of
rather more 'longitudinal' studies, with each pair of
subjects playing perhaps five games in succession on
difficult-to-describe asymmetrical mazes of different
types would perhaps produce an appropriate data base with
which to appropriately test the negotiation hypotheSiS.
The 'negotiation of meaning' hypothesis is perhaps the
most contentious hypothesiS postulated in the present
thesis, and would certainly prove an interesting issue to
tackle. A further question which naturally arises with
regard to this hypotheSis is whether such negotiation (if
conclusively demonstrated in the data from the maze game
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task) does in fact take place in other types of natural
conversation concerning different domains of discourse as
compared to the present maze game task (for example,
whether it would be in evidence in the data from other
different types of experimental speech-production tasks).
The present research also has implications for the
computer simulation of natural dialogue. The use of
model-based theories in such work is, of course, not new.
However, the buildin~ of a mental model during the course
of a dialogue would be an intriguing (if exceedingly
complex) project for simulation. Such a project could
provide theoretical insight into some of the phenomena of
pragmatics (particularly that of audience design) from the
artificial intelligence perspective. Similarly, it would
seem possible in principle to simulate some of the
hypothesized mechanisms of negotiation postulated in
chapter 10. One would then be in a position to account
for 'audience design' in terms of different models being
constructed by the processor when in 'conversation' with
different others.
Finally, the work reported in this thesis underlines
the importance of studying language which is in use for a
purpose by those who generate and interpret it, a point
made most forcefully by theorists such as Rommetveit and
Wittgenstein. It is argued that experimental tasks which
involve the subjects in producing natural dialogue in
order to achieve some purpose is an excellent way of
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framing and investigating a large variety of hypotheses,
many of which simply could not be studied otherwise. This
is not to say that other experimental tasks are inferior
by comparison; the point to be emphasized is that the data
produced by such tasks as the experimental maze game
certainly merit detailed study even if such tasks are
(perhaps) less well controlled empirically than is the
case with other experimental tasks which investigate
language production and understanding.
As is the case with all research into the phenomena
of language use, the present set of studies raise many
questions. These questions, in particular that concerning
mental models as social representations, and the
possibility that meaning is, to some extent, a negotiated
product, would appear to be two particularly interesting
questions which provide theoretically intriguing and
potentially fruitful hypotheses for future studies.
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Appendix 1. The basic maze shapes used in the maze game
studies.
a) Maze 1A, the practice maze used in studies 1 and 2.
b) Maze 58} The symmetrical
c) Maze 68} mazes which were
d) Maze 7A} used in studies
e) Maze BA} 1, 2 and 4
f) Maze 98 the symmetrical 'column biased' maze which was
used in study 3.
g) Maze 10A, the asymmetrical 'specially-constructed' maze
usediri~studies 3 and 4.
-~
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Appendix la) Maze. 1A,the symmetricai
pract ice maze. (baS~~ 'on the smaller
4 x 4 matrix_of.nodesl:used 'in studies
1'and 2.
~
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Appendix Ib) Maze 5B, the symmetrical maie (based on
the larger.6 x 6 matrix of nodes) used in studies 1 and 2.
- -- -
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Appendix Ic) Maze 6B, the symmetrical maze (based
en the larger b x 6 matrix of nodes) used in studies
1 and 2.
:..
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Appendix Id) Maze 7A, the symmetrical maze (based
on the la~ger 6 x 6 matrix of n6des) used in studies
1; 2 and 4.
~.-., '
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Appendix Ie) Maze BA, the symmetrical maze (based on
the larger 6 x 6 matrix of nodes) used in studies 1, 2
and 4.
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Appendix If) Maze 9B, the symmetrical 'column biased'
'('specially constructed') maze used in study 3.
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~ppendix Ig) Maze lOA, the asymmetrical
('specially-constructed') maze used in
studies 3 and 4.
i , .; .',,": 1
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Appendix II. State of game for both players at the start
of the various types of game, showing
initial position marker locations, and
barrier and switch node positions in the
following types of game.
a) Practice game (studies 1 and 2)
i) initial game state for player A.
ii) initial game state for player B.
b) Baseline game involving similar directions of movement
for both players:
i) initial game state for player A.
ii) initial game state for player B.
c) Baseline game involving opposite directions of movement
for the two players.
i) initial game state for player A.
ii) initial game state for player B.
d) Monster game:
i) initial game state and monster position for pl~yer
A.
ii) initial game state and monster position for player
B.
e) Game played on asymmetrical maze (studies 3 and 4).
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i) initial game state for player A.
ii) initial game state for player B.
f) Game played on 'column biased' maze (study 3) :
i) initial game state for player A.
i1) initial game state for player B.
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Appendix IIa) i) Practice same (studies.
1 and 2):. initial game state for player A.
I '
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Appendix IIa) ii) Practice game (studies
1 and 2): initial'game state for player B
(cf. Appendix IIai)).
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A~pendix lIb) i) Baseline game involving similar
dlrections of movement for both players: i~ltial
game state for player A I
: ..
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Appendix lIb) 11) Baseline game involving similar
directions of movement for both players: initial
game state for player B (cf. Appendix ·IIb) i». '. .
"
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I,
Appendix IIc) 1) Baseline game involving opposite
directions of movement for the two players; initial
game state for player A.
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Appendix IIc) ii) Baseline game involving opposite
directions of movement for the two players, initial
game state for player B (cf. Appendix lIc) i». .
-.::-517
/
Appendix lId) i) Monster game: initial game. state
and monster position for player A •
.~
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Appendix lId) ii) Monster game: initial game state
and mon'st.e r position for player D (cf. Appendix lId) I ) •
..
,,-:-,519
" ~
Appendix lIe) i) Game played on asymmetrical maze'
(studies 3 and 4): initial game state for player A.
".
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Appendix lIe} ii) Game played on asymmetrical
maze (studies 3 and 4): initial game state for
player B (cf. Appendix lIe) i».
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-Append ix IIf) i) Game played on 'column biased'
-maze (study 3): initial game state for player A._- ....
... . -~- -
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Appendix IIC) ii) Game played on 'column biased' maze
(study 3): initial game state for player B (cf.
Appendix IIC) i».
I
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Appendix III
Symbols employed in transcripts of subjects' ~Qe~ch
When transcribing subjects' speech, care was taken to
provide as accurate a representation as possible. The
resulting transcripts therefore contained information
regarding filled and unfilled pauses, the length of such
pauses, the amount of simultaneous speech, and any special
intonation contours (such as the occasional shout, or
stressing of particular syllables). The symbols
employed in representing these various features are listed
below. These are the symbols employed throughout the
text of the present thesis.
Pauses are represented in two forms. The colon, : ,
is used to symbolize pauses of less than 1 second duration.
Longer pauses were measured as accurately as possible
using the second counter of a digital wristwatch, are
represented in parentheses, and are accurate to the
nearest half second - for example, (3.5 sec.) indicates a
pause of approximately 3.5 seconds in duration.
Filled pauses took the form of expressions such as
"ehmu , "er"; "uhm", and the like, and were transcribed
and represented in a fashion as close to the original
sound as possible.
Simultaneous speech is represented in the transcripts
and in the present volume by means of placing the
simultaneous speech of the two individuals adjacently
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vertically, the start and end of the simultaneous speech
being represented by means of square brackets. For example:
B • . • if you go to the bottom right corner
[one along, two up]
B [one along ] two uP.
In this example the phrase "one along" is spoken
simultaneously by both players (although player A speak~
the phrase a little more slowly and overlaps thc followln3
phrase 'two up' of player B).
Cases where subjects employed special IntQnatjQn, as
judged on a purely intuitive basis, were represented by a
line drawn above the specially-intoned speech. For
example:
B Oh no, one along and two up:
A Two up?
B Well: youknow, counting both squares.
Player A's repetition "two up" takes the form of a
question, and his special emphasis in this example 1s best
described as one which reflects incredulity. The
representation of such intonational emphasis in the ferm of
a line drawn above the relevant phrase or lexical item
aVOids confusion with the convention adopted 1n the
present thesis of underlinin~ exemplars of whatever 15
being discussed (and also the names of lexical
categories).
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Technical AQQgndi!i
Hierarchical cluster analysis is a descriptive
statistical technique used for the purposes of exploratory
data analysis of data' sets involving a number of variables.
Gordon (1981) presents a lucid exposition of the rationale
behind the technique, and in,the present appendix some of
the important pOints raised by Gordon from the point of
view of the present set of studies will be discussed.
The aim of a classification couched 1n terms of a
cluster analysis is the uncovering of the structure that
is present 1n the data rather than the imposition of some
inappropriate structure upon them. It 1s a widely used
technique, being used in a variety of disciplines.
From the point of view of the present set of studies,
two of the possible uses of cluster analysis are of
relevance, namely:
i) Data simplification. Cluster analysis can be used
to detect the important relationships between
variables and the patterns of relationships in the
data. This 1s particularly useful where an
investigation involves large numbers of variables,
which makes it difficult for an experimenter to
easily understand the data.
and ii) Hypothesis generation. As a corollary to i)
above, if the data have been summarized in a
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manner which allows the important relationships
between variables to emerge more clearly, this can
aid the investigator in generating predictions or
hypotheses to account for the form of the data.
In the present context, the uncovering of the
structure of the data is a desideratum. A summary of the
important relationships between the lexical categories in
our classification would be useful, and it would also be
of great interest to us to assess how well the formal
description arrived at by purely mechanical means would
accord with our intuitive description which was presented
earlier (see chapter 6).
Gordon (1981) describes a number of statistical
techniques which are used to uncover the structure of the
data in large data sets. He refers to these techniques as
classification techniques. They include hierarchical
cluster analysis, 'clumping' methods, partitioning
methods, and geometrical methods of classification. The
present set of studies used the hierarchical cluster
analysis technique available in the SHDP (Bio-medical
computer programs) statistical software package (Dixon et
al., 1981).
Hierarchical cluster analysis works essentially as
follows. Firstly, a measure of similarity (or distance)
between each pair of variables is computed (for example,
the correlation between the variables could be used as
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a measure of similarity between the variables), resulting
in a half-matrix of pairwise similarities (or distances).
Next, clusters are formed according to a chosen
amalgamation rule, and the amalgamation procedure operates
on the computed similarities or distances between
variables. Initially, each cluster contains only one
variable, and at each step the two most similar clusters
are joined to form a new cluster, until all the variables
are in the same cluster. The result is summarized in a
tree diagram known as a dendrogram (see example dendrogram
below).
The resulting hierarchical structure is a best-fit
hierarchical structure imposed on the data using the
linkage rule, and the tree displays both the groupings of
variables within clusters and the relationships between
clusters. The hierarchical structure is imposed on the
data to the extent that each group in a partition at one
level is wholly contained within a single group at a higher
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0.7Heasure of
similarity 0.8
(e.g.
correlation)
0.9
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I
" - - - - - - --- - - -- - -
I 1
1 2 43 65 7
Hypothetical example of a dendrogr~m showing the
clusterings between seven variables. The vertical axis
represents the scale of similarity (in this case the
measure of similarity between variables is the
correlation) •. Thus, variables 1 and 2 are more similar
than are variables 6 and 7. The structure is hierarchical
in that clusters which are separate at one level (e.g. that
corresponding to a correlation of 0.9) form part of a
Single cluster at a higher level (e.g. that corresponding
to a correlation of 0.7; see diagram above and text).
level: as Gordon (1981) points out, it is conceivable that
partitions at different levels should not be
hierarchically nested. Since hierarchical cluster analysis
imposes a best-fit hierarchical structuring on the data,
it is possible that the structure in the data is distorted
by this procedure, and one should not accept uncritically
the results suggested by a Single clusterinG procedure
(Gordon, 1981, P. 33-34).
It is possible to compare results yielded using
different clustering procedures (that is, different
amalgamation or linkage rules for forming clusters). The
rationale behind this is as follows. If there really is a
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distinct structure "present in the data, any clustering
procedure worthy of use should uncover that structure.
Conversely, if the results of several different clustering
procedures agree closely, fl ••• then one has more
confidence in the reality of any group structure which is
indicated; it is less likely to be purely an artifact of
the classification criteria used" (Gordon, 1981, p, 132).
Thus, if the same structure (the same groupings of
variables) is revealed by different cluster analysis
procedures, we can be more confident that this is indeed
part of the structure in the data rather than it having
been imposed by the classification (clustering) technique
itself.
To summarize: cluster analysis operates by generating
a half matrix of pairwise similarities or distances
between variables, and the procedure then imposes a best-
fit hierarchical structuring upon the variables using a
selected amalgamation (linkage) rule for forming clusters
which operates upon the half-matrix of pairwise
similarities (or distances). Since the hierarchical
structuring is to some extent imposed on the data, it is
best to examine sets of results yielded using more than one
clustering (amalgamation) rule, since greater confidence
can be had in results which appear consistently according
to different amalgamation criteria: these consistent
results are more likely to reflect the structure in the
data, rather than being an artifact of the clustering
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techniques employed.
Gordon (1981) presents a simple method for comparing
results from different cluster analyses. In the present
context, we are interested in quite 'low-level'
relationships, that is, we are concerned with which
groupings of individual lexical categories exist, rather
than being concerned with the relationships between
groupings of categories. In other words, we are primarily
interested in the lowest levels of the dendrogram.
Gordon's comparison technique is as follows: consider
results from two analyses which have cluster analyzed
seven variables, numbers 1 to 7. The analysis based on
amalgamation rule Q (for example, the sum of squares
criterion) yields three groupings: Q, (comprising
variables 1 and 2), 02 (variables 3 and 4) and 03
(variables 5, 6 and 7). The other analysis, based on the
single link amalgamation rule S1' yields four groups as
follows: group S, (variables 1, 2 and 3) group S2
(variable 4), group S3 (variable 5), and group S4
(variables 6 and 7). One analysis thus partitions the
variables into three groups, whereas the other analysis
partitions the data into four groups. A two-way table is
drawn up which summarizes the intersections of the groups,
as follows:
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Table IV::.ll
Comparison of l~Q£~rtitions of ~ data ~ ifrQm Qordon,
Single link Sum of square groups
groups
Q, Q2 °3 °4
(,, 2) (3, 4) (5, 6, 7)
S, ( 1 , 2, 3) ( 1 , 2)* (3)
S2 (4) (4)*
S3 (5 ) 5
S4 (6, 7) (6, 7)*
The starred entries indicate the optimal matching of the
two data sets.
There are two pOints of note. Firstly, 04 is
defined to be an empty set in order to equalize the number
of groups in the two partitions. Secondly, the groups are
matched in pairs in such a way as to maximize the number of
variables in common in the set of matched pairs of groups.
ThUS, although both groups are shown in the table set out
in order Q, ••• Q4 and S, • • • S4' one of these
sequences could be rearranged if this resulted in a
greater degree of matching between the groups.
The overall result, as can be seen from table IV-1,
is that the two partitions agree on five out of the seven
variables, these falling into the three groups (1, 2),
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(4), and (6, 7), with the other variables (3) and (5)
being outliers or intermediate between some of these
groups. One might have more confidence in the reality of
the three groups (1, 2), (4) and (6, 7), since they are
yielded in the intersection of two analyses satisfying
different clustering criteria.
This technique of comparing cluster analyses has a
double appeal in that (a) it is simple and quick to use,
and (b) it is readily extended to allow comparison of more
than two data partitions. The technique is, of course,
also readily extendable to partitions involving larger
numbers of groupings.
In the present set of studies, the above cluster
comparison technique was employed to, as it were, 'filter
out' the consistently occurring groupings of lexical
categories. The statistical package BHDP (Dixon et al.,
1981) was used to carry out the cluster analyses using
program P1M (cluster analysis of variables). With the
BMDP P1M program, it is possible to vary (a) the measure
of similarity or dissimilarity on which the clustering is
based and (b) the criteria on the basis of which
clusterings are built uP. Both the measure of
similarity and the criterion for clustering were varied in
the present set of studies (see chapter 7), and the above
cluster comparison technique was employed to ascertain
which consistent groupings of variables were occurring
across different analyses.
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Appendix V. The maze shapes used in the maze-game-
independent ('paper-and-pencil') location
description task.
a) The symnet:ricalmaze wi th regularly-spaced node
H
positions.
b) The sy~metrical maze with irregularly-spaced node
positions.
c) The asymmetrical maze with regularly-spaced node
positions.
d) The asymmetrical maze with irregularly-spaced node
positions.
e) The symmetrical maze with regularly-spaced node
positions and diagonally-oriented pathways.
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Appendix Va) The symmetrical maze with regularly-
spaced node positions (identical to maze 7A, see
Appendix Id» used in the 'paper-and-pencil' study •
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Appendix Vb) The symmetrical maze with irregularly-
spaced node positions which was used in the 'paper-
and-pencil' study.
i . "; ." I
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Appendix Vc) The asymmetrical maze with
regularly-spaced node posit1ons (identical
to maze' OA, see Appendix Ig» which was
used in the 'paper-and-pencil' study.
;......
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Appendix Vd) The asymmetrical maze with
irregularity-spaced node positions used in
the 'paper-and-pencil' study.
."
.,
Appendix Ye) The symmetrical maze with regularly-
spaced node positions and diagonally-oriented
pathways which was used in the 'p~per-and~penGil'study. I ; -r ,
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APPENDIX II
THE MAZE GAME PROGRAM: FURTHER DETAILS
As noted already in Chapter 4, the original maze
program (i.e. that used in the present set of studies) was
written in the appropriate machine codes of the Data
General Nova computer and the 'Intel' and 'Imlac'
terminals by Mr. J. Mullin, Computer Manager of the
Department of Psychology at the University of Glasgow.
The maze game itself was devised by Dr. S. C. Garrod of
the Department of Psychology at the University of Glasgow.
Since the present set of studies were conducted, the
maze game program has been rewritten in the programming
language Pascal for use with Apple II microcomputers using
a Corvus Constellation disk drive. The updated version
of the program contains additional options which had not
been available in the original program, namely, the
spacing of nodes in the maze can be made irregular (as in
some of the mazes used in the 'paper-and-pencil' study) and
a series of marks or 'footprints' can be placed in those
paths traversed by subjects. The updated version of the
maze game program was written by Mr. S. Oliphant, of the
Department of Psychology at the University of Glasgow.
Enquiries regarding the program can be sent to:
Mr. Stuart Oliphant
Department of Psychology
University of Glasgow
56 Hillhead street
Glasgow G12 .
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